A  HISTORY  OF  THE 

SPANISH -AMERICAN    WAR 

OF    1898 


RICHARD    H.   TITHERINGTON 

>\ 


With  Diagrams  and  Index 


New  York 

D.  Appleton  and  Company 
1900 


.Tb 


COPYRIGHT,  1900 
BY  D.  APPLETON  AND    COMPANY 


PREFACE 


MUCH  has  been  published  on  the  brief  but  in 
teresting  and  very  important  war  of  1898  between 
the  United  States  and  Spain ;  but  practically  every 
thing  that  has  appeared  belongs  to  one  of  two  classes. 
On  the  one  hand,  there  are  the  narratives  of  sailors, 
soldiers,  and  correspondents  who  took  part  in  it, 
and  who  describe  what  they  saw.  These  books  are 
not  history,  though  many  of  them  are  excellent  ma 
terial  for  history.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are 
records  of  a  more  general  character,  most  of  which 
are  hasty  compilations  of  little  value.  The  con 
temporary  accounts  of  the  war  were  very  inaccurate 
and  imperfect ;  it  was  not  until  some  time  later  that 
there  was  a  sufficient  body  of  trustworthy  evidence 
to  make  it  possible  to  write  anything  like  a  real 
history. 

For  the  present  volume  it  is  claimed  that  it  is 
based  upon  a  study  of  all  the  available  first-hand 
evidence.  On  the  American  side  there  is  a  great 
quantity  of  this  in  the  shape  of  the  copious  reports 


iy  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

made  public  by  the  War  and  Navy  Departments, 
and  the  numerous  books  and  magazine  articles  writ 
ten  by  participants  in  the  war.  On  the  Spanish  side 
comparatively  little  has  been  published,  but  there 
is  interesting  material  in  the  works  of  Lieutenant 
Miiller  and  Captain  Severe  Gomez  Nunez,  which 
have  been  translated  and  printed  by  the  Bureau 
of  Naval  Intelligence,  and  in  a  few  letters  and  re 
ports  by  Admirals  Cervera  and  Montojo  and  other 
officers. 

This  narrative  appeared  serially  in  Munsey's 
Magazine,  and  has  since  been  revised  in  the  light 
of  recently  published  evidence  and  of  letters  re 
ceived  by  the  writer. 

RICHARD  H.  TITHERINGTON. 
NEW  YORK,  December,  i8gg. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I- — THE   EARLY    HISTORY    OF   CUBA,    1492-1823  .  I 

II. — AMERICAN  RELATIONS  WITH  CUBA,  1823-1873  .      17 

HI-— FROM     THE    VlRGINIUS     TO     THE     MAINE,    1873- 

1898 36 

IV.— THE  COMING  OF  WAR 66- 

V. — THE  RESOURCES  OF  THE  COMBATANTS        .        .      96 

VI. — THE   BEGINNING   OF   WAR Irg 

VII.— THE   BATTLE   OF    MANILA    BAY      .  .  .  .127 

VIII.— THE  CUBAN  BLOCKADE,  MAY,  1898    .        .        .145 

IX. — THE  COMING  OF  CERVERA I57 

X. — THE  BLOCKADE  OF*  SANTIAGO     .        .        .        .181 
XI. — THE  SANTIAGO  EXPEDITION         ....    204 

XII. — THE   BATTLES   OF   CANEY    AND    SAN   JUAN    .  .      232 

XIII. — THE  SANTIAGO  SEA  FIGHT 269 

XIV. — THE   SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO     ....      294 

XV.— THE  PORTO  Rico  CAMPAIGN       .        .        .        .331 
XVI.— THE  MANILA  CAMPAIGN 350 

XVII. — THE   LATTER   DAYS    OF   THE   CUBAN    BLOCKADE    .      379 

XVIII.— THE  CONCLUSION  OF  PEACE        .        .        .        .389 

INDEX 395 

v 


^**C\  B  R  A  ft 

UNIVERSITY 


HISTORY   OF   THE 
SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


CHAPTER  I 

THE    EARLY    HISTORY   OF    CUBA,    1492-1823 

THE  war  of  1898  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain  was  the  logical  and  inevitable  ending  of  a 
long  chapter  of  history.  The  conditions  that 
caused  it  began  with  the  earliest  settlements  of  the 
English  and  the  Latin  peoples  in  the  new  world. 
The  race  that  was  to  dominate  the  wide  continent 
of  North  America  came  into  conflict  with  its  French 
rivals  two  centuries  ago,  and  their  struggle  was  de 
cided  by  Wolfe  at  Quebec  in  1759.  While  Spain 
held  Florida  and  Louisiana,  hostilities  with  the 
English  colonies,  which  had  now  become  the 
United  States,  were  a  constant  probability,  and  were 
averted  only  by  the  timely  cession  of  both  those 
great  provinces.  The  possession  of  Texas  and  Cali 
fornia  was  the  prize  of  victory  in  the  war  of  1846 
and  1847  against  the  Spaniards  of  Mexico — a  war 
that  seems  to  have  finally  settled  the  southwestern 
frontier  of  the  Union.  Cuba,  lying  scarcely  more 
than  a  hundred  miles  from  the  shores  of  the  great 
republic,  facing  its  southern  seaports,  and  com 
manding  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  is  geographically  as 
necessary  an  appanage  of  its  territory  as  Florida. 
Under  Spanish  rule  the  so-called  Pearl  of  the  An 
tilles  has  been  an  unfailing  source  of  anxiety  in  the 
foreign  relations  of  the  United  States,  a  perpetual 


2  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

problem  to  American  statesmen — a  problem  to 
which  there  could  be  but  one  ultimate  solution. 
The  unhappy  island  has  long  been  a  running  sore 
in  the  body  politic  of  the  northern  half  of  the  new 
world.  It  is  extraordinary  that  the  nineteenth  cen 
tury  should  almost  have  ended  before  the  great 
power  to  which  Nature  has  set  her  in  such  close 
relation  found  itself  compelled  to  draw  the  sword 
against  the  government  responsible  for  her  intoler 
able  condition. 

It  was  the  first  westward  voyage  of  Columbus 
that  made  Cuba  known  to  European  civilization. 
Sixteen  days  after  the  Italian  navi- 
gator's  landing  on  the  island  that  he 
christened  San  Salvador — which  was 
probably  Watling's  Island — he  sighted  the  Cuban 
coast  at  a  point  near  the  present  site  of  Nuevitas. 
This  was  on  the  28th  of  October,  old  style,  or  the 
7th  of  November,  new  style,  in  the  year  1492.  Here 
was  no  low-lying  islet,  such  as  he  had  seen  in  the 
Bahamas ;  it  was  a  land  of  forests  and  rivers  and 
noble  mountains — a  part,  doubtless,  of  the  Asiatic 
mainland  of  which  Columbus  was  in  search.  In  the 
discoverer's  optimistic  way  he  described  it  in  his 
diary  as  "  the  most  beautiful  land  that  human  eyes 
ever  beheld."  The  natives  received  him  with  won 
dering  hospitality,  but,  naturally  enough,  could  give 
him  little  information.  Hearing  them  mention  a 
village  or  district  called  Cubanacan,  Columbus 
concluded  that  he  had  reached  the  dominions  of 
Kublai  Khan,  the  great  Tartar  sovereign  whose 
court  Marco  Polo  visited  two  hundred  years  before. 
He  sent  some  of  his  men  inland,  as  ambassadors  to 
the  reigning  prince ;  but  after  travelling  a  dozen 
leagues  they  came  back,  reporting  that  they  could 
find  no  prince,  no  cities,  no  roads — nothing  but  the 
same  primitive  villages  of  naked,  harmless  Indians. 
Columbus  spent  two  months  on  the  northern 
coast  of  Cuba;  then  he  sailed  from  Cape  Maysi — 


THE   EARLY    HISTORY   OF   CUBA  3 

which  he  named  "  Alpha  and  Omega,"  supposing  it 
to  be  the  easternmost  extremity  of  Asia — to  His- 
paniola  (Haiti),  where  his  flagship,  the  Santa 
Maria,  was  wrecked,  and  he  left  its  crew  to  build 
the  fortified  post  of  La  Navidad.  He  never  founded 
any  settlement  in  Cuba,  though  on  his  second  voy 
age  (1494)  he  passed  along  almost  the  entire  length 
of  its  southern  coast,  and  on  his  fourth  and  last 
(1503)  he  paid  it  another  brief  visit.  When  he 
died,  three  years  later,  he  still  believed  that  it  was 
part  of  the  mainland  of  Asia.  He  had  named  it 
Juana,  in  honour  of  the  Infant  Juan  (John),  the 
son  of  his  patrons,  Ferdinand  and  Isabella.  It 
also  appears  on  early  maps  as  Fernandina,  Isa 
bella,  Santiago  (after  the  patron  saint  of  Spain), 
and  Ave  Maria ;  but  all  these  titles  were  soon 
superseded  by  the  old  Indian  name  which  it  still 
bears. 

To  the  chance  that  wrecked  the  Santa  Maria  on 
its  shores  was  due  the  fact  that  Spanish  colonization 
of  the  new  world  began  in  Hispaniola.  In  1511 
Diego  Columbus,  the  great  discoverer's  son,  who 
was  ruling  in  that  island  as  admiral  of  the  Indies, 
sent  out  Diego  Velasquez,  with  four  ships  and 
three  hundred  men,  to  conquer  Cuba.  With  this 
force — of  which  Hernando  Cortez,  the  future  con 
queror  of  Mexico,  was  an  undistinguished  member 
— Velasquez  established  the  armed  posts  of  Bara- 
.coa  (1511),  Santiago  de  Cuba  (1514),  and  some 
others  whose  names  still  appear  on  the  maps  of  the 
island.  Baracoa,  now  a  decayed  seaport  with  the 
population  of  a  village,  was  the  first  seat  of  gov 
ernment,  being  made  a  city  and  a  bishopric  in 
1518;  but  four  years  later  the  capital  was  trans 
ferred  to  Santiago,  of  whose  long  history  the  latest 
and  most  eventful  chapter  is  fresh  in  all  American 
minds. 

In  Hispaniola  the  Spaniards  had  already  estab 
lished  the  bloody  and  brutal  system  of  enforced  la- 


4  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

hour — or  slavery,  to  give  it  its  true  name — which 
utterly  exterminated  the  West  Indian  aborigines. 
They  carried  the  same  policy  to  Cuba.  The  In 
quisition,  established  in  Spain  thirty  years  before, 
went  with  it,  and  the  torch  of  the  Holy  Office  sec 
onded  the  sword  of  the  soldier  in  cowing  the  help 
less  natives.  "  Thus  began,"  says  Arrate,  the 
Cuban  historian  of  the  eighteenth  century,  "  that 
gathering  of  an  infinite  number  of  gentiles  to  the 
bosom  of  our  holy  religion,  who  otherwise  would 
have  perished  in  the  darkness  of  paganism."  They 
were  gathered  so  rapidly  to  that  gentle  bosom  that 
within  fifty  years  the  Indians  of  Cuba,  who  had 
numbered  several  hundred  thousand  when  the 
Spaniards  came,  were  totally  extinct. 

There  is  a  characteristic  story  of  Hatuey,  a  chief 
whom  Velasquez  ordered  to  the  stake  for  his  re 
sistance  to  the  conquerors.  A  priest  soothed  his 
last  moments  by  asking  if  he  wished  to  go  to 
heaven.  "  Are  there  any  Spaniards  there  ?  "  Ha 
tuey  inquired.  "  Many,"  replied  the  priest. 
"  Then,"  said  the  Indian,  "  I  would  rather  go  to 
hell ! " 

Spain  has  suffered  from  no  little  misrepresenta 
tion  at  the  hands  of  Cuban  writers,  and  of  some 
Americans;  but  the  facts  of  this  dark  page  of  her 
colonial  annals  do  not  rest  upon  the  testimony  of 
any  foreign  critic.  They  are  told  by  that  great 
Spaniard,  Bartolome  de  las  Casas,  whose  Destruc 
tion  of  the  Indies  is  a  narrative  of  what  he  himself 
saw  in  Cuba  and  Hispaniola  between  1502  and 

I530- 

For  more  than  two  hundred  years  after  the  first 
colonization  of  Cuba  the  development  of  the  island 
was  very  slow.  Spanish  interest  centred  upon  the 
richer  provinces  of  Peru  and  Mexico,  and  the  chief 
value  of  Cuba  was  as  a  port  of  call  for  treasure 
ships  sailing  from  the  mainland.  It  was  this  traffic 
that  gave  Havana  its  importance. 


THE   EARLY    HISTORY   OF   CUBA  5 

The  history  of  the  chief  city  and  seaport  of  the 
West  Indies  begins  in  1515,  with  the  settlement  of 
fifty  of  the  men  of  Diego  Velasquez's 
expedition  at  the  post  of  San  Cristo 
bal  de  la  Habana,  on  the  present  site 
of  the  town  of  Batabano,  on  the  southern  coast  of 
Cuba.  A  few  years  later,  finding  the  spot  they  had 
chosen  unhealthy,  the  settlers  crossed  to  the  north 
ern  shore,  little  more  than  thirty  miles  distant,  and 
established  themselves  at  the  narrow  entrance  of  a 
bay  in  which  Ocampo — the  Spanish  admiral  who 
first  circumnavigated  Cuba — had  repaired  his  ships 
in  1508.  Here,  beside  its  fine  harbour,  Havana 
had  a  long  struggle  for  existence.  The  sixteenth 
century  was  a  stormy  time  in  West  Indian  waters. 
There  might  be  peace  at  home,  but  in  the  new 
world  the  Spaniard,  the  Frenchman,  the  English 
man,  and  the  Hollander  were  foes  wherever  they 
met ;  and  all  of  them  were  fair  game  to  the  bucca 
neers  who  fought  under  any  flag  or  no  flag.  Havana 
suffered  several  hostile  visitations.  In  1538,  the 
settlement  having  been  burned  by  a  French  pirate 
or  privateer — the  distinction  between  the  two  was 
often  very  slight — Hernando  de  Soto,  the  governor 
of  Cuba,  came  from  Santiago,  his  capital,  and  built 
the  fort  of  La  Fuerza  to  defend  it.  The  old  build 
ing,  not  a  formidable  fortress,  still  stands,  the  most 
ancient  relic  of  Havana's  early  days. 

It  was  at  Havana  that  De  Soto  gathered  his 
expedition  for  the  exploration  of  Florida,  and  from 
thence  that  he  sailed  with  nine  ships  on  the  I2th 
of  May,  1539 — never  to  return.  A  dozen  years 
later  the  seat  of  government  was  transferred  from 
Santiago  to  Havana ;  but  this  did  not  save  the  place 
from  another  piratical  raid  in  1554.  In  1589,  to 
protect  his  treasure  ships  from  those  dreaded 
wolves  of  the  sea,  Drake  and  Hawkins,  who  "  held 
the  power  and  glory  of  Spain  so  cheap,"  Philip  II 
ordered  two  strong  fortresses  built  to  defend  the 


6  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

harbour.  These,  too,  are  standing  to-day — the  Ba- 
teria  de  la  Punta  (Battery  of  the  Point)  at  the 
northernmost  point  of  the  city,  west  of  the  entrance 
to  the  bay,  and  the  famous  Morro  *  on  the  low 
heights  that  rise  on  the  east  side  of  the  channel.  In 
the  same  year  the  colonial  government  of  Cuba  was 
reconstituted,  and  Juan  de  Tejada  was  sent  out  as 
the  first  captain-general. 

During  the  next  century  the  fortification  of  Ha 
vana  was  completed  by  the  building  of  a  wall 
around  the  town ;  and  from  this  time,  owing  to  its 
situation  and  defences,  it  was  long  regarded  as  im 
pregnable.  A  contemporary  description  pictures 
it  as  an  unkempt  place,  with  houses  of  straw  and 
wood,  surrounded  by  little  gardens  with  hedges  of 
a  prickly  shrub.  At  night  the  narrow  streets  were 
unlighted,  and  swarmed  with  land  crabs. 

As  agriculture  slowly  gained  a  footing  in  Cuba, 
and  commerce  developed,  gold  seekers  were  no 
longer  the  only  adventurers  in  the  West  Indies,  and 
the  day  of  the  buccaneers  passed  away.  Trade 
questions  began  to  be  the  motives  of  political  con 
tention.  In  1717  the  first  clash  between  the  inter 
ests  of  the  colony  and  those  of  the  mother  country 
was  caused  by  the  proclamation  of  the  tobacco  in 
dustry  as  a  royal  monopoly.  In  1739  hostility  be 
tween  Spanish  and  English  traders  broke  out  into 
war,  which  lasted  for  nine  years  without  any  de 
cisive  result,  its  principal  incident  being  an  unsuc 
cessful  British  attack  upon  Santiago  de  Cuba  in 
1741. 

In  1762  occurred  an  event  which,  memorable  and 
interesting  in  itself,  is  of  historical  importance  as 
having  first  brought  Cuba  prominently  into  the  field 
of  international  politics,  and  as  marking  the  begin- 

*  The  Spanish  word  tnorro,  which  means  "  a  protruding  lip,"  is  fre 
quently  applied  to  forts  standing  upon  an  elevation  at  the  mouth  of  a 
harbour.  There  is  another  famous  Morro  at  Santiago  de  Cuba,  and 
another  at  San  Juan,  in  Porto  Rico. 


THE    EARLY    HISTORY   OF   CUBA  7 

ning  of  the  island's  relations  with  the  United  States, 
then  a  dependency  of  England.     This  was  the  cap 
ture  of  Havana  by  the   British   and 
Havana  taken      coioniai    troops    commanded    by    the 

by  the  British,        r>      i      f    A  ti  1  T  "    r     i 

I762<  Earl  of  Albemarle.  It  was  one  of  the 

scenes  of  that  great  drama  of  battle, 
the  Seven  Years'  War,  in  which  Europe's  soldiers 
and  sailors  met  and  fought  in  Asia  and  America,  on 
Atlantic  and  Pacific.  England,  after  some  initial 
reverses,  had  shattered  the  French  fleets  at  Lagos 
and  Quiberon,  and  driven  the  Bourbon  flag  from 
Canada  and  India.  When  Spain  entered  the  con 
flict  as  France's  ally,  the  next  blows  were  directed 
against  her  colonial  possessions,  and  British  expe 
ditions  were  despatched  against  Havana  and  Manila. 
Both  were  completely  successful,  although  in  each 
case  diplomacy  gave  back  to  Spain  what  had  been 
won  from  her  by  the  sword. 

Havana  being  reputed  a  strongly  fortified  and 
garrisoned  place,  the  force  sent  against  it  was  a 
powerful  one.  There  were  thirty-two  ships  of  war, 
with  nearly  two  hundred  transports,  in  the  fleet  that 
was  sighted  off  the  harbour  on  the  6th  of  June, 
1762.  A  landing  was  effected  at  Guanabacoa,  a 
few  miles  east  of  Havana,  on  the  I7th,  and  the  Brit 
ish  army,  numbering  about  twenty  thousand  men, 
advanced  and  captured  the  heights  above  the  har 
bour,  where  the  fortress  of  Cabanas  now  stands. 
The  Spaniards,  who  had  twenty-seven  thousand 
regulars,  besides  an  auxiliary  force  of  volunteers, 
still  held  the  Morro,  and  prevented  the  English 
men-of-war  from  entering  the  port  by  sinking  ships 
in  the  channel. 

In  many  respects  the  campaign  suggests  com 
parisons  with  the  experiences  of  Shafter's  army  at 
Santiago  a  hundred  and  thirty-six  years  later.  Al 
though  a  considerable  part  of  their  force  had  been 
raised  in  the  West  Indies,  the  British  found  the 
fevers  of  the  Cuban  coast  a  deadlier  foe  than  the 


8  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Spanish  guns.  Before  the  end  of  July  nearly  half 
of  their  force  was  disabled  by  sickness,  and  the  ar 
rival,  on  July  28th,  of  a  body  of  fresh  troops  from 
the  North  American  colonies  was  a  most  welcome 
reinforcement.  These  earliest  American  invaders 
of  Cuba  consisted  of  a  thousand  men  from  Connec 
ticut,  eight  hundred  from  New  York,  and  five  hun 
dred  from  New  Jersey,  with  General  Lyman,  of 
the  first-named  colony,  in  command.  It  is  worth 
recording  that  Israel  Putnam,  destined  to  win 
fame  in  the  Revolution,  was  acting  colonel  of  the 
Connecticut  regiment. 

The  Morro  was  stormed  a  few  days  later,  and 
on  August  1 3th  the  city  surrendered,  the  garrison 
being  allowed  to  march  out  with  the  honours  of 
war.  An  immense  quantity  of  spoil  fell  to  the  vic 
tors,  who  confiscated  public  property  and  levied 
contributions  unsparingly.  The  tobacco  and  sugar 
seized  and  sold  on  the  spot  alone  brought  three  and 
a  half  million  dollars.  Sir  George  Pocock,  who 
commanded  the  fleet,  and  Lord  Albemarle  drew  six 
hundred  thousand  dollars  apiece  as  prize  money. 
The  comparative  value  that  eighteenth-century 
officialdom  attached  to  officers  and  men  may  be  in 
ferred  from  the  fact  that  each  soldier's  share  was 
twenty  dollars  and  each  sailor's  eighteen. 

The  territory  surrendered  to  the  British 
stretched  eastward  to  Matanzas,  but  they  had  made 
no  effort  to  push  their  conquests  when  peace  was 
proclaimed,  and  on  the  6th  of  July,  1763,  they 
evacuated  Cuba,  George  Ill's  Government  having 
accepted  in  exchange  the  Spanish  province  of 
Florida — which  was  returned  to  Spain  twenty  years 
later.  While  holding  Havana  the  soldiers  were  ter 
ribly  scourged  by  disease.  Mante,  a  chaplain  from 
New  England,  has  left  in  his  diary  a  vivid  picture 
of  the  sufferings  of  his  compatriots,  in  whose  camp 
the  "  putrid  fever  "  wrought  frightful  havoc.  Only 
a  remnant  returned  alive. 


THE    EARLY    HISTORY   OF   CUBA  9 

To  Havana  a  year  of  British  occupation  was 

not  without  benefit.    Efforts  were  made  to  improve 

the     sanitary     condition     of     a     city 

Cuba's  golden      which  Spanish  incompetence  allowed 

period.  r.  1         1        i  r        r 

to  remain  a  hotbed  ot  lever  to 
the  present  day.  Its  port,  for  the  first  time,  was 
opened  to  the  commerce  of  the  nations,  and  the 
world's  attention  was  called  to  the  possibilities  of 
Cuba  as  a  mart  for  trade.  Havana's  importance  as 
a  modern  city  may  be  said  to  have  begun  at  this 
point,  although  with  the  restoration  of  Spanish  rule 
the  law  giving  Spain  a  monopoly  of  traffic  with  Cuba 
was  temporarily  reaffirmed.  At  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century  it  was  probably  the  largest 
American  city  of  European  settlement,  and  cer 
tainly  the  richest  and  most  important  seaport  in  the 
new  world. 

Luis  de  las  Casas,  who  came  out  as  captain- 
general  in  1790,  did  much  for  Havana,  helping  to 
form  its  Sociedad  Patriotica  (Patriotic  Society),  to 
found  its  first  newspaper,  the  Papel  Periodico,  and 
to  promote  useful  public  works.  Another  name  of 
the  same  period  that  is  held  in  grateful  memory  is 
that  of  Francisco  Arango.  Born  in  Havana  in 
1765,  Arango  was  secretary  of  the  local  chamber  of 
commerce  when  Napoleon  drove  the  Bourbon 
dynasty  from  Madrid,  in  July,  1808.  The  Spanish 
officials  in  Cuba  promptly  met,  and  at  four  thou 
sand  miles'  distance  defied  the  conqueror  of  Europe 
by  affirming  their  loyalty  to  the  deposed  sovereign. 
Their  action  won  for  Cuba  the  title  of  the  Ever 
Faithful  Isle — a  name  of  grim  irony,  in  the  light  of 
later  events — and  the  privilege,  bestowed  by  the 
constitution  framed  in  1812,  when  Ferdinand  VII 
returned  to  his  throne,  of  representation  in  the 
Cortes  at  Madrid.  Arango  went  to  Spain  as  one 
of  the  first  Cuban  delegates,  and  secured  the  final 
abolition  of  the  law  debarring  foreign  ships  from 
the  ports  of  the  island.  -*"x*  "R'A'K  **" 

OF    Tf*tt 

UNIVERSITY 


10  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

The  first  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  has 
been  called  the  "  golden  period  "  of  Cuba's  history. 
It  was  for  her  a  time  of  general  internal  tranquility, 
and  of  great  industrial  and  commercial  develop 
ment.  She  was  benefited  by  the  fact  that  Spain  was 
at  its  lowest  ebb  of  weakness  both  at  home  and 
abroad.  For  years  at  a  time,  during  the  Napoleonic 
wars,  communication  with  Madrid  was  cut  off  by 
the  hostile  sea  power  of  Britain,  which,  though  it 
seized  Trinidad,  made  no  further  attack  upon  Cuba. 
The  successful  revolt  of  all  the  mainland  colonies, 
too,  seemed  at  least  temporarily  to  have  opened  the 
ear  of  the  Spanish  Government  to  Cuban  griev 
ances.  At  the  same  time  it  brought  loyalist  settlers 
to  the  island,  just  as  Canada,  after  the  American 
Revolution,  became  a  refuge  for  colonists  who  pre 
ferred  their  old  allegiance.  A  more  important  im 
migration  came  from  Haiti,  whence  thirty  thousand 
white  families,  victims  of  the  island's  race  war,  are 
said  to  have  fled  to  Cuba  between  1798  and  1808, 
bringing  with  them  the  cultivation  of  coffee — which 
became  the  chief  Cuban  product,  till  superseded  by 
sugar.  All  these  causes  contributed  to  the  island's 
rapid  advance  in  wealth  and  population.  She 
had  but  170,370  inhabitants  in  1775,  and  272,140 
in  1791.  The  number  grew  to  551,998  in  1817,  to 
704,487  in  1827,  and  to  1,007,624  in  1841. 

But  with  all  this  material  development  signs  of 
Cuba's  later  troubles  were  not  lacking. 

The  West  Indies  seem  to  be  well  fitted  by  na 
ture  to  be  the  home  of  civilized  and  prosperous 
communities,  yet  European  colonization  can  show 
little,  if  anything,  but  failure  in  that  rich  chain  of 
islands.  They  have  had  four  centuries  of  checkered 
history — history  full  of  revolts  and  massacres,  of 
crimes  and  horrors,  of  battles  fought  for  the  spoils 
of  war.  The  white  conquerors  exterminated  the 
native  tribes,  to  replace  them  with  negro  slaves ; 
and  it  has  been  their  just  retribution  to  see  the 


THE   EARLY   HISTORY   OF  CUBA  Ir 

African  multiply  and  possess  the  land  where  the 
superior  race  failed  to  take  thrifty  root.  In  Haiti 
negro  domination  has  long  been  absolute.  Ja 
maica,  always  orderly  under  English  rule,  and  for 
a  time  a  prosperous  colony,  has  but  a  dwindling 
remnant  of  a  few  thousand  whites  to  more  than 
half  a  million  coloured  inhabitants.  In  the  lesser 
islands — British  or  French,  Danish  or  Dutch — the 
story  is  the  same. 

To  this  long  chapter  of  failures  Cuba  has  ap 
peared  as  the  conspicuous  exception.  With  all  her 
mistakes  and  shortcomings  as  a  colonizing  power, 
Spain  seemed  to  have  done  in  the  West  Indies 
what  France  and  England  could  not  do — to  have 
planted  the  seeds  of  a  community  capable  of  be 
coming  a  civilized  nation.  But  recent  history  sug 
gests  a  serious  question  of  this  conclusion.  There 
are  many  to-day  who  hold  that  the  prosperity  of 
Cuba  was  founded  upon  slave  labour;  that  from 
the  industrial  viewpoint  Cuba  without  slavery — 
which,  it  must  be  remembered,  ended  little  more 
than  a  dozen  years  ago — is  still  an  experiment; 
that  from  the  social  and  political  viewpoint  the 
islanders,  taken  as  a  community,  have  yet  to  prove 
their  capacity  for  self-government  and  their  right 
to  rank  with  the  free  peoples  of  America. 

There  were  no  schools  in  Cuba  till  near  the 
end  of  last  century.  In  1836,  when  the  population 
was  nearly  a  million,  only  nine  thousand  pupils 
were  receiving  instruction.  In  1860  the  munici 
palities  of  the  island  had  two  hundred  and  eighty- 
three  schools  for  white  children,  and  just  two  for 
coloured,  and  the  total  attendance  was  no  larger, 
in  proportion  to  the  population,  than  in  1836.  In 
1883  a  report  shows  eight  hundred  and  thirty-five 
schools,  but  their  management  is  described  as  one 
of  utter  neglect,  few  teachers  being  paid  their  sal 
aries,  and  sixty-seven  schools  being  entirely  vacant. 
There  is  no  census  of  illiteracy  in  Cuba,  but,  of 


12  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

course,  it  is  practically  universal  among  the 
negroes  and  quite  general  among  the  poorer 
whites.  Enrique  Varona,  a  Cuban  deputy  to  the 
Cortes,  stated  in  1895  that  seventy-six  per  cent  of 
the  population — meaning,  presumably,  the  adult 
population — could  neither  read  nor  write ;  and  his 
estimate  is  probably  too  low.  Of  another  test  of 
popular  enlightenment — the  relative  proportion  of 
legitimate  and  illegitimate  births — we  find  no  re 
cent  report.  The  percentages  of  forty  years  ago  are 
given  by  Ballou : 


Legitimate. 

Illegitimate. 

White  

67   8 

02    2 

aa.7 

66.  q 

Total  

CQ.  C 

4Q.  ^ 

Even  allowing  for  the  existence  of  slavery,  the 
figures  are  sufficiently  shocking.  Both  Spain  and 
Cuba  were  to  pay  a  terrible  penalty  for  allowing 
successive  generations  to  grow  up  under  such  con 
ditions  of  savagery. 

Negro  slavery,  as  has  been  said,  ended  in  Cuba 

in  1886,  but  it  has  left  a  deep  and  indelible  mark 

upon  the  island's  present  and  future. 

Slavery  in  Cuba.     T*  ,  .  \  .       .        c          .    , 

It  began  almost  with  the  bpanish  oc 
cupation,  and  by  a  curious  anomaly  its  origin  is 
traced  to  the  sainted  Las  Casas.  Seeing  that  the 
native  Indians,  a  people  neither  accustomed  to  la 
bour  nor  physically  competent  for  it,  were  perish 
ing  in  thousands  under  the  lash  of  their  taskmas 
ters,  Las  Casas  suggested,  as  an  alternative,  the 
importation  of  a  limited  number  of  African  slaves. 
The  suggestion,  developed  to  an  extent  of  which  its 
author  never  dreamed,  was  destined  to  bring  mo 
mentous  results,  and  to  stain  the  history  of  the  new 
world  with  a  crime  to  be  expiated  by  the  blood 
and  tears  of  nations.  Yet  to  stigmatize  Las  Casas 


THE   EARLY   HISTORY   OF   CUBA  ^ 

as  the  founder  of  American  slavery  is  scarcely  fair. 
There  were  African  bondsmen  in  Spain  before  the 
time  of  Columbus,  and  the  institution  was  certain 
to  cross  the  Atlantic  to  lands  where  it  found  so  fer 
tile  a  field  prepared  for  it. 

Nominally,  at  least,  the  Spanish  laws  that  regu 
lated  slavery  in  Cuba  were  fairly  humane.  They 
forbade  the  owner  to  work  his  slaves  longer  than 
from  sunrise  to  sunset  (from  six  to  six,  in  the 
tropics),  with  two  hours  for  a  siesta  at  noon,  and 
with  Sunday  as  a  day  of  rest.  They  prescribed  a 
certain  quantity  and  variety  of  food,  allowed  slaves 
to  keep  pigs  and  cultivate  patches  of  their  own,  and 
created  a  system  whereby  an  industrious  negro 
could  secure  his  freedom  by  paying  the  amount  of 
his  first  cost  to  his  master;  but  it  appears  that  if 
there  was  little  ill  treatment  of  slaves — and  Ballou, 
Abiel  Abbott,  and  other  American  travellers  in 
Cuba  testify  that  they  witnessed  none — it  was 
rather  from  self-interest  on  the  part  of  their  owners 
than  from  respect  for  the  statutes. 

Whatever  the  material  condition  of  the  slaves, 
the  institution  was  a  fruitful  source  of  social  and 
political  disorder.  It  was  bitterly  opposed  by  the 
mass  of  white  Cubans,  just  as  it  was  opposed  by 
the  free  labouring  class  in  the  United  States.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  kept  the  rich  planters  loyal  to 
Spanish  rule,  which  protected  them  in  the  posses 
sion  of  their  chattels ;  especially  as  the  cafctals 
(coffee  farms)  were  turned  into  great  sugar  plan 
tations,  operated  on  a  far  larger  scale  of  agricul 
ture.  It  was  a  fruitful  source  of  official  corruption. 
The  negroes  themselves  formed  a  dangerous  ele 
ment  of  the  population  in  slavery,  and  an  unde 
sirable  one  since  emancipation.  Their  numbers,  at 
different  times,  are  given  in  the  table  on  the  next 
page. 

Their  number  in  1898  was  estimated  at  half  a 
million.  If  these  figures  are  correct,  it  is  strange 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


Slaves. 

Free. 

1827 

286,042 

106,494 

1841  

4^6.40^ 

152,838 

iSm 

4.42  ooo 

20^,670 

1867  .  . 

370,521 

22^,038 

that  Cuba's  coloured  population  should  have  de 
creased  by  nearly  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
in  the  last  half  century,  while  that  of  the  United 
States  during  the  same  period  has  considerably 
more  than  doubled.  It  looks  as  if  many  Cuban 
negroes  had  been  set  down  as  whites. 

The  first  blow  at  slavery  in  Cuba  was  struck  in 
1817,  when  Spain  agreed  to  prohibit  the  importa 
tion  of  African  negroes  into  her  colonies.  A  con 
sideration  for  this  act  of  humanity  was  the  receipt 
of  two  million  dollars  from  the  British  Government 
— which,  a  hundred  years  before,  had  itself  bought 
from  Spain  a  monopoly  of  the  slave  trade  in  her 
ports.  But  long  after  1817  the  forbidden  traffic 
went  on  clandestinely.  With  the  full  cognizance 
of  the  Spanish  officials,  and  to  their  great  financial 
profit,  the  barracoons  of  Havana  continued  to  be  a 
mart  for  planters  who  needed  labour.  The  trade 
was  not  without  its  risks,  of  course,  and  many  a 
human  cargo  from  the  east  coast  of  Africa  was  con 
fiscated  and  liberated  by  the  watchful  British 
cruisers ;  and  as  the  demand  outran  the  supply,  the 
price  of  slaves  went  up.  In  1830  an  able-bodied 
negro  was  worth  two  hundred  and  fifty  dollars  or 
less;  in  1850  his  value  had  doubled,  and  in  1870  it 
had  doubled  again. 

But  the  government  at  Madrid  could  not  much 
longer  maintain  an  institution  offensive  to  the  civi 
lized  world,  and  in  1870,  without  compensating  the 
planters,  a  law  was  passed  to  effect  its  gradual 
abolition.  Slaves  sixty  years  old  were  declared 
free,  and  those  not  yet  sixty  were  to  become  free 


THE   EARLY   HISTORY   OF   CUBA  j^ 

on  reaching  that  age ;  children  born  to  slavery  were 
to  remain  under  "  patronage "  until  they  were 
twenty-two,  and  then  be  free.  One  purpose  of  this 
act  was  to  dissuade  the  negro  population  from  join 
ing  the  revolt  then  in  progress.  Ten  years  later 
the  Spanish  Cortes  hurried  matters  by  declaring 
slavery  abolished,  while  patronage — the  same  thing 
under  another  name — was  to  end  in  1888.  Shortly 
before  the  latter  date  arrived,  the  liberation  of  all 
negroes  was  completed  by  the  decree  of  October  7, 
1886. 

It  was  the  Cuban  negroes  who  first  began  the 
series  of  revolts  that  have  made  the  island's  later 
history  so  turbulent  and  disastrous. 
During  the  race  war  in  Haiti,  ending 
in  the  triumph  of  the  blacks,  order 
was  preserved  in  Cuba;  but  in  1812,  when  the  first 
agitation  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  was  in  the  air, 
there  was  a  revolt  under  a  free  negro,  one  Jose 
Aponto,  which  was  speedily  ended  by  the  execution 
of  its  leaders. 

The  first  rising  of  white  Cubans — Creoles,  as 
they  used  to  be  called,  though  the  word  is  not  often 
used  now — was  that  of  the  Soles  de  Bolivar  in  1823. 
The  revolution  of  1820  in  Spain  had  led  to  inter 
vention  by  the  Holy  Alliance,  and  a  French  army, 
commissioned  by  that  league  of  rulers  by  divine 
right,  had  invaded  the  peninsula  and  restored  Bour 
bon  absolutism  by  force  of  arms,  suppressing  the 
newly  established  liberal  constitution.  Of  this  con 
stitution  Cuba  had  briefly  enjoyed  the  benefit,  but 
Marshal  Vives  was  sent  to  Havana  to  cancel  the 
privileges  it  had  granted.  Intense  discontent  was 
the  result,  and  the  secret  association  of  the  Soles 
de  Bolivar  was  organized,  its  aim  being  to  accom 
plish  for  Cuba  what  the  South  American  liberator 
had  achieved  for  the  mainland  colonies.  It  is  said 
to  have  been  in  correspondence  with  Bolivar,  and 
to  have  received  from  him  promises  of  help.  Au- 


!6  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

gust  16,  1823,  was  fixed  as  the  date  for  simultaneous 
risings  in  several  cities ;  but  there  were  traitors  in 
the  camp.  On  the  day  of  the  intended  outbreak 
the  head  of  the  society,  Jose  Lemus,  and  his  chief 
lieutenants,  were  arrested,  and  the  conspiracy  col 
lapsed. 


CHAPTER   II 

AMERICAN    RELATIONS    WITH    CUBA,    1823-1873 

THAT  same  year,  1823,  was  a  memorable  one  in 
American  history.  The  close  political  relations  of 
Cuba  and  the  United  States  may  be  dated  from  it. 
The  Holy  Alliance,  organized  to  combat  de 
mocracy  wherever  found,  sought  to  follow  up  its 
success  in  Spain  by  reconquering  her 
revolted  colonies,  the  South  Ameri 
can  republics.  With  Cuba  as  a  mili 
tary  base  it  would  not  have  been  a  difficult  task, 
had  there  not  been  strenuous  and  probably  unex 
pected  opposition.  In  December,  1823,  President 
Monroe  sent  to  the  United  States  Congress  his  fa 
mous  message  declaring  that  "  we  could  not  view 
an  interposition  by  any  European  power  in  any 
other  light  than  as  a  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly 
disposition  toward  the  United  States  " — thus  laying 
down  the  principle  that  has  become  historic  as  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  The  stand  he  took  was  backed 
by  England,  and  the  Continental  powers  were 
checked. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  not  a  new  principle 
of  American  statesmanship,  but  its  enunciation  at 
this  time  marked  a  new  era  in  the  foreign  relations 
of  the  United  States.  vTo  the  destiny  of  Cuba  it  was 
a  fact  of  decisive  importance,  for  it  directly  implied 
that  the  island  would  not  be  allowed  to  pass  to  any 
power  other  than  Spain?  Thus  much  had  been 
foreshadowed  a  few  months  before  by  John  Quincy 

17 


1  8  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Adams,   then   Secretary   of  State,   writing  to   Mr. 
Nelson,  American  minister  at  Madrid: 


e  transfer  of  Cuba  to  Great  Britain  would  be  an 
*S  event  unpropitious  to  the  interests  of  this  Union./  The 
opinion  is  so  generally  entertained  that  even  the  ground 
less  rumours,  that  it  was  about  to  be  accomplished  which 
have  spread  abroad,  and  are  still  teeming,  may  be  traced 
to  the  deep  and  almost  universal  feeling  of  aversion  to 
it,  and  to  the  alarm  which  the  mere  probability  of  its 
occurrence  has  stimulated.  The  question  both  of  our 
right  and  of  our  power  to  prevent  it,  if  necessary  by 
force,  already  obtrudes  itself  upon  our  councils,  and  the 
administration  is  called  upon,  in  the  performance  of  its 
duties  to  the  nation,  at  least  to  use  all  the  means  within 
its  competency  to  guard  against  and  forefend  it. 

At  nearly  the  same  time  the  veteran  Jefferson 
wrote  to  Monroe,  whose  valued  political  counsellor 
he  had  always  been  : 

(  Cuba  alone  seems  at  present  to  hold  up  a  speck  of  war 
to  us.  Its  possession  by  Great  Britain  would  indeed  be 
a  great  calamity  to  us.  Could  we  induce  her  to  join  us 
in  guaranteeing  its  independence  against  all  the  world, 
/'  except  Spain,  it  would  be  nearly  as  valuable  as  if  it  were 
our  own.  But  should  she  take  it,  I  would  not  immedi 
ately  go  to  war  for  it;  because  the  first  war  on  other  ac 
counts  will  give  it  to  us,  or  the  island  will  give  itself  to 
us  when  able  to  do  so./ 

After  Monroe's  message,  American  statesmen 
took  a  more  decisive  tone.  For  instance,  in  Henry 
Clay's  instructions  to  the  American  ministers  in 
Europe,  issued  shortly  after  he  became  Secretary 
of  State  in  1825,  he  said  : 

*  You  will  now  add  that  we  could  not  consent  to  the 
/  occupation   of  those   islands    [Cuba  and   Porto   Rico]   by 
any  other  European  power  than  Spain  under  any  contin 
gency  whatever. 

Spain's  extreme  weakness  at  this  period,  and 
her  loss  of  great  colonies  in  rapid  succession,  natu 
rally  led  to  the  belief  that  she  could  not  retain 
her  hold  upon  her  remaining  dependencies.  That 
England  intended  to  seize  Cuba  seems  to  have  been 


AMERICAN   RELATIONS  WITH   CUBA  ig 

a  baseless  supposition.  At  that  time — and  later — 
American  politicians  were  prone  to  mistrust  of 
British  designs.  There  was  a  strong  feeling  in 
favour  of  annexing  the  island  to  the  United  States. 
Adams,  in  the  note  already  quoted,  declared: 

'    It   is   scarcely   possible   to   resist   the   conviction   that        s 
the  annexation  of  Cuba  to  our  Federal  Republic  will  be 
indispensable.,  to    the    continuance    and    integrity    of    the 
Union  itself.  / 

And  Jefferson  gave  his  opinion  that 

her  addition  to  our  confederacy  is  exactly  what  is  wanted 
to  round  our  power  as  a  nation  to  the  point  of  its  utmost 
interest.  . 

But  nothing  was  done  to  realize  the  suggestion. 
The  sinister  shadow  of  the  slavery  question  was  an 
obstacle  to  action,  either  in  the  direction  of  acquir 
ing  Cuba  from  Spain,  or  in  that  of  helping  the 
island  to  assert  its  independence.  All  the  South 
American  states,  on  throwing  off  the  Spanish  yoke, 
had  abolished  human  servitude.  An  influential  ele 
ment  in  the  United  States  was  very  unwilling  to 
aid  Cuba  to  take  a  similar  step.  f  As  for  admission 
to  the  Union,  the  North  would  not  accept  the  island  ^ 
with  slavery,  the  South — or  those  who  controlled 
the  South's  political  course — would  not  admit  her 
as  a  free  State.  Van  Buren,  as  Secretary  of  State, 
in  1829,  thus  stated  the  situation,  after  asserting 
the  country's  "  deep  interest "  in  the  fate  of  the 
Spanish  Antilles : 

Considerations  connected  with  a  certain  class  of  our 
population  make  it  to  the  interest  of  the  Southern  section 
of  our  Union  that  no  attempt  should  be  made  in  that  island 
to  throw  off  the  yoke  of  Spanish  dependence,  the  first 
effect  of  which  would  be  the  sudden  emancipation  of  a 
numerous  slave  population,  which  result  could  not  but  be 
very  sensibly  felt  upon  the  adjacent  shores  of  the  United 
States. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  a  couple  of  years  after 
Jefferson's  expression  of  a  wish  that  England  would 


2Q  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

join  in  guaranteeing  Cuba  to  Spain,  the  British 
Government  made  that  very  proposal  to  France  and 
the  United  States,  the  consideration  from  Spain  be 
ing  her  acknowledgment,  which  she  still  refused,  of 
the  independence  of  the  South  American  republics ; 
but  both  Paris  and  Washington  Declined  the  sug 
gestion.  The  former,  possibly,  did  not  care  to  re 
nounce  its  chance  for  a  valuable  possession  that 
seemed  to  be  in  the  international  market ;  the  latter 
acted  strictly  on  the  lines  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Amid  these  international  complications  a  sec 
ond  rebellion  against  Spanish  rule  was  planned  by 
Cuban  Creoles  in  1826.  Its  chief 
organizers  were  fugitives  of  the 
unsuccessful  movement  of  three 
years  before ;  their  headquarters  were  in  Caracas, 
and  again  the  aid  of  Bolivar  was  expected ;  but 
again,  through  treachery  or  lack  of  support,  the 
rising  collapsed  before  a  blow  was  struck.  The 
Spanish  authorities  were  now  equipped  against  dis 
affection  with  the  weapon  which  from  that  time 
they  used  so  unsparingly  to  subvert  popular  rights 
and  render  pretended  concessions  worthless.  By 
the  decree  of  May  28,  1825,  the  captain-general  had 
been  permanently  invested,  in  "  extraordinary  cir 
cumstances  " — of  which  he  was  to  be  the  sole  judge 
— with  "  all  the  powers  which  are  conceded  to  the 
governors  of  cities  in  a  state  of  siege  " — in  other 
words,  with  absolute  military  power  superseding  all 
forms  of  law  and  all  guarantees  of  liberty. 

With  his  authority  thus  asserted  in  Cuba,  Cap 
tain-General  Vives  formed  a  highly  ambitious  plan 
for  the  reconquest  of  Spain's  mainland  colonies.  It 
was  a  task  far  beyond  his  powers.  Landing  at 
Tampico  in  August,  1828,  with  three  thousand  five 
hundred  men,  he  was  speedily  hemmed  in  by  su 
perior  Mexican  forces,  and  compelled  to  surrender 
his  arms  and  withdraw.  But  Spain's  power  in  Cuba 
was  not  shaken  by  this  reverse,  and  a  third  native 


AMERICAN    RELATIONS   WITH   CUBA          2I 

rising,  planned  by  the  secret  society  of  the  Aguila 
Negra  (Black  Eagle),  was  crushed  as  readily  as  its 
predecessors.  Vives,  who  personally  was  a  clear 
sighted  ruler  and  capable  administrator,  refrained 
from  any  bloody  vengeance  upon  the  conspirators, 
none  of  whom  was  executed. 

Vives  was  succeeded  by  Ricafort,  Ricafort  by 
Tacon,  the  most  famous  of  Spain's  colonial  gov 
ernors.         Cuban      historians      paint 

Misuel  Tacon  in  dark  colours-  A 

more  impartial  estimate  of  him  is 
given  by  an  American  *  who  lived  in  Havana  dur 
ing  his  administration.  He  seems  to  have  been  a 
benevolent  tyrant.  He  took  vigorous  measures  to 
end  the  social  and  political  disorders  that  had  made 
Cuba  a  place  where  there  was  no  honesty  in  gov 
ernment  and  little  security  for  life  and  property. 
He  warred  fiercely  upon  the  organized  bands  of 
criminals.  He  divided  the  island  into  partidos,  and 
required  all  who  went  from  one  district  to  another 
to  carry  a  passport.  He  shut  the  gates  of  Havana 
at  eleven  o'clock  at  night,  and  allowed  no  one  on 
the  streets  after  that  hour  without  a  lantern.  He 
forbade  the  carrying  of  weapons.  Even  swearing 
was  prohibited  till  it  was  found  that  Cuban  horses 
and  cattle  could  not  be  driven  without  the  cries 
to  which  they  were  accustomed.  He  inspected 
prisons,  and  invited  petitions  from  all  who  had 
grievances.  He  promoted  public  works,  and  built 
the  first  railway  in  the  island,  the  line  from  Havana 
to  Guines. 

"  General  Tacon,"  says  the  American  chroni 
cler,  "  was  the  only  Spanish  official  I  ever  knew 
who  would  not  accept  a  bribe."  When  an  importer 
who  did  not  know  his  peculiarities,  and  who  had 
recently  landed  a  shipload  of  slaves,  brought  him 

*  Jonathan  S.  Jenkins,  an  artist,  who  was  afterward  United  States 
consul  in  Samoa,  and  whose  memoirs  were  published  in  the  Century 
Magazine  in  1898. 


22  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR 

what  was  both  before  and  after  his  time  the  captain- 
general's  customary  tribute — a  doubloon  per  head 
of  the  cargo — Tacon  gave  the  money  to  a  favour 
ite  orphan  asylum.  Some  of  his  corrupt  underlings 
he  punished  severely,  thereby  earning  much  hatred 
among  the  Spanish  officials  in  Cuba.  He  was  not 
merciful  to  those  who  dared  to  oppose  him,  whether 
they  were  great  or  small.  When  he  learned  that 
some  negroes  in  Havana  were  organizing  a  rebel 
lion,  he  promptly  arrested  them,  and  their  punish 
ment  is  thus  described : 

The  leaders  and  instigators  were  taken  to  the  garrote. 
The  iron  collar  was  drawn  until  they  were  nearly  dead 
from  suffocation;  then  they  were  released  until  life  was 
restored,  their  heads  were  struck  off,  inclosed  in  parrot 
cages,  and  set  on  the  bridges  as  a  warning  to  others. 

Well-meaning  despot  as  he  was,  the  benefits  of 
Tacon's  rule  were  temporary,  while  the  evil  he 
wrought  was  lasting.  It  was  he  who  deliberately 
destroyed  the  last  chance  of  reconciliation  between 
Spaniard  and  Cuban.  Amid  the  troubles  that  fol 
lowed  the  death  of  Ferdinand  VII,  in  1833,  the  revo 
lution  of  La  Granja  secured  for  Spain  the  re-estab 
lishment  of  the  liberal  constitution  of  1812.  When 
the  news  crossed  the  Atlantic,  General  Lorenzo, 
governor  of  the  province  of  Santiago,  at  once  pro 
claimed  the  new  order,  which  affirmed  the  liberty 
of  the  press,  and  created  local  governing  bodies  and 
a  national  militia.  At  Havana,  Tacon  utterly  re 
fused  to  recognise  the  reformed  constitution,  and 
used  his  arbitrary  power  to  suppress  it.  Declaring 
Lorenzo  a  public  enemy,  he  was  moving  an  armed 
force  to  invade  the  eastern  province,  when  the  gov 
ernor  of  Santiago  fled  to  Spain  and  laid  his  case 
before  the  Cortes.  With  fatuous  inconsistency, 
the  Madrid  legislators  approved  Tacon's  course, 
excluded  the  deputies  who  had  arrived  as  repre 
sentatives  of  Cuba,  and  declared  that  the  island  was 
not  governed  by  the  restored  constitution,  but  by 


AMERICAN   RELATIONS  WITH   CUBA          23 

special  laws.  Meanwhile  Tacon  had  established  a 
reign  of  terror  in  Santiago,  where  he  laid  heavy 
hands  on  those  who  had  dared  to  antagonize  him. 
Clergymen  and  leading  citizens  were  imprisoned  or 
banished,  and  five  hundred  men  were  set  to  work 
with  shackled  feet  in  the  streets  of  Havana. 

fTn  the  early  forties,  when  the  troubles  of  the 

Texan    border   were    bringing    the    United    States 

nearer  and  nearer  to  war  with  Mex- 

pians  for  •         American    attention    again    be- 

annexing  Cuba.  fe. — i 

came  focused  upon  Cuba.  /  The 
British  Government's  active  work  for  the  abolition 
of  the  slave  trade — which,  as  has  been  said,  con 
tinued  to  flourish  in  the  Spanish  West  Indies  with 
corrupt  official  connivance — gave  rise  to  a  wide 
spread  belief  that  England's  real  aim  was  the  ac 
quisition  of  Cuba  for  herself.  Such  a  plan  certainly 
never  materialized,  and  there  seems  to  be  not  a 
scintilla  of  evidence  that  it  was  ever  contemplated ; 
but  the  alarm  evidently  found  credence  at  Wash 
ington.  John  Forsyth,  Secretary  of  State,  wrote  to 
the  American  minister  at  Madrid,  in  1840: 

You  are  authorized  to  assure  the  Spanish  Government 
that  in  case  of  any  attempt,  from  whatever  quarter,  to 
wrest  from  her  this  portion  of  her  territory,  she  may  se 
curely  depend  upon  the  military  and  naval  resources  of 
the  United  States  to  aid  her  either  in  preserving  or  re 
covering  it. 

Daniel  Webster,  who  succeeded  Mr.  Forsyth  in 
the  State  Department,  told  the  same  official,  three 
years  later : 

It  is  represented  that  the  situation  of  Cuba  is  at  this 
moment  in  the  highest  degree  dangerous  and  critical,  and 
that  Great  Britain  has  resolved  upon  its  rule. 

Had  such  a  design  been  formed  in  London,  the 
war  with  Mexico  offered  a  favourable  opportunity 
for  its  execution ;  but  nothing  of  the  sort  occurred. 
That  war  over,  leaving  the  United  States  with  a  vast 
accession  of  territory,  President  Polk  sought  to 


24  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

round  out  its  new  acquisitions  by  a  stroke  like  Jef 
ferson's  purchase  of  Louisiana,  and  in  1848 — a  year 
of  trouble  in  Europe — he  instructed  his  minister  at 
Madrid  to  offer  the  Spanish  Government  a  hundred_ 
million  dollars  for  the  sovereignty  of  the  island.- 
Spain  refused  the  proposal,  regarding  the  mere 
suggestion  of  such  a  transaction  as  an  indignity ; 
/and  it  was  never  officially  renewed,  though  various 
plans  for  the  purchase  of  Cuba  were  brought  for- 
t-xX  ward  by  individuals  or  newspapers,  and  President 
Buchanan  twice  urged  Congress  to  consider  the 
subject./ 

At  this  same  date,  just  fifty  years  ago,  the  po 
litical  disorders  of  Cuba  developed  a  new  phase, 
bringing  them  into  closer  connection 

Filibustering  *,«.i_    _*.!_        TT     -^    j     O.L  j 

begins,  1849  Wlt^  "ie  United  States,  and  consti 
tuting  a  source  of  annoyance  that 
ultimately  became  almost  intolerable.  In  1848 
the  first  society  of  Cuban  refugees  in  America  was 
formed  by  Narciso  Lopez,  a  Venezuelan  soldier  of 
fortune,  who  had  escaped  from  the  island  after  an 
other  attempt  at  rebellion,  too  feeble  and  abortive 
to  deserve  chronicling;  and  in  the  following  year 
Lopez  organized  his  first  filibustering  expedition. 
He  was  stopped  by  the  United  States  Government, 
but  in  1850  he  rendezvoused  six  hundred  men  on 
an  island  off  the  Yucatan  coast,  and  effected  a  land 
ing  at  Cardenas,  where  he  expected  that  recruits 
would  flock  to  his  standard. 

The  story  of  a  dozen  insurrections  shows  that 
while  the  grievances  of  the  Cubans  have  undoubt 
edly  been  great,  and  their  outcry  against  their  op 
pressors  correspondingly  loud,  they  have  been  sin 
gularly  backward  in  striking  a  bold  and  united 
blow  for  liberty.  The  expectations  of  Lopez  were 
totally  disappointed.  The  people  did  not  rise. 
They  did  not  even  obstruct  the  railway  from  Ha 
vana,  which  speedily  brought  two  thousand  five 
hundred  of  Captain-General  Roncali's  soldiers ;  and 


AMERICAN   RELA-nbN  25 

at  his  approach  the  invaders,  who  had  seized  the  gov 
ernment  house,  retreated  to  their  steamer.  They 
disbanded  at  Key  West,  and  Lopez  was  arrested  by 
the  Federal  authorities.  Brought  to  trial  he  was  dis 
charged,  but  his  ship,  the  Creole,  was  confiscated. 

The  expedition  of  1851  was  at  least  a  more  stir 
ring  and  romantic  failure.  Lopez  had  gathered 
about  four  hundred  and  fifty  men  and  procured  a 
steamer,  the  Pampero.  His  second  officer,  Gen 
eral  Pragay,  was  an  exiled  Hungarian  rebel. 
There  were  a  few  more  Hungarians  and  Germans 
among  his  men ;  forty-nine  were  Cubans,  the  rest 
Americans,  one  of  them  being  a  well-known  Ken- 
tuckian,  Colonel  Crittenden.  They  sailed  from 
New  Orleans,  and,  after  nearly  running  into  Ha 
vana  harbour  by  mistake,  landed  at  Bahia  Honda, 
some  forty  miles  to  the  west,  on  the  nth  of  August. 
As  Lopez  stepped  ashore  he  went  down  on  his 
knees  and  kissed  the  earth,  saying :  "  Querida 
Cuba!"  ("  Beloved  Cuba!") 

With  about  three  hundred  of  his  soldiers,  Lopez 
pushed  inland  toward  the  mountains,  where  he 
planned  to  establish  himself  in  an  intrenched  camp. 
Colonel  Crittenden  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  men 
were  left  at  Bahia  Honda  to  land  the  ammunition 
and  baggage.  They  had  not  brought  everything 
ashore  when  a  Spanish  steamer  entered  the  harbour 
and  attacked  them.  Some  of  the  filibusters  fled  in 
land  and  rejoined  Lopez ;  Crittenden  and  most  of 
his  men  attempted  to  escape  in  their  boats,  but 
were  captured,  taken  to  Havana,  and  shot. 

The  Spanish  troops  found  Lopez  at  Las  Pozas. 
Attacking  his  camp,  they  were  received  with  a 
deadly  fire,  and  driven  off  with  a  loss  of  two  hun 
dred  killed.  The  filibusters  had  lost  thirty-five 
men,  and  when  they  abandoned  Las  Pozas  they  had 
to  leave  their  wounded  behind  to  be  murdered  by 
the  Spaniards,  who  had  no  mercy  for  outlaws.  They 
made  a  second  stand  at  Las  Frias,  where  two  hun- 


commerce. 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

dred  of  them  defeated  thirteen  hundred  of  the 
enemy,  but  their  doom  was  certain.  No  recruits 
jointed  them,  they  had  no  supplies,  and  their  scanty 
ammunition  was  ruined  by  tropical  storms.  They 
became  scattered,  and  wandered  through  the  for 
ests  till  every  one  of  them  perished  miserably,  or 
was  captured  and  taken  to  Havana  for  execution. 
Lopez  met  a  felon's  death  by  the  garrote  in  the 
castle  of  La  Punta. 

The  annihilation  of  the   Lopez  expedition  did 

not  deter  the  Cubans  and  their  sympathizers  in  the 

United    States — among    whom    Gen- 

interferences       eraj  Quitman  of  Mississippi  was  ac- 

with  American       ,  •       ,  •  r  ,« 

tively  prominent — from  threatening 
fresh  descents,  andfthe  result  was  a 
serious  strain  in  the  relations  between  the  Govern 
ments  at  Washington  and  Madrid.  The  bitter  feel 
ing  of  the  latter  found  expression  in  interferences 
with  American  commerce,  which  provoked  intense 
indignation  in  the  United  States.  In  1851  the 
American  ship  Falcon  was  fired  on,  and  two  other 
vessels  were  seized  upon  a  vague  suspicion  that 
they  had  been  concerned  in  Lopez's  operations. 
In  1852  the  United  States  mail  bags  at  Havana 
were  opened  and  examined  by  order  of  the  cap 
tain-general ;  and  the  Crescent  City  was  debarred 
from  landing  her  passengers  and  mails  because  her 
purser,  a  Mr.  Smith,  was  personally  obnoxious  to 
the  Spanish  officials.  In  his  annual  message  that 
year  President  Fillmore  stated  the  situation  thus : 

The  affairs  of  Cuba  remain  in  an  uneasy  condition, 
and  a  feeling  of  alarm  and  irritation  on  the  part  of  the 
Cuban  authorities  appears  to  exist.  This  feeling  has  in 
terfered  with  the  regular  commercial  intercourse  between 
the  United  States  and  the  island,  aQd  led  to  some  acts  of 
which  we  have  a  right  to  complain./ 

In  the  same  document  the  President  reported  a 
renewal  of  the  British  suggestion  of  1825,  and  its 
renewed  rejection : 


AMERICAN    RELATIONS   WITH    CUBA  2? 

Early  in  the  present  year  (1852)  official  notes  were  re 
ceived  from  the  ministers  of  France  and  England  inviting 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  to  become  a  party 
with  Great  Britain  and  France  to  a  tripartite  convention, 
in  virtue  of  which  the  three  powers  should  severally 
and  collectively  disclaim,  now  and  for  the  future,  all  in 
tention  to  obtain  possession  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  and 
should  bind  themselves  to  discountenance  all  attempts  to 
that  effect  on  the  part  of  any  power  or  individual  what 
ever.  This  invitation  has  been  respectfully  declined.  I 
have,  however,  directed  the  ministers  of  France  and  Eng 
land  to  be  assured  that  the  United  States  entertain  no  de 
signs  against  Cuba,  but  that  on  the  contrary  I  should  re 
gard  its  incorporation  into  the  Union  at  the  present  time 
as  fraught  with  serious  peril. 

/  During  the  next  two  years  the  friction  of  which 
Mr.  Fillmore  complained  became  still  more  serious, 


The  Ostend 

Manife^o"  i854.  can  shiP  BJack  Warrior  at  Havana, 
on  a  charge  of  violating  the  custom 
house  regulations,  brought  Spain  and  the  United 
States  to  the  verge  of  war.  The  famous  Ostend 
manifesto,  issued  by  the  American  ministers  at 
London,  Paris,  and  Madrid,  was  generally  indorsed 
by  American  public  opinion  when  it  declared: 

Our  past  history  forbids  that  we  should  acquire  the 
island  of  Cuba  without  the  consent  of  Spain,  unless  justi 
fied  by  the  great  law  of  self-preservation.  We  must,  in 
any  event,  preserve  our  own  conscious  rectitude  and  our 
self-respect.  Whilst  pursuing  this  course,  we  can  afford 
to  disregard  the  censures  of  the  world,  to  which  we  have 
been  so  often  and  so  unjustly  exposed.  After  we  shall 
have  offered  Spain  a  price  for  Cuba,  far  beyond  its  pres 
ent  value,  and  this  shall  have  been  refused,  it  will  then  be 
time  to  consider  the  question:  "  Does  Cuba  in  the  pos 
session  of  Spain  seriously  endanger  our  internal  peace 
and  the  existence  of  our  cherished  Union?  "  Should  this 
question  be  answered  in  the  affirmative,  then  by  every 
law,  human  and  divine,  we  shall  be  justified  in  wresting  it 
from  Spain  if  we  possess  the  power:  and  this  upon  the 
very  same  principle  that  would  justify  an  individual  in 
tearing  down  the  burning  house  of  his  neighbour  if  there 
were  no  other  means  of  preventing  the  flames  from  de 
stroying  his  own  home.~~7 


28  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

This  bold  and  somewhat  undiplomatic  state 
ment  was  signed  by  Pierre  Soule  of  Louisiana, 
John  Young  Mason  of  Virginia,  and  James  Bu 
chanan  of  Pennsylvania;  but  neither  Congress  nor 
the  Executive  took  any  action  upon  it.  Two  years 
later,  when  Buchanan  was  elected  to  the  Presi 
dency,  it  was  thought  that  he  would  take  some  step 
toward  carrying  out  the  decided  views  he  had  ex 
pressed;  but  beyond  his  repeated  suggestion  that 
Congress  should  consider  the  purchase  of  Cuba, 
nothing  was  done.  •  All  less  pressing  questions  were 
now  thrust  aside  by  the  great  conflict  that  culmi 
nated  in  the  civil  wan 

The  prospect  of  intervention  by  the  United 
States  naturally  did  not  tend  to  allay  Cuba's  in 
ternal  troubles,  and  the  social  and  political  disorder 
of  the  island  continued.  In  1865  the  Liberal  party, 
then  in  power  at  Madrid,  made  a  characteristic  at 
tempt  to  restore  the  once  vaunted  loyalty  of  the 
Ever  Faithful  Isle,  by  referring  its  grievances  to  a 
commission  of  reform,  half  of  whose  members  were 
appointed  by  the  Government  itself,  and  the  rest 
elected  in  Cuba,  but  by  a  system  that  gave  the 
Spanish  party  control  of  the  polls.  The  Cuban  de 
mands  *  were  submitted  and  rejected  seriatim. 

Three  years  later  there  was  again  a  gleam  of 
hope  for  Cuba,  which  proved  equally  illusory. 
The  reign  of  Isabella  ended  in  a  revolution,  and 
another  constitution — one  of  the  seven  or  eight 
that  Spain  has  had  in  the  present  century — was  pro 
claimed.  On  paper,  at  least,  it  was  quite  an  ad 
vanced  one,  decreeing  universal  suffrage  and  a  free 
press,  and  granting  Cuba  and  the  Philippines  com 
plete  political  equality  with  the  mother  country ; 
but  it  was  never  put  into  operation  beyond  the 

*  The  chief  points  of  these  were  the  abolition  of  the  military  autoc 
racy  of  the  captain-general ;  representation  in  the  Cortes ;  mitigation 
of  the  press  censorship  ;  the  right  of  assembly  ;  the  lessening  of  taxa 
tion,  and  the  enforcement  of  the  laws  against  the  slave  trade. 


AMERICAN   RELATIONS   WITH   CUBA 


29 


ocean.  It  would  have  destroyed  the  political  su 
premacy  of  the  Peninsular cs,  the  Spanish  element 
that  regarded  itself  as  rightfully  the  ruling  class  in 
Spain's  colonies ;  and  Lersundi,  captain-general  at 
Havana,  simply  ignored  it.  Had  he  desired  to 
recognise  it,  the  Spanish  volunteers,  who  were  now 
established  as  the  strongest  political  force  in  Cuba, 
would  not  have  permitted  him  to  do  so. 

It  was  clear  that  the  Cubans  could  rest  no  fur 
ther  hope  on  political  agitation.  Plans  for  a  new 
revolution  were  already  afoot,  and  on 
October  I0>  l868>  the  standard  of 
revolt  was  raised  by  Carlos  Cespedes 
on  the  plantation  of  Yara,  near  Manzanillo,  in  the 
province  of  Santiago.  At  the  head  of  one  hundred 
and  forty  men,  Cespedes  proclaimed  the  Cuban  re 
public  ;  and  thus^fregan  the  Ten  Years'  War,  which,ix 
barren  of  other  results,  was  destined  to  bring  such 
frightful  losses  to  Spain  and  such  equally  terrible 
devastation  to  the  Pearl  of  the  Antilles!5 

The  military  history  of  the  Ten  Years'  War  is 
utterly  insignificant.  It  consisted  of  a  confused 
series  of  guerrilla  campaigns,  similar  to  those  that 
have  laid  Cuba  waste  during  the  last  few  years. 
There  were  frequent  reports  of  important  actions, 
which  were  always  sweeping  victories  for  the  side 
making  the  report.  It  was  several  times  announced 
that  the  insurgents  had  captured  this  or  that  city, 
but  quite  or  almost  invariably  these  triumphs  were 
purely  imaginary.  The  Spaniards  succeeded  in 
confining  the  rebellion  to  the  provinces  of  Santiago 
and  Puerto  Principe,  its  western  limit  being  prac 
tically  marked  by  the  trocha,  or  fortified  line,  which 
they  threw  across  the  island  from  Moron  to  Jucaro. 
In  the  two  eastern  provinces  they  held  the  sea- 
coast,  the  towns,  and  many  fortified  posts,  but  were 
utterly  unable  to  dislodge  the  patriots  from  the 
forest-clad  mountains  of  the  interior. 

Had  they  sent  thirty  or  forty  thousand  men  to 


30  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Cuba  on  the  outbreak  of  the  rebellion,  and  moved 
against  its  scanty  and  ill-armed  forces  with  prompt 
ness  and  vigour,  it  is  very  improbable  that  the 
Cubans  could  have  kept  the  field.  But  Spain  was 
distracted  by  domestic  troubles ;  civil  war  was 
threatened,  and  in  1872  it  broke  out,  the  Carlists 
attacking  the  supporters  of  the  Italian  Amadeo. 
Such  troops  as  could  be  spared  were  sent  over  to 
Cuba  in  driblets.  Some  were  Carlist  prisoners, 
whose  loyalty  was  doubtful.  Some  officers  high  in 
command  were  strongly  suspected  of  a  desire  to 
continue  the  war  for  the  chances  of  illegitimate 
profit  it  brought  them. 

fThere  were  shocking  atrocities  on  both  sides, 
i/terribje  waste  of  life,  and  great  destruction  of  prop 
erty.  /  Statistics  of  the  Spanish  losses  were  never 
published,  but  it  is  believed  that  during  the  ten 
years  not  less  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
soldiers  from  the  Peninsula  left  their  bones  in  Cuba 
— some  of  them  victims  of  the  bullets  or  machetes 
of  the  insurgents,  but  far  more  slain  by  the  fevers 
of  the  tropics.  The  Cubans  suffered  in  turn,  for 
half  of  the  island  was  laid  waste ;  and  though  they 
seem  never  to  have  had  more  than  a  few  thousand 
men  in  the  field  at  once — it  is  impossible  to  give  the 
exact  number,  estimates  varying  all  the  way  from 
two  thousand  to  thirty  thousand — their  losses  from 
the  hardships  of  guerrilla  warfare  were  dispropor 
tionately  heavy. 

Some  of  the  worst  excesses  of  the  war  were 
committed  by  the  Spanish  volunteers — a  force  nu 
merous  enough  to  have  suppressed  the  rebellion  had 
they  displayed  any  desire  for  active  service  in  the 
field  rather  than  for  terrorizing  the  cities.  There 
were  about  sixty  thousand  of  them  in  Cuba,  twenty 
thousand  in  Havana  alone,  and  they  carried  matters 
with  a  high  hand  in  the  capital. 

In  May,  1870,  a  performance  was  announced  at 
one  of  the  Havana  theatres  for  the  benefit  of  "  Cu- 


AMERICAN   RELATIONS  WITH   CUBA  3! 

ban  insolvents,"  which  doubtless  meant  the  insur 
gents.  A  crowd  of  armed  volunteers  broke  into  the 
house  and  poured  a  volley  into  the  audience.  In 
the  following  month,  displeased  with  the  mild  pol 
icy  of  Captain-General  Dulce,  they  arrested  him 
and  forced  him  to  sail  for  Spain — a  bold  usurpation 
in  which  the  Madrid  Government  meekly  ac 
quiesced.  In  November,  1871,  they  seized  forty- 
three  students  of  the  University  of  Havana,  charg 
ing  them  with  scratching  the  glass  in  a  cemetery 
vault  containing  the  remains  of  a  Spanish  soldier. 
The  students  were  acquitted  in  court,  whereupon 
the  volunteers  constituted  a  court-martial  of  their 
own  officers,  condemned  eight  of  the  young  men 
to  death,  and  shot  them  the  next  morning.  The 
official  paper  announced  that  "  some  negroes  had 
killed  a  volunteer,  and  two  of  them  were  summarily 
shot." 

"  It  could  not  be  expected/'  wrote  an  American 
correspondent  who  was  in  Cuba  in  1873,  "  that  the 
insurgents,  on  their  side,  should  abstain  from  fear 
ful  reprisals.  The  practice  with  them  when  a  pris 
oner,  and  especially  an  officer,  falls  into  their  hands, 
is  to  tie  his  feet  up  to  a  tree,  and  to  pile  up  fuel 
under  the  dangling  head,  thus  burning  their  enemy 
alive  with  a  slow  fire.  It  would  not  be  easy  to 
ascertain  on  which  side  the  atrocities  first  began, 
or  are  carried  to  greater  lengths." 

A  specially  sinister  reputation  was  earned  by 
the  Spanish  general,  Balmaceda  (afterward  captain- 
general  of  Cuba),  whose  proclamation  of  April  4, 
1869,  in  the  districts  of  Bayamo  and  Jiguani,  antici 
pated  the  ruthless  policy  of  Weyler  in  some  of  its 
orders : 

Every  man  from  the  age  of  fifteen  years  upward  found 
away  from  his  habitation,  who  does  not  prove  a  proper 
reason  therefor,  will  be  shot. 

Every  unoccupied  habitation  will  be  burned. 

Every  habitation  that  does  not  fly  a  white  flag,  as  a 
sign  that  its  occupants  desire  peace,  will  be  burned. 


32  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Women  not  living  at  their  own  homes,  or  at  the 
houses  of  their  relatives,  will  collect  in  the  towns  of 
Jiguani  and  Bayamo,  where  subsistence  will  be  provided. 
Those  who  do  not  present  themselves  will  be  conducted 
forcibly. 

I  It  was  only  natural  that  popular  sympathy  in 
the  United  States  should  be  strongly  enlisted  on 
behalf  of  the  insurgents.     The  spec- 
American  t     j      f      people  struggling  to  be  free 

sympathy  for          .  ,     fete        fe 

the  insurgents.  ls  one  tnat  appeals  too  strongly  to 
give  time  for  a  close  scrutiny  of  the 
standing  and  the  methods  of  those  whom  misgov- 
ernment  has  driven  to  revolt^  Washington's  sol 
diers  were  ragged  regiments,  and  partisan  warfare 
had  helped  to  whj^the  struggle  against  the  armies 
of  George  III.  \  On  the  other  side  was  a  power 
against  whom  Americans  had  a  long  series  of  griev 
ances,  and  who  represented  a  European  domination 
such  as  'they  themselves  had  cast  off.  There  was  a 
strong  demand  that  the  Government  should  form 
ally  recognise  the  insurgents  as  belligerents,  as 
had  been  done  by  some  of  the  South  American 
republics ;  but  the  Administration,  with  undoubted 
political  wisdom,  opposed  this  step,  which  would 
have  been  of  no  practical  benefit./  As  President 
Grant  said  in  his  first  annual  message  (December 
6,  1869) : 

The  contest  has  at  no  time  assumed  the  conditions 
which  amount  to  a  war  in  the  sense  of  international  law, 
or  which  would  show  the  existence  of  a  de  facto  political 
organization  of  the  insurgents  sufficient  to  justify  a  recog 
nition  of  belligerency. 

/  Conditions    had    not    changed    when    in    June, 

/   1870,  the  President  sent  to  Congress  a  special  mes- 

^-^      sage  in  which  he  described  the  shocking  state  of 

affairs  existing  in  CubzL/  It  was  a  description  that 

applied  as  well  to  the  rebellion  of  1895  as  to  that  of 

1868: 

The  condition  of  the  insurgents  has  not  improved, 
and  the  insurrection  itself,  although  not  subdued,  ex- 


AMERICAN    RELATIONS   WITH   CUBA 


33 


hibits  no  signs  of  advance,  but  seems  to  be  confined  to 
an  irregular  system  of  hostilities  carried  on  by  small 
and  illy  armed  bodies  of  men,  roaming  without  concen 
tration  through  the  woods  and  the  sparsely  populated  re 
gions  of  the  island,  attacking  from  ambush  convoys  and 
small  bands  of  troops,  burning  plantations  and  the  estates 
of  those  not  sympathizing  with  their  cause. 

But  if  the  insurrection  has  not  gained  ground,  it  is 
equally  true  that  Spain  has  not  suppressed  it.  Climate, 
disease,  and  the  occasional  bullet  have  worked  destruction 
among  the  soldiers  of  Spain;  and  although  the  Spanish 
authorities  have  possession  of  every  seaport  and  every 
town  on  the  island,  they  have  not  been  able  to  subdue  the 
hostile  feeling  which  has  driven  a  considerable  number 
of  the  native  inhabitants  of  the  island  to  armed  resistance 
against  Spain,  and  still  leads  them  to  endure  the  dangers 
and  the  privations  of  a  roaming  life  of  guerrilla  warfare. 

^Public  feeling  in  the  United  States  was  greatly 
excited  by  the  seizure  (January  21,  1869)  of  the 
American  steamer  Colonel  Lloyd  Aspinwall,  on  the 
charge,  apparently  unfounded,  that  she  had  been 
landing  arms  for  the  insurgents.  She  was  held  for 
three  months,  and  was  finally  liberated  on  the 
ground  that  she  carried  official  despatches,  the 
Spanish  Government  ignoring  repeated  protests 
from  Washington  that  her  arrest  on  the  high  seas 
was  a  violation  of  international  law.  Subsequently 
a  small  indemnity — $19,702.50  in  gold — was  paid 
to  her  owners?") 

In  March  of  the  same  year  another  American 
ship,  the  schooner  Lizzie  Major,  was  arrested  at 
sea  by  a  Spanish  frigate,  and  two  passengers, 
alleged  to  be  Cuban  revolutionists,  were  forcibly 
taken  from  her.  The  act  wa's  disclaimed,  however, 
and  the  prisoners  released.  In  May,  Captain-Gen 
eral  Dulce  attempted  to  legalize  such  seizures 
by  a  proclamation  authorizing  Spanish  men-of-war 
to  stop  and  search  foreign  vessels.  Of  course 
the  United  States  Government  promptly  pro 
tested  against  this  palpable  breach  of  the  law  of 
nations,  and  Dulce  had  to  withdraw  his  procla 
mation. 


34 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 


Much  greater  excitement  was  caused  by  the 
Virginius  affair,  which  for  a  time  made  war  ap 
pear  inevitable.  The  Virginius  was 
a  sma11  side-wheel  steamer,  British 
built,  but  claiming  a  somewhat  ques 
tionable  American  registry,  which  had  made  sev 
eral  filibustering  voyages  to  Cuba.  On  October 
31,  1873,  she  was  sighted  off  the  south  coast  of  the 
island  by  the  Spanish  gunboat  Tornado,  which 
promptly  gave  chase.  By  a  curious  coincidence  the 
two  vessels  were  sister  ships,  built  in  the  same  Eng 
lish  yard ;  and  in  the  light  of  recent  tests  of  Spanish 
and  American  seamanship  it  might  have  been  ex 
pected  that  the  Virginius  would  outrun  her  pur 
suer.  But  though  she  made  frantic  efforts  to  reach 
Jamaican  w7aters,  throwing  her  cargo  of  horses  and 
arms  overboard  to  lighten  the  ship,  as  well  as  to 
destroy  evidences  of  her  unlawful  mission,  she  was 
overhauled  and  taken  to  Santiago  de  Cuba. 

One  hundred  and  fifty-five  men  were  captured 
with  the  Virginius.  On  November  4th  four  of 
them — three  Cubans  and  one  American — were 
summarily  shot  by  order  of  the  Spanish  com 
mander,  General  Juan  Burriel.  Three  days  later, 
thirty-seven  prisoners,  one  of  whom  was  the  ship's 
commander,  Captain  Joseph  Fry,  a  former  officer 
of  the  United  States  navy,  were  taken  ashore,  lined 
up  before  a  file  of  marines,  and  shot.  These  men 
were  Cubans,  Americans,  and  British  subjects. 
The  American  and  British  consuls  protested  vehe 
mently,  but  without  effect.  On  the  8th  twelve 
more,  prisoners  suffered  the  same  fate. 

The  news  of  the  executions  was  received  with 
wild  rejoicings  in  Havana,  with  a  burst  of  horrified 
indignation  in  the  United  States.  The  Govern 
ment  at  Washington  found  itself  in  a  very  difficult 
position.  Whether  they  were  filibusters  or  not,  the 
shooting  of  American  citizens  captured  on  the  high 
seas  was  an  undisguised  outrage  upon  international 


AMERICAN    RELATIONS   WITH   CUBA 


35 


law  ;  but  the  weakness  of  the  navy — which  since  the 
end  of  the  civil  war  had  been  left  to  rot  in  de- 
fenceless  harbours — rendered  a  prompt  and  effec 
tual  protest  impossible}  A  fleet  was  ordered  to  ren 
dezvous  at  Key  West,  but  little  could  be  expected 
of  the  rusty  ironclads  and  obsolete  wooden  ships. 
The  rest  of  the  Virginius  prisoners  would  probably 
have  shared  the  doom  of  the  fifty-three  who  had 
perished  had  it  not  been  for  Sir  Lambton  Loraine, 
captain  of  the  British  sloop  of  war  Niobe,  who  ran 
into  Santiago  harbour  with  his  guns  ready  for 
action,  and  threatened  to  open  fire  on  six  Spanish 
gunboats  lying  in  the  port  if  there  were  any  fur 
ther  executions.  He  had  come  from  Jamaica  in 
answer  to  an  urgent  message  from  Mr.  F.  W. 
Ramsden,  the  British  consul  at  Santiago — a  gentle 
man  who  will  be  mentioned  again  in  this  history. 

There  followed  weeks  of  tedious  correspondence 
between  Washington  and  Madrid.  The  Spanish 
Government  declared  that  it  had  sent  orders  for 
bidding  the  shooting,  but  that  owing  to  the  interrup 
tion  of  telegraph  lines  by  the  insurgents  they  had  not 
reached  Santiago  in  time.  Finally  Spain  consented 
to  surrender  the  Virginius,  to  release  the  surviving 
Americans  in  her  crew,  to  pay  an  indemnity  of 
eighty  thousand  dollars,  to  salute  the  American 
flag,  and  to  punish  "  those  who  have  offended." 
By  way  of  carrying  out  the  last  promise,  General 
Burriel  was  promoted.  The  formal  transfer  of  the 
Virginius,  which  had  been  taken  in  triumph  to  Ha 
vana,  was  ungraciously  carried  out  in  the  obscure 
harbour  of  Bahia  Honda;  she  was  in  a  filthy  and 
unseaworthy  condition  —  the  Spaniards  had  pur 
posely  defiled  her — and  she  sank  on  her  way  to  the 
north. 

But  once  more  war  with  the  United  States  had 
been  postponed,  and  Spain  was  left  to  wreak  her 
will  in  Cuba. 


CHAPTER  III 

FROM    THE   VIRGINIUS    TO    THE    MAINE,   1873-1898 

\THE  series  of  unpleasant  incidents  that  culmi 
nated  in  the  Virginius  affair  created  a  mutual  feeling 
of  intense  bitterness  in  America  and  in  Spain)  In 
the  latter  country,  where  civil  war  was  in  progress, 
Don  Carlos  sent  an  aide-de-camp  to  Madrid  to 
propose  to  his  cousin  Alfonso,  lately  restored  to 
the  throne  of  the  Bourbons,  that  the  two  factions 
should  suspend  their  strife  to  join  forces  against 
their  common  foe,  the  United  States,  whose  arro 
gance  punished,  each  prince,should  be  free  to  assert 
his  claim  to  the  crown.  In  America  the  general 
feeling  in  favour  of  an  official  recognition  of  the 
Cuban  insurgents  was  greatly  strengthened,  and 
the  step  would  undoubtedly  have  been  taken  had  it 
not  been  for  the  opposition  of  the  Secretary  of 
State,  Mr.  Fish,  whose  advice  was  decisive  with 
President  Grant — an  opposition  that  was  unpopular 
at  the  time,  but  which  has  been  abundantly  justified 
by  later  events?? 

As  the  hope  of  American  intervention  faded, 
the  rebellion  seemed  to  wane.  In  December,  1873, 
its  lack  of  organization  was  shown  by  reports  of  dis 
sensions  among  its  leaders.  Carlos  Cespedes,  who 
had  been  designated  as  the  first  president  of  the 

*  General  Grant's  position  upon  the  question  of  recognising  the 
Cuban  insurgents  was  fully  stated  in  his  first  annual  message  (Decem 
ber  6,  1869)  ;  in  the  special  message  of  June  13,  1870;  and  in  his 
seventh  annual  message  (December  7,  1875). 

36 


FROM   THE   VIRGINIUS   TO   THE   MAINE 


37 


insurgent  republic,  was  deposed  by  the  so-called 
Cuban  congress ;  and  it  was  found  impossible  to 
agree  upon  a  successor,  though  Salvador  Cisneros 
Betancourt  assumed  the  title  of  acting  president. 
Cespedes  continued  in  the  field,  but  in  March,  1874, 
he  was  mortally  wounded  in  a  skirmish,  and  his 
death  brought  further  discouragement. 

The  war  had  dragged  on  for  two  years  more 
when  the  Spanish  Government  decided,  in  1876, 
to  make  a  supreme  effort  to  end  it. 
^ap°s87g6°esto  The  old  Bourbon  dynasty  was  now 
firmly  re-established  at  Madrid,  the 
struggle  with  the  Carlists  was  over,  and  the  man 
of  the  hour,  the  man  to  whom  Spain  owed  the  res 
toration  of  peace  and  order,  was  General  Martinez 
Campos.  With  twenty-five  thousand  soldiers,  the 
flower  of  the  Spanish  army,  he  was  sent  out  to 
Havana  as  captain-general,  in  the  hope  that  he 
would  do  for  Cuba  what  he  had  accomplished  at 
home. 

As  a  rule,  the  military  operations  of  the  Cuban 
wars  have  been  practically  limited  to  the  winter 
and  spring  months,  which  constitute  the  dry  sea 
son  ;  there  being  on  both  sides  a  wholesome  dread 
of  the  climatic  terrors  of  the  summer  and  early 
autumn,  which  decimated  the  American  troops  dur 
ing  the  brief  Santiago  campaign  of  1898.  Campos's 
first  winter,  that  of  1876-^77,  passed  without  any 
tangible  result ;  and  he  found  his  task  so  heavy  that 
he  turned  over  the  captain-general's  office  to  Gen 
eral  Jovellar,  devoting  himself  solely  to  his  work  in 
the  field  against  the  insurgents.  Perhaps  the  most 
patriotic  and  clear-sighted  public  man  that  his 
country  has  produced  in  our  time,  he  recognised 
that  Spain's  policy  in  Cuba  had  been  a  disastrous 
failure.  In  one  of  his  reports — a  remarkable  docu 
ment,  which  must  have  been  read  with  unpleasant 
surprise  in  Madrid — he  openly  arraigned  its  blun 
ders  and  crimes : 


38  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

The  insurrection  here,  acknowledging  as  its  cause  the 
hatred  of  Spain,  is  due  to  the  causes  that  have  separated 
our  other  colonies  from  the  mother  country,  intensified 
by  the  fact  that  promises  made  to  Cuba  at  different  times 
have  not  been  fulfilled;  that,  as  I  understand  it,  their  ful 
filment,  when  begun,  has  been  forbidden  by  order  of  the 
Cortes. 

When  one  day  after  another  passed  without  the 
island's  hopes  being  realized,  the  concessions  occasionally 
granted  by  this  or  that  governor  being  more  than  can 
celled  by  his  successor;  when  bad  officials  and  a  worse  ad 
ministration  of  justice  aggravated  the  existing  disorders; 
when  the  provincial  governorships,  continually  growing 
more  corrupt,  fell  at  last  into  the  hands  of  men  without 
training  or  education,  petty  tyrants  who  could  practise 
their  thefts,  and  sometimes  their  oppressions,  because  of 
their  distance  from  the  supreme  authority;  then  public 
opinion  began  urgently  to  desire  those  liberties  which,  if 
they  bring  much  good,  contain  also  some  evil,  especially 
when  applied  to  a  country  that  has  so  peculiar  a  life  of 
its  own,  and  is  not  prepared  for  them. 

Seeing  that  pacification  by  the  sword  was  im 
possible,  and  that  to  prolong  the  war  meant  ruin 
to  Cuba  and  disastrous  loss  to  Spain, 
The  compro-        Campos  resolved  to  attempt  concilia- 

mise  of  Zanjon,        .         *    TT.       ~  c   f    .,      ,    , 

Feb.  jo,  1878.  tlon-  His  first  negotiation  failed  be 
cause  the  insurgent  leaders  to  whom 
he  made  overtures,  and  who  expressed  a  desire  for 
peace,  were  murdered  by  the  irreconcilables  who 
had  decreed  death  to  any  one  treating  with  the 
Spaniards  except  on  the  basis  of  independence.  In 
spite  of  this  outrage  he  succeeded  in  communicat 
ing  with  Vicente  Garcia,  who  had  recently  been 
named  to  succeed  Cisneros  as  head  of  the  insur 
gent  government,  and  on  the  7th  of  February, 
1878,  the  two  commanders  had  a  seven  hours'  in 
terview  at  Chorrilla,  near  Las  Tunas.  On  the 
loth  there  was  a  second  meeting,  at  Zanjon,  be 
tween  Campos  and  ten  Cuban  commissioners,  of 
whom  Garcia  was  one  and  Maximo  Gomez  an 
other  ;  and  here  was  signed  the  document,  variously 
called  the  treaty  or  compromise  of  Zanjon,  which 
ended  the  Ten  Years'  War.  These  were  its  terms : 


FROM    THE   VIRGINIUS   TO   THE   MAINE       39 

ARTICLE  I.  Concessions  to  the  island  of  Cuba  of  the 
political,  organic,  and  administrative  privileges  accorded 
to  the  island  of  Porto  Rico.* 

ART.  II.  Forgetfulness  of  the  past  as  regards  political 
offences  committed  from  1868  to  the  present  time,  and 
amnesty  for  all  now  under  sentence  for  such  offences  in  or 
put  of  the  island;  full  pardon  to  deserters  from  the  Span 
ish  army,  irrespective  of  nationality,  including  all  who  had 
taken  part  in  revolutionary  movements. 

ART.  III.  Freedom  to  the  Asiatic  coolies  and  the 
slaves  who  are  now  in  the  revolutionary  ranks. 

ART.  IV.  No  one  who  by  virtue  of  this  convention  rec 
ognises  and  remains  under  protection  of  the  Spanish  Gov 
ernment  shall  be  compelled  to  render  any  military  service 
until  peace  be  established  throughout  the  island. 

ART.  V.  All  persons  affected  by  these  provisions  who 
desire  to  leave  the  island  without  stopping  in  any  town 
shall  receive  the  aid  of  the  Spanish  Government  to  that  end. 

ART.  VI.  The  capitulation  of  the  forces  shall  take 
place  in  the  open  field,  where,  preferably,  the  arms  and 
military  equipments  shall  be  surrendered. 

ART.  VII.  The  commander-in-chief  of  the  Spanish 
army,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  disbanding  of  the  several 
sections  of  the  Cuban  army,  will  place  at  their  disposal 
the  railway  and  steamship  facilities  at  his  command. 

ART.  VIII.  This  agreement  with  the  central  committee 
shall  be  considered  general  and  without  special  restric 
tions,  extending  to  all  departments  of  the  island  accept 
ing  these  conditions. 

To  the  terms  of  this  treaty  the  signature  of 
Campos  morally — though  perhaps  not  technically, 
as  there  seems  to  have  been  a  convenient  vagueness 
about  his  authority  to  treat  with  the  insurgents — 
committed  the  Spanish  Government ;  and  after 
provisionally  establishing  a  system  for  the  election 
of  Cuban  deputies  to  the  Cortes,  he  went  back  to 
Madrid  to  secure  the  execution  of  the  agreement. 
The  premier,  Canovas  del  Castillo,  declared  that 
Spain  could  accept  nothing  but  the  complete  sub 
jection  of  Cuba,  and  resigned  office  to  avoid  sub 
mitting  a  compromise  to  the  legislature.  Campos 

*  These  were  substantially  identical  with  the  concessions  demanded 
by  the  Cubans  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Ten  Years'  War,  and  enu 
merated  on  page  28  (footnote). 


40  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

took  the  vacant  place,  but  found  himself  unable  to 
form  a  cabinet  that  would  accept  his  plans,  and 
gave  up  the  attempt  in  despair.  Canovas  returned 
to  the  premiership,  and  the  promises  of  Zanjon 
were  laid  aside. 

Cuba  still  had  her  right  of  representation  at 
Madrid,  but  even  that  was  speedily  rendered  little 
more  than  a  mockery.  The  Pcninsulares  regarded 
themselves  as  entitled  to  a  political  domination  over 
the  Insulares  as  natural  as  that  exercised  by  the 
white  men  of  the  Southern  States  over  their  seven 
million  negro  fellow-citizens ;  and  their  methods 
of  insuring  their  supremacy  were  as  ingenious  and 
as  unscrupulous  as  anything  yet  devised  in  Louisi 
ana  or  Mississippi.  The  franchise  was  limited  to 
those  paying  a  tax  of  twenty-five  dollars  annually — 
a  provision  which  excluded  all  but  the  richer  Cu 
bans,  many  of  whom,  especially  in  former  years, 
were  loyal  to  the  Spanish  connection,  mainly 
through  dread  of  the  disorders  of  civil  war.  But 
to  prevent  the  disfranchisement  of  Spaniards,  all 
government  employees,  and  all  persons  recognised 
as  belonging  to  any  mercantile  company,  were 
registered  as  voters  without  taxation. 

The  result  was  that  the  Peninsular es,  number 
ing  not  more  than  one  sixth  of  the  total  population, 
were  enabled  to  carry  most  of  the  election  districts. 
In  1 879,"  of  forty  delegates,  ten  were  Cuban  autono 
mists,  thirty  Spanish  or  Cuban  conservatives,  and 
the  disproportion  grew  still  more  marked  at  later 
elections.  In  1886,  of  thirty-eight  delegates,  eight 
were  autonomists,  thirty  conservatives,  all  but  four 
of  the  latter  being  Spanish  born ;  in  1896,  of  thirty 
delegates,  all  but  four  were  Spaniards.  Some  of 
the  Spanish  candidates  were  men  who  had  never 
seerj^Cuba. 

/The  Ten  Years'  War  was  followed  by  seventeen 
years  of  comparative  quietude  in  Cuba.  There  was 
official  friction  with  the  United  States,  but  not  so 


FROM    THE   VIRGINIUS   TO   THE    MAINE       4I 

serious  as  to  create  an  alarm  of  war,  though  in  1880 
Mr.  Evarts,  then  Secretary  of  State,  sent  an  urgent 
protest  to  Madrid  against  a  "  grave 
affront  to  the  honour  and  dignity  of 
our  flag  "  in  the  overhauling  of  four 
Amencan  vessels  by  Spanish  gunboats 
off  the  Cuban  coas*t7  There  were  minor  internal  dis 
orders — banditry  in  the  hills,  the  legacy  of  years 
of  guerrilla  warfare,  and  plots,  or  suspicions  of 
plots,  in  the  cities ;  but  no  disturbance  loud  enough 
to  reach  the  ears  of  the  outside  world.  The  diary 
of  Captain-General  Polavieja,  subsequently  pub 
lished  in  Madrid,  records  that  in  1892  he  executed 
no  less  than  sixty-three  prisoners  accused  of  trea 
sonable  conspiracy  against  the  existing  regime. 
During  the  following  year  there  were  two  more 
attempts  at  insurrection — one  under  the  Sartorius 
brothers  in  the  province  of  Santiago,  the  other  un 
der  Esquirre  in  Santa  Clara;  but  both  were  feeble 
and  futile. 

It  would  not  be  fair  to  say  that  the  Spanish 
Government  made  no  attempt  whatever  to  improve 
the  condition  of  Cuba.  The  burden  of  taxation, 
which  had  been  mercilessly  extortionate,  was  made 
less  crushing.  The  Cuban  budget  for  1878— '79  was 
more  than  forty-six  million  dollars ;  that  of  1882, 
a  little  less  than  thirty-six  millions ;  that  of  1893, 
twenty-three  millions.  Of  the  other  reforms,  or 
pretended  reforms,  some  were  farcical  in  their 
worthlessness ;  others,  perhaps  well  meant  by  their 
authors  at  Madrid,  were  frustrated  by  the  official 
dom  of  Cuba,  whose  morale  was  hinted  at  in  Cam- 
pos's  report,  already  quoted. 

Under  the  changes  effected  in  the  Spanish  con 
stitution  in  1876,  the  government  of  Cuba,  hitherto 
regarded  as  an  appanage  of  the  crown,  was  trans 
ferred  to  the  Cortes.  This  was  not  proclaimed  in 
the  island  until  five  years  later,  and  then  proved  to 
be  a  reform  only  in  name.  In  1892  the  qualifica- 


42  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

tion  for  the  franchise  was  reduced  from  twenty-five 
dollars  a  year  in  taxes  to  five  dollars ;  but  the 
extension  of  the  suffrage  had  no  apparent  influ 
ence  upon  the  result  of  the  elections,  as  re 
turned  by  the  Spanish  authorities  in  control  of  the 
polls.  In  1895  it  was  announced  that  the  mili 
tary  power  of  the  captain-general  was  to  be  tem 
pered  by  a  council  of  thirty  members,  but  the 
constitution  of  the  advisory  body  was  character 
istic.  Of  its  thirty  members,  fifteen  were  to  be  ap 
pointed  by  the  crown,  fifteen  elected  in  Cuba,  and 
to  muzzle  any  champion  of  popular  rights  who 
might  slip  into  it,  the  captain-general  was  empow 
ered  to  suspend  at  will  any  fourteen  councillors, 
and  with  the  consent  of  certain  officials — all  pretty 
sure  to  be  Peninsula-res — to  dismiss  the  entire  body. 

Spaniards  who  recount  these  efforts  at  concilia 
tion,  and  bewail  the  ingratitude  of  the  colony  that 
is  now  lost  to  them,  add  that  taxes  are  proportion 
ately  higher  in  the  Peninsula  than  they  were  in 
Cuba ;  that  the  Cubans  have  had  the  privilege  of 
exemption  from  the  conscription ;  and  that  the 
long  maintenance  of  slavery,  in  the  face  of  strenu 
ous  opposition,  was  a  special  favour  to  the  indus 
tries  of  the  island.  They  do  not  add*  that  it  may 
have  been  because  Spain  dared  not  arm  and  train 
the  Cubans  that  she  asked  no  military  service  from 
them ;  or  that  the  connivance  at  human  servitude 
suited  the  interests  of  peculating  Spanish  office 
holders  rather  than  the  public  sentiment  of  Cuba. 
None  of  these  excuses  can  palliate  the  fact  that  the 
island  was  utterly,  hopelessly,  and  shamelessly  mis 
governed,  under  a  vicious  system  badly  adminis 
tered  by  corrupt  officials. 

Under  such  conditions,  the  recurrence  of  dis 
order  was  inevitable.  It  is  idle  to  discuss  whether 
those  who  began  the  latest  rebellion  were  justified 
in  drawing  the  sword.  They  were  men  who  saw 
the  Ten  Years'  War,  and  who  must  have  foreseen, 


FROM    THE   VIRGINIUS   TO   THE    MAINE 


43 


if  they  foresaw  anything,  that  in  raising  the  stand 
ard  of  revolt  they  were  dooming  the  island  they 
professed  to  love  to  years  of  blood  and  ruin,  of  an 
archy  and  starvation.  Revolt  is  justified  only  when 
it  has  the  prospect  of  military  success ;  and  could 
these  leaders  of  small  guerrilla  bands  expect  to  cope 
with  Spain's  army  and  navy?  Events  brought 
them  a  mighty  ally,  but  Gomez  and  Maceo  and 
their  comrades  have  much  to  answer  for  besides  the 
ending  of  Spanish  rule  in  the  West  Indies.  And 
yet — we  think  of  the  "  embattled  farmers  "  who 
defied  the  power  of  George  III,  and  sympathy 
silences  criticism. 

The  24th  of  February,  1895,  was  a  day  of  ex 
citement  in  Havana,  and  of  consternation  in  the 

palace  of  the  captain-general,  Don 
ofhie895ebe  Emilio  Calleja.  There  were  tidings 

of  new  revolts  both  in  the  east 
and  in  the  west.  Juan  Gomez  had  taken  the  field, 
near  Matanzas,  with  a  small  band  of  followers;  at 
Manzanillo,  Bartolome  Masso  was  at  the  head  of 
two  hundred  men ;  and  at  several  points  in  the 
province  of  Santiago  there  were  risings  tinder  Jesus 
Rabi,  Guillermo  Mon^ada,  and  other  rebel  leaders. 
Calleja  at  once  proclaimed  a  state  of  siege,  and  tele 
graphed  to  Madrid  for  assistance.  There  were 
about  eighteen  thousand  Spanish  troops  in  the 
island,  besides  the  volunteers,  but,  as  is  quite  usual 
with  Spanish  troops,  they  were  poorly  supplied  and 
equipped.  Little  had  been  done  to  modernize  the 
mediseval  fortifications  of  the  chief  cities ;  the  cap 
tain-general  had  scarcely  any  artillery,  and  only 
eleven  small  cruisers  and  gunboats  to  patrol  a  coast 
line  of  two  thousand  miles.  The  neglect  and  in 
efficiency  of  the  Spanish  military  administration 
was  a  powerful  ally  to  the  rebels. 

The  revolutionists  in  Matanzas,  or  a  part  of 
them,  were  speedily  forced  to  surrender  to  the  gov 
ernor  of  the  province,  who  thereupon  reported  his 


44 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 


district  as  "  pacified  " ;  but  further  east  the  Span 
iards  were  practically  powerless,  and  the  rebellion 
spread  like  a  prairie  fire.  In  the  province  of  Santi 
ago,  within  three  weeks  several  thousand  men, 
armed  with  rifles  or  machetes,  had  flocked  to  its 
standard,  and  the  Spanish  troops  found  themselves 
unable  to  leave  their  fortified  posts  without  subject 
ing  themselves  to  guerrilla  attacks.  The  gravity  of 
the  situation  was  appreciated  both  at  Havana  and 
at  Madrid,  for  on  the  2/th  of  March  Captain-Gen 
eral  Calleja  resigned,  and  next  day  the  cabinet  of 
Premier  Canovas  del  Castillo  met  to  decide  upon 
heroic  measures. 

Campos,  who  had  once  pacified  Cuba  with 
promises  which  he  had  not  been  allowed  to  fulfil, 
was  again  summoned  to  save  for  Spain  the  Pearl 
of  the  Antilles.  He  can  scarcely  have  approached 
the  task  with  confidence,  or  without  reluctance ; 
but  he  accepted  the  commission,  and  sailed 
promptly — not  to  Havana,  but  to  the  troubled  east, 
the  headquarters  of  the  rebellion,  landing  at  Guan- 
tanamo  on  the  i6th  of  April,  1895.  Three  gun 
boats  were  sent  at  the  same  time  to  Cuban  waters, 
twelve  thousand  additional  troops  were  ordered 
from  Spain,  and  an  unlimited  credit  was  voted  by 
the  Cortes  for  the  expenses  of  the  war. 

Meanwhile  the  rebels  had  received  important 
accessions,  for  the  chieftains  of  the  Ten  Years'  War, 
who  had  sought  safety  in  exile,  now  returned  to 
strike  another  blow  at  Spain.  On  the  ist  of  April 
the  two  negro  leaders,  Antonio  and  Jose  Maceo, 
landed  near  Baracoa,  easily  avoiding  the  Spanish 
gunboats;  and  on  the  nth  they  were  followed  by 
Jose  Marti,  who  assumed  the  provisional  headship 
of  the  government  nominally  established  by  the  in 
surgents,  and  by  Maximo  Gomez,  who  was  recog 
nised  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  scattered  and 
scantily  equipped  "  army  of  liberation." 

Campos's  first  plan  of  campaign  was  to  confine 


FROM    THE   VIRGINIUS   TO   THE   MAINE      45 

the  insurrection  to  the  Santiago  province,  and  he 
posted  ten  thousand  troops  along  the  Puerto  Prin 
cipe  border.  Marti  was  killed  in  attempting  to 
break  through  the  cordon,  but  Gomez  made  his  way 
into  Puerto  Principe  ;  and  during  the  summer, 
when  hostilities  slackened,  he  remained  there,  or 
ganizing  the  rebellion,  threatening  the  Spanish  posi 
tions,  and  beginning  his  work  of  destruction  among 
the  plantations  and  the  railroads.  At  the  approach 
of  the  dry  season  he  moved  westward  again,  in  con 
cert  with  Antonio  Maceo. 

During  the  Ten  Years'  War  a  main  feature  of 

the  Spanish  military  policy  was  the  maintenance  of 

the  trocha,   or  fortified  line   running 

Campos^'  aCr°SS    thC    islaild    fl"0m    M°r0n    t0   JU- 

caro,  near  the  western  boundary  of 
Puerto  Principe  ;  and  this  line  Campos  now  at 
tempted  to  hold  against  Gomez  and  Maceo.  As  a 
question  of  strategy,  his  judgment  was  of  doubtful 
wisdom.  Although  he  massed  along  the  trocha 
troops  that  might  have  been  better  employed  in 
attacking  and  following  up  the  enemy,  it  was  im 
possible  to  guard  its  fifty  miles  of  length  effectually. 
Gomez  and  Maceo  had  little  difficulty  in  crossing 
the  barrier  when  hostilities  reopened  in  the  autumn 
of  1895. 

With  fire  and  sword  the  rebel  leaders  continued 
their  westward  advance.  Campos  marched  in  pur 
suit,  but  their  rapid  movements  and  better  knowl 
edge  of  the  country  baffled  him.  Their  forces  were 
usually  split  into  small  commands,  which  engaged 
the  Spaniards  only  when  they  could  intercept  a 
convoy  or  ambush  a  detachment.  In  spite  of 
Spain's  determined  efforts  to  crush  the  revolt  —  fifty 
thousand  soldiers  were  sent  to  Cuba  during  the 
summer  and  autumn,  and  in  November  General 
Pando  sailed  from  Cadiz  with  thirty  thousand  more 
—  her  ablest  commander,  when  he  entered  Havana 
on  the  day  before  Christmas,  appeared  there  as  a 


OF   TltS 

,-r-KTTVfTRsrrY 


46  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

defeated  general,  while  Gomez  followed  him  with 
impunity  almost  within  sight  of  the  capital.  The 
smoke  of  burning  villages  and  plantations  could  be 
seen  from  the  suburbs,  and  the  railroads  running 
out  of  the  city  were  paralyzed  by  the  destruction  of 
bridges  and  trains. 

Unsuccessful  in  the  field,  and  assailed  by  a  fierce 
storm  of  criticism  both  in  Havana  and  from  Spain, 
Campos  resigned  his  command,  and  on  January  17, 
1896,  it  was  announced  from  Madrid  that  General 
Valeriano  Weyler  had  been  selected  to  succeed 
him.  This  appointment,  which  was  regarded  as 
foreshadowing  a  stringent  and  vigorous  prosecu 
tion  of  the  war,  was  received  with  delight  by  the 
Peninsular  es,  with  bitter  resentment  by  the  Cubans 
and  their  sympathizers.  As  an  officer  in  the  Ten 
Years'  War  Weyler  was  accused  of  numerous  and 
shocking  cruelties.  The  charges  may  have  been 
false,  as  were  many  of  those  brought  against  him 
later;  but  he  speedily  proved  himself  truculent 
enough. 

Weyler  reached  Havana  on  the  loth  of  Feb 
ruary.  On  the  I7th  he  issued  a  sweeping  proclama 
tion  ordering  a  summary  military 


conviction,  for  fourteen  specified  of 
fences,  including  the  furnishing  of 
arms,  provisions,  horses,  or  any  other  assistance  to 
the  rebels  ;  the  disclosing  of  telegraph  messages  to 
any  but  the  proper  official  ;  the  invention  or  circu 
lation  of  any  news  directly  or  indirectly  favouring 
the  rebellion  ;  the  speaking  or  writing  of  anything 
that  might  belittle  the  prestige  of  Spain  or  of  the 
Spanish  army.  He  further  ordered  that  in  the  two 
eastern  provinces,  Puerto  Principe  and  Santiago, 
all  stores  in  country  districts  should  be  vacated  by 
their  owners,  and  that  no  person  should  go  abroad 
without  a  passport  issued  by  the  military  com 
manders. 


FROM   THE   VIRGINIUS   TO   THE   MAINE 


47 


It  would  be  useless  to  attempt  to  follow  in  detail 
the  campaigns  of  1896  and  1897.  The  struggle 
continued  to  be  a  confused  series  of  guerrilla  com 
bats,  destructive  yet  indecisive,  uninteresting  to 
the  historian  and  utterly  valueless  to  the  student  of 
tactics.  The  facts  of  the  situation  were  constantly 
obscured  by  a  cloud  of  false  statements.  The  offi 
cial  bulletins,  chronicling  nothing  but  Spanish 
successes,  were  manifestly  unreliable.  Reports 
from  insurgent  sources  were  still  more  irresponsi 
ble  and  imaginative. 

It  may  be  regarded  as  strange  that  the  Ameri 
can  newspaper  press,  with  its  record  of  almost 
invincible  enterprise,  should  have 
allowed  years  of  civil  strife  in  Cuba, 
an  island  so  close  to  the  shores  of 
the  great  republic,  and  bound  to  it  by  so  many 
ties  of  interest,  to  pass  without  a  more  earnest  and 
successful  effort  to  record  the  exact  facts  of  the 
case.  While  Campos  was  in  command,  corre 
spondents  were  free  to  go  and  come  throughout 
the  island,  and  to  investigate  the  character  and 
progress  of  the  struggle;  but  little  or  nothing  was 
done  in  this  direction.  Certainly  not  one  of 
them  went  afield  with  the  Spanish  forces.  Wey- 
ler,  from  the  first,  was  less  accommodating  to 
newspaper  men ;  few  soldiers  regard  them  with 
special  affection — witness  Kitchener  in  the  Sou 
dan,  Otis  at  Manila,  and  sundry  generals  in  the 
civil  war ;  but  he  did  not  begin  to  expel  them  until 
he  had  received  very  serious  provocation.  A  corre 
spondent  is  always  held  responsible  for  the  news 
that  appears  in  the  periodical  he  represents,  and 
any  commander  might  well  resent  the  utterly  un 
scrupulous  fakes — if  that  expressive  term  may  be 
employed — continually  published  by  certain  sheets 
which  loudly  proclaim  themselves  the  leaders  of 
American  journalism,  and  which  the  foreigner  may 
be  pardoned  for  accepting  as  such. 


48  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR 

An  exposure — which  apparently  stands  uncon- 
tradicted  and  imcontroverted — of  this  long  series 
of  misstatements  has  been  published  by  Mr.  George 
Bronson  Rea,  one  of  the  very  few  American  corre 
spondents  who  witnessed  any  considerable  amount 
of  righting  in  Cuba.  According  to  Mr.  Rea's  Facts 
and  Fakes  About  Cuba,  there  were  only  three,  or 
possibly  four,  who  can  truthfully  claim  to  have  done 
so.  Of  the  dozens  of  others  who  started  for  the 
seat  of  war  in  1896  and  1897,  many  seem  to  have 
gone  no  farther  south  than  Florida,  where  they 
found  abundant  material  for  sensational  stories  in 
the  information  they  gathered  from  Cuban  labor- 
antes — a  class  with  whom  the  invention  of  news 
favourable  to  the  insurgents  may  be  said  to  have 
been  a  recognised  duty. 

!  It  is  from  this  source  that  American  newspapers 
received  the  imaginative  tales  that  only  need  to  be 
collected  and  compared,  as  they  are  in  Mr.  Rea's 
book,  to  make  evident  their  reckless  inconsistencies 
and  extreme  improbabilities — the  stories  of  desper 
ate  battles,  when  in  the  whole  war  there  was 
scarcely  an  action  that  deserved  the  name ;  of  the 
capture  of  fortified  towns,  of  terrible  machete 
charges,  of  dynamite  guns  that  mowed  down  whole 
Spanish  battalions,  of  the  marvellous  prowess  of 
regiments  of  Cuban  Amazons — all  equally  ficti 
tious  ;  of  the  thorough  organization,  civil  and  mili 
tary,  of  the  rebel  government ;  of  its  "  capital  "  at 
Cubitas,  of  its  school  system  and  postal  service — 
almost  all  of  which  were  mere  figments  of  the  im 
agination.  Spanish  atrocities,  which  may  have  oc 
curred,  but  which  were  established  solely  by  hear 
say  evidence,  were  contrasted  with  the  miraculous 
and  incredible  clemency  said  to  distinguish  the  in 
surgent  chiefs.] 

/As  a  typical  instance,  out  of  scores  that  might 

given,  take  the  case  of  the  alleged  outrage  upon 
a  Cuban  woman,  a  passenger  on  the  American 


FROM    THE   VIRGINIUS   TO   THE    MAINE      49 

steamer  Olivette,  who  in  February,  1897,  was 
charged  with  carrying  documents  for  the  insurgents, 
and  was  searched  before  being  allowed 

to  leave  Havana-  A  New  York 
newspaper  *  paraded  this  as  a  sensa 
tion,  and  published  a  large  engraving  showing 
the  woman  stripped  naked,  standing  before  three 
Spanish  officials.  The  not  unnatural  result  was  a 
burst  of  public  indignation  at  what  appeared  to  be  , 
a  very  shocking  incident — until  the  correspondent 
who  had  furnished  the  story  emphatically  dis 
claimed  it  in  any  such  guise  as  that  in  which  his 
paper  presented  it.  The  woman  had  been  searched 
only  by  a  female  inspector,  privately,  in  a  state 
room  ;  the  sensational  picture  had  been  drawn  by 
an  artist  who  was  not  present,  and  who  very  care 
lessly  and  culpably  relied  upon  his  imagination.  ! 

fThe  newspaper  press  possesses  much  less  prac 
tical  and  direct  political   influence   in   the  United     /Jj 
States    than    unthinking    observers    suppose.      All  V 
this  journalistic  misrepresentation  was  unfortunate, 
but  it  had  no  effect  upon  the  policy  of  either  the 
Cleveland    or   the    McKinley    Administration]    ^It 
aroused  Spanish  resentment,  created  false  impres 
sions  in  America,  and  led  to  utterances  in  Congress     /' 
that  were  unwise  and  regrettable  ;  but  it  could  never  ^ 
have  brought  on  a  war.    That  came,  primarily,  from  ^ 
the  inevitable  logic  of  an  age-long  situation,  and  '" 
was  immediately  precipitated  by  the  terxlble  and  un 
foreseen  disaster  of  the  Maine  explosion./ 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  during  the  last  two  months 
of  Campos's  command  the  Cuban  rebellion  reached 
its    high-water   mark,    and   from   the 
fam'nfa^d^      arrival  of  Weyler  it  steadily  declined, 
death.  "  To  the  Spaniards,  indeed,  the  cost  of 

the    war,    in    men    and    money,    con 
tinued  to  be  frightful,  and  even  ruinous ;  nor  was 

*  The  New  York  Journal,  February  12,  1897.     The  reporter  was 
Mr.  Richard  Harding  Davis,  the  artist  Mr.  Frederic  Remington. 


50  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

there  any  apparent  prospect  of  restoring  peace  and 
order  in  Cuba  so  long  as  the  last  of  the  native  in 
habitants  remained  alive  to  face  the  starvation  that 
was  closing  in  upon  them ;  but  it  became  more  and 
more  clear  that  the  insurgents  were  hopeless  of 
military  success.  Antonio  Maceo,  by  general  testi 
mony  the  most  soldierly  of  the  Cuban  leaders,  was 
hemmed  in  in  Pinar  del  Rio,  the  trocha  that 
stretched  from  Mariel  to  Majana  cutting  him  off 
from  Gomez,  who  seems  to  have  made  no  effort  to 
succour  him ;  and  when  he  made  his  way  across  the 
trocha  with  a  few  followers,  in  December,  1896,  he 
was  killed  in  a  chance  encounter  with  Spanish 
troops.  His  successor  in  command  of  the  insur 
gents  in  the  west,  Rius  Rivera,  was  captured  in 
March,  1897,  and  deported.  His  brother,  Jose 
Maceo,  had  fallen  in  the  preceding  July.  The 
operations  of  Gomez,  of  whom  so  much  was  heard 
in  the  first  year  of  the  war,  seem  to  have  degener 
ated  into  mere  guerrilla  tactics — if,  indeed,  they 
ever  were  anything  else. 

Seldom  caring  to  take  the  offensive,  the  insur 
gents  were  constantly  aided  in  eluding  the  Span 
iards  by  the  fact  that  most  of  the  rural  population 
were  ready  to  serve  as  spies,  carrying  information 
of  every  movement  attempted  by  the  Spanish  com 
manders.  \  It  was  to  prevent  this,  and  to  render  it 
more  difficult  for  the  enemy  to  obtain  food,  that 
Weyler  issued  his  reconcentration  order — an  order 
that  brought  detestation  upon  his  name,  that  was 
rightly  denounced  by  President  McKinley  as 
"brutal"  and  "horrible,"  and  that^ proved  disas 
trous  to  both  parties  in  the  struggle.!  It  may  have 
been  as  much  of  a  military  necessity  as  Sheridan's 
devastation  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  but  its  effects 
were  so  cruel  that  it  proved  to  be  one  of  those  blun 
ders  that  are  worse  than  crimes. 

Yet  it  is  easy  to  show — not  as  any  excuse  for  its 
author — that  reconcentration  was  not  the  only  nor 


FROM   THE   VIRGINIUS   TO   THE   MAINE       5! 

indeed  the  main  cause  of  famine  and  death  in  Cuba. 
The  sufferings  of  the  pacificos  began  before  it  was 
inaugurated  and  continued  after  it  ended.  Weyler's 
first  bando  directing  the  country  people  to  assemble 
in  the  fortified  towns  was  issued  October  21,  1896, 
and  the  new  policy  was  not  in  general  operation 
before  February,  1.897,  to  be  revoked  by  Blanco's 
decree  of  November  I3th  in  that  year;  but  as  far 
back  as  December,  1895,  there  were  reports  of  thou 
sands  of  refugees  flying  to  the  cities  from  the  dev 
astated  rural  districts.  In  his  report  presented  at 
the  meeting  of  Congress  in  1896,  Mr.  Olney,  then 
Secretary  of  State,  said  : 

It  is  officially  reported  that  there  are  in  one  provin 
cial  city  alone  some  four  thousand  necessitous  refugees 
from  the  surrounding  country,  to  whom  the  municipal  au 
thorities  can  afford  little  or  no  relief. 

It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  evidence  of  this 
state  of  affairs,  and  it  is  equally  easy  to  discover 
reasons  for  it.  How  could  there  but  be  destitution 
and  suffering  when  all  the  industries  of  the  island 
were  practically  suspended — when  plantations  were 
burned  on  every  hand,  factories  razed  and  railroads 
destroyed,  while  a  considerable  part  of  the  able- 
bodied  male  population,  instead  of  working  to  sup 
port  their  families,  took  to  the  woods 
as  guerrilla  warriors? 

General  Gomez,  in  the  letter  he 
sent  to  President  McKinley  in  February,  1898,  had 
the  effrontery  to  assert : 

The  revolution,  as  master  of  the  country,  has  never 
prohibited  any  citizen,  whatever  his  nationality,  from 
earning  his  living. 

This  was  the  same  commander  who  issued  the 
following  proclamation  under  date  of  November 
6,  1895: 

ARTICLE  I.  All  plantations  shall  be  totally  destroyed, 
their  sugar  cane  and  outbuildings  burned,  and  railroad 
connections  destroyed. 


52  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

ART.  II.  All  labourers  who  shall  aid  the  sugar  fac 
tories  shall  be  considered  as  traitors  to  their  country. 

ART.  III.  All  who  are  caught  in  the  act,  or  whose  vio 
lation  of  Article  II  shall  be  proven,  shall  be  shot.  Let  all 
officers  of  the  army  of  liberty  comply  with  this  order,  de 
termined  to  unfurl  triumphantly,  even  over  ruin  and  ashes, 
the  flag  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba. 

Such,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  was  the  deliberate  pol 
icy  of  the  insurgents  throughout  the  war.  As  early 
as  March,  1895,  an  American  traveller  who  was  in 
eastern  Cuba  during  the  first  two  weeks  of  the  re 
bellion,  said  that  4k  the  most  deplorable  feature  of 
the  warfare  is  the  pillaging  and  burning  done  by 
the  insurgents  " ;  and  so  it  continued  to  the  end. 
Gomez's  order  was  frequently  and  emphatically  re 
iterated  by  those  of  other  chieftains ;  witness  one 
of  Antonio  Maceo's,  dated  June  9,  1896: 

Allow  me  to  impress  on  you  the  necessity  of  employ 
ing  all  means  to  destroy  the  railroads  in  your  district,  and 
to  blow  up  trains  and  bridges  with  dynamite. 

It  is  also  advisable  to  destroy  all  houses  that  may 
offer  refuge  or  shelter  to  the  Spanish  troops,  and  to  ren 
der  useless  all  corn  and  tobacco  found  deposited  in  your 
territory. 

Here  is  another  signed  by  "  Jose  B.  Aleman, 
Secretary  of  War,"  and  dated  December  2,  1897 : 

Considering  that  the  working  of  the  sugar  estates  fa 
vours  the  plans  of  our  enemies,  as  shown  by  the  marked 
interest  in  their  last  winter  campaign,  thus  injuring  the 
steady  headway  of  the  revolution: 

It  has  been  ordered  by  our  government  ...  to  abso 
lutely  prohibit  the  realization  of  the  sugar  crop  of  1897- 
'98.  .  .  .  Violators  will  suffer  the  punishment  prescribed 
by  our  laws. 

The  practical  working  of  these  ruthless  edicts, 
and  their  effect  upon  the  starving  plantation  hands 
of  Cuba,  may  be  illustrated  by  a  few  quotations 
from  the  official  reports  of  the  American  consuls  in 
Cuba — authorities  unlikely  to  be  unduly  favourable 
to  the  Spaniards.  Mr.  Barker  wrote  from  Sagua  la 
Grande,  December  28,  1897  : 


FROM    THE   VIRGINIUS   TO    THE    MAINE 


53 


This  (Santa  Clara)  province  is  capable  this  season  of 
producing  perhaps  two  thirds  of  whatever  cane  might  be 
made  in  the  entire  island.  To  grind  this  cane  without  in 
terruption  would  be  the  means  of  saving  the  lives  of  thou 
sands  who,  without  this  or  outside  aid  within  the  next 
thirty  to  fifty  days,  must  die  of  actual  hunger.  Over  a 
month  since  the  planters  were  officially  advised  of  Spain's 
inability  to  provide  protection  in  order  to  operate  their 
mills.  This  leaves  the  sugar-growers  entirely  in  the  hands 
of  the  Cubans  in  revolt.  I  know  that  strict  orders  have 
been  given  that  under  no  circumstances  must  mills  be 
permitted  to  grind. 

A  month  later — January  31,  1898 — the  same 
official  reported : 

One  sugar  mill  is  running,  not  without  interruption, 
with  chances  of  making  one  fourth  of  a  crop.  Another, 
just  started  up,  was  attacked  yesterday  by  a  band  of  in 
surgents,  killing  fourteen  and  wounding  five  of  the  guer 
rillas  paid  by  the  estate  to  protect  the  operatives.  Seven 
labourers  were  killed. 

An  adjoining  estate,  the  property  of  the  British  con 
sul,  was  also  attacked,  the  growing  cane  burned.  This 
precludes  further  attempts  to  grind,  as  men  can  not  be 
induced  to  work  while  the  insurgents  roam  at  will  over 
the  country. 

Such  was  the  humane  warfare  of  which  Gomez 
boasted ! 

Mr.  Brice  wrote  from  Matanzas,  November  17, 
1897 — after  the  reconcentrados  had  received  official 
permission  to  return  to  the  country : 

Only  those  who  can  obtain  employment  on  sugar  plan 
tations  can  live.  .  .  .  Several  plantations  report  cane 
burned  by  insurgents,  and  the  general  opinion  is  little  or 
no  sugar  will  be  made  this  season. 

On  December  5,  1897,  Mr.  Hyatt  reported  from 
Santiago  de  Cuba : 

Mr.  Rigney,  an  American  sugar  planter  near  Manza- 
nillo,  was  preparing  to  grind  during  the  coming  season. 
A  few  nights  since,  the  insurgents  fired  seven  cannon  shots 
among  his  buildings,  one  ball  passing  through  the  roof  of 
his  house. 


54  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

On  January  12,  1898,  the  same  consul  added: 

I  regret  to  say  that  the  stoppage  of  industries,  from 
present  appearances,  will  not  halt  at  the  sugar  crop,  but 
coffee  and  other  agricultural  crops  fall  under  the  same 
ban.  .  .  .  All  of  the  benefits  that  should  have  accrued  to 
our  citizens  are  thwarted  by  the  action  of  the  insurgents, 
who  refuse  to  allow  them  to  return  to  their  sugar,  coffee, 
and  other  estates.  The  Pompo  manganese  mines,  owned 
by  Americans,  are  also  being  held  up  by  the  same  power. 

It  is  beyond  the  power  of  my  pen  to  describe  the 
situation  in  Eastern  Cuba. 

On  the  other  hand,  where  the  insurgents  were 
unable  to  carry  out  their  policy  of  destruction, 
somewhat  better  conditions  prevailed.  Mr.  Mc- 
Garr,  American  consul  at  Cienfuegos,  reported  on 
January  10,  1898: 

All  the  sugar  mills  in  this  consular  jurisdiction,  twen 
ty-three  in  number,  have  been  grinding  since  the  first  of 
the  month.  .  .  .  The  demand  for  labour  has  drawn  from 
the  towns  a  great  portion  of  the  unemployed  labourers 
and  given  employment  to  the  male  concentrados,  many 
of  whom  were  in  a  state  of  enforced  idleness  and  destitu 
tion.  As  a  consequence,  few  of  them  are  now  seen  here, 
and  the  labour  congestion  has  been  relieved. 

Small  predatory  parties  of  insurgents  make  frequent 
attempts  to  fire  the  cane  fields,  and  it  requires  constant 
and  active  vigilance  to  prevent  their  destruction.  The  dry 
weather  and  the  high  winds  prevailing  at  this  season  ren 
der  it  a  simple  matter  for  one  person  (who  can  easily 
conceal  himself  in  the  tall  cane)  to  start  a  conflagration 
that  will,  unless  promptly  extinguished,  destroy  hundreds 
of  acres  in  a  few  hours. 

The  sugar  crop  is  the  support  of  all  classes,  and  espe 
cially  of  the  labouring  class,  and  should  it  be  in  large 
part  destroyed  a  famine  in  reality  would  be  inevitable. 

This  letter  explains  the  extreme  difficulty  the 
Spanish  commanders  experienced  in  preventing  the 
destruction  of  the  industries  by  which,  in  time  of 
peace,  the  island  supported  itself.  That  their  efforts 
to  do  so  were  sincere — as  they  naturally  would  be, 
if  only  from  motives  of  self-interest — is  attested  by 
General  Fitzhugh  Lee,  who  reported  under  date  of 
November  23,  1897: 


(  UNr 


UNIVERSITY 
FROM   THE   VIRGINIUS<O  THE   MAINE       55 

The  Spanish  authorities  are  sincere  in  doing  all  in 
their  power  to  encourage,  protect,  and  promote  the  grind 
ing  of  sugar.  The  insurgents'  leaders  have  given  instruc 
tions  to  prevent  grinding  wherever  it  can  be  done,  because 
by  diminishing  the  export  of  Sugar  the  Spanish  Gov 
ernment  revenues  are  decreased.  It  will  be  very  difficult 
for  the  Spanish  authorities  to  prevent  cane  burning,  be 
cause  one  man  at  night  can  start  a  fire  which  will  burn 
hundreds  of  acres,  just  as  a  single  individual  could  ignite 
a  prairie  by  throwing  a  match  into  the  dry  grass. 

Nor  is  it  true  that  the  Spanish  authorities,  mili 
tary  and  civil,  made  no  effort  whatever  to  relieve 
the  victims  of  the  cruel  war.  The 
measures  taken  were  indeed  inade 
quate  and  futile ;  when  Spain  could 
not  pay  her  own  officials  and  feed  her  own  troops, 
how  could  she  provide  for  half  a  million  hungry 
Cubans?  She  was  powerless  before  the  hideous 
spectre  of  famine  that  arose  in  the  island  which  she 
had  so  long  misruled,  and  whose  doom  was  now 
sealed  by  its  own  sons.  Yet  there  were  attempts 
at  relief,  besides  the  three  million  pesetas  (six  hun 
dred  thousand  dollars)  voted  by  the  Cortes  in 
March,  1898,  but  never  sent  to  Cuba — the  outbreak 
of  war  with  the  United  States  being  a  good  excuse 
for  its  retention.  While  Campos  was  at  Havana  he 
raised  a  fund  for  the  destitute,  himself  heading  the 
list  with  two  thousand  dollars,  and  the  entire  Span 
ish  army  subscribing  a  day's  pay.  In  many  cities  a 
junta  dc  socorros  was  formed,  which  distributed 
such  money  or  provisions  as  could  be  obtained. 
In  November,  1897,  General  Lee  reported  that 
"  charitable  committees "  were  caring  for  "  large 
numbers  "  of  refugees.  General  Blanco  gave  one 
hundred  thousand  dollars  in  Spanish  silver  to  feed 
the  destitute,  and  the  city  of  Havana  raised  eighty 
thousand  dollars  by  a  special  tax  for  the  same  pur 
pose. 

Elsewhere  municipal  relief  failed  because  public 
and  private  resources  were  exhausted.  Consul 


N/ 


56  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Brice  wrote  from  Matanzas,  also  in  November, 
1897,  that  "  several  days  ago  an  order  from  captain- 
general  *  was  given  municipal  authorities  to  issue 
rations  and  clothing,  but  no  attention  is  paid  the 
order  " — lack  of  funds  being,  no  doubt,  one  reason 
for  the  neglect.  Later,  in  the  same  city,  "  two  thou 
sand  rations  were  given  out,  for  a  few  days  only, 
to  eight  thousand  persons."  But  by  this  time  the 
situation  almost  everywhere  was  that  described  by 
Consul  Barker,  of  Sagua  la  Grande :  "  The  authori 
ties  are  utterly  helpless  to  extend  any  relief  to  those 
who  have  thus  far  survived  the  pangs  of  hunger." 
Truly  General  Sherman's  saying  that  "  war  is  hell  " 
was  never  more  frightfully  verified  than  in  Cuba. 
There  was  no  hope  of  relief  from  within.  The  situa 
tion  was  one  that  cried  to  Heaven  for  the  merciful 
intervention  of  a  foreign  power,  more  loudly  than 
ever  Bulgaria  cried,  or  Armenia,  or  Crete. 

But  terrible  as  was  the  island's  plight,  it  was 

exceedingly  difficult  to  formulate  any  proper  and 

practical  plan  of  ameliorating  it.  (it 

The  movement     «s  not  strangre  that  whi]e  intervention 

for  interven-  °   -  1     1  A 

tion  was   so   eagerly   urged   by   American 

sympathy,  two  successive  administra 
tions  were  so  reluctant  to  undertake  it.  For  more 
than  two  years  the  United  States  witnessed  the 
spectacle  —  not  an  entirely  pleasant  one  to  the 
friends  of  popular  government  —  of  periodical 
scenes  of  excitement  in  Congress,  which,  vehement 
and  even  disorderly  in  debate,  yet  failing  to  agree 
upon  any  definite  and  consistent  line  of  action ; 
making  inflammatory  speeches  and  passing  belli 
cose  resolutions,  yet  continuing  its  neglect  of  the 
national  defences — stood  in  more  or  less  direct  op 
position  to  an  executive  policy,  which,  though  criti 
cised  as  unduly  conservative,  was  firm,  prudent, 

*  This  word  appears  in  consular  reports  (Senate  document  No.  230, 
Fifty-fifth  Congress,  second  session)  as  "Captain  Gin" — no  doubt  a 
typographical  error. 


FROM    THE   VIRGINIUS   TO   THE    MAINE       57 
and  based  upon  a  better  understanding  of  the  situ-  - 


question  first  came  to  the  front  in  the  na 
tional  legislature  when  the  Senate  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  reported,  on  January  20.  jjfafi.  ,a  curi 
ously  worded  resolution  instructing  President 
Cleveland  to 

use  in  a  friendly  spirit  the  good  offices  of  this  Government, 
to  the  end  that  Spain  shall  be  requested  to  accord  to  the 
armies  with  which  it  is  engaged  in  war  the  rights  of 
belligerents. 

After  a  month's  debate,  during  which  the  reso 
lution  went  through  several  changes,  the  Senate 
finally  passed  it  in  the  form  of  a  recognition  of  the 
insurgents  as  a  belligerent  power,  with  the  further 
request 

that  the  friendly  offices  of  the  United  States  should  be 
offered  by  the  President  to  the  Spanish  Govejnment  for 
the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Cuba.  "J 

'  The  House  of  Representatives  adopted  a  much 
less  pacific  resolution,  declaring  that  the  only  per 
manent  solution  of  the  conflict  was  the  establish-      J  'v^, 
ment  of  a  government  by  the  choice  of  the  Cuban  \/ 
people  ;  that  American  interests  were  seriously  in 
jured  by  the  struggle,  and  should  be  protected  by 
intervention  if  necessaryTTjThere  were  conferences 
and  further  debates,  in  one  of  which  Senator  Mills,   \/ 
of  Texas,  offered  a  motion  calling  on  the  President 
to  seize  the  island  and  hold  it  by  military  force  until 
the  Cuban  people  could  organize  a  republic  ;  but 
finally,  on  April  6th,  the  House  accepted  the  Senate 
resolution.    The  President  took  no  action  upon  it.  / 
It   could   hardly   have  been   expected   that  the 
"  friendly  offices  "  thus  proffered  had  the  slightest 
chance   of  acceptance   by   what   Senator  Sherman 
termed  the  "  sensitive,  proud,  and  gallant  nation  " 
of  the  Iberian  peninsula,  whose  temper  was  indi 
cated,  during  the  debate  in  Congress,  by  an  attack 


58  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR 

on  the  United  States  consulate  in  Barcelona,  and 
by  riotous  anti-American  demonstrations  in  other 
Spanish  cities.  Two  days  before  the  final  passage 
of  the  resolution — April  4,  1896 — Secretary  Olney 
had  sent  to  Madrid  a  frank  and  full  statement  of  the 
position  of  the  Washington  Administration.  He 
pointed  out  that  Spain's  promises  of  a  speedy  res 
toration  of  order  had  signally  failed;  that  the 
anarchy  existing  in  Cuba  had  greatly  damaged 
American  commerce,  and  threatened  the  "  absolute 
impoverishment  "  of  the  island's  inhabitants ;  that 
while  not  suggesting  intervention  at  the  time — in 
deed,  he  expressl-y  declared  that  "  the  United  States 
has  no  designs  upon  Cuba,  and  no  designs  against 
the  sovereignty  of  Spain  " — yet  he  hoped 

to  find  a  way  of  co-operating  with  Spain  in  the  imme 
diate  pacification  of  the  island  on  such  a  plan  as,  leaving 
Spain  her  rights  of  sovereignty,  shall  yet  secure  to  the 
people  of  the  island  all  such  rights  and  powers  of  local 
self-government  as  they  can  reasonably  ask. 

The  Spanish  reply,  not  received  until  June,  was 
a  refusal  of  Mr.  Olney's  rather  vague  offer;  and 
there  the  matter  ended  for  a  time. 

When  Congress  met  in  the  following  December, 
President  Cleveland's  message  contained  a  brief  re 
view  of  the  situation  in  Cuba,  which 
congress  versus  remained  unchanged,  and  a  carefully 
president  cieve-  guarcled  yet  distinct  warning  of  pos- 

land,  Dec.,  1896.      &..,       ,    ,     J       .    ,       ,  fe 

sible  future  interference : 

I— 

*  When  the  inability  of  Spain  to  deal  successfully  with 
the  insurrection  has  become  manifest,  and  it  is  demon 
strated  that  her  sovereignty  is  extinct  in  Cuba  for  all  pur 
poses  of  its  rightful  existence,  and  when  a  hopeless  strug 
gle  for  its  re-establishment  has  degenerated  into  a  strife 
which  means  nothing  more  than  the  useless  sacrifice  of 
human  life  and  the  utter  destruction  of  the  very  subject- 
matter  of  the  conflict,  a  situation  will  be  presented  in 
which  our  obligation  to  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  will  be 
superseded  by  higher  obligations  which  we  can  hardly 
hesitate  to  recognise  and  discharge. 


FROM    THE   VIRGINIUS   TO   THE    MAINE 


59 


'This  cautions  utterance  was  severely  criticised 
in  Congress,  and  several  motions  were  made  with 
a  view  to  forcingj.be  Administration  to  take  some 
more  decided  stepT/The  most  important  was  a  reso 
lution  offered  by  Senator  Cameron,  of  Pennsyl 
vania  : 

That  the  independence  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba  be  and 
the  same  hereby  is  acknowledged  by  the  United  States  of 
America. 

That  the  United  States  should  use  its  friendly  offices 
with  the  Government  of  Spain  to  bring  to  a  close  the 
war  between  Spain  and  Cuba. 

This  resolution  was  reported  favourably  by  the 
Senate  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  (December  18, 
1896),  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Secretary  Olney  ap 
peared  before  that  body  and  strongly  opposed  it. 
On  the  day  after  the  committee's  decision  the  sec 
retary  publicly  stated  that  if  it  passed  both  houses, 
as  was  then  generally  expected,  it  would  be  noth 
ing  more  than  "  an  expression  of  opinion  by  the 
eminent  gentlemen  who  might  vote  for  it.  The 
power,"  he  added,  "  to  recognise  the  so-called  re 
public  of  Cuba  as  an  independent  state  rests  exclu 
sively  with  the  Executive " — thereby  raising  an 
interesting  point  of  constitutional  law  which  still 
remains  in  doubt.  fT'or  a  time  it  seemed  as  if  a 
conflict  between  the  national  legislature  and  the  Ex 
ecutive  was  imminent,  but  a  more  conservative  feel 
ing  arose  in  Congress,  created  partly  by  the  alarm 
of  various  commercial  interests  at  what  appeared 
to  be  a  threat  of  war,  and  partly  by  the  general  will 
ingness  to  leave  the  whole  question  to  be  dealt  with 
by  the  incoming  Administration,  and  the  Cameron 
resolution  was  never  pressed  to  a  voteT^I 

It  soon  became  clear  that  under  President  Mc- 
Kinley  and  Secretary  Sherman  the  Administration's 
Cuban  policy  was  to  be  a  continuation  of  the  mas 
terly  inactivity  of  Messrs.  Cleveland  and  Olney; 
Mr.  McKinley's  position  being  that  domestic  prob- 


6o  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

lems  of  the  currency,  the  tariff,  the  deficit  in  the 
government  revenue,   and  the   long-continued   in 
dustrial  depression    were    paramount 
president  ^o  a       cajj  frOm  beyond  the  repub- 

McKinley  and         «•    »        r  •  /-\         ir  o 

Cuba  lies    frontiers.      On    May    17,    1897, 

however,  the  tidings  of  increasing 
distress  in  Cuba,  and  Consul-General  Lee's  report 
that  from  six  hundred  to  eight  hundred  American 
citizens  were  among  the  destitute,  led  him  to  send 
to  Congress,  which  he  had  called  together  in  special 
session,  a  message  asking  for  an  appropriation  of 
fifty  thousand  dollars  for  their  relief.  The  money 
was  voted,  not  without  some  delay  in  the  House, 
caused  by  an  attempt  to  attach  to  the  grant  a  recog 
nition  of  the  insurgents. 

Seven  months  later  (December  24,  1897),  the 
President  issued  a  public  appeal  for  charity  to 
Cuba's  famine-stricken  people.  There  was  a  gen 
erous  response,  about  two  hundred  thousand  dollars 
being  speedily  contributed.  The  Red  Cross  So 
ciety  gave  valuable  aid,  and  its  president,  Miss 
Clara  Barton,  went  to  Havana  to  distribute  the 
supplies,  which  Captain-General  Blanco  admitted 
free  of  duty,  and  which  proved  at  least  a  temporary 
assistance  to  thousands  of  sufferers  until  the  coming 
of  w#r  ended  the  relief  work. 

•Meanwhile  the  Senate  (May  20,  1897),  by  forty- 
one  votes  to  fourteen,  passed  a  joint  resolution  ac- 
/  cording  belligerent  rights  to  "  the  government  pro 
claimed  and  for  some  time  maintained  by  force  of 
arms  by  the  people  of  Cuba.";  This  was  done  in 
spite  of  the  well-understood  objections  to  such  a 
recognition.  It  was  not  warranted  by  the  known 
status  of  the  rebellion ;  it  might  have  encouraged 
the  insurgents,  but  it  would  have  been  of  much 
greater  practical  aid  to  Spain,  by  giving  her  ships 
the  right  of  searching  neutral  vessels  on  the  high  ' 
seas ;  it  would  have  tied  the  hands  of  the  United 
States  Government  in  its  later  dealings  with  the 


FROM    THE   VIRGINIUS   TO   THE    MAINE       6l 

island,  and  it  would  have  precluded  all  claims  from 
American  citizens  for  damages  caused  by  the  war. 
The  Senate's  declaration,  however,  was  entirely 
fruitless,  fit  never  came  before  the  House,  as  tX 
Speaker  Reed,  who  was  no  less  strong! v  opposed  to 
hasty  intervention  than  was  the  President]  had 
named  no  committees  for  the  special  session,  and 
there  was  no  medium  for  receiving  and  transmit- 
tinga  joint  resolution. 

(Throughout  this  critical  period  of  American  re 
lations  with  Spain,  constant  friction  was  caused  by 

the  activity  of  Cuban  agents  and 
^il^tfon10"  symPatmzers  in  tne  United  States,  by 
1896  1897  expeditions  carrying  arms  to  the  in-  .  /  \ 

surgents,  and  by  questions  of  the  ^ 
rights  of  American  citizens  involved  in  the  strug 
gle — all  of  which  had  been  such  sinister  factors  in 
the  situation  during  the  Ten  Years'  War,  and  were 
certain  to  remain  so  while  Spanish  sovereignty  in 
Cuba  should  lasO  The  list  of  individuals  on  whose 
behalf  the  Washington  Government  was  called 
upon  to  intervene  was  a  long  one,  the  most  im 
portant  cases  being  those  of  Julio  Sanguilly,  who 
was  liberated  at  its  request  by  the  Spanish  Govern 
ment  ;  of  Ricardo  Ruiz,  whose  death  in  prison  was 
never  satisfactorily  explained ;  and  of  Alfredo  La- 
borde  and  four  others,  captured  on  the  filibustering 
schooner  Competitor.  These  names  will  suggest 
what  was  undoubtedly  the  case — that  American 
citizenship  was  acquired,  or  claimed,  by  many  Cu 
bans  with  the  deliberate  intention  of  invoking  its 
protection  in  case  of  conflict  with  the  Spanish  au 
thorities  ;  but  the  Federal  Government  was  none 
the  less  bound  to  defend  their  rights,  and  it  did  so 
— in  one  instance,  that  of  the  Competitor  prisoners, 
to  the  point  of  threatening  the  most  serious  conse 
quences  had  not  their  death  sentence  been  re 
scinded. 

On  their  side,  the  United  States  authorities  ex- 


62  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

ercised  great  vigilance  in  the  fulfilment  of  neutral 
obligations  and  the  suppression  of  filibustering. 
On  the  30th  of  July,  1896,  President  Cleveland 
issued  a  special  and  very  stringent  proclamation 
against  such  illegal  attempts  "  to  make  war  upon  a 
foreign  country."  Several  arrests  were  made,  in 
American  ports  and  on  the  seas,  and  a  diligent 
patrol  was  maintained  by  revenue  cutters  and  naval 
vessels,  at  a  cost  said  to  amount  to  rfearly  a  million 
dollars  annually;  yet  many  expeditions  succeeded 
in  reaching  Cuba,  and  the  Spaniards  found  it  im 
possible  to  believe  that  the  United  States  was  not 
deliberately  giving  aid  and  comfort  to  the  rebels. 

The  assassination  of  the  Spanish  premier,  Cano- 

vas  del  Castillo,  on  the  8th  of  August,  1897,  again 

delayed     action     from     Washington 

The  recall  of        upon  the  Cuban  question  ;  and  when, 

Weyler,  Oct.  6.  T          ,1  •     •    ,  r     A 

I8g7>  after  the  stopgap  ministry  of  Azcar- 

raga,  Sagasta,  leader  of  the  Liberal 
party  at  Madrid,  came  into  power,  the  new  Govern 
ment  made  a  genuine  effort  to  forestall  the  demands 
which  the  United  States,  in  the  name  of  civiliza 
tion,  must  inevitably  sooner  or  later  formulate.  At 
a  meeting  held  on  the  6th  of  October  the  Spanish 
cabinet  decided  upon  the  recall  of  Captain-General 
Weyler,  and  announced  a  new  constitution  for 
Cuba,  giving  the  island  a  local  parliament  of  its 
own,  and  a  fairly  liberal  measure  of  autonomy.  In 
timations  were  made  at  Washington  that  Sagasta's 
ministry  would  be  willing  to  negotiate  a  treaty 
abolishing  the  differential  duties  which  had  given 
Spanish  manufacturers  a  practical  monopoly  of  the 
Cuban  market — a  system  very  unfair  to  Cuba  and 
detrimental  to  American  commercial  interests.  To 
succeed  Weyler,  General  Blanco  was  sent  to  Ha 
vana,  where  his  earliest  official  actions  were  a  form 
al  revocation  of  his  predecessor's  reconcentration 
order,  a  proclamation  offering  amnesty  to  all  po 
litical  offenders,  and  the  release  of  the  Competitor 


FROM   THE  VIRGINIUS   TO   THE   MAINE      63 

prisoners,    whom    Weyler    had    held    for    eighteen 
months. 

rvVhen  Congress  met,  in  December,  President 
McKinley's  message  reviewed  the  Cuban  question 
at  some  length.  With  regard  to  the  demand  for  a 
recognition  of  the  insurgents,  either  as  a  govern 
ment  or  as  belligerents,  the  President  recited  Gen 
eral  Grant's  arguments  against  such  a  step,  and  re-; 
peated  the  conclusion  that  it  was  "  now  unwise, 
and  therefore  inadmissible,"  adding  a  sentence 
which  reads  a  little  curiously  in  the  light  of  later 
events : 

I  speak  not  of  forcible  annexation,  for  that  can  not  be 
thought  of.  That,  by  our  code  of  morality,  would  be 
criminal  aggressionT? 

Continuing,  the  message  hailed  Spain's  new 
policy  with  somewhat  optimistic  gratification : 

That  the  Government  of  Sagasta  has  entered  upon  a 
course  from  which  recession  with  honour  is  impossible 
can  hardly  be  questioned;  that  in  the  few  weeks  it  has 
existed  it  has  made  earnest  of  the  sincerity  of  its  profes 
sions  is  undeniable.  I  shall  not  impugn  its  sincerity,  nor 
should  impatience  be  suffered  to  embarrass  it  in  the  task 
it  has  undertaken.  It  is  honestly  due  to  Spain,  and  to 
our  friendly  relations  with  Spain,  that  she  should  be 
given  a  reasonable  chance  to  realize  her  expectations,  and 
to  prove  the  asserted  efficacy  of  the  new  order  of  things 
to  which  she  stands  irrevocably  committed.  She  has  re 
called  the  commander  whose  brutal  orders  inflamed  the 
American  mind  and  shocked  the  civilized  world.  She  has 
modified  the  horrible  order  of  concentration,  and  has  un 
dertaken  to  care  for  the  helpless  and  permit  those  who  de 
sire  to  resume  the  cultivation  of  their  fields  to  do  so,  and 
assures  them  the  protection  of  the  Spanish  Government 
in  their  lawful  occupations.  Not  a  single  American  citi 
zen  is  now  in  arrest  or  confinement  in  Cuba,  of  whom  this 
Government  has  any  knowledge. 

Had  Sagasta's  move  been  made  two  years 
earlier,  it  is  possible,  though  not  probable,  that  it 
might  have  succeeded ;  but  now  it  came  far  too 
late.  Indeed,  by  a  curious  train  of  events,  and 


64  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

with  the  ill  luck  that  seems  to  be  the  historical  at 
tendant  of  weakness  and  unwisdom,  it  was  Spain's 
most  earnest  attempt  at  conciliation  that  brought 
about  the  catastrophe  which  was  to  lose  her  the 
remnant  of  her  empire  in  the  new  world. 

It  speedily  became  clear  that  the  offer  of  auton 
omy  was  an  absolute  failure.     Years  before  there 
had  been  an  organized  political  party 

The  failure  of  f    autonomists     in     Cuba      but     ft     had 

autonomy.  .  / 

practically  ceased  to  exist.  Enough 
of  its  adherents  could  not  be  found  to  fill  the  offices 
in  which  the  Spanish  Government  now  desired  their 
services.*  There  \vas  no  possibility  of  any  com 
promise  with  the  insurgents — the  single  exception 
reported  being  the  surrender  of  Juan  Masso,  in  the 
province  of  Santiago,  with  one  hundred  and  ten 
men.  Colonel  Joaquin  Ruiz,  of  the  Spanish  army, 
commissioned  by  Blanco  to  treat  with  the  rebel 
leader  Aranguren,  was  seized  and  shot,  in  spite  of 
his  flag  of  truce — a  brutal  murder  that  was  excused 
as  an  "  execution "  under  the  insurgents'  decree 
against  all  dealings  with  the  enemy. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  new  constitution  pro 
voked  furious  opposition  from  the  Peninsular  party 
in  Cuba.  There  were  violent  outbreaks  in  Havana, 
and  on  January  12,  1898,  a  mob  led  by  officers  of  the 
Spanish  garrison  attacked  the  offices  of  three  au 
tonomist  newspapers — the  Diario  de  la  Marina,  the 
Discusion,  and  the  Reconcentrado.  Soldiers  sent 
to  restore  order  fraternized  with  the  rioters,  and 
though  little  damage  was  done  there  was  great  ex- 


*  Consul  Hyatt  reported  from  Santiago,  January  8,  1898:  "That 
the  Spanish  Government  has  made  a  most  energetic  and  thorough 
campaign  to  make  autonomy  successful  there  is  no  room  for  doubt.  .  .  . 
Wholesale  removals  of  Spanish  officers  from  civil  positions  are  made 
by  sweeping  orders,  with  instructions  to  fill  their  places  with  Cuban 
autonomists.  About  a  week  since  there  came  an  order  dismissing 
every  employee  of  the  custom  house  in  this  city,  to  take  effect  as  soon 
as  proper  autonomists  could  be  found  to  fill  their  places.  As  yet  only 
two  have  been  named— ths  collector  and  first  deputy." 


FROM   THE   VIRGINIUS   TO   THE    MAINE       65 

citemcnt.  The  crowds  shouted  threats  against 
Blanco,  and  there  was  alarm  among  the  Americans 
in  the  city.  On  the  following  day  Consul-General 
Lee  telegraphed  to  Washington : 

Uncertainty  exists  whether  he  [Blanco]  can  control 
the  situation.  If  demonstrated  he  can  not  maintain  order, 
preserve  life,  and  keep  the  peace,  or  if  Americans  and  their 
interests  are  in  danger,  ships  must  be  sent,  and  to  that 
end  should  be  prepared  to  move  promptly. 

For  a  month  the  second-class  battleship  Maine 
had  been  lying  at  Key  West,  with  orders  to  answer 
any  call  that  might  come  from  General  Lee.  She 
was  now  instructed  to  go  at  once  to  Havana,  her 
mission  being  announced  as  a  "  friendly  naval  visit." 
General  Lee  was  informed  of  her  despatch  on  Janu 
ary  24th,  and  at  once  replied : 

Advise  visit  be  postponed  six  or  seven  days,  to  give 
last  excitement  more  time  to  disappear. 

Secretary  Day's  immediate  answer  was: 
Maine  has  been  ordered. 

And  on  the  following  morning,  January  25, 
1898,  at  eleven  o'clock,  the  white  battle  ship,  flying 
the  Stars  and  Stripes,  exchanged  salutes  with  the 
Spanish  batteries  and  steamed  into  the  harbour, 
where  so  terrible  a  fate  awaited  her. 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE    COMING    OF   WAR 

WHILE  the  Maine  lay  in  Havana  harbour  the 
s  tension  of  the  situation  was  greatly  increased  by  an 
incident  which  at  another  time  might  have  pos 
sessed  little  significance!  On  February  9,  1898, 
there  was  published  a  letter  written  by  Senor 
Dupuy  de  Lome,  the  Spanish  minister  to  the 
United  States,  whose  tactfulness  and  influential  per 
sonal  friendships  had  made  him  a  valuable  agent 
for  his  country  at  Washington.  It  was  a  private 
letter  to  Senor  Jose  Canalejas,  the  editor  of  a  Mad 
rid  newspaper,  the  Heraldo,  who  had  recently 
visited  America  and  had  gone  thence  to  Cuba,  and 
it  had  come  into  the  hands  of  Cuban  sympathizers, 
presumably,  through  theft  in  the  Havana  post 
office.  It  was  an  astounding  indiscretion  on  the 
part  of  a  man  regarded  as_an  accomplished  and  ex 
perienced  diplomatist,  fit  condemned  Sagasta's 
policy  of  attempted  conciliation  as  "  a  loss  of  time 
and  a  step  in  the  wrong  direction,"  and  went  on  to 
record  the  writer's  private  opinion  of  President 
McKinley  and  his  statesmanship : 

The  message  has  undeceived  the  insurgents,  who  ex 
pected  something  different,  and  has  paralyzed  the  action 
of  Congress,  but  I  consider  it  bad.  Besides  the  natural 
and  inevitable  coarseness  with  which  it  repeats  what  the 
press  and  public  opinion  in  Spain  has  said  of  Weyler,  it 
shows  once  more  what  McKinley  is — weak  and  catering 
to  the  mob,  and  moreover  a  small  politician  \polto\ccahr9\ 
66 


THE  COMING  OF  WAR 


67 


who  wishes  to  leave  a  door  open  and  to  stand  well  with 
the  jingoes  of  his  party .""] 

Self-respect  compelled  the  Administration  to 
take  action,  but  the  Spanish  Government,  instead  of 
recalling  the  offending  minister,  allowed  him  to  re 
sign,  appointing  Senor  Luis  Pplo  y  Bernabe  to 
take  his  place  at  Washington.  ^The  incident  had  a 
very  unfortunate  effect  upon  public  feeling  in  the 
United  States."?  If  the  suave  and  courtly  Dupuy  de 
Lome  in  private  held  this  cynical  estimate  of  the 
men  with  whom  he  had  been  dealing,  what  Spanish 
professions  could  be  trusted?  /No  wonder  that 
there  was  an  instant  cry  of  treachery  a  few  days 
later,  when  news  came  of  the  fearful  tragedy  of 
February  I5th77 

The  Maine  had  been  at  Havana  for  three  weeks, 
lying  at  the  buoy  assigned  her  by  the  authorities  of 
the  port.  The  usual  formal  courtesies 
The  Maine  were  exchanged  between  her  corn- 

destroyed,  Feb.  t  /•*•  A  •  /"-i  1  T-\  r"  t_ 

15,1898.  mancler,  Captain  Charles  D.  Sigsbee, 

and  the  local  officials.  Her  errand  was 
announced  as  a  friendly  visit,  and  her  presence 
evoked  practically  no  demonstration  of  hostility — 
the  only  exceptions  being  a  few  derisive  calls  from  a 
passing  ferryboat  crowded  with  people  returning 
from  the  bullfight  at  Regla,  and  a  circular,  copies  of 
which  were  sent  to  Sigsbee,  denouncing  the  cochinos 
yankces  (Yankee  pigs)  and  their  podrida  escuadra 
(rotten  squadron).  As  was  natural  and  proper,  the 
captain  had  enjoined  an  extra  degree  of  watchful 
ness  upon  all  those  responsible  for  the  care  of  the 
ship,  but  there  was  no  alarm  of  any  sort  until 
twenty  minutes  to  ten  o'clock  on  the  night  of  Tues 
day,  February  I5th.  Then,  without  a  moment's 
warning,  from  deep  down  in  the  bowels  of  the  ves 
sel  there  came  the  shock  and  roar  of  a  tremendous 
explosion — or  rather  of  two  explosions  with  a  brief 
but  distinct  interval — instantly  transforming  the  en 
tire  forward  part  of  the  Maine  into  a  shattered 


68  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

wreck,  scattering  debris  over  other  vessels  an 
chored  in  the  harbour,  and  breaking  windows  and 
extinguishing  lights  along  the  water  front  of 
the  city. 

Captain  Sigsbee  was  sitting  in  his  cabin  writing 
a  letter  when  the  upheaval  came.  As  he  reached 
the  door  an  orderly,  from  whom  no  explosion  could 
shock  the  habit  of  discipline,  stumbled  against  him 
in  the  darkness — the  ship's  lights  had  gone  out 
— and  reported  that  the  Maine  had  been  blown 
up.  The  captain  ran  on  deck  and  ordered  that 
the  magazines  should  be  flooded ;  but  the  maga 
zines,  partly  exploded,  were  already  filled  by  the 
water  that  rushed  through  the  rent  frame  of  the 
vessel. 

The  Maine  was  blazing  fiercely  and  sinking  fast. 
In  a  few  minutes*  she  had  settled  down  in  about 
thirty  feet  of  water,  her  upper  works,  a  mass  of 
wreckage,  remaining  above  the  surface,  and  con 
tinuing  to  burn,  with  occasional  explosions  of  am 
munition,  for  four  hours  more.  Three  of  her  boats, 
which  hung  aft,  were  intact,  and  were  launched 
before  she  sank;  and  in  these,  and  in  boats  from 
two  neighbouring  vessels — the  Spanish  cruiser 
Alfonso  XII  and  the  American  steamer  City  of 
Washington,  of  the  Ward  line — the  survivors  were 
carried  ashore.  Most  of  the  crew,  whose  quarters 
were  directly  above  the  seat  of  the  explosion,  were 
instantly  killed,  or  were  drowned  with  the  sinking 
ship,  the  total  loss  being  two  hundred  and  sixty 
men,  including  two  officers,  Lieutenant  Jenkins 
and  Engineer  Merritt.  A  third  officer,  Lieutenant 
Blandin,  died  some  months  later  from  causes  at 
tributed  to  the  shock  of  the  disaster. 

To  his  brief  announcement  of  the  loss  of  his 
ship,  cabled  as  soon  as  he  went  ashore,  Captain 
Sigsbee  added  the  sentence  : 

Public  opinion  should  be  suspended  until  further 
proof. 


THE   COMING  OF  WAR  fig 

I  The  circumstances  were  such  that  a  suspension 
of  the  popular  judgment  was  impossible.  The 
case  was  one  that  decided  itself.  The 
5imPle  fact  that  an  American  man-of- 
war  had  gone  to  a  Spanish  port,  and 
there,  moored  in  the  spot  assigned  by  Spanish 
officials,  had  been  destroyed  by  a  nocturnal  explo 
sion,  led  inevitably  to  one  conclusion.  / 

At  another  time  it  might  have  been  possible  to 
consider,  as  was  urged  by  a  technical  journal,* 
that  "  the  combination  of  steam,  electricity,  high 
explosives,  and  coal  that  may  become  self-igniting, 
is  not  a  happy  one,  and  the  most  exact  precau 
tions  against  accidents  may  fail  at  times,  as  they 
have  in  the  case  of  other  vessels."  There  had  been 
narrow  escapes  from  disastrous  explosions  on  at 
least  three  others  of  the  new  American  steel  war 
ships,  due  to  the  escape,  in  the  coal  bunkers,  of  the 
gas  that  causes  "  fire-damp  "  explosions  in  mines  —  a 
gas  which,  innocuous  in  the  open  air,  is  a  very 
dangerous  explosive  when  it  accumulates  in  a  con 
fined  space.  About  two  years  before,  while  she  was 
stationed  at  Key  West,  some  of  the  Cincinnati's 
coal  was  fired  by  spontaneous  combustion,  and  the 
steel  bulkhead  which  —  just  as  in  the  Maine  —  sepa 
rated  the  bunker  from  a  magazine  full  of  projectiles 
and  ammunition  became  red  hot.  The  imminent 
peril  was  revealed  only  by  a  tiny  curl  of  smoke,  and 
the  magazine  was  flooded  in  time  to  prevent  dis 
aster,  although  some  of  the  shells  it  contained  had 
actually  been  charred  by  the  heat.  Among  other 
cases  cited  was  that  of  the  British  man-of-war 
Dotterel,  destroyed  in  the  Straits  of  Magellan,  in 
18?3,  by  an  explosion  which  remained  a  mystery 
until  it  was  traced  to  the  paint  room,  where  a  dan 
gerous  inflammable  gas  had  generated. 
)  But  no  technical  plea  of  the  possibility  of  acci- 

*  The  Army  and  Navy  Journal,  February  19,  1898. 


irNTVERSlTY 


70  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

dent  to  the  Maine  could  avail  against  the  over 
whelming  suspicion — nay,  the  practical  certainty — 
engendered  by  the  broad  facts  of  the  case.  She  had 
been  destroyed,  by  deliberate  and  fiendish  treach 
ery,  and  her  destroyers  must  be  brought  to  account. 
That  was  the  verdict  rendered  by  a  public  opinion 
so  strong,  so  unanimous,  so  earnest,  that  no  official 
authority,  however  anxious  to  avoid  a  conflict  so 
long  as  an  honourable  way  of  escaping  it  was  to  be 
found,  could  restrain  the  voice  of  national  indigna 
tion^ 

-  'The  sinking  of  the  Maine  meant  war  between 
the  United  States  and  Spain?  That  soon  became 
evident  even  to  those  who  least  desired  hostilities. 
But  war  was  not  to  be  proclaimed  without  proper 
formalities,  and  these  could  not  proceed  with  undig 
nified  haste.  They  might  have  moved  faster  had 
the  great  republic's  armed  forces  been  better  pre 
pared.  The  game  was  in  its  hands,  but  it  was  not 
ready  to  play  the  trump  card  that  its  vast  and  un 
doubted  superiority  of  strength  gave  it.  Every 
day's  delay  enabled  it  to  organize  that  strength 
for  action,  and  much  effective  work  was  accom 
plished  during  those  eight  weeks  of  suspense,  when 
impatient  critics  were  denouncing  the  Administra 
tion  for  its  supposedly  timid  and  half-hearted  policy. 
The  President's  first  step  was  the  natural  and 
regular  one  of  appointing  a  commission  of  inquiry 
to  make  a  formal  report  on  the  disaster.  Four 
naval  officers  of  ability  and  experience  were  se 
lected  —  Captain  Sampson,  Captain  Chadwick, 
Lieutenant-Commander  Marix,  and  Lieutenant- 
Commander  Potter.  Their  sessions  began  in  Ha 
vana  harbour,  on  board  the  lighthouse  tender 
Mangrove,  which  brought  them  from  Key  West, 
on  the  2  ist  of  February.  Divers  and  wrecking 
apparatus  had  already  been  sent  from  the  United 
States,  but  it  was  soon  determined  that  the  Maine 
could  not  be  raised.  About  a  hundred  of  her  dead 


THE   COMING   OF   WAR  ^j 

were  never  recovered  from  the  wreck ;  the  rest  were 
buried  in  the  Cristobal  Colon  cemetery,  the  funeral 
(February  I7th)  of  those  first  found  being  attended 
by  a  great  demonstration  of  public  sympathy. 

The  commission  of  inquiry  sat  for  twenty-three 
days  in  Havana  harbour  and  at  Key  West,  closely 
following  the  work  of  the  divers,  and 
examining  officers  and  men  of  the 
Maine  and  a  few  others  who  had  been 
near  the  scene  of  the  disaster.  No  Spanish  witnesses 
were  summoned,  and  suggestions  for  a  joint  inquiry 
were  declined ;  but  no  objection  was  made  to  the  in 
spection  of  the  wreck  by  Havana  divers,  whose  evi 
dence  was  taken  by  a  Spanish  board  appointed  on 
the  night  of  the  explosion.  During  the  inquiry  the 
Montgomery,  which  had  been  ordered  to  Cuban 
waters  with  the  Maine,  arrived  at  Havana  from 
Matanzas  (March  pth).  The  Spanish  cruiser  Viz- 
caya  entered  the  harbour  a  few  days  earlier.  To 
keep  up  the  polite  fiction  of  the  Maine's  "  friend 
ly  visit "  to  Havana,  the  Vizcaya  had  been  de 
spatched  to  New  York,  to  return  the  courtesy.  She 
had  arrived  there  in  time  to  hear  of  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  American  vessel  (February  i8th),  and 
had  spent  a  week  in  the  port,  watchfully  guarded 
by  the  metropolitan  police,  before  sailing  for  Ha 
vana,  where  she  was  joined  on  March  5th  by  her 
sister  ship,  the  Almirante  Oquendo — doomed  to 
share  her  fate  in  Sampson's  marine  graveyard  oft' 
Santiago. 

A\vaited  with  intense  eagerness  by  Congress 
and  the  country  at  large,  the  commission's  report — 
signed  by  Captain  Sampson  as  president  and  Lieu 
tenant-Commander  Marix  as  judge  advocate — was 
delivered  to  the  President  on  the  2ist  of  March, 
but  was  not  transmitted  to  Congress  until  the  28th. 
The  message  that  accompanied  it  was  brief,  formal, 
and  non-committal,  reciting  the  facts  ascertained  by 
the  court,  and  concluding : 


72  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

I  have  directed  that  the  finding  of  the  court  of  inquiry 
and  the  views  of  this  Government  thereon  be  communi 
cated  to  the  Government  of  her  Majesty  the  Queen  Re 
gent,  and  I  do  not  permit  myself  to  doubt  that  the  sense 
of  justice  of  the  Spanish  nation  will  dictate  a  course  of 
action  suggested  by  honour  and  the  friendly  relations  of 
the  two  Governments. 

It  will  be  the  duty  of  the  Executive  to  advise  Congress 
of  the  result,  and  in  the  meantime  deliberate  consideration 
is  invoked. 

This  W7as  highly  unsatisfactory  to  that  portion 
of  the  American  public  which  retains  its  old-time 
appetite  for  flamboyant  oratory.  The 
country's  lack  of  preparation  for 
hostilities  was  not  generally  appre 
ciated,  ev<en  by  those  who  should  have  under 
stood  it ;  'and  fiery  spirits  in  Congress  and  in 
journalism  continued^  to  talk  war  with  the  "  light 
heart "  with  which  Emile  Ollivier,  in  1870,  sent 
the  unready  legions  of  France  against  the  per 
fectly  organized  armies  of  Germany.  "  I  do  not 
think,"  declared  a  senator,  on  the  28th  of  March — • 
and  his  easy  confidence  was  by  no  means  excep 
tional — "  that  any  war  measure  will  be  necessary, 
except  to  blockade  two  or  three  Cuban  ports  and 
compel  their  capitulation."/  The  President's  utter 
ances  and  actions  were  in  a  different  spirit.  As  be 
fitted  his  vastly  greater  responsibilities  as  the  official 
head  of  the  nation,  he  moved  with  a  dignified 
deliberation ;  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  armed 
forces  of  the  United  States  he  was  preparing  for 
the  decisive  moment  with  the  whole  energies  and 
resources  of  the  Government. 

It  is  a  familiar  fact  that  the  United  States  was 
not  ready  for  war.  It  was  afterward  stated  by  the 
American  minister  to  Spain  *  that  on  February 
1 8th,  three  days  after  the  destruction  of  the  Maine, 
he  was  warned,  by  departments  other  than  the  State 

*  General  Woodford's  speech  at  the  Army  and  Navy  Club  in  New 
York,  January  28,  1899. 


THE   COMING   OF   WAR 


73 


Department,  to  defer  decisive  action  as  long  as  pos 
sible,  because  "  there  were  not  on  American  ships 
or  in  the  ordnance  depots  of  the  United  States  two 
rounds  of  powder  per  gun."  He  also  spoke  of  the 
hasty  despatch  of  a  sealed  express  train  across  the 
continent,  loaded  with  ammunition  which  the  Bal 
timore  carried  to  Dewey,  at  Hong-Kong,  in  the 
nick  of  time.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  if  such  infor 
mation  was  sent  to  General  Woodford,  it  was  in 
correct.  Such  a  shortage  could  exist  only  by  a 
flagrant  and  inexcusable  neglect  of  the  standing 
regulations  of  the  Navy  Department,  which  prescribe 
forty  rounds  per  gun  as  the  minimum  supply  that 
every  war  ship  must  maintain  while  at  sea ;  and  the 
Bureau  of  Ordnance  emphatically  denied  *  that  any 
American  vessel  carried  less  than  that  allowance. 
Ammunition  had  been  shipped  to  the  Asiatic  sta 
tion  on  the  Concord,  which  left  San  Francisco  on 
January  8th,  and  on  the  Mohican,  which  left  on 
March  nth  and  met  the  Baltimore  at  Honolulu. 
The  only  trainload  sent  West  was  one  made  up  at 
Harrisburg  on  June  3Oth,  to  replenish  the  supply 
at  the  Mare  Island  navy  yard. 

But  though  it  was  by  no  means  entirely  unready 
for  service,  the  American  navy  was  an  untried 
weapon.  Some  of  its  ships  had  never  been  under 
forced  draft  since  their  first  trial,  f  Owing  to  the 
refusal  of  Congress  to  vote  the  necessary  money  in 
time,  it  had  no  guns  ready  to  arm  the  merchant 
vessels  purchased  as  auxiliaries. 

With  a  mere  handful  of  standing  army,  and  with 
very  inadequate  coast  defences,  there  was  much  to 
do  at  the  eleventh  hour,  and  both  War  and  Navy 
Departments — the  latter,  as  appeared  in  the  light 
of  later  revelations,  working  with  the  greater  fore 
sight  and  efficiency — were  busily  making  ready  for 

*  Statement  of  Captain  O'Neill,  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance, 
January  30,  1899. 

t  Chief  Engineer  Melville's  report  for  1898. 


74  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

hostilities.  Enlistments  were  hastened,  the  navy 
yards  and  arsenals  toiled  day  and  night,  guns  and 
ammunition  were  hurried  to  strategic  points,  orders 
were  placed  for  all  kinds  of  military  material.  Had 
all  this,  which  of  course  was  done  as  quietly  as  pos 
sible,  been  more  widely  known  at  the  time,  it 
might  have  silenced  the  popular  impatience. 

On  the  2th  of  March,  as  the  result  of  a  confer 
ence  at  the  White  House — the  most  important 
participants  being  Secretaries  Day  and  Long, 
Senator  Hale,  chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee 
on  Naval  Affairs,  and  Representative  Dingley, 
chairman  of  the  House  Committee  on  Ways  and 
Means — /Representative  Cannon  introduced  a 
briefly  worded  bill  appropriating  fifty  million  dol- 
lars  "  for  the  national  defence,  and  for  each  and 
every  purpose  connected  therewith,  to  be  expended 
at  the  discretion  of  the  President. 'J  More  might 
have  been  voted,  for  the  Treasury  had  an  avail 
able  cash  balance  of  more  than  two  hundred  mil 
lion  dollars.  Vine  appropriation  was  passed  by 
the  House,  on  the  8th,  by  a  vote  of  three  hun- 
dred  and  eleven  to  none  —  a  signal  demon- 
stration  of  the  fact  that  all  political  parties  were 
united  in  support  of  a  firm  policy — and  by  the 
Senate,  on  the  Qth,  without  change  or  debate?"? 
This  placed  ample  funds  at  the  disposal  of  the  War 
and  Navy  Departments,  and,  besides  employing 
almost  all  the  available  industrial  forces  at  home,  a 
trusted  agent,  Commander  Brownson,  was  imme 
diately  sent  to  Europe  to  purchase  anything  that 
might  be  in  the  market. 

Another  valuable  preparatory  measure  was  the 
Hawley  bill,  passed  by  the  Senate  on  the  22d  of 
February,  and  approved  by  the  House  on  the  /th 
of  March,  adding  to  the  army  two  regiments  of 
artillery,  urgently  needed  to  man  the  coast  defences. 

A  bill  providing  for  a  much  larger  increase,  re 
organizing  the  regular  forces  and  augmenting  them 


THE   COMING   OF   WAR 


75 


to  one  hundred  and  four  thousand  six  hundred 
men — four  times  their  existing  number — failed  of 
Failure  of  the  Passag^>  meeting  with  an  opposition 
H un^ui!  ^at  might  seem  unaccountable  were 

it  not  of  a  piece  with  the  historical 
policy  of  Congress.  Ever  since  the  ending  of  the 
Revolutionary  War,  when  it  reduced  the  Conti 
nental  Army  to  eighty  men,  and  refused  to  send 
garrisons  to  the  frontier  posts  surrendered  by  the 
British,*  the  national  legislature  has  shown  an  ex 
traordinary  jealousy  of  a  standing  force.  The 
statesmen  of  1784  may  be  excused  for  fearing  that 
such  a  body  might  one  day  subvert  their  hardly 
won  popular  liberties,  as  it  had  done  in  ancient 
Rome ;  but  in  1898  prudence  seems  to  have  degen 
erated  into  prejudice.  In  the  debate  upon  the  Hull 
bill — so  named  after  the  chairman  of  the  Com 
mittee  on  Military  Affairs,  who  fathered  it  in  the 
House — Representative  Lewis,  of  Washington,  is 
reported  as  describing  the  regular  army  as  consist 
ing  of  "  gilded  military  satraps  on  the  one  hand  and 
tasselled  society  sapheads  on  the  other."  Mr.  Hep 
burn,  of  Iowa,  voiced  the  traditional  sentiment  of 
Congress  when  he  said,  in  the  same  debate 
(April  6th) : 

If  the  country  enters  upon  war,  we  want  that  war  to 
be  a  popular  one.  To  make  it  so,  the  patriots  of  the  land 
must  be  invited  to  take  part  in  it,  as  they  have  done  in 
all  previous  wars. 

"  Ignorance  and  prejudice  held  high  carnival," 
Mr.  Hull  afterward  said,  and  his  description  of  the 
debate  is  not  an  unjust  one,  "  and  the  bill  was  de 
feated  by  sheer  force  of  the  lung  power  of  members 
who  have  since  confessed  that  they  knew  nothing 
of  the  subject."  f 

*  McMaster's  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  vol.  i, 
p.  i 86. 

t  North  American  Review,  April,  1899.  "An  army  can  be  raised 
in  a  day,  and  be  drilled  and  disciplined  in  a  month,"  Senator  Foraker 
6 


76 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


Had  the  Hull  bill  been  passed,  the  United  States 
would  have  had,  even  at  the  eleventh  hour,  a  regu 
lar  army  large  enough  to  conquer  the  Spanish 
colonies,  while  the  militia  could  have  been  relied 
on  for  service  as  a  home  guard.  The  sufferings  of 
the  volunteers  in  the  field  and  in  camp  would  have 
been  minimized  or  avoided,  and  the  nation  would 
have  escaped  most  of  the  unpleasant  developments 
that  tarnished  the  glory  of  its  victory.  If  the  les 
sons  of  the  war  with  Spain  are  heeded,  as  those 
of  previous  wars  have  not  been,  it  will  have  an 
adequate  force  of  trained  regulars  for  the  next 
emergency,  instead  of  depending  upon  a  hasty 
"  invitation  "  to  the  "  patriots  of  the  land." 

The  proceedings  of  the  Maine  commission  had 

been  carefully  kept  from  the  public  until  the  report 

was  published  on  the  28th  of  March. 

Report  of  the       jt   was    another    comparatively    brief 

Maine  commis-  ,    r  ,      ,  .L       .    .         ' 

sioni  and  formal  document,  giving  a  gen 

eral  description  of  the  condition  and 
discipline  of  the  ship  and  crew  previous  to  the  ex 
plosion,  a  technical  summary  of  the  injuries  she  had 
received,  and  the  following  momentous  verdict : 

The  court  finds  that  the  loss  of  the  Maine  was  not  in 
any  respect  due  to  fault  or  negligence  on  the  part  of  any 
of  the  officers  or  members  of  the  crew  of  said  vessel, 
x  /  In  the  opinion  of  the  court  the  Maine  was  destroyed 
by  the  explosion  of  a  submarine  mine,  which  caused  the 
partial  explosion  of  two  or  more  of  her  forward  maga 
zines. 

The  court  has  been  unable  to  obtain  evidence  fixing 
the  responsibility  for  the  destruction  of  the  Maine  upon 
any  person  or  persons.  / 

The  commission  had  been  able  to  gather  com 
paratively  little  definite  and  positive  evidence;  and 
no  ray  of  light  has  since  been  thrown  upon  the  sub 
ject.  Only  one  of  the  Maine  survivors  was  actually 

said  in  an  article  published  in  Munsey's  Magazine,  December,  1897,  and 
that  extraordinary  statement  may  be  taken  as  the  keynote  of  the  mili 
tary  policy  of  Congress. 


THE   COMING  OF   WAR 


77 


an  eye-witness  of  the  explosion — Marine  William 
Anthony,  the  orderly  who  reported  it  to  Captain 
Sigsbee.  He  testified  that  he  saw  "  an  immense 
shoot  of  flame  "  and  "  debris  going  up  with  it," 
but  did  not  notice  any  column  of  water,  such  as 
might  have  been  expected  to  be  thrown  into  the 
air  by  a  submarine  mine.  Captain  Teasdale,  of  the 
British  bark  Deva,  anchored  near  the  destroyed 
battleship,  "  saw  no  wave  after  the  explosion  "- 
another  negative  piece  of  testimony.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  divers — whose  work  was  accomplished 
under  great  difficulties,  owing  to  the  shattered 
condition  of  the  wreck  and  its  rapid  settling  in  the 
soft  bottom  of  the  harbour — testified  positively  to 
finding  a  hole  in  the  mud  under  the  Maine's  bow, 
and  some  of  her  bottom  plates  bent  inward  and 
thrust  upward;  and  this  testimony,  no  doubt,  was 
conclusive  with  the  board  of  inquiry.  One  diver 
spoke  of  wires  and  pieces  of  plate,  not  belonging 
to  the  ship,  lying  near  her  in  the  mud — not  a  very 
suspicious  circumstance  in  so  frequented  a  harbour. 
A  large  piece  of  cement  found  on  the  deck  of  the 
City  of  Washington  after  the  explosion,  and  at  first 
supposed  to  have  come  from  the  Maine's  bottom — 
which  would  have  been  striking  evidence — was 
afterward  identified  as  part  of  the  floor  of  a  wash 
room  on  the  berth  deck. 

The  proceedings  of  the  Spanish  board  of  in 
quiry  were  belittled  by  the  American  correspond 
ents  in  Havana,  but  they  resulted  in  a  voluminous 
report — it  fills  more  than  seventy  pages  as  a  Con 
gressional  document— ^-which  at  least  made  a  dis 
play  of  careful  examination  of  such  slight  evidence 
as  was  procurable.  The  Spanish  divers  flatly  con 
tradicted  the  American  divers.  Witnesses  from  the 
Alfonso  XII,  moored  only  about  a  hundred  and 
fifty  yards  from  the  Maine,  and  from  the  Legazpi, 
which  lay  at  twice  that  distance,  testified  that  there 
was  no  disturbance  of  the  water,  as  from  the 


78  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

explosion  of  a  mine.  One  of  these  witnesses 
was  Ensign  Guillermo  Farragut,  said  to  be  nearly 
connected  by  blood  with  the  famous  Ameri 
can  admiral,  whose  father  was  a  Spaniard,  a  native 
of  the  island  of  Minorca.  There  had  been  an 
official  search  of  the  harbour  early  in  the  morning 
after  the  disaster,  and  no  dead  fish  had  been  found 
— a  point  on  which  the  Spaniards  laid  much  stress, 
but  which  was,  at  best,  negative  and  inconclusive. 
Their  conclusion,  of  course,  was  that  the  catas 
trophe  was  due  to  internal  causes ;  and  this  was 
confirmed  by  the  statement,  officially  made  through 
the  Spanish  legation  at  Washington,  that  no  mines 
had  ever  been  placed  in  the  harbour  of  Havana. 
It  is  pointed  out  by  Captain  Sigsbee  *  that  no 
demonstration  of  the  truth  of  this  statement  was 
made  or  suggested.  On  the  other  hand,  in  an  in 
terview  published  in  the  Madrid  Heraldo  (April  6, 
1898),  Admiral  Beranger,  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
under  Canovas,  declared  that  he  had  shipped  one 
hundred  and  ninety  electrical  and  contact  torpedoes 
to  Cuba,  and  arranged  for  their  installation  at  Ha 
vana,  Cienfuegos,  Santiago,  and  Nuevitas. 

There  is  much  about  the  destruction  of  the 
Maine  that  still  remains  unexplained.  The  Span 
iards  have  only  themselves  to  blame  if  their  official 
reports  are  disbelieved  and  disregarded.  The  in 
vestigation  by  the  American  naval  officers  was  to  a 
certain  extent  an  ex  parte  inquiry.  Those  who  vir 
tually  stood  before  it  as  men  accused  of  a  frightful 
crime — the  official  authorities  of  Havana — were 
not  and  could  not  be  represented  by  counsel.  Had 
they  been  so  represented,  it  is  at  least  conceivable 
that  the  evidence  on  which  the  court  based  its  find 
ings  might  have  been  modified  at  material  points. 
Those  findings  suggest  interesting  and  important 
questions.  A  submarine  mine  powerful  enough  to 

*  The  Maine,  p.  188. 


THE   COMING  OF   WAR 


79 


destroy  a  war  ship  is  no  ordinary  article  of  com 
merce.  It  costs  hundreds,  or  even  thousands,  of 
dollars ;  it  weighs  several  hundred  pounds ;  it  is  not 
likely  to  be  possessed  or  operated  except  with 
official  authority  and  by  expert  hands.  Who  set  so 
mighty  an  engine  of  destruction  under  the  keel  of 
the  Maine?  Was  it  exploded  there — exploded  with 
such  fatal  precision,  such  a  maximum  of  destruc- 
tiveness — by  some  accident  of  criminal  careless 
ness,  or  by  the  foulest  act  of  deliberate  treachery 
that  ever  blotted  the  name  of  Spain?  How  was  it 
all  accomplished  without  leaving  behind  any  ap 
parent  trace  of  telltale  evidence  ?  If  no  later  revela 
tions  answer  these  questions,  the  loss  of  the  Maine 
will  go  down  in  history  as  one  of  the  most  ex 
traordinary  and  mysterious  events  ever  recorded. 

Although  the  Government  at  Washington  was 
actively  making  ready  for  the  foreseen  event  of 
war,  diplomatic  dealings  with  Madrid 
were  not  abandoned.  On  the  2;th 
of  March  General  Woodford,  the 
United  States  minister  to  Spain,  was  instructed  to 
submit  a  proposition  for  a  six  months'  armistice  in 
Cuba,  to  give  time  "  for  the  negotiation  of  peace 
with  the  good  offices  of  the  President " ;  and  to  ask 
for  the  immediate  and  final  revocation  of  the  order 
of  reconcentration.  In  reply,  on  the  3ist,  Sagasta's 
cabinet  offered  to  intrust  the  preparation  of  peace 
to  the  island's  newly  constituted  parliament,  which 
was  to  convene  on  the  4th  of  May ;  meanwhile,  the 
insurgents  might  ask  the  captain-general  for  an 
armistice,  to  which  the  home  Government  would 
raise  no  objection.  As  for  the  reconcentration  sys 
tem — which,  nominally  ended  by  the  decree  of 
November  10,  1897,  had  practically  continued, 
chiefly  owing  to  the  absolute  helplessness  both  of 
the  refugees  and  of  the  local  authorities — Blanco  at 
once  (March  30)  issued  a  proclamation  declaring  it 
abolished  throughout  the  island,  without  any  limita- 


go  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

tion  or  condition,  and  ordering  all  civil  and  mili 
tary  officials  to  assist  the  destitute  in  finding  means 
of  livelihood. 

Sagasta's  counter  proposal,  it  will  be  seen,  was 
carefully  framed  so  as  to  avoid  the  humiliating  ap 
pearance  of  accepting  American  intervention.  It 
was — largely,  perhaps,  in  consequence  of  this  exi 
gency — somewhat  indefinite  and  dilatory ;  yet  in 
conjunction  with  the  grant  of  three  million  pesetas 
for  the  relief  of  Cuban  distress,  voted  a  few  days 
before,  and  with  the  free  field  allowed  to  American 
charitable  effort,  it  certainly  showed  a  conciliatory 
disposition.  It  might  have  led  to  further  negotia 
tion  but  for  the  prevalent  fatal  distrust  of  Spanish 
official  sincerity.  President  McKinley,  however, 
regarded  it  as  so  disappointing  that  he  let  the  mat 
ter  drop,  and  made  no  further  pretence  of  amicable 
dealing  with  Madrid. 

The  last  interlude  in  the  drama,  before  the  Gov 
ernment  at  Washington  took  the  decisive  and  irrev 
ocable  step  for  which  it  was  preparing,  came  on 
the  7th  of  April,  when  the  representatives  of  the 
six  great  powers  of  Europe,  headed  by  the  senior 
ambassador,  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote,  called  at  the 
White  House  to  present  a  joint  note  urging  fur 
ther  negotiations  for  the  maintenance  of  peace. 
Whether  undertaken  at  the  request  of  Spain,  or  at 
the  suggestion  of  one  of  the  powers,  the  proceed 
ing — which  might  have  carried  an  unpleasant 
meaning  as  a  hint  of  possible  intervention  in  the 
coming  struggle — was  treated  as  simply  a  humane 
formality.  The  President's  reply  was  perfectly 
courteous,  but  showed  no  sign  of  stirring  from  the 
policy  upon  which  he  had  now  fully  determined, 
and  which  he  was  to  announce  to  the  country  and 
to  the  world  four  days  later : 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  recognises  the 
good  will  which  has  prompted  the  friendly  communica 
tion  of  the  representatives  of  Germany,  Austria-Hungary, 


THE   COMING  OF   WAR  8 1 

France,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  and  Russia,  as  set  forth  in 
the  address  of  your  excellencies,  and  shares  the  .hope 
therein  expressed  that  the  outcome  of  the  situation  in 
Cuba  may  be  the  maintenance  of  peace  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain  by  affording  the  necessary  guar 
antees  for  the  re-establishment  of  order  in  the  island,  so 
terminating  the  chronic  condition  of  disturbance  there 
which  so  deeply  injures  the  interests  and  menaces  the 
tranquility  of  the  American  nation  by  the  character  and 
consequences  of  the  struggle  thus  kept  up  at  our  doors, 
besides  shocking  its  sentiment  of  humanity. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  appreciates  the 
humanitarian  and  disinterested  character  of  the  communi 
cation  now  made  on  behalf  of  the  powers  named,  and  for 
its  part  is  confident  that  equal  appreciation  will  be  shown 
for  its  own  earnest  and  unselfish  endeavours  to  fulfil  a 
duty  to  humanity  by  ending  a  situation  the  indefinite  pro 
longation  of  which  has  become  insufferable. 

The  Spanish  answer  to  the  communication  of 

the  verdict  of  the  Maine  board  was  a  proposal  "  that 

the  facts  be  ascertained  by  an  impar- 

President  ^aj   investigation   by   experts,    whose 

McKinley'swar  dedsion  5  {n  accepts  in  advance.» 
message 

April  11/1898.  To  this  no  reply  was  made.  [On  the 
nth  of  April  the  President  sent  to 
Congress  his  message  reviewing  the  whole  situa 
tion,  recapitulating  the  position  of  the  Government 
during  Cuba's  years  of  agony,  and  declaring  that 
at  last  the  hour  for  intervention  had  struck.  It  was 
an  able  and  dignified  state  paper,  and  of  such  im 
portance  as  defining  the  issues  upon  which  America 
stood  ready  to  dcaw  the  sword,  that  it  deserves  ex 
tended  quotation. '  The  opening  paragraphs  de 
scribe  the  intolerable  conditions  existing  so  close  to 
the  southern  shores  of  the  United  States : 

The  present  revolution  is  but  the  successor  of  other 
similar  insurrections  which  have  occurred  in  Cuba  against 
the  dominion  of  Spain,  extending  over  a  period  of  nearly 
half  a  century,  each  of  which,  during  its  progress,  has  sub 
jected  the  United  States  to  great  effort  and  expense  in 
enforcing  its  neutrality  laws,  caused  enormous  losses  to 
American  trade  and  commerce,  caused  irritation,  annoy 
ance,  and  disturbance  among  our  citizens,  and,  by  the  ex- 


82  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

ercise  of  cruel,  barbarous,  and  uncivilized  practices  of  war 
fare,  shocked  the  sensibilities  and  offended  the  humane 
sympathies  of  our  people. 

Since  the  present  revolution  began,  in  February,  1895, 
this  country  has  seen  the  fertile  domain  at  our  threshold 
ravaged  by  fire  and  sword  in  the  course  of  a  struggle  un 
equalled  in  the  history  of  the  island  and  rarely  paralleled  as 
to  the  numbers  of  the  combatants  and  the  bitterness  of  the 
contest  by  any  revolution  of  modern  times  where  a  de 
pendent  people  struggling  to  be  free  have  been  opposed 
by  the  power  of  the  sovereign  state. 

Our  people  have  beheld  a  once  prosperous  community 
reduced  to  comparative  want,  its  lucrative  commerce  vir 
tually  paralyzed,  its  exceptional  productiveness  dimin 
ished,  its  fields  laid  waste,  its  mills  in  ruins,  and  its  people 
perishing  by  tens  of  thousands  from  hunger  and  destitu 
tion.  We  have  found  ourselves  constrained,  in  the  obser 
vance  of  that  strict  neutrality  which  our  laws  enjoin,  and 
which  the  law  of  nations  commands,  to  police  our  own 
waters  and  watch  our  own  seaports  in  prevention  of  any 
unlawful  act  in  aid  of  the  Cubans.  Our  trade  has  suf 
fered;  the  capital  invested  by  our  citizens  in  Cuba  has 
been  largely  lost,  and  the  temper  and  forbearance  of  our 
people  have  been  so  sorely  tried  as  to  beget  a  perilous 
unrest  among  our  own  citizens  which  has  inevitably 
found  its  expression  from  time  to  time  in  the  national 
legislature. 

The  war  in  Cuba  is  of  such  a  nature  that  short  of  sub 
jugation  or  extermination  a  final  military  victory  for 
either  side  seems  impracticable.  The  alternative  lies  in 
the  physical  exhaustion  of  the  one  or  the  other  party,  or 
perhaps  of  both — a  condition  which  in  effect  ended  the 
Ten  Years'  War  by  the  truce  of  Zanjon.  The  prospect  of 
such  a  protraction  and  conclusion  of  the  present  strife  is 
a  contingency  hardly  to  be  contemplated  with  equanimity 
by  the  civilized  world,  and  least  of  all  by  the  United 
States,  affected  and  injured  as  we  are,  deeply  and  inti 
mately,  by  its  very  existence. 

The  President  then  recounted  his  offers  of 
friendly  mediation,  which  Spain  had  uniformly  de 
clined,  and  discussed  an  alternative  course  which 
had  been  so  frequently  urged  in  Congress — the 
recognition  of  the  insurgents  either  as  belligerents 
or  as  an  independent  power.  He  pointed  out  that 
in  avoiding  this  step  he  had  followed  the  prece 
dents  clearly  established  by  Jackson  and  other  chief 


THE   COMING  OF  WAR  83 

magistrates,  and  had  continued  the  policy  consist 
ently  maintained  by  his  more  recent  predecessors 
before  whom  the  same  question  had  come — Presi 
dents  Grant  and  Cleveland ;  and  he  added,  in  a  pas 
sage  whose  foresight  will  now  be  admitted : 

Such  recognition  is  not  necessary  in  order  to  enable 
the  United  States  to  intervene  and  pacify  the  island.  To 
commit  this  country  now  to  the  recognition  of  any  par 
ticular  government  in  Cuba  might  subject  us  to  embar 
rassing  conditions  of  international  obligation  toward  the 
organization  so  recognised.  In  case  of  intervention  our 
conduct  would  be  subject  to  the  approval  or  disapproval 
of  such  government.  We  would  be  required  to  submit  to 
its  direction  and  to  assume  to  it  the  mere  relation  of  a 
friendly  ally. 

When  it  shall  appear  hereafter  that  there  is  within  the 
island  a  government  capable  of  performing  the  duties  and 
discharging  the  functions  of  a  separate  nation,  and  having, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  proper  forms  and  attributes  of  na 
tionality,  such  government  can  be  promptly  and  readily 
recognised. 

'Recognition  of  the  insurgents  being  inadmis- 
sible  and  inexpedient,  and  mediation  being  de 
clined,  nothing  but  intervention  remained/  That 
the  time  would  come  for  the  United  States  to  take 
action,  Spain  had  long  ago  been  warned.  President 
Grant  had  declared  that  "  the  agency  of  others, 
either  by  mediation  or  by  intervention,  seems  to  be 
the  only  alternative  which  must  sooner  or  later  be 
invoked."  President  Cleveland  had  repeated  the 
warning,  in  a  passage  already  quoted,  and  JVtr. 
McKinley's  earlier  messages  had  reiterated  it.  I  And 
as  to  the  moral  right  to  intervene : 

The  forcible  intervention  of  the  United  States  as  a 
neutral  to  stop  the  war,  according  to  the  large  dictates  of 
humanity,  and  following  many  historical  precedents  where 
neighbouring  states  have  interfered  to  check  the  hopeless 
sacrifices  of  life  by  internecine  conflicts  beyond  their 
borders,  is  justifiable  on  rational  grounds.  It  involves 
hostile  constraint  upon  both  the  parties  to  the  contest,  as 
well  to  enforce  a  truce  as  to  guide  the  eventual  settle 
ment. 


84  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

The  grounds  for  such  intervention  may  be  briefly  sum 
marized  as  follows: 

First.  In  the  cause  of  humanity  and  to  put  an  end  to 
the  barbarities,  bloodshed,  starvation,  and  horrible  mis 
eries  now  existing  there,  and  which  the  parties  to  the  con 
flict  are  either  unable  or  unwilling-  to  stop  or  mitigate. 
It  is  no  answer  to  say  this  is  all  in  another  country,  be 
longing  to  another  nation,  and  is  therefore  none  of  our 
business.  It  is  specially  our  duty,  for  it  is  right  at  our 
door. 

Second.  We  owe  it  to  our  citizens  in  Cuba  to  afford 
them  that  protection  and  indemnity  for  life  and  property 
which  no  government  there  can  or  will  afford,  and  to  that 
end  to  terminate  the  conditions  that  deprive  them  of  legal 
protection. 

Third.  The  right  to  intervene  may  be  justified  by  the 
very  serious  injury  to  the  commerce,  trade,  and  business 
of  our  people,  and  by  the  wanton  destruction  of  property 
and  devastation  of  the  island. 

Fourth,  and  which  is  of  the  utmost  importance.  The 
present  condition  of  affairs  in  Cuba  is  a  constant  menace 
to  our  peace,  and  entails  upon  this  Government  an  enor 
mous  expense.  With  such  a  conflict  waged  for  years  in 
an  island  so  near  us,  and  with  which  our  people  have  such 
trade  and  business  relations;  where  the  lives  and  liberty 
of  our  citizens  are  in  constant  danger  and  their  property 
destroyed  and  themselves  ruined;  where  our  trading  ves 
sels  are  liable  to  seizure  and  are  seized  at  our  very  door 
by  war  ships  of  a  foreign  nation;  the  expeditions  of  fili 
bustering  that  we  are  powerless  to  prevent  altogether, 
and  the  irritating  questions  and  entanglements  thus  aris 
ing — all  these  and  others  that  I  need  not  mention,  with  the 
resulting  strained  relations,  are  a  constant  menace  to  our 
peace,  and  compel  us  to  keep  on  a  semi  war-footing  with 
a  nation  with  which  we  are  at  peace. 

All  these  sinister  conditions  had  been  patiently 
endured  until  there  came  the  crowning  and  intoler 
able  outrage  of  the  destruction  of  an  American 
battle  ship,  while  "  reposing  in  the  fancied  security 
of  a  friendly  harbour."! 

The  naval  court  of  inquiry,  which,  it  is  needless  to 
say,  commands  the  unqualified  confidence  of  the  Govern 
ment,  was  unanimous  in  its  conclusion  that  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  Maine  was  caused  by  an  exterior  explosion, 
that  of  a  submarine  mine.  It  did  not  assume  to  place  the 
responsibility.  That  remains  to  be  fixed. 


THE   COMING  OF   WAR  85 

In  any  event,  the  destruction  of  the  Maine,  by  what 
ever  exterior  cause,  is  a  patent  and  impressive  proof  of  a 
state  of  things  in  Cuba  that  is  intolerable.  That  condition 
is  thus  shown  to  be  such  that  the  Spanish  Government 
can  not  assure  safety  and  security  to  a  vessel  of  the  Ameri 
can  navy  in  the  harbour  of  Havana  on  a  mission  of  peace, 
and  rightfully  there. 

'On   all   these   convincing   and   carefully   stated    \f 
premises  the  President  based  his  concluding  call  for 
immediate  and  decisive  action"!") 

The  only  hope  of  relief  and  repose  from  a  condition 
which  can  no  longer  be  endured  is  the  enforced  pacification 
of  Cuba.  In  the  name  of  humanity,  in  the  name  of  civili 
zation,  in  behalf  of  endangered  American  interests  which 
give  us  the  right  and  the  duty  to  speak  and  to  act,  the 
war  in  Cuba  must  stop. 

....  I  ask  the  Congress  to  authorize  and  empower 
the  President  to  take  measures  to  secure  a  full  and  final 
termination  of  hostilities  between  the  Government  of 
Spain  and  the  people  of  Cuba,  and  to  secure  in  the  island 
the  establishment  of  a  stable  government,  capable  of 
maintaining  order  and  observing  its  international  obliga 
tions,  insuring  peace  and  tranquility  and  the  security  of 
its  citizens  as  well  as  our  own,  and  to  use  the  military  and 
naval  forces  of  the  United  States  as  may  be  necessary  for 
these  purposes. 

The  issue  is  now  with  the  Congress.  .  .  .  Prepared  to 
execute  every  obligation  imposed  upon  me  by  the  Consti 
tution  and  the  law,  I  await  your  action. 

I  The  message  was  received  with  a  marked  and 
rather  curious  absence  of  enthusiasm?)  The  im 
pression  it  made  in  Congress  was  one  of  disappoint 
ment.  In  the  House,  where  it  was  read  to  crowded 
galleries,  it  was  greeted  with  only  two  faint  out 
bursts  of  applause.  /It  was  not  regarded  as  a  call  *•' 
to  arms,  though  it  certainly  seems  such  as  we  read 
it  in  the  light  of  its  consequences.  1  Many  in  Wash 
ington  had  expected  a  direct  and  unqualified  dec 
laration  of  war  with  Spain  jljtliey  were  dissatisfied 
with  a  policy  of  intervention,  seeing  a  possible  loop 
hole  in  the  fact  that  no  date  for  action  was  fixed.  • 
It  is  difficult  to  see  how  they  expected  Spain  to  re- 


86  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

gard  the  announcement  of  forcible  interposition — • 
"  hostile  constraint  upon  both  the  parties  to  the 
contest,"  the  message  said — as  anything  else  but  a 
virtual  declaration  of  hostilities. 

Two  days  later  (April   I3th)  the  Senate  Com 
mittee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  to  which  the  President's 
two  messages  had  been  referred,  with 
The  Davis  several  resolutions,  most  of  them  in 

AprTi'a,  1898.  favour  of  recognising  the  Cuban  in 
surgents,  presented  its  report.  This, 
written  by  the  chairman  of  the  committee,  Senator 
Davis,  was  another  document  of  such  historical  im 
portance  that  its  salient  points  must  be  cited  here. 
It  first  dealt  with  the  situation  created  by  the 
destruction  of  the  Maine,  a  catastrophe  which 

excited  to  an  unprecedented  degree  the  compassion  and 
resentment  of  the  American  people. 

The  event  itself,  though  in  a  certain  sense  a  distinct 
occurrence,  was  linked  with  a  series  of  precedent  tran 
sactions  which  can  not  in  reason  be  disconnected  from 
it.  It  was  the  catastrophe  of  a  unity  of  events  extend 
ing  over  more  than  three  years  of  momentous  his 
tory.  Standing  by  itself  it  would  be,  perhaps,  merely 
an  ominous  calamity;  considered,  as  it  must  be,  with 
the  events  with  which  reason  and  common  sense  must 
connect  it,  and  with  animus  by  Spain  so  plainly  appar 
ent  that  no  one  can  even  plausibly  deny  its  existence, 
it  is  merely  one  reason  for  the  conclusion  to  which  the  in 
vestigating  mind  must  come  in  considering  the  entire  sub 
ject  of  the  relations  of  the  United  States  with  that  Gov 
ernment. 

Coming,  then,  to  the  policy  proper  in  these  un 
toward  circumstances,  the  report  took  issue  with 
the  President's  opposition  to  any  recognition  of  the 
insurgents,  and  defended  the  constant  moves — all 
of  them  fruitless — that  Congress  had  made  in  this 
direction : 

The  United  States  ought  at  once  to  recognise  the  in 
dependence  of  the  people  of  Cuba.  .  .  . 

It  is  believed  that  recognition  of  the  belligerency  of 
the  insurgents  in  Cuba,  if  it  had  been  given  seasonably, 


THE   COMING  OF   WAR  g/ 

when  it  was  suggested  by  concurrent  resolutions  to  that 
effect  passed  by  Congress,  would  have  insured  the  speedy 
termination  of  the  war  without  involving  the  United 
States  in  the  contest. 

The  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  people  of 
Cuba  is  justified  and  demanded  by  the  highest  considera 
tions  of  duty,  right,  and  policy. 

This  very  positive  assertion  was  supported  by  a 
description  of  the  "  Cuban  Republic  "  and  its  sup 
posed  established  control  of  the  eastern  half  of  the 
island. 

The  insurgents  hold  the  eastern  portion  of  the  island, 
to  the  practical  exclusion  of  Spain.  This  possession  ex 
tends  over  one  body  of  territory  comprising  fully  one 
half  of  the  area  of  Cuba. 

....  The  insurgents  comprise  in  the  eastern  half 
nearly  one  third  of  the  population  of  the  island.  That 
third  of  the  population  pays  taxes  to  them,  serves  in  their 
armies,  and  in  every  way  supports  and  is  loyal  to  them. 

The  cause  of  Spain  has  continually  grown  weaker, 
and  that  of  the  insurgents  has  grown  stronger.  The 
former  is  making  no  substantial  effort  for  the  recovery  of 
these  lost  provinces.  Their  people  are  secure  from  in 
vasion  and  cruel  administration.  Spain  has  never  been 
able  to  subject  them  to  her  unprecedented  and  murderous 
policy  of  concentration  and  extermination. 

Her  control  over  the  western  portion  of  the  island  is 
dominance  over  a  desolation  which  she  herself  has  cre 
ated.  Even  there  she  controls  only  the  territory  occupied 
by  her  cantonments  and  camps. 

This  description  accorded  with  the  prevalent 
impression  of  the  existing  state  of  affairs  in  Cuba, 
but  it  was  quite  at  variance  with  the  facts  given 
in  the  reports  quoted  on  an  earlier  page,*  and 
with  the  conditions  which  our  forces  found  con 
fronting  them  when  the  war  began.  The  Presi 
dent's  view  was,  as  has  been  said  before,  the 
better  informed  one.  It  was  strange  that  the 
Senate  committee  should  speak  of  the  eastern 
provinces  as  having  escaped  the  horrors  of  the 
war  when  the  American  consular  agents  were 

*  Page  54. 


88  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

giving  such  frightful  pictures  of  their  sufferings — 
sufferings  far  more  severe  than  the  distress  of  the 
western  provinces,  serious  as  that  was.  "  I  do  not 
believe,"  Consul  Hyatt  wrote  from  Santiago,  Feb 
ruary  i,  1898,  "  that  the  western  continent  has 
ever  witnessed  death  by  starvation  equal  to  that 
which  now  exists  in  eastern  Cuba." 

The  plea  for  recognition  of  the  insurgents  was 
little  more  than  a  thrashing  of  old  straw.  The  re 
port  touched  a  more  vital  point  in  its  justification  of 
intervention  by  sufficient  precedents,  and  by  the 
opinions  of  authorities  on  international  law.  It 
pointed  out  that  the  great  political  principles  which 
guide  national  policies  in  the  old  world  and  in  the 
new — the  "  balance  of  power  "  in  Europe  and  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  America — are  distinct  asser 
tions  of  the  right  of  intervention  in  certain  contin 
gencies.  Under  those  principles,  in  1878,  united 
Europe  intervened  between  Turkey  and  Russia — 
which  latter  power  had  itself  forcibly  intervened  in 
Turkey  to  put  a  stop  to  flagrant  misgovernment — 
and  in  1867  the  United  States,  "  by  threat  and  show 
of  force  "  compelled  France  to  evacuate  Mexico. 
Egypt,  Crete,  and  Greece  have  furnished  further 
instances  in  point. 

After  a  final  summary  of  the  injuries  suffered  by 
American  interests,  already  stated  in  the  Presi 
dent's  message,  Senator  Davis's  report  concluded 
by  submitting  the  following  resolution : 

Whereas,  The  abhorrent  conditions  which  have  existed 
for  more  than  three  years  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  so  near 
our  own  borders,  have  shocked  the  moral  sense  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  have  been  a  disgrace  to 
Christian  civilization,  culminating,  as  they  have,  in  the 
destruction  of  a  United  States  battle  ship,  with  two  hun 
dred  and  sixty-six  of  its  officers  and  crew,*  while  on  a 
friendly  visit  in  the  harbour  of  Havana,  and  can  not  longer 
be  endured,  as  has  been  set  forth  by  the  President  of  the 

*  This  seems  to  have  been  a  slight  inaccuracy.     The  figures  given 
by  the  Navy  Department  are  260. 


THE   COMING   OF   WAR 


89 


United  States  in  his  message  to  Congress  of  April  n, 
1898,  upon  which  the  action  of  Congress  was  invited; 

Therefore,  Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Rep 
resentatives  of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress 
assembled: 

First.  That  the  people  of  the  island  of  Cuba  are,  and 
of  right  ought  to  be,  free  and  independent. 

Second.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  de 
mand,  and  the  Government  of  the  United  States  does 
hereby  demand,  that  the  Government  of  Spain  at  once  re 
linquish  its  authority  and  government  in  the  island  of 
Cuba,  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba 
and  Cuban  waters. 

Third.  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,- 
and  hereby  is,  directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  entire 
land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  and  to  call 
into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States  the  militia  of 
the  several  States  to  such  an  extent  as  may  be  necessary 
to  carry  these  resolutions  into  effect. 

/A  week  of  vehement  debate  followed  in  both 

branches  of  Congress.    The  House  was  the  quicker 

to  act,  passing  a  resolution,  framed 

TheHousevotes   b      {^    Foreign    Affairs    Committee, 

for  intervention,        J        ,  ,    °    -      A        M          -  .. 

April  13, 1898.  on  the  J3th  of  April,  after  a  dis 
cussion  in  which  the  strained  feel 
ings  of  the  hour  found  expression  in  passages  of 
violent  disorder.  The  lie  was  passed  between  the 
two  sides  of  the  House ;  there  was  much  shouting 
and  shaking  of  fists ;  one  Southern  member  hurled 
a  heavy  book  at  an  opponent,  and  another  ran  along 
the  top  of  a  line  of  desks  to  plunge  into  the  fray, 
which  was  finally  quieted  by  the  sergeant-at-arnisT) 
The  resolution  adopted  amid  such  scenes  of  ex 
citement  was  couched  in  terms  that  were  certainly 
sweeping  and  vigorous,  lit  declared  that  for  three 
years  Spain  had  waged  war  upon  the  inhabitants  of 
Cuba  without  making  any  substantial  progress  to 
ward  suppressing  the  revolution ;  that  she  had  con 
ducted  her  warfare  in  a  manner  contrary  to  the  laws 
of  nations,  had  caused  the  death  by  starvation  of 
more  than  two  hundred  thousand  non-combatants, 
and  had  destroyed  the  lives  and  property  of  many 


gQ  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

American  citizens ;  that  the  long  series  of  losses,  in- 
/  juries,  and  murders  for  which  Spain  was  responsible 
had  culminated  in  the  destruction  of  the  Maine]! 
With  all  this  as  a  preamble,  it  authorized  the  Presi 
dent  to  intervene  at  once  to  stop  the  war  in  Cuba, 
"  with  the  purpose  of  establishing,  by  the  free 
action  of  the  people  thereof,  a  stable  and  inde 
pendent  government  of  their  own."  It  passed  the 
House  by  322  votes  to  19,  Representative  Boutelle, 
of  Maine,  being  the  most  prominent  member  of  the 
minority. 

fThe  debate  in  the  Senate  was  also  marked  by 

.  an  excitement  rare  in  that  dignified  body,  and  the 

lie  was  passed  when  one  speaker  al- 

The  senate          hided   to   another   Senator's   visit   to 

resolution,  /—    i  .1          a  •       •  »        r 

April  16, 1898.  Cuba  as  the  commissioner  of  a 
sensational  New  York  newspaper.! 
It  ended  in  the  adoption  of  the  resolution  submitted 
by  the  Senate  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  and  al 
ready  quoted  at  the  conclusion  of  Senator  Davis's 
report,  with  two  notable  amendments.  One  was  the 
addition — suggested  by  a  minority  of  the  com 
mittee,  including  Senators  Foraker  and  Turpie — 
of  the  following  words  to  the  first  paragraph : 

And  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  hereby 
recognises  the  Republic  of  Cuba  as  the  true  and  lawful 
government  of  that  island. 

This  was  in  direct  opposition  to  the  President's 
message  and  reaffirmed  the  Congressional  antago 
nism  to  his  policy  of  non-recognition.  As  Mr.  Mc- 
Kinley  had  very  justly  pointed  out,  it  would  have 
ended  his  freedom  of  action  in  Cuba.  Having  once 
acknowledged  the  authority  of  the  insurgents,  the 
United  States  could  not  have  appeared  in  the  island 
without  their  permission,  nor  have  acted  except  at 
their  direction. 

The  other  amendment,  moved  by  Senator  Davis, 
was  the  addition  of  a  fourth  paragraph  to  the  reso 
lution  : 


THE   COMING  OF   WAR  91 

Fourth.  That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any 
disposition  or  intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdic 
tion,  or  control  over  said  island,  except  for  the  pacification 
thereof,  and  asserts  its  determination  when  that  is  ac 
complished  to  leave  the  government  and  control  of  the 
island  to  its  people. 

With  these  amendments  the  Senate  passed  the 
resolution  by  a  vote  of  sixty-seven  to  twenty-one, 
on  the  night  of  April  i6th,  after  a  continuous  ses 
sion  of  eleven  hours. 

The  difference  between  the  House  and  Senate 
resolutions  necessitating  a  conference,  the  repre 
sentatives  of  the  former  branch  agreed  to  the  fourth 
paragraph,  but  refused  to  accept  the  recognition  of 
the  insurgents.  The  refusal,  in  spite  of  the  strong 
feeling  in  favour  of  recognition  that  had  always  ex 
isted  in  the  House,  was  a  fortunate  and  patriotic 
concession  to  the  judgment  of  the  President,  as  well 
as  a  remarkable  tribute  to  the  influence  of  Speaker 
Reed.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  other  Senate 
amendment  could  not  also  have  been  left  off  the 
record.  Well  intentioned  as  was  the  disclaimer  of 
desire  for  aggrandizement,  and  correctly  as  it  ex 
pressed  the  feeling  in  which  the  United  States 
entered  upon  the  war,  it  is  easy  to  see  now  that  its 
wisdom  was  doubtful.  History  moves  rapidly  in 
war  time,  and  it  is  difficult  to  predict,  before  draw 
ing  the  sword,  what  policy  will  best  meet  the  prob 
lems  that  may  have  arisen  when  it  is  sheathed  again. 
It  would  have  been  better  to  follow  more  strictly  the 
lines  laid  down  in  the  President's  message,  and 
avoid  all  the  "  embarrassing  conditions  "  of  which 
he  spoke  in  warning. 

The  final  debate  took  place  on  the  i8th,  lasting 
beyond  midnight  and  ending  at  half  past  one  in 
the  morning  of  the  iQth,  when  the 
tohs  Ua1it^matum  conference  report  was  adopted  by  the 
April  ao^iigi.  House.  The  President  held  the  reso 
lution  for  a  day,  adding  his  signature 
on  the  2Oth,  at  11.24  A.  M.,  in  the  presence  of  most 
7 


92  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

of  his  cabinet.  In  accordance  with  its  terms,  in 
structions  were  immediately  sent  to  General  Wood- 
ford,  United  States  minister  at  Madrid,  to  present 
to  the  Spanish  Government  a  formal  demand  that 
it  should  "  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and  gov 
ernment  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  withdraw  its 
land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban 
waters."  For  a  "  full  and  satisfactory  response," 
the  American  ultimatum  continued,  the  President 
would  wait  till  noon  on  April  23d ;  in  default  of  such 
reply,  he  would  use  the  power  of  the  nation  to  carry 
it  into  effect. 

That  Spain  would  comply  with  the  demand  was 
not  to  be  expected.  Although  diplomatically  she 
had  admitted  that  the  conduct  of  the  United  States 
during  the  Cuban  civil  war  had  been  correct,  she 
bitterly  resented  the  fact  that  the  insurrection  had 
been  to  a  great  extent  organized  and  directed  from 
that  country,  and  assisted  by  illegal  expeditions  re 
cruited  there.  She  had  been  the  subject  of  constant 
abuse,  both  just  and  unjust,  in  its  newspapers  and 
in  Congress.  Her  proud  and  sensitive  people, 
ignorant  of  the  real  character  and  resources  of  the 
American  republic,  would  not  have  suffered  her 
statesmen  to  accept  the  proffered  terms  even  had 
they  themselves  desired  to  do  so.  Such  a  conces 
sion  would  have  unseated  Sagasta's  ministry  and 
might  have  upset  little  Alfonso's  throne. 

Senor  Polo,  the  Spanish  minister  at  Washing 
ton,  was  notified  by  a  messenger  from  the  State 
Department,  on  the  morning  of  the 

Diplomatic  rela-  2Qth  Q|  the  s{orn{njr  Qf  the  joint  rCSO- 
tions  broken  off,  ,  ,  9  ,  te  .  J  .  , 

April  20  1898.  lution,  and  of  the  instructions  that 
had  gone  to  General  Woodford.  He 
at  once  replied  with  a  request  for  his  passports. 
;<  The  resolution,"  he  wrote,  "  is  of  such  a  character 
that  my  permanence  in  Washington  becomes  im 
possible."  At  seven  o'clock — after  an  interview 
with  the  ubiquitous  newspaper  correspondents,  to 


THE   COMING  OF   WAR  93 

whom  he  foretold  victory  for  Spain  in  the  coming 
struggle — he  took  a  train  for  the  north.  Police 
guarded  the  station  to  prevent  any  hostile  demon 
stration,  but  none  was  attempted.  His  destination 
was  Niagara  Falls,  just  over  the  Canadian  fron 
tier,  whither  Seiior  du  Bosc,  first  secretary  of  the 
legation,  followed  him  a  day  later,  leaving  the 
affairs  of  the  Spanish  Government  in  the  hands  of 
the  French  ambassador,  M.  Cambon,  and  the  Aus 
trian  minister,  Baron  Hengelmuller. 

Meanwhile,  there  was  great  excitement  in 
Madrid.  On  the  iQth  Seiior  Sagasta  addressed  a 
meeting  of  his  supporters  in  the  Cortes — which  had 
been  summoned  in  special  session — and  called  on 
"  all  sons  of  Spain  "  to  "  repel  with  the  whole  might 
of  the  nation  a  most  odious  outrage,  the  like  of 
which  has  never  been  seen  in  history."  On  the  fol 
lowing  day  the  boy  king  and  his  mother,  the  queen 
regent,  went  in  person  to  open  the  legislature,  and 
their  appearance  was  the  signal  for  a  great  demon 
stration  of  enthusiasm.  Maria  Cristina  herself 
read  the  opening  speech  to  the  Cortes,  which  body, 
she  declared,  would  "  undoubtedly  indorse  the 
invincible  resolution  which  inspires  my  Govern 
ment  to  defend  our  rights  with  whatever  sacrifices 
may  be  required  from  us."  It  is  impossible  not  to 
feel  a  touch  of  personal  sympathy  for  this  hapless 
princess,  a  pathetic  figure  amid  the  troubles  of  her 
adopted  country,  and  never,  perhaps,  more  pathetic 
than  when,  on  the  eve  of  a  disastrous  war  that  was 
Spain's  just  punishment,  she  told  the  Cortes  that 
"  with  the  self-devotion  which  always  guided  our 
ancestors  in  the  great  emergencies  of  our  history, 
we  will  surmount  the  present  crisis  without  loss  of 
honour." 

The  American  ultimatum  was  never  officially 
presented,  for  on  the  morning  of  April  21  st,  before 
General  Woodford  had  handed  it  to  the  Spanish 
Government,  he  received  a  note  from  Pio  Gullon, 


94  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

the  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  informing  him  that 
diplomatic  relations  were  at  an  end.  Congress, 
said  Senor  Gullon,  had  passed  a  resolution  which 
"  denies  the  legitimate  sovereignty  of  Spain  and 
threatens  immediate  armed  intervention  in  Cuba — 
which  is  equivalent  to  a  declaration  of  war." 
American  newspapers  saw  in  this  another  piece  of 
Spanish  treachery,  and  declared  that  the  President's 
despatch  to  General  Woodford  must  have  been  sur 
reptitiously  copied  at  the  telegraph  office  in 
Madrid  ;  but  the  supposition  is  unnecessary.  As  al 
ready  stated,  the  ultimatum  had  been  communi 
cated  to  the  Spanish  legation  in  Washington 
twenty-four  hours  before,  and  Senor  Polo  had  no 
doubt  promptly  informed  the  home  Government  of 
so  momentous  a  piece  of  news. 

General  Woodford  at  once  asked  for  his  pass 
ports,  and  on  the  afternoon  of  the  2ist  he  started 
for  the  French  frontier,  leaving  the  affairs  of  his 
legation  in  the  hands  of  the  British  ambassador, 
and  instructing  the  American  consuls  in  other 
Spanish  cities  to  take  similar  steps.  He  was 
escorted  to  the  station  by  Senor  Aguilera,  the  gov 
ernor  of  Madrid,  who  preserved  an  attitude  of  grave 
Castilian  courtesy  till  the  train  was  moving  away, 
when  he  led  the  bystanders  in  cheering  for  Spain. 
There  was  an  unpleasant  incident  as  the  departing 
minister  passed  through  Valladolid,  where  a  mob 
yelled  "  Death  to  the  Yankees !  "  and  threw  stones 
at  the  train,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  the  local  police. 
In  Madrid,  that  same  evening,  excited  crowds 
thronged  the  streets,  and  there  was  some  disorder, 
a  gilded  eagle  being  pulled  down  from  the  office  of 
an  American  life  insurance  company. 

Such  were  some  of  the  incidents  of  the  day  that 
was  to  be  memorable  in  history  as  the  first  of  the 
war ;  but  its  great  and  decisive  event  was  the  flash 
ing  of  a  brief  message  along  the  wire  from  Wash 
ington  to  Key  West,  where  the  most  powerful  fleet 


THE   COMING   OF   WAR 


95 


of  war  ships  that  ever  floated  in  American  waters 
lay  waiting  with  intense  eagerness  for  the  word 
for  action.  Before  entering  upon  the  battle 
drama  that  ensued,  it  may  be  well  to  give  a  brief 
review  of  the  forces  that  the  combatants  had  mar 
shalled  for  the  struggle  thus  signalled  to  begin. 


•'*?:• 


CHAPTER  V 

THE   RESOURCES    OF   THE    COMBATANTS 

FOUR  hundred  years  ago  Spain  rose  suddenly 
to  the  foremost  place  among  the  nations;  but  she 
fell  almost  as  speedily,  and  in  the  present  century 
she  has  not  been  reckoned  as  one  of  the  great 
powers  of  Europe.  At  the  beginning  of  1898  her 
population  was  estimated  at  eighteen  millions — 
about  a  quarter  of  that  of  the  United  States ;  and 
in  other  respects  the  disproportion  of  resources  was 
still  greater.  Her  one  point  of  advantage — on 
paper,  at  least — lay  in  the  fact  that  she  had  the 
greater  number  of  trained  soldiers.  The  issue  of 
the  conflict  depended  on  the  command  of  the  sea, 
and  her  navy  was  weaker  than  her  adversary's, 
though  the  tremendous  inferiority  it  was  to  display 
under  the  guns  of  Dewey  and  Sampson  did  not 
appear  in  the  navy  lists.  Almost  overwhelmingly 
burdened  with  debt,  her  Government  had  neither 
ready  money  nor  credit — the  sinews  of  modern  war. 
Her  financial  condition,  indeed,  was  in  itself  a 
handicap  that  predetermined  the  result  of  her  strug 
gle  against  her  rich  and  powerful  enemy  from  the 
day  it  began. 

There  is  no  boastfulness  in  saying  that  the 
American  is  a  better  fighter  than  the  Spaniard. 
Napoleon  stigmatized  the  British  as  a  nation  of 
shopkeepers,  and  in  that  historical  epigram  he  un 
intentionally  phrased  the  strength  of  the  peoples 
whom  we  classify  by  the  oft-abused  term  of  Anglo- 
Saxon.  The  qualities  that  win  in  the  arts  of  peace 


THE   RESOURCES   OF   THE   COMBATANTS      97 

will  also  win  in  the  arts  of  war,  and  the  greater 
energy,  intelligence,  and  organizing  power — in  a 
word,  the  superior  business  ability — of  the  men 
who  speak  the  English  language  is  setting  them 
further  and  further  ahead  of  the  Latin  races  in  the 
struggle  for  worldwide  dominion. 

Of  all  the  Latin  countries,  Spain  is  probably  the 
least  advanced,  the  most  mediaeval.  Her  people 
live  primitively  by  agriculture ;  her  manufactures 
are  utterly  insignificant  in  comparison  to  the  vast 
industrial  forces  of  the  United  States.  In  1889 
sixty-eight  per  cent  of  her  inhabitants  were  re 
turned  as  illiterate.  In  such  a  soil  good  govern 
ment  does  not  thrive,  and  she  has  suffered  sorely 
from  misrule  and  civil  disorder.  Her  lack  of  great 
men  is  sufficiently  shown  by  the  disastrous  inepti 
tude  with  which  her  foremost  soldiers  and  states 
men  have  met  the  military  and  political  emergencies 
of  the  last  few  years. 

The  Spaniard  can  fight  bravely,  but  modern 
war,  especially  at  sea,  is  not  won  by  personal  brav 
ery.  It  is  a  matter  of  engineering,  of  the  skilful 
use  of  ponderous  and  intricate  machinery.  In  this 
the  Spaniard  is  specially  deficient,  and  the  Ameri 
can  conspicuously  strong.  As  has  been  said  by  Hi 
ram  S.  Maxim  :  "The  complication  of  modern  imple 
ments  of  destruction  gives  to  the  highly  scientific  and 
mechanical  races  a  marked  advantage  over  the  un 
trained  and  unscientific  nations  " ;  *  and  the  war  of 
1898  was  a  signal  demonstration  of  this  principle. 

As  in  practically  all  the  countries  of  continental 

Europe,    Spain's   army   is   raised   by   conscription, 

80,000  recruits  being  levied  annually. 

The^Span  .j,^   term   Q{   service    js    twdve   years 

— three  in  the  line,  three  in  the  first 
reserve,  six  in  the  second  reserve.  The  full  force 
of  the  army  is  nominally  1,083,595  men,  but  this 

*  The  Engineering  Magazine,  September,  1898. 


98 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


is  on  paper  only,  as  nothing  like  that  number  could 
be  equipped  for  service.  The  standing  army  is 
stated  at  128,183  on  a  peace  footing,  183,972  on  a 
war  footing.  The  infantry  is  equipped  with  the 
Mauser,  a  good  modern  rifle  that  is  also  used  by  the 
German  and  other  armies.  It  is  of  German  make, 
a  magazine  rifle  of  small  calibre  and  great  range 
and  power,  using  smokeless  powder,  and  shooting 
five  bullets  without  reloading. 

Of  the  morale  of  the  Spanish  soldiers,  their  ill 
success  in  Cuba  had  created  an  unfavourable — a 
much  too  unfavourable — opinion  in  the  United 
States.  Americans  who  saw  them  there  described 
them  as  not  lacking  in  courage,  but  undisciplined, 
undrilled,  and  badly  officered — criticisms  that  agree 
with  those  made  by  Wellington  during  the  Penin 
sular  war.  They  were  wretched  marksmen,  the  cor 
respondents  said,  never  doing  target  practice,  and 
so  careless  in  action  that  they  seldom  raised  their 
rifles  to  the  shoulder,  finding  it  easier  to  fire  with 
the  butt  held  under  the  arm.  They  spoiled  their 
weapons  by  ignorant  misuse,  knocking  off  the 
sight,  for  instance,  because  they  complained  that  it 
tore  their  clothes. 

In  the  face  of  the  American  navy  Spain  had 
little  prospect  of  sending  any  further  reinforcement 
to  her  army  in  Cuba.  The  strength  of  her  garrison 
there  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  was  not  known 
with  anything  like  exactitude.  According  to  Mr. 
Springer,  vice-consul  at  Havana,  official  records 
showed  that  since  February,  1895,  she  had  de 
spatched  237,000  men  across  the  Atlantic;  a  few  of 
these  had  been  killed  in  action,  many  thousands  had 
died  of  disease,  many  more  thousands  had  been  in 
valided  home.  Consul-General  Lee  testified  before 
the  Senate  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  on  April 
1 2th,  that  there  were  probably  97,000  or  98,000 
Spanish  troops  then  in  the  island,  of  whom  only 
about  55,000  were  capable  of  bearing  arms.  This 


THE   RESOURCES  OF   THE   COMBATANTS 


99 


was  far  too  low  an  estimate;  the  figures  given  by 
General  Miles — 150,000  men  with  183  guns — were 
much  nearer  the  truth.  At  the  end  of  the  war, 
after  some  23,000  troops  had  left  Santiago,  the 
American  commissioners  in  Cuba — Admiral  Samp 
son  and  Generals  Wade  and  Butler — reported  that 
there  were  in  the  island  about  118,000  Spanish 
regulars,  21,000  volunteers  on  duty,  and  52,000  vol 
unteers  armed  but  not  on  duty. 

It  has  been  repeatedly  stated  that  Spain's  naval 

power,  on  paper,  was  quite  equal  to  that  of  the 

United  States ;  but  the  navy  lists  do 

IaveySpan  not  bear  this  out     Her  total  number 

of  vessels  in  service  was  given  as  137, 
against  86  in  the  American  navy ;  but  such  figures 
mean  nothing.  Of  armoured  men-of-war — the 
ships  that  win  sea  fights — she  had  in  commission 
six,  against  seven,  and  her  vessels  were  individually 
inferior.  In  its  second  line  the  United  States  had 
thirteen  good  modern  steel  cruisers — besides  the 
New  Orleans,  bought  just  in  time  for  the  war ;  Spain 
had  only  five  that  could  be  classed  as  such.  The  rest 
of  her  navy  consisted  mainly  of  old  iron  and  wooden 
vessels  and  of  small  gunboats  used  in  patrolling  the 
Cuban  coast.  Of  her  six  first-rates,  only  one  was  a 
battle  ship — the  Pelayo,  a  steel  vessel  of  9,900  tons, 
launched  at  La  Seyne  (Toulon)  in  1887  and  since 
fitted  with  new  boilers.  Another  battle  ship,  the  Em- 
perador  Carlos  V,  launched  at  Cadiz  in  1895,  was  at 
Havre  taking  her  armament  aboard  when  the  war 
began.  In  June  she  was  hurried  off  with  Camara's 
squadron,  her  equipment  still  incomplete.  Spain  had 
no  other  ship  of  this  class  in  service  or  building. 

The  fighting  strength  of  the  Spanish  navy  lay  in 
its  armoured  cruisers.  Nine  of  these  were  listed, 
but  two  of  the  nine  were  unfinished,  and  two — the 
Numancia  and  the  Vittoria — were  iron  ships  more 
than  thirty  years  old,  very  slow,  and  practically  use 
less  for  distant  work.  The  other  five  cruisers  were 


I00  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

fine  modern  vessels.  Four — theAlmiranteOquendo, 
the  Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  the  Princesa  de  Asturias, 
and  the  Vizcaya — were  sister  ships,  built  in  the 
Spanish  yards,  mainly  by  British  constructors,  dur 
ing  the  last  eight  years.  Each  was  of  7,000  tons, 
with  a  speed  stated  at  twenty  knots  an  hour,  and 
costing  three  million  dollars.  The  fifth  was  the 
Cristobal  Colon,  built  at  Sestri,  Italy,  as  the 
Giuseppe  Garibaldi  II,  the  purchase  of  which  was 
reported  by  the  American  newspapers,  in  March, 
1898,  as  part  of  Spain's  hostile  preparations.  As  a 
matter  of  fact  the  Colon  was  bought  in  1897,  an 
order  being  placed  with  the  same  builders  for  a 
sister  ship,  which  has  never  been  delivered. 

At  the  Spanish  yards — the  most  important  are 
those  at  Cartagena,  Cadiz,  Ferrol,  and  Bilbao — 
some  other  ships  were  building.  Two  were  the  un 
finished  cruisers  Cardinal  Cisneros  and  Cataluna, 
similar  to  the  Vizcaya  class.  Another,  the  Isabel 
la  Catolica,  a  3,ooo-ton  cruiser,  was  to  be  paid  for 
by  a  fund  raised  in  Mexico ;  a  third  small  cruiser, 
the  Rio  de  la  Plata,  was  building  at  Havre,  as  a 
gift  from  the  Spaniards  of  South  America.  None 
of  these  could  be  made  ready  for  service,  but  two 
swift  torpedo  cruisers  had  just  been  completed  in 
Thomson's  yard,  at  Glasgow.  In  bringing  them 
south  their  Spanish  crews  ran  afoul  of  the  Irish 
coast,  and  one  was  badly  damaged. 

Never,  since  the  days  of  the  Armada,  has 
Spain's  navy  been  famed  for  good  seamanship. 
Her  people,  as  has  been  said,  do  not  possess  the 
mechanical  ability  that  is  proverbially  an  American 
characteristic ;  and  in  handling  so  complicated  a 
piece  of  machinery  as  the  modern  war  ship  a  lack 
of  intelligent  care  is  speedily  ruinous  to  efficiency. 
During  the  last  three  years  her  vessels  had  suffered 
many  mishaps,  and  four  had  actually  been  lost — 
one  being  the  cruiser  Reina  Regente,  which  went 
down  with  all  on  board  off  Cape  Trafalgar  in  1895. 


UNIVERSITY 


THE   RESOURCES  OF   THE   CO] 

The  personnel  of  the  Spanish  navy — recruited 
mainly  by  conscription  in  the  coast  districts — was 
thus  stated  for  1898: 

Officers 1,002 

Sailors 14,000 

Marines 9,000 

Mechanics,  etc 725 

Total 24,727 

For  fourteen  years  the  United  States  had  been 
busily  at  work  upon  the  construction  of  its  new 
navy,  but  for  about  two  years  there 
The  united  iiacj  been  something  of  a  lull  in  the 
fs^63  work.  During  that  time  the  Iowa 

and  the  Brooklyn  were  the  only  im 
portant  additions  to  the  list,  and  no  large  vessels 
were  under  construction  until,  in  1897,  five  new 
battle  ships  were  ordered.  These — the  Illinois,  the 
Kearsarge,  the  Kentucky,  the  Alabama,  and  the 
Wisconsin — will  be  powerful  vessels  of  11,525  tons 
each,  and  will  practically  double  the  fighting 
strength  of  the  navy's  first  line.  None  of  them  had 
been  launched  at  the  outbreak  of  war  with  Spain. 

At  the  head  of  the  list  of  ships  in  actual  service 
there  stood  seven  great  engines  of  warfare  which 
in  speed,  armament,  and  general  efficiency  were 
well  prepared  to  meet  anything  of  their  inches  on 
the  sea.  These  included  the  four  first-class  battle 
ships — four  floating  fortresses,  carrying  twelve-  and 
thirteen-inch  guns,  making  from  fifteen  and  a  half 
to  seventeen  knots  an  hour,  and  costing  more  than 
three  million  dollars  each  : 


SHIPS. 

Tonnage. 

When  launched. 

1  1  4.IO 

Philadelphia,  1896. 

Indiana 

10  288 

Philadelphia,  1893. 

Massachusetts         .... 

10,288 

Philadelphia,  1893. 

Oregon                          .  . 

10  288 

San  Francisco,  1893. 

102 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


Spain  had  nothing  to  pit  against  this  quartette 
of  bulldogs  of  the  sea.  Next  came  one  second-class 
battle  ship,  a  vessel  very  similar  to  the  lost  Maine, 
and  classed  by  some  authorities  as  an  armoured 
cruiser: 


SHIP. 

Tonnage. 

When  launched. 

Texas  

6.^  1C 

Norfolk    1892 

Then  the  two  great  armoured  cruisers : 


SHIPS. 

Tonnage. 

When  launched. 

Brooklyn 

Q  21  ^ 

Philadelphia   1805 

New  York 

8  2OO 

Philadelphia   1891 

These  carried  eight-inch  guns,  with  a  good  sec 
ondary  rapid-fire  battery,  and  had  a  rated  speed 
of  21  and  21.9  knots  respectively.  After  them,  in 
a  class  by  themselves,  came  two  large  and  swift 
protected  cruisers : 


SHIPS. 

Tonnage. 

When  launched. 

Columbia  

Philadelphia,  1892. 

Minneapolis  .  . 

7.*7< 

Philadelphia.  180^. 

These  two,  generally  designated  as  "  commerce 
destroyers,"  were  built  for  speed,  carrying  no 
armour  and  a  comparatively  light  armament — one 
eight-inch  gun  apiece,  with  batteries  of  four-inch 
rapid-firers.  They  did  not  play  any  very  promi 
nent  part  in  the  war  with  Spain. 

Of  smaller  protected  cruisers  the  United  States 
had  eleven  of  three  thousand  tons  or  more,  all  of 
them  good  modern  steel  vessels : 


THE   RESOURCES  OF   THE  COMBATANTS 


103 


SHIPS. 

Tonnage. 

When  launched. 

Olympia  

«;  800 

San  Francisco    1802 

Chicago  

4  ^OO 

Chester   1885 

4,413 

Philadelphia,  1888 

Philadelphia 

A  724 

Philadelphia    1889 

San  Francisco   

4,008 

San  Francisco   1880 

Newark  

4,008 

Philadelphia,  1890 

Charleston.. 

1  730 

San  Francisco   1889 

Cincinnati    

3.21'? 

Brooklyn,  1892 

Raieigh  

3,213 

Norfolk,  1892. 

Atlanta 

3  OCO 

Chester   1884 

Boston  

3  OOO 

Chester,  1884 

The  heaviest  weapons  carried  on  these  vessels 
were  eight-  and  six-inch  rifles,  supplemented  by 
rapid-fire  batteries — usually  of  six-pounders,  but  in 
the  Olympia,  the  Raleigh,  and  the  Cincinnati  of 
five-inch  guns.  A  valuable  addition  to  their  class 
was  made  by  the  purchase,  in  March,  of  the  cruisers 
Amazonas  and  Almirante  Abru  (rechristened  New 
Orleans  and  Albany)  built  by  the  Armstrongs,  at 
Elswick,  for  the  Brazilian  Government.  The 
Albany  *  was  still  unfinished ;  the  New  Orleans,  a 
fine  vessel  of  3,600  tons,  twenty  knots,  and  armed 
with  a  powerful  battery  of  6-inch  and  4./-inch 
rapid-fire  guns  using  smokeless  powder,  had  just 
been  completed,  and  left  the  Thames  for  New  York 
on  the  27th  of  March. 

In  the  remainder  of  the  navy  list  the  more  im 
portant  items  were  the  six  double-turreted  monitors 
—Puritan,  Monterey,  Amphitrite,  Monadnock, 
Miantonomoh,  and  Terror — vessels  of  low  speed, 
armed  with  heavy  guns  (ten-  and  twelve-inch 
rifles),  and  designed  for  coast  and  port  defence, 
though  the  voyage  of  the  Monterey  and  the  Mo 
nadnock  to  Manila  proved  their  availability  for  dis 
tant  service  in  an  emergency ;  the  trio  of  small 
cruisers,  each  displacing  2,089  tons — the  Detroit, 

*  The  Albany  was  launched  January  14,  1899. 


104 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


the  Marblehead,  and  the  Montgomery ;  that  unique 
naval  type,  the  Vesuvius,  with  her  three  fifteen-inch 
dynamite  guns;  and  a  dozen  gunboats.  Of  these 
last  the  largest  were  the  i,7io-ton  Bennington, 
Concord,  and  Yorktown,  armed  with  six-inch  guns ; 
next  came  the  Wilmington  and  the  Helena,  1,392 
tons  apiece,  carrying  four-inch  rapid-fire  guns ;  the 
Nashville,  1,371  tons;  the  Castine  and  the  Machias 
of  1,177  tons;  the  Annapolis,  the  Marietta, the  New 
port,  the  Vicksburg,  the  Wheeling,  and  the  Prince 
ton,  each  of  1,000  tons — the  last  named  not  quite 
ready  for  service ;  and  the  Petrel,  892  tons. 

The  personnel  of  the  navy  was  thus  stated  at  the 
beginning  of  the  year : 

Officers  (line) 1,031 

Engineers 226 

Paymasters,  surgeons,  and  chaplains .  . .  262 

Warrant  officers 143 

Seamen 1 1 , 750 

Marines,  officers 74 

Marines,  men JJ939 

Total 15,425 

The  naval  militia,  which  had  been  organized  in 
fifteen  seaboard  and  lake  States,  constituted  an 
auxiliary  force  of  200  officers  and  3,703  men — vol 
unteers  who,  though  not  experienced  sailors,  had 
had  some  training  in  seamanship  and  gunnery. 

The  corresponding  figures  for  the  army  were: 


Officers. 

Men. 

Infantry  25  regiments 

877 

jq  I2£ 

Cavalry    10         "                  

4^2 

6  T7O 

280 

A    O2^ 

General  and  staff  officers 

162 

Ordnance  department      .  .        

56 

6O5 

IOQ 

=;oo 

Hospital  corps 

706 

Miscellaneous                  .  .        

C7e 

Total          

2,116 

2^,706 

THE    RESOURCES   OF   THE   COMBATANTS     105 

To  this  force  the  Hawley  bill  had  added  two 
regiments  of  artillery.  The  adjutant  general's  re 
turns  (February,  1898)  showed  114,632  4iien  en 
rolled  in  the  militia  of  the  States,  and  estimated  the 
total  number  of  men  available  for  service  in  case  of 
necessity  at  10,301,339. 

The  meaning  of  this  brief  array  of  figures  was 

that  the  United  States  had  gone  to  war,  practically 

speaking,  without  an  army.   To  create 

The  call  for  Q  the    first    st          must   be    a    call    for 

volunteers,  ,  ,  .  «        f  ,   . 

April  23  volunteers,  and  to  provide  tor  this 

Congressman  Hull,  chairman  of  the 
House  Military  Affairs  Committee,  introduced  a 
bill  (April  2oth)  framed  by  the  War  Department. 
It  declared  that  all  able-bodied  male  citizens  from 
eighteen  to  forty-five  years  old  constituted  the  na 
tional  forces,  and  were  liable  to  military  duty ;  that 
troops  might  be  called  out  by  the  President,  to  be 
supplied  by  each  State  and  Territory  in  proportion 
to  its  population ;  that  the  regimental  and  company 
officers  should  be  named  by  the  Governors  of  the 
States,  the  general  and  staff  officers  by  the  Presi 
dent.  The  bill  was  hurried  through  House  and 
Senate,  and  received  Executive  approval  April  22d ; 
and  on  the  following  day  a  call  for  125,000  men  was 
issued. 

By  an  act  that  became  law  four  days  later  Con 
gress  partially  retrieved  its  failure  to  pass  the  orig 
inal  Hull  bill  for  the  reorganization  of  the  regular 
army.  This  later  measure,  also  named  after  Mr. 
Hull,  who  fathered  it  in  the  House,  authorized  addi 
tional  enlistments  up  to  a  total  of  62,597  men, 
doubling  the  rank  and  file  of  each  of  the  existing 
regiments.  It  was  carefully  provided  that  the  in 
crease  should  be  only  temporary,  and  that  the  army 
should  be  reduced  to  its  former  strength — or  rather 
weakness— at  the  end  of  the  war. 

The  first  plans  of  the  War  Department  were  to 
concentrate  the  regular  troops,  scattered  in  small 


106  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

detachments  at  the  army  posts,  at  three  Southern 
ports — New  Orleans,  Mobile,  and  Tampa — in 
readiness  for  an  immediate  move  upon  the  Spanish 
West  Indies.  Like  a  great  many  other  plans  made 
during  the  war,  this  was  changed  before  it  had  been 
carried  out.  It  was  decided  to  form  a  great  central 
camp  in  the  national  park  on  the  battlefield  of 
Chickamauga,  to  whose  poignant  memories  of 
warfare  a  new  chapter  was  to  be  added  by  the  great 
host  that  gathered  there — the  North  and  the  South 
in  arms  together. 

The  first  regiment  to  move  southward  was  the 
Seventeenth  Infantry,  which  left  its  post  at  Colum 
bus  Barracks,  Ohio,  on  the  i8th  of  April,  bound  for 
Camp  Thomas,  as  the  point  of  concentration  at 
Chickamauga  had  been  named,  in  honour  of  the 
general  who  stemmed  the  tide  of  Federal  defeat 
there  in  1863.  Later,  another  great  instruction 
camp — Camp  Alger — was  formed  at  Falls  Church, 
Virginia ;  and  troops  were  sent  to  three  points  in 
Florida — Tampa,  Jacksonville,  and  Fernandina — 
selected  for  their  healthfulness,  real  or  supposed, 
and  for  their  convenience  as  ports  of  embarkation. 
At  Tampa  a  powerful  train  of  siege  artillery  was  or 
ganized  as  rapidly  as  possible,  under  General  John 
I.  Rodgers — only  one  battery  of  it  being  destined 
to  see  active  service. 

Such  were  the  army's  chief  offensive  prepara 
tions.  It  had  also  to  care  for  the  defence  of  the 
coast,  which,  except  at  a  few  points, 
fn0^01  was  very  inadequately  protected.  In 

1886,  at  a  time  when  the  ports  of 
the  United  States  were  practically  devoid  of  de 
fences,  a  commission  of  officers,  generally  known 
as  the  Endicott  Board,  drew  up  a  comprehensive 
scheme  of  fortification ;  but  Congress  dealt  out 
the  necessary  money  so  grudgingly — only  $50,000 
was  appropriated  in  1893,  and  no  more  than 
$3,521,000  from  1890  to  1895  inclusive — that  only 


THE   RESOURCES   OF   THE   COMBATANTS 


107 


a  small  part  of  the  work  had  been  completed. 
Plans  had  been  prepared  for  batteries  at  thirty 
ports,  to  consist  of  about  five  hundred  heavy  guns, 
seven  hundred  smaller  rapid-fire  weapons,  and  a 
thousand  mortars.  Of  these,  at  the  beginning  of 
the  fiscal  year  (July  I,  1897)  only  one  hundred 
and  six — less  than  five  per  cent — had  actually  been 
mounted.  The  supply  of  powder  and  projectiles 
was  entirely  inadequate,  only  about  one  fifth  of  the 
quantity  needed  being  on  hand.*  Many  important 
points  were  in  a  condition  of  defencelessness  which, 
in  the  face  of  a  more  powerful  and  active  enemy, 
might  have  proved  disastrous.  To  remedy  this 
the  ordnance  and  engineer  departments,  as  far  back 
as  the  preceding  February,  had  been  making  spe 
cial  efforts,  and  though  the  work  is  of  the  sort  that 
moves  slowly,  much  had  been  accomplished.  At 
the  end  of  the  fiscal  year  (June  30,  1898),  630  em 
placements  were  reported  as  completed  or  under 
construction,  291  guns  and  mortars  were  mounted, 
and  it  was  promised  that  within  three  months  156 
more  would  be  in  place.  Besides  these,  1,500  sub 
marine  mines  had  been  planted  in  twenty-nine  har 
bours. 

The  navy's  preparations  were  much  farther  ad 
vanced  than  those  of  the  army.     It  was  the  service 

upon  which  the  first  brunt  of  the 
preparation..  struggle  was  expected  to  fall ;  nor  had 

it,  like  the  army,  been  kept  in  time 
of  peace  at  merely  skeleton  strength.  Roughly 
speaking,  its  personnel  was  doubled  during  the 
war;  that  of  the  army  was  multiplied  by  ten.  Its 
problems  of  organization  and  equipment  were  easy 
ones  compared  to  the  overwhelming  task  that  con 
fronted  the  army  staff.  This,  however,  does  not 
detract  from  the  credit  due  to  Secretary  Long's 
department  for  the  remarkable  record  it  made 

*  Annual  report  of  General  Flagler,  Chief  of  Ordnance. 


I08  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

throughout  the  conflict,  administering  the  affairs  of 
the  American  fleets  in  two  hemispheres  without  a 
breakdown,  a  hitch,  or  a  complaint. 

For  months  the  navy  had  been  holding  itself  in 
readiness  to  strike  at  short  notice.  In  January, 
Admiral  Sicard,  commanding  the  North  Atlantic 
squadron,  rendezvoused  at  Key  West  the  strongest 
fleet  that  ever  went  to  sea  under  the  American 
flag,  its  chief  vessels  being  the  Iowa,  the  Massa 
chusetts,  the  Indiana,  the  Maine,  the  Texas,  the 
Brooklyn,  and  the  New  York.  It  was  from  this 
squadron  that  the  Maine  was  detached  for  her  fatal 
cruise  to  Havana.  The  rest  of  the  fleet  was  still  in 
Southern  waters,  from  Hampton  Roads  to  the  West 
Indies,  and  the  Cincinnati  (brought  up  from  the 
South  Atlantic  station),  the  Detroit,  the  Marble- 
head,  the  Montgomery,  the  monitors  Amphitrite, 
Miantonomoh,  Puritan,  and  Terror,  and  several 
other  vessels,  much  more  than  replaced  the  lost 
battle  ship. 

On  the  European  station,  at  the  beginning  of 
the  year,  there  were  only  the  cruiser  San  Francisco 
and  the  gunboats  Helena  and  Bancroft.  These 
were  ordered  home,  the  San  Francisco  crossing  the 
Atlantic  in  company  with  the  newly  purchased  New 
Orleans,  and  reaching  New  York  on  the  I4th  of 
April 

Of  the  eleven  second-class  cruisers,  four — the 
Philadelphia,  the  Newark,  the  Chicago,  and  the 
Atlanta — were  undergoing  repairs  or  alterations. 
The  Newark  went  into  commission  in  June;  the 
Philadelphia  was  ready  for  sea  in  July,  when  she 
was  ordered  to  Hawaii ;  the  two  latter  were  not 
available  during  the  war.  Three  more  —  the 
Olympia,  the  Raleigh,  and  the  Boston — were  on 
the  Asiatic  station,  commanded  by  Commodore 
George  Dewey.  A  fourth  cruiser,  the  Baltimore, 
had  been  ordered  from  the  Pacific  station  to 
strengthen  Dewey's  squadron,  for  which  fighting 


THE   RESOURCES   OF   THE   COMBATANTS 


109 


was  foreseen ;  and  she  joined  him  at  Hong-Kong 
on  the  second  day  of  the  war  (April  22d). 

On  the  Pacific  coast  were  the  battle  ship 
Oregon,  the  cruiser  Charleston,  and  the  monitors 
Monadnock  and  Monterey,  besides  the  cruiser 
Philadelphia,  laid  up  for  repairs,  and  the  gunboat 
Marietta,  which  had  been  showing  the  flag  in  the 
Pacific  ports  of  Central  America.  The  Oregon,  of 
little  service  where  she  was,  would  make  a  splendid 
addition  to  the  navy's  fighting  strength  in  the  main 
theatre  of  war,  and  immediately  after  the  Maine  ex 
plosion  she  had  been  dry-docked  and  prepared  for 
the  fifteen-thousand-mile  journey  around  Cape  Horn. 
It  was  an  object  lesson  upon  the  strategic  value  of  a 
canal  through  the  Central  American  isthmus. 

The  Oregon's  voyage  from  Puget  Sound  to 
Florida  was  a  remarkable  one,  far  surpassing  all 

previous  records  made  by  men-of-war 
voyage  over  anything  like  so  great  a  dis- 

MMcht"*00'     tance.*     Leaving  the  Bremerton  dry 
Mayas.  dock  on  March  6th,  she  sailed  from 

San  Francisco,  under  command  of 
Captain  Charles  E.  Clark,  on  the  iQth,  and  reached 
Callao  on  April  4th.  Here  coal — ordered  by 
the  Marietta,  which  had  preceded  her,  having 
started  from  Panama  March  24th — was  waiting  in 
lighters,  and  was  hurried  aboard.  The  Marietta 
had  gone  on  to  Punta  Arenas,  the  southernmost 
Chilian  port,  to  arrange  for  another  supply  of  fuel ; 
but  the  Oregon,  leaving  Callao  on  April  7th,  passed 
her  in  the  Straits  of  Magellan,  after  weathering  one 
of  the  fierce  squalls  of  those  stormy  seas.  The  gun 
boat  overtook  the  battle  ship  at  Punta  Arenas,  and 
the  two  coaled  together. 


*  When  the  cruiser  Columbia  made  her  speed  trial  across  the  At 
lantic,  in  July  and  August,  1895,  she  recorded  a  considerably  higher 
average  speed  (18.41  knots  an  hour  from  Southampton  to  Sandy 
Hook) ;  but  her  journey  was  only  one  fifth  as  long  as  the  Oregon's 
great  voyage. 


IIO  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

From  this  point — which  they  left  on  April  2ist, 
of  course  unaware  that  it  was  the  first  day  of  the 
war — the  run  was  an  exciting  one.  It  was  expected 
that  hostilities  might  be  declared  at  any  time,  and 
it  wyas  known  that  a  Spanish  torpedo  cruiser,  the 
Temerario,  was  in  their  track,  off  the  South  Ameri 
can  coast.  The  American  ships  were  kept  in  con 
stant  readiness  for  action,  and  no  lights  were  shown 
at  night.  On  the  3Oth  they  reached  Rio  de  Janeiro, 
where  they  heard  the  news  of  war,  and  learned  that 
the  Temerario  had  sailed  from  Montevideo,  proba 
bly  for  Rio.  Expecting  that  she  might  appear  at 
any  moment,  and  fearing  that  in  the  neutral  har 
bour  his  costly  ship  might  not  be  safe  from  treach 
erous  attack,  Captain  Clark  sent  word  to  the  port 
authorities  that  if  the  Spanish  torpedo  cruiser  en 
tered  the  bay  and  came  too  near  him  he  would 
sink  her. 

The  Temerario  did  not  appear,  and  on  May  4th 
the  Oregon  and  the  Marietta  put  to  sea,  followed 
by  the  Nictheroy,  which  the  United  States  had  pur 
chased  from  the  Brazilian  Government.  The  Nic 
theroy,  renamed  the  Buffalo,  had  originally  been 
El  Cid,  of  the  Morgan  line,  and  had  since  been 
fitted  as  a  cruiser  and  armed  with  a  dynamite  gun. 
She  was  a  vessel  of  nearly  five  thousand  tons,  but 
proved  an  unsatisfactory  purchase,  her  machinery 
being  in  very  poor  condition.  Her  first  perform 
ance  was  to  break  down,  shortly  after  starting  from 
Rio,  and  the  Oregon  pushed  on  alone,  leaving  the 
Marietta  to  convoy  the  crippled  ship.  The  engineers 
repaired  her,  but  at  Para  she  broke  down  again,  and 
the  Marietta  left  her,  making  for  Key  West,  where 
she  arrived  on  June  4th.  The  Buffalo  reached 
Norfolk  only  three  days  later. 

Meanwhile  the  Oregon,  straining  every  nerve 
for  speed,  had  called  at  Bahia  to  inquire  for  news 
of  Cervera's  movements.  Later  acquaintance  with 
the  Spaniards'  seamanship  and  gunnery  showed 


THE   RESOURCES   OF   THE   COMBATANTS     Iri 

that  she  need  scarcely  have  feared  an  encounter 
with  the  enemy's  squadron,  overwhelmingly  supe 
rior  as  it  was  on  paper.  Captain  Clark  was  quite 
prepared  to  fight  if  necessary,  and  telegraphed  to 
the  Navy  Department  from  Bahia  (May  9th)  his 
opinion  that  his  vessel  "  in  a  running  fight  might 
beat  off  and  even  cripple  the  Spanish  fleet."  Secre 
tary  Long's  reply  was  cautious  but  confident: 
"  Avoid  if  possible — we  believe  that  you  will  defeat 
it  if  met."  On  the  I2th  the  naval  war  board  dis 
cussed  the  question  of  sending  him  assistance,  but 
it  was  decided  not  to  do  so,  as  the  Oregon  could 
probably  take  care  of  herself,  and  it  was  not  desired 
to  weaken  Sampson's  fleet. 

There  was  no  definite  news  of  Cervera  till  Cap 
tain  Clark  put  in  at  Barbadoes  (May  i8th),  where 
he  learned  that  seven  Spanish  men-of-war  were  at 
Martinique,  just  to  the  north  of  him.  Leaving  the 
little  British  island  at  sunset  that  day,  he  steamed 
to  the  northwest,  as  if  direct  for  Cuba,  but  as  soon 
as  darkness  fell  he  turned  about,  went  south  of 
Barbadoes,  and  eastward  into  the  ocean,  before 
again  heading  toward  the  United  States.  On  the 
25th  he  put  into  Jupiter  Inlet,  Florida,  for  instruc 
tions,  with  the  Oregon  in  as  fine  condition  as  when 
she  left  the  dry  dock,  and  needing  only  a  supply  of 
coal  to  be  in  complete  readiness  for  instant  action. 

During  the  civil  war,  when  the  Federal  Govern 
ment,  with  but  little  naval  strength  at  its  command, 
found  itself  compelled  to  blockade 

auxiliaries'  the    lon?    COaSt    lmC     °f    the     Southern 

States,  it  bought  almost  everything 
that  Northern  shipmasters  had  to  sell.  More  than 
four  hundred  vessels,  from  ocean  steamers  to  coast 
ing  schooners  and  New  York  ferryboats,  were 
purchased,  and  it  was  one  of  the  latter  unwarlike 
craft — a  boat  taken  from  daily  duty  on  the  Fulton 
Ferry — that  captured,  in  Cuban  waters,  one  of  the 
most  valuable  prizes  of  the  war.  There  was  less 


H2  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

need  of  indiscriminate  purchases  in  1898,  but  aux 
iliaries  and  supply  ships  of  all  sorts  were  wanted, 
and  immediately  after  the  voting  of  fifty  million  dol 
lars  for  military  preparations  a  board,  with  Captain 
Frederick  Rodgers  at  its  head,  was  appointed  to 
buy  or  lease  the  most  available  vessels. 

The  most  important  accessions  were  the  four 
swift  passenger  steamers  of  the  American  line — the 
St.  Paul,  the  St.  Louis,  the  New  York  (rechristened 
Harvard),  and  the  Paris  (rechristened  Yale), 'for 
whose  services  the  Government  paid  nine  thousand 
dollars  a  day,  and  whose  great  speed  (twenty  to 
twenty-two  knots)  and  carrying  capacity  made 
them  valuable  as  scouts  and  transports.  The  St. 
Paul,  armed  with  eight  five-inch  rapid-fire  guns, 
was  to  show  that  she  could  fight,  too.  A  number 
of  smaller  steamers  were  bought  from  other  com 
mercial  lines,  some  of  which  had  their  business  sus 
pended  by  the  war.  A  flotilla  of  small  and  speedy 
auxiliary  cruisers  and  despatch  boats  was  formed 
by  the  purchase  of  twenty-five  private  steam  yachts, 
and  two  more  were  lent  to  the  Government,  without 
charge,  by  their  public-spirited  owners — Messrs. 
Augustus  Schermerhorn  and  William  R.  Hearst, 
of  New  York.  The  city  of  Philadelphia  gave  the 
use  of  an  ice-boat,  the  Arctic — or,  to  be  precise, 
rented  it  for  the  nominal  sum  of  one  dollar.  The 
total  cost  of  one  hundred  and  two  vessels  added  to 
the  navy  before  the  war  ended  was  nearly  eighteen 
million  dollars. 

Of  the  ships  bought  abroad,  the  New  Orleans, 
the  Albany,  and  the  Buffalo  have  already  been 
mentioned.  Another  was  the  i,8oo-ton  cruiser 
Diogenes,  built  in  Germany,  in  1884,  for  Peru,  but 
never  delivered.  In  1896  she  was  rebuilt  by  the 
Thames  Iron  Works,  which  firm  now  sold  her  to 
the  United  States  for  $175,000 — a  low  price,  even 
though  her  machinery  was  not  in  first-rate  condi 
tion.  The  one  other  armed  vessel  that  the  Ameri- 


THE    RESOURCES   OF   THE  COMBATANTS     113 

can  agents  succeeded  in  finding  in  the  market  was 
the  torpedo  boat  Somers,  which  Lieutenant  Knapp 
purchased  in  Germany  from  the  Schichau  Com 
pany,  of  Elbing.  The  lieutenant  took  her  to  Wey- 
mouth,  where  she  met  the  Diogenes  (renamed  the 
Topeka),  and  crews  were  picked  up  to  take  the 
two  vessels  across  the  Atlantic ;  but  the  Somers 
proved  to  be  unseaworthy,  and  had  to  put  in  at 
Falmouth,  where  she  was  dismantled  and  laid  up.* 
The  Topeka  went  on  without  her,  and  reached  New 
York  on  May  ist. 

The  Treasury  Department  also  turned  over  to 
the  navy  fifteen  revenue  cutters  and  four  lighthouse 
tenders.  Four  of  the  former,  by  courtesy  of  the 
British  and  Canadian  authorities,  were  brought 
down  by  way  of  the  St.  Lawrence  from  the  great 
lakes  to  the  Atlantic.  Another,  the  Hugh  McCul- 
loch,  was  on  its  way  from  New  York  to  the  Pacific 
Coast,  via  the  Suez  Canal,  when  it  was  ordered  to 
join  Dewey,  who  afterward  acknowledged  its  use 
fulness  in  a  special  despatch. 

Another  imposing  fleet  was  created  by  the  War 
Department,  as  need  arose  for  transports,  f  More 
than  fifty  troop  ships  were  required 
for  the  expeditions  to  Manila,  Cuba, 
and  Porto  Rico,  besides  water  boats, 
lighters,  barges,  and  such  prosaic  but  useful 
craft.  High  rates  were  paid  for  some  of  them 
— for  instance,  a  Plant  line  steamer  of  5,018  tons 
was  rented  to  the  Government  for  $1,200  a 
day.  In  the  Pacific  the  transport  service  was  still 
more  expensive,  the  Pacific  Mail  receiving  $1,500 
daily  for  the  5,ooo-ton  China,  and  steamers  of  no 
more  than  2,400  tons  being  rated  at  $1,000  a  day. 


*  The  Somers  was  finally  brought  across  the  Atlantic  on  board  an 
ocean  liner  in  April,  1890. 

t  Transports  are  under  the  sole  charge  of  the  War  Department. 
When  the  St.  Louis  and  other  American  liners  were  used  to  transport 
troops,  they  had  been  turned  over  to  the  army  service  by  the  navy. 


H4  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

In  all,  the  War  Department  chartered  seventy-seven 
vessels  and  bought  sixteen. 

Each  service  had  a  hospital  ship,  the  two  ves 
sels  (the  Solace  for  the  navy,  and  the  Relief  for  the 
army)  being  purchased  for  $600,000  and  $450,000 
respectively,  besides  the  cost  of  equipment.  They 
were  a  new  feature  in  warfare,  as  was  also  another 
experiment  which  proved  its  value,  the  naval  re 
pair  ship  Vulcan. 

A  rich  government  can  buy  ships,  but  it  can  not 
buy  experienced  naval  officers ;  and  the  great  in 
crease  in  the  number  of  vessels  in  service  proved 
a  heavy  strain  upon  the  personnel  of  the  navy.  In 
other  words,  there  were  just  enough  officers  to  go 
around,  and  none  to  spare.  Had  the  struggle 
proved  a  long  and  severe  one,  with  many  casual 
ties  on  both  sides,  the  American  navy  would  have 
suffered  seriously  for  want  of  a  reserve  of  trained 
men.  Coming  through  the  war,  as  it  did,  with  the 
marvellous  record  of  only  eighteen  men  killed,  it 
escaped  this  difficulty ;  but  the  lesson  is  one  that 
should  not  be  forgotten. 

It  was  evident  that  Key  West,  lying  in  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico,  opposite  Havana,  and  only  a  hundred 
miles  from  the  Cuban  capital,  would  be  a  very  im 
portant  point  in  the  naval  strategy  of  the  war. 
Early  in  March  a  great  depot  of  supplies  was  estab 
lished  there,  and  the  building  of  a  repair  plant — 
long  planned,  but  never  undertaken  owing  to  lack 
of  the  necessary  appropriation — was  begun.  In  the 
latter  part  of  April  the  War  Department  erected  a 
hospital  and  a  distilling  plant — the  latter  made 
necessary  by  the  lack  of  water  on  the  island — for 
the  benefit  of  troops  using  Key  West  as  a  base  of 
operations  for  the  invasion  of  Cuba. 


CHAPTER   VI 

THE   BEGINNING   OF   WAR 

THE  preparatory  moves  outlined  in  the  preced 
ing  chapter  were  forming  the  effective  force  of  the 
United  States  navy  into  two  fleets,  on  opposite 
sides  of  the  globe,  ready  to  strike  at  Spain  in  the 
two  remaining  strongholds  of  her  colonial  empire. 
One  was  the  North  Atlantic  squadron,  in  which 
were  all  the  first-rate  men-of-war;  the  other  the 
fleet  of  cruisers  at  Hong-Kong.  Their  chief  officers 
were  two  men  destined  to  win  the  brightest  laurels 
of  the  war,  and  to  prove  themselves  worthy  to  rank 
among  the  heroic  figures  of  American  naval  annals 
— Commodore  George  Dewey,  commanding  the 
Asiatic  station ;  and  Captain  William  T.  Sampson, 
acting  rear  admiral,  promoted  from  the  captaincy 
of  the  Iowa  to  succeed  Rear-Admiral  Sicard,  who 
was  relieved  on  account  of  ill  health. 

Admiral   Sicard   relinquished   his   command   to 

Captain  Sampson  on  March  26th.    On  the  first  day 

of  the  war  (April  2ist)  Sampson  was 

Rear-Admiral      appointed  an  acting  rear  admiral,  and 

Sampson,  l     ,          r    ,,         .  *5  ,         ,  *    *  • 

April  21.  on  the  lollowing  day  he  hoisted  his 

admiral's  pennant  on  his  flagship,  the 
cruiser  New  York.  He  owed  his  selection  for  the 
most  important  and  responsible  post  in  the  entire 
service  to  the  fact  that  he  was  the  senior  officer 
present  with  the  squadron,  that  he  knew  its  vessels 
and  their  capabilities,  and  that  his  record  had  been 
an  excellent  one  ever  since  the  days  when,  as  a 
young  lieutenant,  he  narrowly  escaped  death  in  the 

"5 


H6  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Patapsco's  daring  run  into  Charleston -harbour,  in 
January,  1865. 

The  great  fleet  under  Sampson's  orders  was  di 
vided  into  two  main  bodies — one,  under  his  per 
sonal  command,  with  its  base  at  Key  West;  the 
other,  under  Commodore  Winfield  Scott  Schley, 
held  in  reserve  at  Newport  News  as  a  "  flying 
squadron  "  to  meet  any  move  that  might  be  made 
by  the  Spanish  fleet  lying  at  St.  Vincent,  in  the 
Cape  Verde  Islands.  The  "  flying  squadron  "  con 
sisted,  at  the  date  of  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  of 
the  armoured  cruiser  Brooklyn  (Commodore 
Schley's  flagship,  Captain  Cook),  the  battle  ships 
Massachusetts  (Captain  Higginson)  and  Texas 
(Captain  Philip),  the  cruisers  Columbia  (Captain 
Sands)  and  Minneapolis  (Captain  Jewell),  and  the 
collier  Merrimac  (Commander  Miller).  Sampson's 
own  fleet,  at  the  same  date,  when  he  first  moved 
upon  Cuba,  comprised  twenty-two  men-of-war — 
the  armoured  cruiser  New  York  (Admiral  Samp 
son's  flagship,  Captain  Chadwick) ;  the  two  battle 
ships  Iowa  (Captain  Evans)  and  Indiana  (Captain 
Taylor) ;  the  three  monitors  Amphitrite  (Captain 
Barclay),  Puritan  (Captain  Harrington),  and  Ter 
ror  (Captain  Ludlow) ;  the  four  cruisers  Cincinnati 
(Captain  Chester),  Marblehead  (Commander  Mc- 
Calla),  Detroit  (Commander  Dayton),  and  Mont 
gomery  (Commander  Converse) ;  the  six  gunboats 
Wilmington  (Commander  Todd),  Nashville  (Com 
mander  Maynard),  Castine  (Commander  Berry), 
Machias  (Commander  Merry),  Newport  (Com 
mander  Tilley),  and  Helena  (Commander  Swin 
burne)  ;  the  despatch  boat  Dolphin  (Commander 
Lyon),  the  converted  yacht  Mayflower  (Com 
mander  Mackenzie),  and  the  four  torpedo  boats 
Dupont  (Lieutenant  Wood),  Foote  (Lieutenant 
Rodgers),  Porter  (Lieutenant  Fremont),  and  Wins- 
low  (Lieutenant  Bernadou). 

Besides   these   two   fleets,   a   "  northern   patrol 


THE   BEGINNING  OF   WAR 


117 


squadron  "  was  hastily  organized  for  the  protection 
of  the  Atlantic  coast  from  the  capes  of  the  Delaware 
northward.  It  was  commanded  by  Commodore 
John  A.  Howell,  and  consisted,  in  the  first  days  of 
the  war,  of  his  flagship,  the  cruiser  San  Francisco 
(Captain  Leary),  and  four  auxiliary  cruisers 
manned  by  naval  reserve  men — the  Yankee  (Com 
mander  Brownson),  the  Dixie  (Commander  Davis), 
the  Prairie  (Commander  Train),  and  the  Yosemite 
(Commander  Emory).  In  May  the  Columbia  and 
the  Minneapolis  were  detached  from  the  Flying 
Squadron,  and  served  for  a  time  under  Howell,  the 
latter  being  posted  at  Newport  News  to  guard  the 
battle  ships  building  there ;  but  as  Spain's  navy 
demonstrated  its  impotence,  and  the  fear  of  an  at 
tack  upon  the  northern  coast  dwindled  to  the  van 
ishing  point,  one  after  another  of  the  commodore's 
ships  was  detached  for  more  active  service  in  Cuban 
waters,  till  on  the  25th  of  June  he  was  ordered  to 
Key  West  with  all  his  remaining  force  except  the 
Minneapolis. 

But  in  the  early  days  of  hostilities  there  were 
many  alarms  of  mysterious  Spanish  war  ships.  On 
the  27th  of  April,  for  instance,  it  was  very  positively 
reported  that  a  Spanish  battle  ship  and  three  tor 
pedo  boats  had  been  seen  in  the  North  Atlantic,  in 
the  track  of  the  ocean  liners ;  and  some  uneasiness 
was  felt  for  the  Paris,  which  had  left  Southampton 
on  the  22d,  to  take  her  place  in  the  navy  as  an  aux 
iliary  cruiser.  On  the  3Oth,  however,  she  reached 
New  York  in  safety,  having  seen  nothing  of  the 
phantom  foe. 

To  all  the  warlike  preparations  of  the  United 
States  Spain  had  made  but  little  answer — chiefly, 
no  doubt,  through  her  lack  of  means, 
but  Partly  because  her  statesmen 
seem  to  have  been  strangely  blind  to 
the  crisis  that  was  upon  them.  There  is  a  charac 
teristic  Spanish  proverb  which  says  that  "  it  is  a 


U8  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

long  way  from  said  to  done,  and  from  talking  war 
to  making  war  "  ;  and  Sagasta's  Government  appar 
ently  acted  upon  it  to  the  last  moment.  Their  de 
fensive  moves  were  few.  Just  before  hostilities  be 
gan  they  purchased  three  German  Atlantic  liners 
and  an  English  yacht  as  auxiliary  cruisers.  On  the 
day  when  General  Woodford  left  Madrid,  a  call  was 
issued  for  eighty  thousand  men  of  the  reserves. 
The  most  important  move  was  the  concentration  oi 
a  squadron  at  St.  Vincent.  A  small  flotilla  of  tor 
pedo  boats  and  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  com 
manded  by  Captain  Fernando  Villamil,  had  left 
Cadiz  early  in  March,  going  to  the  Canaries,  and 
thence  (March  24th)  to  the  Cape  Verde  Islands. 
Here  they  were  joined  on  April  I4th  by  the 
Maria  Teresa,  Admiral  Cervera's  flagship,  and  the 
Cristobal  Colon,  which  had  followed  them  from 
Cadiz,  and  on  the  I9th  by  the  Vizcaya  and  the 
Almirante  Oquendo,  from  Havana.  With  a 
couple  of  transports — the  Ciudad  Cadiz  and  the 
San  Francisco — the  squadron  remained  at  St.  Vin 
cent,  a  Portuguese  port,  awaiting  the  outbreak 
of  war. 

It  was  in  no  condition  to  meet  the  powerful 
fleet  that  was  waiting  for  it  across  the  Atlantic. 
The  Colon  had  never  received  the 
heavy  guns  that  should  have  been  in 
her  turrets.  On  the  three  other 
cruisers,  the  batteries  of  fourteen  centimetre  (five- 
and-a-half-inch)  artillery — their  chief  power  of  of 
fence — were  disabled  by  defective  breech  mechan 
ism  and  inferior  ammunition.  The  Vizcaya  urgent 
ly  needed  docking  and  cleaning,  and  was  far  below 
her  speed.  Cervera  had  repeatedly  reported  the 
deficiencies  of  his  ships,  but  the  authorities  at 
Madrid  took  no  notice  of  either  recommendations 
or  protests.  Just  before  leaving  Cadiz  he  frankly 
declared  that  he  was  going  upon  a  desperate,  not  to 
say  a  suicidal,  errand : 


THE   BEGINNING   OF   WAR  119 

It  seems  to  me  a  most  risky  adventure,  which  may 
cost  us  very  dear,  for  the  loss  of  our  flotilla  and  the  defeat 
of  our  squadron  in  the  Caribbean  Sea  entails  a  great 
danger  for  the  Canaries,  and  perhaps  the  bombardment 
of  our  coast  cities.  I  do  not  mention  the  fate  of  the 
island  of  Cuba,  because  I  have  anticipated  it  long  ago. 

In  spite  of  this,  on  the  22cl  of  April,  orders  came 
from  Madrid  that  the  squadron  should  sail  for 
Cuba  at  once.  Cervera  acknowledged  their  receipt 
thus : 

It  is  impossible  for  me  to  give  an  idea  of  the  sur 
prise  and  astonishment  experienced  by  all  on  the  receipt 
of  the  order  to  sail.  Nothing  can  be  expected  for  this 
expedition  except  the  total  destruction  of  the  fleet  or  its 
hasty  and  demoralizing  return.  .  .  .  This  is  already  a  dis 
aster,  and  it  is  to  be  feared  that  it  will  be  a  more  frightful 
one  before  long. 

And  Captain  Villamil,  his  second  in  command, 
added  in  a  private  telegram  to  Sagasta — a  pathetic 
message  from  the  brave  sailor  who  was  to  lose  his 
life  off  Santiago : 

I  deem  it  expedient  you  should  know,  through  a  friend 
who  does  not  fear  censure,  that  while  as  seamen  we  are 
all  ready  to  meet  honourable  death  in  the  performance  of 
duty,  I  think  it  certain  that  the  sacrifice  of  these  naval 
forces  will  be  as  sure  as  it  will  be  fruitless  and  useless. 

The  fleet  did  not  put  to  sea  until  April  29th,  and 
then  it  separated — the  torpedo  boats  Rayo,  Ariete, 
and  Azor,  and  the  two  transports,  putting  back  to 
the  Canaries,  while  Cervera,  with  the  four  cruisers 
and  three  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  headed  west 
ward.  The  subsequent  career  of  his  squadron — a  ca 
reer  neither  long  nor  glorious — will  be  traced  later. 

As  Havana  was  the  great  seat  of  Spanish  power 

in  the  West  Indies,  it  was  natural  that  the  first  plan 

of    attack    should    look    toward    the 

Cuban  caPitaL  Admiral  Sampson 
was  anxious  to  begin  the  war  by 
striking  direct  at  it  with  the  full  power  of  his 
squadron,  and  at  least  three  of  his  leading  officers — 


120  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Captains  Evans  of  the  Iowa,  Taylor  of  the  Indiana, 
and  Chadwick  of  the  New  York — strongly  sup 
ported  him.  The  matter  was  fully  discussed  before 
hostilities  began.  On  April  6th  Secretary  Long  in 
structed  him : 

The  department  does  not  wish  the  vessels  of  your 
squadron  to  be  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  batteries  at 
Havana,  Santiago  de  Cuba,*  or  other  strongly  fortified 
ports  in  Cuba,  unless  the  more  formidable  Spanish  ves 
sels  should  take  refuge  in  those  harbours.  Even  in  this 
case  the  department  would  suggest  that  a  rigid  blockade 
and  employment  of  our  torpedo  boats  might  accomplish 
the  desired  object,  viz.,  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's 
vessels,  without  subjecting  unnecessarily  our  own  men-of- 
war  to  the  fire  of  the  land  batteries. 

There  are  two  reasons  for  this: 

First.  There  may  be  no  United  States  troops  to  oc 
cupy  any  captured  stronghold,  or  to  protect  from  riot  and 
arson,  until  after  the  dry  season  begins,  about  the  first  of 
October. 

Second.  The  lack  of  docking  facilities  makes  it  particu 
larly  desirable  that  our  vessels  should  not  be  crippled  be 
fore  the  capture  or  destruction  of  Spain's  most  formidable 
vessels. 

On  April  Qth  Sampson  replied  with  a  long  letter 
in  which  he  pleaded  hard  for  permission  to  carry 
out  his  aggressive  policy.  He  described  the  shore 
batteries  at  Havana,  all  of  which  face  seaward,  with 
little  protection  for  their  gunners,  and  explained 
his  plan  of  attack : 

These  batteries  are  well  calculated  to  keep  off  a  fleet 
from  seaward,  which  approaches  to  within  a  moderate  dis 
tance  of  a  few  thousand  yards.  I  do  not  think  they  are 
well  placed  to  resist  an  attack  (for  instance,  the  western 
batteries)  from  the  westward  and  close  inshore,  where 
the  batteries  would  be  exposed  to  a  flank  fire,  or  to  the 
fire  of  our  big  ships  at  short  range,  where  the  secondary 
batteries  would  have  full  effect.  Even  under  these  cir 
cumstances  the  ships  must  have  such  a  heavy  fire  that  the 
men  in  the  batteries  would  be  overwhelmed  by  its  volume. 
Before  the  Puritan  and  Amphitrite  arrived  I  was  not  en- 

*  The  strength  of  the  batteries  at  Santiago  de  Cuba  was  greatly 
overestimated  at  this  time. 


THE   BEGINNING  OF   WAR  121 

tirely  sanguine  of  the  success  of  such  an  attack.  Since 
their  arrival  yesterday  I  have  little  doubt  of  its  success.* 

Having  silenced  the  western  batteries,  it  would  be 
quite  practicable  to  shell  the  city,  which  I  would  do  only 
after  warning  given  twenty-four  hours  in  advance. 

I  see  the  force  of  your  reasoning  that  we  would  have 
no  troops  to  occupy  the  city  if  it  did  surrender,  yet,  Mr. 
Secretary,  it  will  be  very  unfortunate,  besides  a  great  loss 
of  time,  if  we  must  delay  until  the  rainy  season  is  over. 
Probably  a  close  blockade  would  terminate  the  trouble 
before  October. 

Captain  Chadwick,  Sampson's  chief  of  staff, 
records  that  an  order  of  battle  for  an  assault  upon 
Havana  was  drawn  up  and  placed  in  the  hands  of 
each  officer  whose  ship  was  to  take  part  in  it.  An 
other  plan  discussed  at  the  naval  council  was  that  of 
forming  three  squadrons — one  to  bombard  Ha 
vana  ;  a  second  to  be  held  at  Cape  Haitien  in  readi 
ness  to  attack  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico,  as  soon  as  war 
was  declared;  and  a  third,  consisting  of  swift 
cruisers,  to  move  upon  the  coast  of  Spain  itself. 

In  spite  of  Sampson's  plea,  it  was  decided  f  to 
defer  the  blow  till  an  army  could  be  organized  to 
follow  it  up,  and  the  first  mobilization  of  troops  was 
made  with  this  object  in  view.  But  when  the  War 
Department,  a  few  days  before  hostilities  began, 
ordered  the  regulars  to  the  Gulf  ports  (April  I5th), 
it  does  not  seem  to  have  realized  how  ill  prepared 
its  forces  were  for  an  active  campaign,  and  how 
tremendous  the  task  before  the  commissary,  quar 
termaster,  medical,  and  other  bureaus.  The  camp 

*  After  the  expedition  to  San  Juan,  Admiral  Sampson's  opinion  of 
the  monitors  was  less  favourable.  In  a  report  dated  May  2oth,  he  de 
scribed  them  as  "very  inefficient." 

t  Instructions  to  the  commanding  officers  of  the  United  States  fleets 
and  armies  issue  from  the  President,  as  commander  in  chief  of  the  land 
and  sea  forces  of  the  nation,  through  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy.  In  planning  the  grand  strategy  of  the  late  war, 
the  President  and  Secretary  Long  were  assisted  by  a  specially  appointed 
naval  war  board,  which  at  first  consisted  of  Rear-Admiral  Sicard,  Cap 
tain  Barker,  Captain  Crowninshield,  and  Theodore  Roosevelt,  Assist 
ant  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  In  May  Mr.  Roosevelt  and  Captain  Barker 
left  the  board,  and  Captain  Mahan  joined  it. 


122  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

at  Chickamauga  was  formed  to  give  time  for  the 
work  of  equipment ;  and  from  this  point  men  were 
to  be  moved  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  Tampa,  or 
other  Southern  ports. 

On  the  2  ist  of  April,  as  was  said  at  the  end  of 
Chapter  IV,  Admiral  Sampson,  at  Key  West,  re 
ceived  the  orders  for  which  he  had 
been  waiting  for  weeks.  What  they 
were  the  world  knew  on  the  fol 
lowing  day,  when  President  McKinley  issued  a 
proclamation  declaring  a  blockade  of  "  the  north 
coast  of  Cuba,  including  ports  on  said  coast  be 
tween  Cardenas  and  Bahia  Honda,  and  the  port  of 
Cienfuegos  on  the  south  coast."  This  meant  a 
blockade  covering  Havana  and  extending  some 
forty  miles  westward  and  fifty  miles  eastward. 
Cienfuegos,  on  the  other  side  of  the  island,  was 
closed  because  it  had  railroad  communication  with 
the  Cuban  capital. 

The  instructions  sent  to  Sampson  on  the  2ist 
informed  him  that  a  plan  was  under  consideration 
for  an  expedition  to  Matanzas,  where  a  sufficient 
force  might  be  landed  to  hold  the  place  and  open 
communication  with  the  insurgents.  Meanwhile, 
an  attack  upon  the  defences  of  Havana  was  defi 
nitely  forbidden. 

It  is  possible  that  the  admiral's  plan  of  imme 
diate  and  vigorous  aggression  might  have  ended  the 
war  more  summarily,  but  the  policy  that  prevailed 
at  Washington  was  an  eminently  safe  one.  The 
first  move  made  Blanco's  position  in  Cuba  unten 
able,  unless  Spain  should  make  some  effective  coun 
ter  stroke — which,  with  her  weaker  navy,  and  with 
all  the  disadvantages  of  fighting  from  a  base  four 
thousand  miles  distant,  was  practically  impossible. 
The  American  fleet  at  once  took  undisputed  com 
mand  of  Cuban  waters.  A  number  of  armed  vessels 
lay  in  the  harbours  of  the  island — the  cruisers  Al 
fonso  XII  and  Conde  de  Venadito,  with  one  or 


THE   BEGINNING  OF   WAR  123 

more  torpedo  boats,  at  Havana;  the  Reina  Mer 
cedes  at  Santiago,  the  Jorge  Juan  in  Nipe  Bay,  and 
smaller  gunboats  at  Manzanillo,  Cienfuegos,  and 
other  ports ;  but  they  made  no  serious  attempt  to 
attack  the  American  ships.  The  first  prize,  the 
Spanish  steamer  Buena  Ventura,  was  taken  by  the 
Nashville  early  on  the  morning  of  April  22d,  shortly 
after  Sampson's  squadron  left  Key  West;  and  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  the  New  York  over 
hauled  a  larger  vessel,  the  Pedro,  coming  out  of 
Havana. 

The  seizure  of  ships  owned  by  citizens  of  a  hos 
tile  country  is  a  survival  from  the  days  when  might 
was    right,    and    a    successful    battle 
private  prop-  t   indiscriminate   loot.      In   war- 

erty  at  sea.  .  , 

fare  on  land,  private  property  has 
long  been  respected  by  civilized  armies,  and  it  is  a 
curious  anomaly  that  the  same  principle  should  not 
obtain  on  the  sea.  It  was  partially  recognised, 
forty  years  ago,  in  the  Declaration  of  Paris,  by 
which  the  leading  European  powers  agreed  to  abol 
ish  privateering,  and  to  respect  neutral  flags  and 
neutral  goods.  Spain  did  not  sign  that  agreement, 
nor  did  the  United  States,  though  President  Pierce 
offered  to  go  further,  and  to  join  in  a  declaration  ex 
empting  all  private  property,  except  contraband  of 
war,  from  seizure,  whether  by  privateers  or  by  naval 
vessels.  It  has  been  suggested  that  the  Washing 
ton  Government,  with  the  prestige  of  a  victorious 
war,  should  propose  to  add  such  a  rule  to  the 
canons  of  international  law,  and  the  suggestion  com 
mends  itself  to  all  respecters  of  the  eighth  com 
mandment.*  Overhauling  some  helpless  mer 
chantman,  which  may  have  had  no  notice  of  the 

*  In  his  annual  message  of  December  5,  1898,  President  McKinley 
recommended  "  that  the  Executive  be  authorized  to  correspond  with  the 
Governments  of  the  principal  maritime  powers  with  a  view  of  incorpo 
rating  into  the  permanent  law  of  civilized  nations  the  principle  of  the 
exemption  of  all  private  property  at  sea,  not  contraband  of  war,  from 
capture  or  destruction  by  belligerent  powers." 


124 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


existence  of  war  ;  making  prisoners  of  its  crew  ;  de 
priving  its  skipper  of  the  ship  that  is  perhaps  his 
only  property  and  source  of  livelihood ;  and  con 
fiscating  its  cargo,  which  may  be  of  no  possible 
service  to  the  enemy's  forces — the  Buena  Ventura, 
for  instance,  was  a  small  steamer  carrying  American 
lumber — this  is  a  poor  business  for  the  navy  of  a 
great  power. 

At  the  same  time,  it  is  so  profitable  that  naval 
officers  can  not  be  expected  to  oppose  its  continu 
ance.  During  the  civil  war,  for  instance,  Admiral 
Farragut — besides  the  fifty  thousand  dollars  pre 
sented  to  him  by  a  subscription  raised  in  New 
York — received  no  less  than  one  hundred  and  forty 
thousand  dollars  in  prize  and  bounty  money,  and 
several  other  Federal  officers  drew  an  amount  not 
much  less.  In  the  United  States  army,  which  has 
no  such  perquisite,  the  pay  of  all  ranks  is  increased 
twenty  per  cent  during  war.  It  would  be  more  con 
sonant  with  the  advance  of  civilization  to  give  the 
navy  a  similar  allowance,  and  to  end  the  seizure  of 
private  property  on  the  sea. 

It  was  announced  by  the  State  Department,  on 
the  day  before  the  war  began,  that  the  United  States 
would  commission  no  privateers ;  but 

as   SPain   had  not   siSned   th,e  .°ec- 
laration  of  Paris,  she  was  technically 

at  liberty  to  do  so.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that 
an  inquiry — which  implied  a  warning  against  a 
policy  that  might  work  serious  damage  to  neutral 
commercial  interests — was  sent  to  Madrid  from 
London.  On  April  24th  Sagasta's  Government  re 
plied  by  issuing  a  decree  which  declared  a  state  of 
war  to  exist  between  Spain  and  the  United  States, 
and  added : 

The  Spanish  Government,  reserving  its  right  to  grant 
letters  of  marque,  will  at  present  confine  itself  to  organiz 
ing,  with  the  vessels  of  the  mercantile  marine,  a  force  of 
auxiliary  cruisers,  which  will  co-operate  with  the  navy, 


THE    BEGINNING   OF   WAR  125 

according  to  the  needs  of  the  campaign,  and  will  be  under 
naval  control. 

The  threatened  force  of  auxiliary  cruisers  did 
not  figure  in  the  war,  though  the  Government,  in 
addition  to  its  few  purchases  abroad,  took  over  sev 
eral  steamers  from  the  Compania  Transatlantica 
Espaiiola,  whose  traffic  to  West  Indian  ports  was 
cut  off  by  the  blockade.  Only  one  American  ves 
sel  was  taken  during  the  struggle — the  bark  Sara- 
nac,  which,  not  knowing  that  hostilities  were  in 
progress,  entered  the  port  of  Iloilo,  in  the  Philip 
pines,  and  was  captured  by  a  Spanish  gunboat. 
She  was  subsequently  released,  as  her  owners  had 
transferred  her  to  a  British  subject  while  she  was 
at  sea.  On  the  other  hand,  the  American  men-of- 
war  took  no  less  than  fifty-six  prizes.* 

The  United  States  was  a  day  behind  Spain  in 
its  formal  announcement  of  war.  On  the  25th  of 
April  the  President  requested  Congress  to  give 
legal  status  to  the  operations  of  the  country's  armed 
forces,  and  a  brief  bill  stating  that  "  war  has  existed 
since  the  2ist  day  of  April,  1898,  including  said  day, 
between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  king 
dom  of  Spain "  was  passed  without  a  dissenting 
vote  in  either  House.  The  State  Department  at 
once  notified  all  the  foreign  powers,  who  promptly 
responded  with  proclamations  of  neutrality. 

The  American  squadron  in  Cuban  waters  had 

before  it  plenty  of  nobler  and  more  serious  work 

than   the   taking   of   prizes.      It    first 

First  shots  at       exchanged  shots  with  the  enemy  at 

April"**'  Matanzas,   on   April   27th.      On   that 

morning  Captain  Harrington,  of  the 

monitor  Puritan,  reported  to  Admiral  Sampson  that 

a   new   battery   was   being   constructed    at    Punta 

*  According  to  the  Attorney- General's  annual  report  for  1898.  The 
amount  realized  by  the  sale  of  these  vessels  and  their  cargoes,  up  to  the 
date  of  the  report  (November,  1898),  with  several  ships  still  to  be  sold, 
was  $701,034. 


126  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Gorda  (Broad  Point)  on  the  west  side  of  the  en 
trance  to  Matanzas  harbour.  Deciding  that  his  in 
structions  *  would  permit  him  to  give  his  gunners 
some  target  practice,  the  admiral  steamed  eastward 
from  his  blockading  station  off  Havana,  and,  in 
company  with  the  Puritan  and  the  cruiser  Cincin 
nati,  opened  fire  on  the  Spaniards,  bombarding  both 
the  Punta  Gorda  battery  and  another  on  the  east 
side  of  the  harbour.  The  range  was  long — from 
two  to  four  miles — but  the  shells  seemed  to  reach 
their  mark,  and  the  batteries  replied  with  only  a 
few  shots,  which  did  no  damage.  The  three  ships 
had  discharged  about  three  hundred  projectiles  in 
half  an  hour  when  the  admiral  signalled  to  "  cease 
firing."  The  Spaniards  reported  that  their  loss  was 
"  one  mule  " — which,  whether  true  or  not,  was  dis 
tinctly  humorous,  and  caused  much  mirth  in  Ha 
vana  and  Madrid. 

*  On  April  26th  Secretary  Long  telegraphed  to  Sampson  :  "  While 
the  department  does  not  wish  a  bombardment  of  forts  protected  by 
heavy  cannon,  it  is  within  your  discretion  to  destroy  light  batteries 
which  may  protect  vessels  you  desire  to  attack,  if  you  can  do  so  without 
exposure  to  heavy  guns." 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE    BATTLE    OF    MANILA    BAY 

VERY  different  news  was  to  come  a  few  days 
later,  from  a  widely  distant  point.  It  was  strange 
that  the  first  battle  of  a  war  waged  for  the  liberation 
of  an  island  almost  in  sight  of  the  American  shores 
should  be  fought  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  globe  ; 
but  it  was  a  perfectly  logical  —  indeed,  an  inevitable 
—  train  of  action  that  led  to  the  attack  on  Manila, 
with  all  the  new  and  unforeseen  chapter  of  history 
of  which  that  was  to  be  the  beginning.  War  con 
sists  in  striking  at  the  enemy's  forces  wherever  they 
are  to  be  found;  and  a  blow  at  the  Spanish  power 
in  the  Philippines  was  not  only  a  telling  offensive 
move,  but  also  a  defensive  necessity  for  the  protec 
tion  of  American  commerce  in  eastern  seas,  and 
even  for  the  security  of  the  Pacific  coast. 

The  Philippines  were  Spain's,  like  the  rest  of  her 
once  vast  empire,  by  right  of  discovery.  Fernao  de 
Magalhaes,'  better  known  as  Magellan, 


. 

and  was  slain  there  by  hostile  natives. 
In  1565  Spaniards  from  Mexico,  under  Legazpi, 
crossed  the  Pacific  to  plant  colonies  in  these  eastern 
islands,  which  they  named  after  the  reigning  sover 
eign,  the  Philip  of  the  Armada.  Manila  was 
founded  in  1571,  on  the  finest  harbour  on  the  west 
coast  of  Luzon  ;  and  from  that  date  to  1898  the 
Philippines  have  had  very  little  history.  In  the  six 
teenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  there  were  hos- 

127 


I28  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

tilitics  with  Chinese  pirates,  and  with  the  Dutch, 
who  harried  the  Spanish  commerce,  but  were  de 
feated  in  an  attack  on  Manila. 

In  1762  the  city  was  taken  by  the  British.  A 
fleet  under  Admiral  Cornish,  with  twenty-five  hun 
dred  men  commanded  by  Sir  William  Draper,  en 
tered  the  bay  on  September  23d  of  that  year ;  and  on 
October  6th  the  defences  of  Manila  were  stormed, 
except  the  citadel,  which  the  Spanish  governor,  the 
Marquis  de  Medina,  surrendered  a  few  days  later, 
together  with  the  entire  archipelago.  A  ransom  of 
four  million  dollars  was  demanded,  and  was  paid  in 
drafts  on  Madrid,  which  were  afterward  repudiated ; 
and  in  1763  the  Philippines  were  returned  to  Spain, 
together  with  Havana,  captured  in  the  same  year. 

Under  Spain's  colonial  rule  the  development  of 
the  islands  was  extraordinarily  slow.  Manila  was 
almost  fifty  years  old  when  the  Pilgrims  landed  at 
Plymouth,  yet  the  Philippines  are  to-day  in  great 
part  a  terra  incognita.  Compare  what  the  Span 
iards  have  done  for  them  with  the  achievements 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  in  Australia,  whose  coloni 
zation  began  in  1788,  and  in  South  Africa,  British 
only  since  1806;  or  with  the  changes  wrought  in 
India  by  her  present  rulers,  whose  power  dates  from 
Clive's  victory  at  Plassey  in  1757.  While  civiliza 
tion  has  fought  its  battles  and  won  its  triumphs  in 
America,  in  Asia,  in  Africa,  in  the  isles  of  the  sea, 
the  greater  part  of  this  richly  endowed  archipelago 
has  progressed  little  since  the  days  when  the  pagan 
king  of  Cebu  came  to  meet  Magellan. 

The  ruinous  disorders  of  Cuba,  too,  have  had 

their   counterpart    in    Spain's    eastern   possessions. 

Throughout  this  century  the  natives 

flections.       have  £rown  more  and  "more  discon 
tented    with    the    domination    of   the 

monastic  orders,  the  corrupt  and  oppressive  admin 
istration  of  the  courts,  the  burden  of  compulsory 
military  service,  and  above  all  the  intolerably  ex- 


THE   BATTLE   OF    MANILA   BAY  129 

tortionate  system  of  taxation.  One  revolt  followed 
another,  but  the  Spaniards  suppressed  them — usu 
ally  with  little  difficulty,  always  with  great  cruelty. 
The  insurrection  of  1896  was  more  formidable 
than  any  that  preceded  it.  Blanco,  then  captain- 
general  at  Manila,  could  do  little  to  suppress  it.  He 
had  only  a  handful  of  regular  soldiers,  and  his  na 
tive  auxiliaries  could  not  be  trusted ;  and  when 
he  left  the  islands,  in  December  of  that  year,  the 
insurgents  controlled  all  the  southern  part  of  Luzon, 
close  up  to  the  capital.  His  successor,  General 
Polavieja,  came  out  with  strong  reinforcements,  and 
inaugurated  an  active  campaign.  More  than  twenty 
thousand  Spanish  troops,  commanded  in  the  field 
by  General  Lachambre,  made  a  clean  sweep  of  the 
revolted  territory,  and  drove  the  remnants  of  the 
Filipino  forces  into  the  mountains  of  the  north. 
But  Polavieja,  irritated  at  the  failure  of  the  Madrid 
Government  to  support  him  with  the  men  and  sup 
plies  he  needed,  resigned  after  four  months  in  office ; 
and  under  the  next  captain-general,  Primo  de  Rivera, 
the  rebels  continued  to  hold  their  own.  Finally, 
Rivera  succeeded  in  effecting  a  pacification,  osten 
sibly  by  liberal  promises  of  political  concessions, 
but  secretly,  it  is  understood,  by  the  more  effectual 
method  of  bribing  the  Filipino  leaders.*  The  na 
tives  disbanded,  and  seven  thousand  of  Rivera's 
troops  were  returned  to  Spain ;  but  the  promised 
reforms  were  not  made,  and  in  the  early  months  of 
1898,  when  Rivera  was  succeeded  by  Basilio  Au- 
gustin,  there  were  renewed  risings  on  several  of  the 

*  Oscar  F.  Williams,  United  States  consul  at  Manila,  reported  to 
the  State  Department  (February  22,  1898)  that  "  certain  rebel  leaders 
were  given  a  cash  bribe  of  $1,650,000  to  consent  to  public  deportation 
to  China."  Mr.  Wildman,  consul-general  at  Hong-Kong,  gave  a  dif 
ferent  version  in  a  report  dated  July  18,  1898  :  "  I  was  in  Hong-Kong 
in  September,  1897,  when  Aguinaldo  and  his  leaders  arrived  under  con 
tract  with  the  Spanish  Government.  They  waited  until  the  ist  of  No 
vember  for  the  payment  of  the  money  promised  for  the  widows  and 
orphans  of  the  insurgents  and  the  fulfilment  of  promised  reforms. 
Only  $400,000  Mexican  was  ever  placed  to  their  credit." 


130 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 


islands.  Meanwhile  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  who  had 
been  the  head  and  front  of  the  rebellion  in  Luzon, 
had  gone  to  Singapore,  where  he  met  Mr.  Pratt, 
the  United  States  consul,  and  through  him  opened 
relations  with  the  American  forces  which  were  to 

have    an    important    bearing    on    the 

Manila  campaign. 

On  April  24th  Commodore 
Dewey,  at  Hong-Kong,  received  the  following 
despatch  from  the  Navy  Department  at  Wash 
ington  : 

War  has  commenced  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain.  Proceed  at  once  to  Philippine  Islands.  Commence 
operations  at  once,  particularly  against  the  Spanish  fleet. 
You  must  capture  vessels  or  destroy.  Use  utmost  en 
deavours. 

This,  of  course,  was  not  his  first  notification  of 
the  task  before  him.  For  several  weeks  he  had  been 
preparing  his  squadron  for  it.  He  had  dismantled 
the  one  unserviceable  vessel  in  his  command,  the 
old  wooden  corvette  Monocacy,  and  had  distributed 
her  crew  among  his  other  men-of-war,  leaving  her 
at  Woosung.  At  the  beginning  of  April  he  was 
instructed  to  secure  two  auxiliary  ships  to  carry 
coal  and  supplies ;  he  accordingly  bought  the  Nan- 
shan  and  the  Zafiro,  with  ten  thousand  tons  of 
Welsh  coal,  besides  filling  up  the  bunkers  of  the 
cruisers.  His  fuel  bill  for  the  month  was  $81,872. 

At  Manila,  Governor-General  Augustin  pre 
pared  for  the  coming  fray  by  issuing,  on  April  23d, 
a  proclamation  which,  if  the  published  version  of  it 
be  correct,  was  so  ridiculously  bombastic  that  it  is 
worth  quoting  as  a  curiosity  : 

The  North  American  people,  constituted  of  all  the  so 
cial  excrescences,  have  exhausted  our  patience  and  pro 
voked  war  with  their  perfidious  machinations,  with  their 
acts  of  treachery,  with  their  outrages  against  the  law  of 
nations  and  international  conventions. 

The  struggle  will  be  short  and  decisive.     The  God  of 


THE   BATTLE   OF    MANILA   BAY 


victories  will  give  us  one  as  brilliant  as  the  justice  of  our 
cause  demands.  Spain,  which  counts  upon  the  sympathies 
of  all  the  nations,  will  emerge  triumphantly  from  this 
new  test,  humiliating  and  blasting  the  adventurers  from 
those  States  which,  without  cohesion  and  without  a  his 
tory,  offer  to  humanity  only  infamous  traditions  and  the 
ungrateful  spectacle  of  a  legislature  in  which  appear  united 
insolence  and  defamation,  cowardice  and  cynicism. 

A  squadron  manned  by  foreigners  possessing  neither 
instruction  nor  discipline  is  preparing  to  come  to  this 
archipelago  with  the  ruffianly  intention  of  robbing  us  of 
all  that  means  life,  honour,  and  liberty. 

Filipinos,  prepare  for  the  struggle,  and  united  under 
the  glorious  Spanish  flag,  which  is  ever  covered  with 
laurels,  let  us  fight  with  the  conviction  that  victory  will 
crown  our  efforts,  and  to  the  challenge  of  our  enemies 
let  us  oppose,  with  the  decision  of  the  Christian  and  the 
patriot,  the  cry  of  "Viva  Espafia!  " 
Your  General, 

BASILIC  AUGUSTIN  Y  DAVILA.* 

This  was  as  fine  a  piece  of  vituperation  as  any 
thing  that  Napoleon  ever  launched  at  his  foes. 

Dewey  was  still  at  Hong-Kong — completing  his 

preparations,  and  awaiting  the  arrival  of  Oscar  F. 

Williams,    the    American    consul    at 

Dewey  leaves      Manila,  f  who  was  expected  to  bring 

Hong-Kong,  .  .     r  .  ^ 

April  25.  important     information  —  when,     on 

April  25th,  the  governor  of  the  colony 
requested  him  to  leave  the  harbour,  to  prevent  any 
breach  of  British  neutrality.  The  squadron — now 
reinforced  by  the  Baltimore,  which  reached  Hong- 
Kong  on  the  22d — accordingly  withdrew  to  Mirs 
Bay,  in  Chinese  territory,  about  thirty  miles  dis 
tant.  Mr.  Williams  arrived  on  the  27th,  and  in  the 

*  This  is  an  instance  of  the  Spanish  custom  of  adding  the  maiden 
name  of  a  man's  mother  to  his  own  surname,  to  distinguish  him  from 
others  of  the  same  name. 

t  Mr.  Williams  left  Manila  on  April  23d,  turning  over  the  affairs  of 
his  office  to  E.  H.  Rawson  Walker,  the  British  consul,  whose  services 
were  afterward  acknowledged  by  Dewey  as  "of  invaluable  assistance," 
Mr.  Walker  being  his  "only  means  of  communicating  with  the  Span 
ish  authorities,  and  the  chief  agent  in  the  protection  of  foreign  resi 
dents."  The  Belgian  consul,  M.  Andre,  also  did  valuable  work  of 
the  sort. 


132  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

afternoon  of  that  day  the  start  for  Manila  was  made. 
Besides  the  Olympia  (flagship,  Captain  C.  V.  Grid- 
ley  commanding ;  Commander  Lamberton,  chief  of 
the  commodore's  staff),  the  Baltimore  (Captain  N. 
M.  Dyer),  the  Raleigh  (Captain  J.  B.  Coghlan), 
and  the  Boston  (Captain  Frank  Wildes),  the  fleet 
included  the  small  cruiser  Concord  (1,700  tons, 
Commander  Asa  Walker),  the  gunboat  Petrel  (890 
tons,  Commander  E.  P.  Wood),  the  two  colliers, 
and  the  revenue  cutter  Hugh  McCulloch,  now 
serving  as  a  despatch  boat. 

Accommodating  its  speed  to  that  of  the  heavy 
colliers,  the  squadron  crossed  the  China  Sea  to 
gether.  On  the  morning  of  the  3Oth,  when  the 
shore  of  Luzon  was  sighted,  the  ships  were  cleared 
for  action,  nets  were  stretched  around  the  boats  to 
lessen  the  danger  from  flying  splinters,  and  on  some 
of  the  cruisers  chain  cables  were  coiled  around  the 
ammunition  hoists.  The  ingenuity  of  this  last  de 
vice  for  increasing  the  protection  of  a  vulnerable 
point  was  afterward  warmly  commended  by  an 
English  naval  critic,  who  apparently  did  not  know 
that  it  was  used  on  board  the  Kearsarge  when  she 
fought  and  won  her  famous  duel  with  the  Alabama. 
Captain  Winslow  went  into  action  with  his  engines 
protected  by  sheet  chains  hung  over  the  side  of  his 
vessel. 

Steaming  southward,  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
3Oth  the  American  ships  reached  Subig  Bay,  an  in 
dentation  of  the  coast  about  forty  miles  north  of 
Manila.  Dewey  had  information  that  Montojo,  the 
Spanish  admiral,  intended  to  meet  the  attacking 
squadron  at  this  point,  and  he  sent  the  Boston  and 
the  Concord  into  the  bay,  which  is  about  seven 
miles  deep,  in  search  of  the  enemy;  but  the 
Spaniards'  plans  had  been  changed,  and  they 
were  not  there.  During  the  reconnaissance,  the 
Baltimore,  lying  in  the  entrance  of  the  bay,  fired  the 
first  shot  of  the  campaign  in  overhauling  a  Spanish 


THE   BATTLE   OF    MANILA   BAY 


133 


schooner — of  which,  however,  it  was  not  thought 
worth  while  to  make  a  prize.  Late  in  the  afternoon 
the  commodore  ordered  the  fleet  to  lie  to,  to  avoid 
appearing  before  Manila  by  daylight,  and  sum 
moned  his  commanding  officers  to  a  council  on 
board  the  flagship.  He  informed  them  that  he 
meant  to  enter  Manila  Bay  during  the  night. 

The  bay  is  a  large  sheet  of  water,  running  inland 
for  thirty  miles,  and  the  same  distance  in  average 
width,  though  much  narrower  at  the 
Dewey  reaches  mouth.  In  the  entrance  are  two  high 
Apriilo***'  rocky  islands,  Corregidor  and  Ca- 
ballo,  dividing  the  waterway  into  two 
channels,  the  Boca  Chica  (Little  Mouth)  on  the 
north,  and  the  Boca  Grande  (Great  Mouth)  on  the 
south.  In  the  latter,  which  is  about  six  miles  wide, 
rises  the  isolated  rock  of  El  Fraile  (The  Friar) ; 
in  the  former  are  La  Monja  (The  Nun)  and  sev 
eral  other  islets.  Corregidor  was  fortified  and 
garrisoned  by  the  Spaniards ;  there  were  small  bat 
teries  on  Caballo  and  El  Fraile,  and  on  the  main 
land  at  Punta  Restinga,  south  of  the  entrance,  and 
at  Mariveles,  Punta  Gorda,  and  Punta  Lasisi,  north 
of  it.  None  of  them  contained  guns  of  more  than 
fifteen-centimetre  (six-inch)  calibre. 

An  hour  before  midnight  the  American  fleet 
reached  the  mouth  of  the  bay  and  turned  into  the 
Boca  Grande,  steaming  at  eight  knots.  The  ships 
were  in  column,  the  Olympia  leading,  and  the  Bal 
timore,  Raleigh,  Petrel,  Concord,  and  Boston  fol 
lowing  in  order.  No  lights 'were  shown  except  one 
at  the  stern,  to  guide  the  vessel  next  in  line.  There 
was  a  half  moon,  and  the  night  was  light  enough 
to  make  it  a  risky  matter  to  run  through  a  channel 
that  was  commanded  by  batteries  and  might  be  laid 
with  mines.  In  a  published  narrative  by  Lieu 
tenant  Fiske,*  of  the  Petrel,  it  is  stated  that  not  an 

*  The  Century  Magazine,  November,  1898. 


I 


THE    BATTLE   OF   MANILA   BAY  ^5 

officer  in  the  squadron  had  been  in  the  bay  before, 
but  this  is  not  quite  correct,  for  Captain  Gridley 
was  at  Manila  in  1894,  when  he  commanded  the 
Marion.  Nevertheless,  Lieutenant  Calkins,  the 
navigator  of  the  Olympia,  who  piloted  the  fleet,  had 
a  very  difficult  and  responsible  task. 

Commodore  Dewey  had  been  perfectly  correct 
in  his  belief  that  the  Spaniards  would  not  dream  of 
his  forcing  an  entrance  into  the  bay  before  day 
break.  Their  watch  was  not  a  very  sharp  one,  for 
half  of  the  ships  had  passed  Corregidor  before  any 
alarm  was  given.  Then  a  rocket  went  up  from  the 
island,  and  a  little  later  the  guns  on  El  Fraile 
opened  fire.  The  Raleigh  and  the  Concord  replied, 
and  the  rear-guard  ship,  the  Boston,  turned  aside  to 
pass  close  to  the  battery,  not  a  formidable  one,  and 
hammered  it  until  it  was  silenced. 

The  McCulloch  and  the  two  colliers  formed  a 
separate  column  to  the  right  of  the  war  ships.  As 
they  passed  into  the  bay  the  former  signalled  that 
her  chief  engineer  had  been  disabled  by  sudden  ill 
ness.  It  was  a  stroke  of  heat  prostration  or  of 
apoplexy,  and  in  twenty  minutes  Engineer  Randall 
was  dead — the  only  life  lost  in  the  attack  on  Manila. 

Past  the  batteries,  and  untouched  by  a  hostile 
shot,  the  fleet  advanced  at  its  leisure  toward  the 
Philippine  capital,  still  about  twenty  miles  distant. 
There  was  time  to  spare,  as  it  was  useless  to  arrive 
there  before  daybreak,  and  the  crews,  who  had 
stood  to  their  guns  since  nightfall,  had  three  or  four 
hours  for  such  rest  as  they  could  get.  At  four 
o'clock  coffee  and  hardtack  were  served  out.  At 
five  the  ships  were  opposite  Jihe  city,  and  it  was 
light  enough  to  see  that  there  were  no  men-of-war 
in  the  port.  Turning  southward  again,  the  squad 
ron  moved  toward  the  peninsula  of  Cavite,  which 
projects  into  the  bay  a  few  miles  below  Manila,  and 
on  which  the  Spaniards  had  their  naval  arsenal; 
and  here  Montojo's  fleet  was  speedily  descried.  As 


136  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

the  American  ships  circled  toward  Cavite,  a  few 
shots  were  exchanged  with  a  shore  battery  in 
Manila — that  of  the  Luneta,  consisting  of  twenty- 
five-centimetre  (ten-inch)  Krupp  guns — but  at  too 
great  a  range  to  be  effective. 

Montojo  had  only  one  vessel  that  could  be 
ranked  as  high  as  the  second  class — his  flagship, 
the  Reina  Cristina,  a  steel  cruiser  of 
3'5°°  tons>  launched  at  Ferrol  in 
1886,  and  armed  with  six  six-inch  and 
fourteen  smaller  guns.  Her  consorts  were  two 
small  English-built  cruisers,  the  Isla  de  Cuba  and 
the  Isla  de  Luzon,  1,030  tons  each,  and  two  others, 
old  iron  ships,  slightly  larger  but  less  efficient,  the 
Don  Antonio  de  Ulloa,  which  was  under  repair, 
and  the  Don  Juan  de  Austria;  a  still  more  an 
cient  wooden  vessel,  whose  engines  were  disabled 
— the  Castilla,  3,342  tons ;  two  5ooton  gunboats, 
the  General  Lezo  and  the  Marques  del  Duero ;  and 
four  small  torpedo  boats.  There  were  also  two 
transports,  the  Manila  and  the  Isla  de  Mindanao, 
and  the  Velasco,  another  obsolete  iron  ship  which 
was  undergoing  repairs.  In  offensive  and  defen 
sive  power  the  squadron  was  far  inferior  to  Dewey's 
fine  quartette  of  cruisers,  but  it  had  a  great  ad 
vantage  in  position,  fighting  in  its  own  waters, 
where  it  knew  the  ranges,  and  had  the  aid  of  bat 
teries  on  shore. 

Montojo  had  abandoned  his  plan  of  meeting 
Dewey  in  Subig  Bay  only  two  days  before,  having 
found  the  fortifications  there  to  be  worthless.  In 
Manila  Bay  he  had  a  stronger  base,  but  he  had 
not  had  time  to  complete  his  preparations.  What 
ever  may  have  been  the  case  elsewhere,  at  Cavite 
the  Spaniards  had  an  abundant  store  of  war  ma 
terial.  When  the  American  marines  occupied  the 
arsenal,  they  found  it  well  supplied  and  apparently 
well  kept.  The  most  serious  defect  in  the  Spanish 
defences  was  the  lack  of  mines.  It  was  believed  on 


THE    BATTLE   OF    MANILA   BAY 


137 


the  Olympia  that  as  she  approached  Montojo's 
squadron  two  mines  were  exploded  in  the  bay, 
ahead  of  her.  Captain  Gridley  reported  so,  and  in 
Dewey's  first  detailed  account  of  the  action  he  also 
said  that  "  while  advancing  to  the  attack,  two  mines 
were  exploded  ahead  of  the  flagship,  too  far  to  be 
effective."  In  a  statement  given  by  one  of  the 
Olympia's  engineers  it  is  asserted  that  a  mine  went 
off  twelve  hundred  yards  in  front  of  the  ship.  At 
such  a  distance,  in  the  dim  light  of  dawn,  it  would 
be  easy  to  mistake  the  splash  of  a  shell,  which  some 
times  throws  the  water  masthead  high,  for  the  ex 
plosion  of  a  torpedo.  Spanish  projectiles  frequently 
fell  as  much  as  twelve  hundred  yards  short  of  their 
mark,  but  it  would  be  an  extraordinary  mis 
calculation  to  discharge  an  electric  mine  nearly 
three  quarters  of  a  mile  away  from  its  intended 
victim. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  reports  of  Dewey's  other 
captains,  and  the  narratives  of  Lieutenant  Fiske,  of 
Engineer  Ford  of  the  Baltimore,*  and  of  several 
other  eye-witnesses,  do  not  record  any  explosion 
of  mines.  The  official  report  of  Admiral  Montojo, 
in  which  he  details  his  preparations  for  defence, 
mentions  no  mines ;  nor  does  the  account  published 
in  the  Diario  de  Manila  of  May  4th.  Lieutenant 
Fiske  expressly  states  that  the  Spaniards  had  none 
in  place,  though  some  mine  cases  lay  in  the  arsenal, 
unfinished.  This  is  confirmed  by  Montojo's  state 
ment  f  that  he  had  repeatedly  asked  for  torpedoes 


*  An  American  Cruiser  in  the  Far  East. 

t  Reported  by  the  China  Mail's  correspondent  in  Manila  shortly 
after  the  battle. 

A  comparison  of  Gridley's  report  with  Montojo's  confirms  the  sug 
gestion  that  the  splash  of  shells  was  mistaken  for  the  explosion  of 
mines.  The  captain  of  the  Olympia  says  :  "  At  5.06  two  submarine 
mines  were  exploded  near.  At  5.15  batteiy  on  Shangly  Point  opened 
fire."  Montojo  records  that  "at  q  the  batteries  on  Sanp-lev  Point 
opened  fire.  The  two  first  shots  fell  short  and  to  the  left  of  the  lead 
ing-  vessel.  These  shots  were  not  answered  by  the  enemy.  ...  At 
5.15  I  made  signal  that  our  squadron  open  fire." 


138  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

from  Madrid,  but  had  received  none,  and  his  at 
tempts  to  make  them  had  been  failures. 

The  peninsula  of  Cavite  is  shaped  like  a  two- 
pronged  fork,  with  the  small  bay  of  Canacao  be 
tween  the  prongs,  and  the  larger  bay 
of  Bakoor  between  the  peninsula  and 
the  mainland  of  Luzon.  Montojo's 
ships  were  drawn  up  in  line  across  Bakoor  Bay, 
their  left  resting  on  the  Cavite  arsenal,  their  right 
on  the  shore  near  the  village  of  Bakoor.  The  two 
disabled  vessels,  the  Castilla  and  the  Ulloa,  were 
moored  close  to  Sangley  Point,  the  former  having 
a  row  of  lighters,  filled  with  sand,  to  protect  her 
water  line.  The  Velasco  was  tied  up  at  the  arsenal, 
and  was  not  in  the  action.  The  six  other  cruisers 
and  gunboats  were  at  anchor,  with  steam  up.  In 
spite  of  the  warning  sounded  by  the  firing  at  the 
mouth  of  the  harbour,  Dewey's  attack  apparently 
took  the  Spaniards  by  surprise,  for  many  of  the 
officers  and  men  were  ashore,  and  came  hurrying 
out  in  boats  as  the  battle  began. 

The  American  ships  came  on  in  the  same  order 
as  before,  attacking  in  column,  as  Nelson  did  at  the 
Nile  and  at  Trafalgar,  but  veering  to  the  right,  so 
as  to  turn  their  port  broadsides  to  the  enemy.  The 
Spanish  batteries  and  men-of-war  had  been  firing 
for  about  half  an  hour  when  at  twenty  minutes  to 
six,  and  at  a  distance  of  three  miles,  Dewey  gave 
the  order  for  the  Olympia  to  reply.  The  engage 
ment  soon  became  general.  Every  ship  in  both 
fleets  was  using  every  gun  it  could  bring  to  bear, 
and  the  Spaniards  had  the  assistance  of  five  shore 
batteries.  None  of  the  five,  however,  proved  dan 
gerous  to  the  American  vessels,  the  most  formida 
ble  being  that  on  Sangley  Point,  consisting  of  two 
fifteen-centimetre  (six-inch)  Ordonez  guns,  of 
which  Montojo  reported  that  only  one  could  be 
used.  A  mile  southward,  at  Canacao,  was  another 
battery  of  a  single  twelve-centimetre  (five-inch) 


THE    BATTLE   OF    MANILA   BAY  139 

gun,  and  a  totally  ineffective  fire,  at  long  range, 
was  kept  up  from  three  points  in  Manila — by  the 
heavy  cannon  of  the  Luneta,  by  some  smaller  guns 
on  the  mole  at  the  mouth  of  the  Pasig  River,  and 
by  the  old  fort  in  the  southern  suburb  of  Malate. 

To  render  them  a  more  difficult  mark,  Dewey 
kept  his  ships  passing  slowly  up  and  down  in  front 
of  the  Spanish  line.  Early  in  the  action  Montojo 
ordered  all  of  his  vessels  that  could  do  so  to  slip 
their  anchors  and  get  under  way.  Two  of  the  tor 
pedo  boats  boldly  dashed  out  to  attack  the 
Olympia,  but  the  American  gunners  did  not  allow 
them  to  get  within  striking  distance.  One  was 
sunk,  the  other  driven  ashore  disabled.  The 
Reina  Cristina  also  steamed  out  to  attack  at  close 
quarters,  but  she  too  had  to  retreat,  and  the  Span 
iards  made  no  further  move  until  at  the  end  of  the 
battle  they  went  inshore  to  sink,  as  a  dog  crawls 
into  his  kennel  to  die. 

There  being  no  armoured  ships  on  either  side, 
the  result  was  simply  a  question  of  gunnery;  and 
here  the  Americans  had  a  great  advantage  in  their 
more  powerful  batteries,  and  a  still  greater  one  in 
their  vastly  superior  marksmanship.  Whether  from 
lack  of  training  or  from  inability  to  preserve,  in 
the  stress  and  strain  of  battle,  the  steadiness  of  hand 
and  eye  that  is  needed  for  accurate  gun  practice, 
the  Spaniards'  fire  was  extraordinarily  wild  and  in 
effective.  With  about  seventy  guns  firing  for  two 
hours  at  an  enemy  within  easy  range,  they  did  prac 
tically  no  damage.  Only  one  of  their  shells — a  4.7- 
inch  projectile  from  the  Isla  de  Cuba — injured  a 
gun  or  a  man  in  the  American  fleet,  striking  a  six- 
inch  gun  on  the  Baltimore,  disabling  it,  and  sending 
out  a  shower  of  splinters  that  wounded  Lieutenant 
Kellogg,  Ensign  Irwin,  and  six  seamen,  none  of 
them  seriously.  Besides  this  the  Baltimore  was  hit 
or  grazed  by  four  other  shots,  the  Olympia  by  eight, 
the  Boston  by  four,  the  Raleigh  by  one,  the  Petrel 


140 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 


by  one,  but  none  of  them  left  more  than  a  slight 
mark.  The  Concord  was  not  struck.  Indeed,  the 
chief  injury  received  by  Dewey's  ships  was  the 
shattering  of  boats  and  skylights,  the  starting  of 
planks,  and  the  breaking  of  wires  by  the  concus 
sion  of  their  own  artillery. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  American  fire  was  ex 
ceedingly  accurate  and  destructive.  As  they  passed 
along  the  Spanish  line  Dewey's  gunners  paid  spe 
cial  attention  to  the  Reina  Cristina,  their  only  an 
tagonist  that  could  be  considered  formidable,  and 
Montojo's  flagship  suffered  terribly.  Early  in  the 
action  a  shell  exploded  in  the  forecastle,  and  killed 
or  disabled  the  crews  of  four  of  her  rapid-fire  guns. 
The  helmsman  on  the  bridge  being  wounded  by 
splinters  struck  from  the  foremast,  Lieutenant 
Nunez  took  the  wheel  and  kept  it,  amid  the  hail  of 
shot,  until  another  shell  destroyed  the  steering  gear. 
The  admiral's  flag  was  shot  from  the  mizzenmast, 
one  gun  after  another  was  put  out  of  action,  the 
smokestack  was  riddled,  the  engines  were  struck 
and  damaged.  A  shell  burst  in  the  hospital,  kill 
ing  wounded  men  who  were  being  treated  there ; 
another  set  fire  to  the  crews'  quarters,  and  another 
caused  a  serious  blaze  close  to  one  of  the  maga 
zines.  Altogether,  as  reported  by  Montojo,  the 
flagship  was  struck  seventy  times. 

Both  here  and  on  the  other  ships,  the  Spaniards 
fought  with  great  bravery.  The  Cristina's  guns 
were  fired  until  only  two  gunners  remained  unhurt. 
Finally,  with  his  ship  hopelessly  disabled  and  burn 
ing  in  half  a  dozen  places,  with  more  than  half  her 
crew  killed  or  wounded,  with  her  boilers  and  maga 
zines  likely  to  explode  at  any  moment,  the  admiral, 
who  had  himself  been  wounded  by  a  splinter  from 
a  shell,  ordered  her  abandoned.  The  boats  were 
launched,  and  Montojo  was  rowed  over  to  the  Isla 
de  Cuba.  Many  of  the  crew  jumped  overboard  and 
swam  to  other  vessels  or  to  the  shore.  Captain 


THE   BATTLE   OF    MANILA    BAY 


141 


Cadarso,  the  Cristina's  chief  officer,  stayed  on  the 
ship  to  the  last,  and  was  killed  by  a  shell  as  he  was 
about  to  leave  her. 

The  rest  of  the  Spanish  vessels  had  suffered 
almost  as  severely.  The  wooden  Castilla  was  no 
better  than  a  floating  coffin  under  the  fire  of  the 
American  guns,  and  she  had  burned  and  sunk 
where  she  lay.  As  Lieutenant  Fiske  remarks, 
Montojo  would  have  been  wiser  to  dismantle  her 
before  the  battle,  and  mount  her  guns  on  shore. 
The  whole  fleet  was  practically  silenced  and 
wrecked  when,  at  twenty-five  minutes  to  eight,  after 
passing  five  times  along  the  Spanish  line,  and 
gradually  drawing  closer  until  he  was  within  two 
thousand  yards  of  it,  Dewey  ordered  his  squadron 
to  cease  firing.  It  had  been  reported  to  him  that 
the  Olympia's  ammunition  was  running  low,  only 
fifteen  rounds  remaining  for  her  five-inch  rapid-fire 
battery ;  and  he  drew  out  of  range,  to  communicate 
with  his  other  ships  and  redistribute  his  supply  of 
shot  and  shell.  It  was  soon  discovered  that  the 
report  of  a  shortage  was  a  mistake,  but  the  commo 
dore  remained  out  in  the  bay  for  three  hours  and 
a  half,  receiving  reports  of  casualties — or,  rather,  of 
the  extraordinary  absence  of  casualties — from  his 
captains,  and  giving  his  men  time  for  rest  and  re 
freshment.  During  this  interval  he  sent  in  a  mes 
sage  to  the  governor-general,  informing  him  that  if 
the  city  batteries  continued  to  fire  the  American 
fleet  would  bombard  Manila.  The  warning  silenced 
them. 

At  sixteen  minutes  past  eleven  Dewey  gave  the 
signal  for  returning  to  the  attack,  and  the  squadron 
moved  inshore  again,  the  Baltimore  now  leading 
the  way.  Montojo  had  moved  his  ships — all  that 
could  be  moved — close  to  the  point  of  Cavite. 
Only  one  of  them — the  Antonio  de  Ulloa — was  still 
able  to  fire  a  gun.  Most  of  them  were  in  flames, 
and  one  of  them  after  another  was  scuttled  and 


142 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


abandoned.  The  admiral  himself  had  been  carried 
to  a  convent  in  the  town.  A  few  more  rounds  from 
the  American  cruisers  completed  the  work  of  de 
struction,  and  at  twenty  minutes  to  one,  the  Span 
ish  ships  being  wrecked  and  sunk,  the  shore  bat 
teries  silenced,  and  the  arsenal  having  hauled  down 
its  flag,  Dewey  steamed  northward  again  to  Manila, 


Sangley  Pt 


Sketch  map  showing  position  of  the  sunken  Spanish  ships 
after  the  battle  of  Manila  Bay,  May  I,  1898. 


1.  Reina  Cristina. 

2.  Don  Antonio  de  Ulloa. 

3.  Castilla. 

4.  Velasco. 

5.  Don  Juan  de  Austria. 


6.  Isla  de  Cuba. 

7.  Isla  de  Luzon. 

8.  Marques  del  Duero. 

9.  General  Lezo. 

10.  Isla  de  Mindanao. 


leaving  the  Petrel — whose  light  draught  enabled  her 
to  go  into  the  shallow  water  inshore — to  destroy 
or  capture  anything  that  might  still  remain  afloat. 
Commander  Wood  carried  out  his  commission 
effectually,  sending  his  executive  officer,  Lieuten 
ant  Hughes,  with  a  boat's  crew  to  set  fire  to  the 
scuttled  gunboats,  while  his  navigator,  Lieutenant 
Fiske,  seized  and  brought  out  the  tugs  Rapido  and 


THE    BATTLE   OF    MANILA   BAY 


143 


Hercules  and  three  steam  launches,  without  any  at 
tempt  at  resistance  by  the  Spanish  soldiers  and 
seamen  on  the  beach  at  Cavite.  The  coast-survey 
vessel  Manila,  which  had  been  run  ashore  at 
Bakoor,  was  afterward  hauled  off  uninjured  and 
added  to  the  list  of  prizes. 

Thus  was  executed  one  of  the  most  brilliant  and 
completely  successful  naval  operations  in  history. 
The  morning's  work  of  Dewey's  squadron  had  ob 
literated  Spain's  naval  power  in  the  East,  and  had 
given  him  command  of  the  great  Philippine  archi 
pelago.  All  this  had  been  done  without  losing  a 
single  man  in  a  battle  in  which  the  enemy's  loss, 
as  reported  to  Madrid  by  Montojo,  was  three  hun 
dred  and  eighty-one  killed  and  wounded — besides 
the  destruction  of  a  fleet  and  the  ruin  of  a  colonial 
empire. 

In  the  afternoon,  while  the  victorious  squadron 
was  anchored  off  Manila,  which  lay  at  the  mercy 
of  its  guns,  Mr.  Rawson  Walker,  the  British  con 
sul,  came  out  to  the  Olympia  and  requested,  on 
behalf  of  resident  foreigners  of  twenty-one  nation 
alities,  that  the  city  should  not  be  shelled.  Dewey 
consented  on  certain  conditions,  which  included  a 
supply  of  coal  for  his  ships,  and  control  of  the  cable 
to  Hong-Kong.  Governor-General  Augustin  re 
fused  his  terms,  but  there  was  no  further  firing.  A 
bombardment  would  have  caused  frightful  destruc 
tion,  and  would  have  been  of  no  equivalent  mili 
tary  advantage,  as  Dewey  could  not  land  a  force 
sufficient  to  hold  the  city  against  the  insurgents  who 
would  have  swarmed  in  to  loot  it. 

On  the  following  day  (May  2d)  the  commodore 
moved  his  ships  back  to  Cavite,  where  they  took 
up  a  position  which  they  were  to  hold 

fay3.      for   ma"y    weeks-      °»    the    3d    the 
arsenal,    which    the    Spaniards    had 

evacuated,  was  occupied — not  in  time  to  prevent 
some  plundering  by  the  rebels,  who  also  despoiled 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

the  neighbouring  villages  of  Cavite  and  San  Roque. 
On  the  same  day  the  Baltimore  and  the  Raleigh 
went  over  to  Corregidor  Island  and  received  the 
surrender  of  its  garrison,  which  was  released  on 
parole. 

During  the  battle,  General  Augustin  had  sent  to 
Madrid  a  vaguely  worded  despatch  which,  though 
it  admitted  the  loss  of  two  ships,  gave  the  impres 
sion  that  the  Spaniards  had  the  best  of  the  fight. 
It  created  momentary  jubilation  in  the  Spanish 
capital,  which  was  gradually  changed  to  sorrow 
and  indignation  as  later  reports,  though  still  very 
indefinite,  left  no  doubt  of  a  disaster.  On  the  3d 
of  May,  when  the  Cortes  met,  Sefior  Salmeron,  the 
republican  leader,  demanded  an  explanation,  and 
declared  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  establish  the 
responsibility  attaching  to  the  existing  Govern 
ment.  Sagasta  replied  by  appealing  to  the  house 
to  subordinate  partisanship  to  patriotism.  Com 
munication  between  Madrid  and  Manila  had  ended 
on  the  previous  day,  when  Dewey  cut  the  cable  of 
which  Augustin  had  refused  him  the  use. 

In  America,  meanwhile,  there  was  intense  sus 
pense,  in  the  absence  of  definite  news.  Dewey's 
success  was  not  doubted,  but  no  one  dreamed  that 
it  could  have  been  won  without  serious  loss.  Not 
until  May  4th  did  the  commodore  send  the  McCul- 
loch  speeding  off  to  Hong-Kong,  the  nearest 
cable  station,  with  despatches  for  the  Navy  Depart 
ment,  and  on  the  7th  the  country  was  thrilled  by  his 
laconic  announcement  of  his  magnificent  and  blood 
less  victory. 

Five  more  weeks  were  to  pass  before  a  detailed 
story  of  the  battle  was  received.  By  that  time  an 
army  was  on  its  way  across  the  Pacific  to  reap  for 
America  the  fruit  of  the  fleet's  great  achievement 
of  the  ist  of  May. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

THE    CUBAN    BLOCKADE,    MAY,    1898 

THE  course  of  events  in  the  chief  theatre  of  war 
during  the  months  of  May  and  June  may  be  thus 
briefly  summed  up : 

1.  Plans  for  the  immediate  invasion  of  Cuba, 
which  were  abandoned  or  postponed ;  the  blockade, 
meanwhile,  being  maintained  and  extended. 

2.  The  coming  of  Cervera's  fleet,  and  the  move 
ments  of  the  squadrons  under  Sampson  and  Schley 
to  intercept  it. 

3.  The    "bottling"    of    Cervera    at    Santiago, 
which  thereupon  became  the  centre  of  naval  and 
military  operations,  and  the  scene  of  the  chief  sea 
fight  and  the  only  land  battle  of  the  war. 

The  first  army  of  invasion  was  formed  by  mov 
ing  men  from  Camp  Thomas,  at  Chickamauga,  to 
Tampa,  where  in  the  early  days  of  May  a  corps  was 
organized,  designated  as  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  com 
manded  by  General  William  R.  Shafter — a  briga 
dier  in  the  regular  army,*  appointed  a  major-gen 
eral  of  volunteers.  On  May  2d  it  was  decided,  at 
a  White  House  conference — in  which  General  Miles 
and  Admiral  Sicard  took  part,  as  well  as  the  Presi 
dent  and  Secretaries  Alger  and  Long — to  move 
forty  or  fifty  thousand  men  to  some  point  near  Ha 
vana,  and  attack  or  besiege  the  capital  on  the  land 

*  The  general  officers  of  the  regular  army,  just  before  the  war,  were 
Major-Generals  Miles  (commanding  the  army),  Merritt,  and  Brooke; 
Brigadier-Generals ,  Otis,  Coppinger,  Shafter,  Graham,  Wade,  and 
Merriam ;  and  the  heads  of  the  staff  bureaus,  Brigadier-Generals 
Greely  (chief  signal  officer),  Breckinridge  (inspector-general),  Flagler 

145 


146 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


side.  On  May  Qth  Shafter  was  instructed  by  Sec 
retary  Alger  to  "  move  his  command,  under  pro 
tection  of  navy,  and  seize  and  hold  Mariel,  or  most 
important  point  on  north  coast  of  Cuba  and  where 
territory  is  ample  to  land  and  deploy  army." 

Mariel  is  twenty-six  miles  from  Havana,  and  is 
the  nearest  harbour  west  of  the  city.  General 
Wade,  in  command  at  Tampa,  was  to  send  reinforce 
ments  as  fast  as  they  could  be  brought  from  Chicka- 
mauga  and  other  points.  He  was  directed  to  "  have 
troops  fully  equipped ;  send  abundance  of  ammuni 
tion,  and  ship  with  them  food  for  men  and  animals 
for  sixty  days,  to  be  followed  by  four  months'  sup 
plies." 

It  was  vastly  easier  to  issue  these  instructions 
than  to  execute  them.  There  was  a  great  deficiency 
of  ammunition  and  of  supplies  and  equipments  of 
all  sorts,  and  on  the  loth  orders  came  from  Wash 
ington  to  defer  sailing  until  May  i6th.  Meanwhile, 
to  get  the  army  in  motion,  twelve  thousand  men 
were  to  be  transported  from  Tampa  to  Key  West, 
as  a  halfway  station  on  the  route  to  Cuba.  This 


(chief  of  ordnance),  Sternberg  (surgeon-general),  Lieber  (judge-advo 
cate-general),  Stanton  (paymaster-general),  Wilson  (chief  of  engi 
neers),  Ludington  (quartermaster-general),  Corbin  (adjutant-general), 
and  Eagan  (commissary-general). 

The  following  army  corps  were  organized  during  the  war  : 


CORPS. 

Commander. 

Where  organized. 

Strength, 
June  soth. 

First  .  . 
Third  . 
Second 
Fourth 
Fifth.. 
Sixth  . 

Major-General  Brooke   ) 
Major-General  Wade     j  '  ' 
Major-General  Graham  .  .  . 
Major-General  Coppinger  . 
Major-General  Shafter  .... 
Major-Genera]  Wilson 

Camp  Thomas. 

Camp  Alger.  .  .  . 
Mobile  
Tampa  

58,548 

23.5H 
20,816 
15,736 

Seventh 

Major-General  Lee  

Tampa  (moved 

19,156 

Eighth  .  .  . 

Major-General  Merritt  .  

to  Jacksonville) 
San      Francisco 
and  Manila. 

22,989 

The  Sixth  Corps  was  never  organized ;   General  Wilson  was  as 
signed  to  command  a  division  of  the  First  Corps. 


THE   CUBAN    BLOCKADE 


147 


also  was  speedily  found  to  be  impracticable,  as  there 
was  no  adequate  supply  of  water  on  the  island, 
and  nothing  had  been  done  to  provide  it. 

Finally  the  idea  of  attacking  Havana  with  a 
large  army  was  given  up,  and  Shafter  was  ordered 
to  take  five  thousand  men  for  a  "  reconnaissance  in 
force."  The  plan  was  to  effect  a  landing  on  the 
south  coast,  in  Santiago  or  Puerto  Principe  prov 
ince,  and  open  up  communications  with  Gomez; 
but  this,  too,  fell  through.  Besides  the  difficulty  of 
equipping  an  adequate  force,  the  wet  season  was 
beginning  in  Cuba,  with  its  terrible  menace  to  the 
health  of  unacclimated  invaders;  the  fortifications 
of  Havana  had  been  greatly  strengthened;  there 
was  risk  in  sending  transports  to  sea  while  there 
existed  the  possibility  of  an  attack  by  Cervera's 
fleet;  and  when  the  blockade  of  Santiago  ended 
this  latter  danger,  the  whole  plan  of  campaign  was 
changed. 

What  may  be  called  legalized  filibustering  ex 
peditions  were  a  feature  of  these  early  days  of 
the  war,  when  the  assistance  of  the 
Cuban  insurgents  was  valued  much 
more  highly  than  it  came  to  be  upon 
closer  acquaintance.  Official  relations  with  them 
were  first  opened  by  Lieutenant  A.  S.  Rowan,  of  the 
military  information  bureau.  Charged  with  mes 
sages  to  General  Calixto  Garcia,  the  exact  nature 
of  which  has  not  been  disclosed,  Lieutenant  Rowan 
was  ordered  to  Jamaica  early  in  April,  to  await 
the  inevitable  outbreak  of  war.  When  it  came,  he 
crossed  to  the  south  coast  of  Cuba  in  a  fishing 
smack,  in  company  with  agents  of  the  insurgent 
junta  in  Jamaica,  and  landed  between  .Santiago  and 
Cape  Cruz,  on  April  25th.  On  May  1st,  after  an 
arduous  journey  through  mountains  and  forests,  he 
met  Garcia  at  the  town  of  Bayamo,  which  had  just 
been  evacuated  by  its  Spanish  garrison  and  occu 
pied  by  the  insurgents.  He  delivered  his  de- 


148  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

spatches,  rode  on  across  the  province  of  Santiago, 
which  he  found  to  be  a  desolated  wilderness,  to  the 
north  coast,  and  on  the  5th  sailed  from  the  harbour 
of  Manati,  with  five  companions,  in  an  open  row- 
boat,,  which  was  so  small  that  its  occupants  were 
forced  to  sit  upright  with  their  provisions  between 
their  knees.  They  were  picked  up  by  a  Bahama 
sponging  steamer,  and  on  May  nth  Lieutenant 
Rowan's  adventurous  journey  ended  at  Key  West, 
whence  he  hurried  to  Washington  to  report. 

The  first  expedition  with  arms  and  supplies  for 
the  insurgents  had  left  Key  West  a  few  days  be 
fore,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  R.  H.  Hall,  of 
the  Fourth  Infantry.  Its  purpose  was  accom 
plished,  and  the  honour  of  being  the  first  American 
officer  to  set  foot  on  Cuban  soil  during  the  war  was 
^claimed  for  one  of  its  members,  Lieutenant  W.  M. 
Crofton,  of  the  First  Infantry ;  but  Lieutenant 
Rowan  would  seem  to  possess  a  prior  title  to  this 
particular  distinction. 

Another  expedition,  which  left  Key  West  May 
nth  on  the  transport  Gussie,  with  a  cargo  of  arms 
and  ammunition,  and  a  hundred  men  of  the  First 
Infantry,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  J.  H.  Dorst, 
was  less  successful.  At  Puerto  Cabanas  (about 
forty  miles  west  of  Havana),  where  she  attempted 
to  make  a  landing,  she  found  herself  confronted  by 
a  strong  force  of  Spaniards.  Even  with  the  assist 
ance  of  the  gunboats  Wasp  and  Manning,  the 
enemy  could  not  be  dislodged,  and  the  Gussie  had 
to  withdraw.  Much  of  the  blame  for  her  failure 
was  charged  to  the  newspapers,  which  had  openly 
advertised  the  starting  of  the  expedition  two  days 
before  it  sailed;  and  as  a  result,  the  military  censor 
ship  of  press  despatches  became  more  strict.* 

*  The  chief  signal  officer,  Brigadier-General  A.  W.  Greely,  speaks 
of  this  ' '  most  responsible  as  well  as  most  delicate  duty  "  in  his  annual 
report :  "  The  great  daily  journals  of  the  country  not  only  held  up  the 
hands  of  the  chief  signal  officer,  but  also  refrained  at  critical  times 


THE   CUBAN    BLOCKADE 


149 


No  news  was  published  of  an  expedition  which 
started  from  Tampa  a  week  later.  For  this  eight 
hundred  Cubans  had  been  recruited  —  an  ill- 
equipped,  undisciplined  regiment ;  so  undisciplined 
that  on  the  night  of  embarkation  nearly  half  of 
them  straggled  down  to  the  pier  too  late  for  their 
steamer,  the  Florida,  which  took  the  rest  to  the 
harbour  of  Banes,  on  the  north  coast  of  the  prov 
ince  of  Santiago. 

There  were  a  few  other  similar  expeditions,  but 
their  movements  were  kept  so  quiet  that  their  his 
tory  can  not  now  be  written  fully ;  and,  indeed,  it 
would  scarcely  be  worth  while  to  write  it,  as  they 
had  little  or  no  effect  upon  the  course  of  the  war. 
One  was  diverted  into  a  filibustering  attack  upon 
Santo  Domingo.*  What  was  probably  the  last 
went  from  Key  West  on  the  transports  Florida  and 
Fanita,  June  25th,  with  two  hundred  Cubans,  and 
fifty  coloured  troopers  of  the  Tenth  Cavalry, 
escorted  by  the  auxiliary  cruiser  Peoria.  After  an 
unsuccessful  attempt  to  land  near  Trinidad,  and 

from  publishing;  information  detrimental  to  the  public  interests.  All 
messages  to  the  West  Indies  were  carefully  supervised.  Through  the 
signal-corps  censorship  a  rich  harvest  of  information  was  gained  from 
the  telegrams  of  newspaper  correspondents,  blockade  runners,  personal 
despatches,  etc. 

"  While  hundreds  of  improper  messages  were  quietly  deposited  in 
the  waste-basket,  others  were  allowed  to  pass  freely  as  leading  up  to 
other  and  more  valuable  information." 

The  War  and  Navy  Departments,  of  course,  were  from  the  first 
very  sparing  of  information  for  the  press,  and  on  April  2qth  Secretary 
Alger  issued  an  order  absolutely  forbidding  his  subordinates  to  answer 
any  questions  from  reporters.  The  New  York  Sun  said  on  May  ist : 
"  The  system  inaugurated  yesterday  is  more  stringent  than  a  press  cen 
sorship.  A  query  in  regard  to  the  most  inconsequential  matter  con 
nected  with  the  routine  work  of  the  department  was  treated  in  the 
same  way  as  a  query  in  reference  to  the  next  important  strategic  move  ; 
a  refusal  to  answer  w.is  given  in  all  cases.  The  department  believes 
that  some  recent  publications  have  caused  embarrassment  to  the  plans 
of  the  Government  in  its  campaign  against  Spain." 

*  Commander  Clover,  of  the  Bancroft,  reported  overhauling  this 
expedition,  on  board  the  Fanita,  off  Key  West,  on  May  2yth,  and 
allowing  it  to  proceed,  not  without  some  misgiving  as  to  its  purpose. 
Its  leader  was  a  "General  Rodriguez,"  who  seems  to  have  been  the 
Dominican  revolutionist  Timinez.  A  full  account  of  the  incident  was 
published  in  the  New  York  Herald,  August  6,  1899. 


ISO 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


another  at  Tunas,  a  little  farther  east — where  the 
Cubans  were  repulsed  with  some  loss  by  a  Spanish 
detachment — the  men  were  put  ashore  at  Palo  Alto, 
in  Puerto  Principe  province,  and  joined  Maximo 
Gomez,  who,  according  to  the  story  told  by  a  vol 
unteer  member  of  the  expedition,  gave  them  a 
somewhat  chilly  reception,  declaring  that  he  needed 
arms  and  supplies,  not  recruits.  During  July  they 
took  part  in  some  minor  engagements  with  the 
Cuban  general's  nephew,  Miguel  Gomez,  who  hor 
rified  his  American  allies  by  shooting  prisoners  and 
looting  a  captured  town  (Arroyo  Blanco).  At  the 
close  of  the  war,  after  suffering  much  hardship, 
they  made  their  way  to  the  north  coast. 

It  was  naturally  desired  that  the  Cuban  coast 
should  be  more  effectively  patrolled,  but  during  the 

month  of  May,  with  the  limited  num- 
in  May°C  ^er  °^  sm'ps  available,  it  was  not 

found  possible  to  watch  any  ports 
except  those  covered  by  the  proclamation  of  April 
2 1  st.  Indeed,  it  was  not  until  the  end  of  June, 
when  Sampson's  fleet  had  grown  from  twenty  ves 
sels  to  almost  a  hundred,  that  an  extension  of  the 
blockade  was  declared.  The  whole  coast  of  Cuba 
was  a  line  of  two  thousand  miles — "  greater  in  ex 
tent,"  as  Sampson  said,  "  than  that  patrolled  by 
nearly  six  hundred  ships  during  the  civil  war,  and 
one  in  many  respects  offering  greater  difficulties." 
To  watch  even  a  small  part  of  it  was  a  tedious  and 
exhausting  service  for  the  American  ships  and 
sailors,  without  many  exciting  incidents. 

Sampson's  bombardment  of  the  Matanzas  bat 
teries  (April  27th),  already  chronicled,  was  followed 
by  a  series  of  small  brushes  with  the  enemy,  the 
first  occurring  two  days  later  off  Cienfuegos.  At 
this  point,  owing  to  its  distance  from  a  coaling  base 
(it  is  six  hundred  miles  from  Key  West  by  way  of 
Cape  San  Antonio),  and  to  Sampson's  lack  of  ships, 
it  was  impossible,  in  the  early  weeks  of  the  war,  to 


THE   CUBAN    BLOCKADE  151 

maintain  a  strict  blockade.  The  first  American 
ships  to  appear  there  were  the  cruiser  Marblehead, 
the  gunboat  Nashville,  and  the  converted  yacht 
Eagle,  on  April  29th.  Sampson  had  detached  this 
little  squadron,  whose  senior  officer  was  Com 
mander  McCalla,  of  the  Marblehead,  with  orders  to 
intercept  two  Spanish  transports  which  had  been 
reported  as  bound  for  Cienfuegos.  Unfortunately 
the  Marblehead  and  the  Eagle  ran  aground,  losing 
twelve  hours ;  and  McCalla  was  too  late  to  catch 
the  intended  prizes.  He  was  off  the  port,  and  had 
captured  the  coasting  steamer  Argonauta,  when  the 
torpedo  boat  Gallicia  and  two  other  small  armed 
vessels  came  out  and  fired  on  the  Eagle,  seconded 
by  batteries  on  shore.  The  American  ships  replied 
in  kind,  and  drove  the  Spaniards  off,  disabling  the 
Gallicia,  which  limped  back  into  port  with  a  shot 
through  her  boilers.  Immediately  after  the  brief 
engagement  McCalla  was  obliged  to  withdraw,  as 
his  coal  was  running  low. 

On  the  same  day  the  New  York  fired  upon  forts 
and  a  company  of  cavalry  at  Puerto  Cabanas,  the 
scene  of  the  Gussie's  repulse.  The  Spaniards  main 
tained  a  cavalry  patrol  along  many  parts  of  the 
blockaded  coast,  and  on  May  2d  the  gunboat  Wil 
mington  and  the  torpedo  boat  Ericsson  had  some 
target  practice  of  the  same  sort.  On  the  6th  and 
7th  the  torpedo  boats  Dupont  and  Winslow  and 
the  yacht  Hornet  fired  upon  the  shore  batteries  near 
Matanzas,  where  the  Spanish  engineers  had  re 
sumed  work  since  Sampson's  visit.  On  the  7th  the 
gunboat  Vicksburg  and  the  revenue  cutter  Morrill 
chased  a  schooner  under  the  Havana  fortifications 
and  exchanged  shots  with  them. 

The  most  serious  engagements  of  the  blockade, 
and  the  first  in  which  American  lives  were  lost, 
were  fought  on  May  nth,  at  Cardenas  and  Cien 
fuegos.  At  the  former  port — which  lies  on  one  of 
those  deep  indentations  so  characteristic  of  the 


152 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 


Cuban  coast,  with  an  entrance  barred  by  a  chain 
of  keys — were  three  Spanish  gunboats,  which  con 
stantly  showed  themselves  at  the  mouth  of  the  har 
bour,  and  one  day  repelled  an  attack 
The  fight  at  car-  ,  h  torpedo  boat  Foote.  Early  on 

denas,  May  n.          /  .    ,  _.  .         J     . 

the  morning  of  May  nth,  when  the 
gunboats  Machias  and  Wilmington,  the  revenue 
cutter  Hudson,  and  the  torpedo  boat  Winslow  were 
off  the  port,  Commander  Merry,  of  the  Machias,  the 
senior  officer  present,  after  a  consultation  with 
Commander  Todd,  of  the  Wilmington,  ordered  an 
attack,  in  hope  of  capturing  the  daring  Spaniards. 

The  bay  of  Cardenas  is  shallow,  and  the  main 
entrance  was  believed  to  be  laid  with  mines  oper 
ated  from  a  station  on  Diana  Key,  one  of  the  ob 
structing  islands.  The  Machias  stayed  outside  to 
attack  this  point,  while  the  three  other  vessels 
picked  their  way  into  the  harbour  by  another  chan 
nel  through  the  keys,  and  moved  across  the  wide 
bay  toward  the  town.  The  Winslow,  leading  the 
way,  was  within  a  mile  of  the  wharves,  which  were 
lined  with  small  craft,  when  a  hot  fire  suddenly 
opened  upon  her,  apparently  coming  from  a  battery 
at  the  water's  edge,  as  well  as  from  the  Spanish 
gunboats.  She  made  a  spirited  reply  with  her  puny 
armament  of  three  one-pounder  rapid-fire  guns, 
and  the  Wilmington  and  Hudson  joined  in  the 
bombardment,  doing  serious  damage  to  the  enemy's 
vessels  and  some  to  the  town,  but  failing  to  silence 
the  Spaniards'  fire,  which  was  concentrated  on  the 
Winslow,  and  fairly  riddled  her.  One  of  her  en 
gines  was  struck  and  injured,  her  steering  gear  was 
shot  away,  a  shell  exploded  in  one  of  her  boilers, 
another  started  a  fire  in  her  paint  room,  and  an 
other  disabled  one  of  her  guns ;  and  she  was  drift 
ing  helplessly  toward  the  shore  when  her  com 
manding  officer,  Lieutenant  J.  B.  Bernadou,  sig 
nalled  for  help,  and  the  Hudson  steamed  up  to  tow 
her  out  of  her  imminent  peril.  Lieutenant  Berna- 


THE   CUBAN   BLOCKADE 


153 


dou  had  been  wounded  in  the  thigh  by  a  splinter, 
but  had  stuck  to  his  post,  stopping  the  How  of 
blood  by  means  of  a  tourniquet  improvised  with 
a  towel  and  an  empty  shell  case. 

A  line  was  thrown  from  the  Hudson  to  the 
Winslow,  but  fell  short.  At  the  second  attempt,  as 
the  torpedo-boat's  crew  stood  ready  to  grasp  the 
rope,  a  shell  exploded  among  a  group  of  them, 
instantly  killing  the  second  officer,  Ensign  Bagley, 
and  two  seamen,  and  mortally  wounding  two 
others.  Ensign  Bagley,  a  very  promising  young 
North  Carolinian,  was  the  only  officer  of  the  United 
States  navy  killed  in  action  during  the  war.  Finally 
the  line  was  made  fast,  and  the  Winslow  was  taken 
out  of  the  bay  and  to  Key  West. 

The  skirmish  at  Cardenas,  which  was  more  like 
a  defeat  than  anything  else  that  the  American  arms 
encountered  during  the  war,  showed  that  to  pit 
such  unprotected  vessels  as  torpedo  boats  against 
even  mediocre  shore  batteries  may  be  magnificent, 
but  is  not  war.  Even  for  the  routine  work  of  the 
blockade  these  frail  craft  were  ill  adapted,  and 
probably  they  would  not  have  been  ordered  to  this 
duty  but  for  the  urgent  need  of  all  the  ships  that 
could  be  mustered  into  service.  They  are,  of 
course,  designed  for  a  special  purpose,  armament, 
protection,  and  seagoing  ability  being  sacrificed  to 
the  power  to  make  a  lightninglike  dash  at  the 
enemy  in  battle.  Of  their  condition  after  the  four 
months'  campaign  Engineer-in-Chief  Melville  said 
in  his  official  report :  "  Nearly  every  one  has  had 
some  accident,  and  the  machinery  of  some  at  the 
close  of  the  war  was  in  a  condition  that  can  only 
be  described  as  horrible." 

It  has  been  charged,  or  at  least  hinted,  that  in 
taking  the  Winslow  so  close  to  an  enemy  whose 
strength  was  imperfectly  known,  Lieutenant  Ber- 
nadou  was  guilty  of  the  rashness  to  which  young 
commanders  are  naturally  prone.  The  charge  is 


JEJ4  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

answered,  as  far  as  the  lieutenant  is  concerned,  by 
the  fact  that  he  was  acting  throughout  under  the 
orders  of  superior  officers. 

As  it  was,  the  American  loss — five  killed  and 
three  wounded — was  small,  and  the  Winslow's  in 
juries,  though  numerous,  were  so  slight  that  she 
was  ready  for  sea  again  a  few  hours  after  reaching 
Key  West.  The  Spaniards,  on  the  other  hand,  had 
suffered  considerably.  They  reported  one  of  their 
gunboats,  the  Antonio  Lopez,  a  total  wreck,  and 
much  damage  along  the  water  front  of  the  town. 
The  Machias,  moreover,  had  shelled  and  demol 
ished  the  station  on  Diana  Key.  A  boat's  crew, 
commanded  by  Ensign  A.  L.  Willard,  went  ashore 
on  the  key  and  hoisted  the  Stars  and  Stripes  above 
the  Spanish  barracks — the  first  appearance  of  the 
American  flag  as  an  emblem  of  conquest  on  Cuban 
soil. 

On  the  same  day,  soon  after  sunrise,  four  boats — 
the  steam  and  sailing  launches  of  the  Marblehead  and 
the  Nashville,  commanded  by  Lieu- 

tCnant    Winsl°W>    °f    the    latter    VeSSel> 

May ii  a  son  °f  Captain  Winslow  of  the  old 

Kearsarge — made  a  daring  and  partly 
successful  attempt  to  cut  the  telegraph  cables  that 
connected  Cienfuegos  with  Havana  and  with  Eu 
rope.  For  more  than  three  hours  the  boats'  crews 
grappled  for  the  submarine  wires,  going  within 
sixty  feet  of  the  beach,  in  a  heavy  sea,  and  work 
ing  with  the  utmost  coolness  under  a  constant  rifle 
fire  from  troops  on  shore.  Two  lines  were  brought 
up  and  cut,  and  another  small  one  had  been  found 
when  the  Spanish  fire  became  so  heavy  that  Lieu 
tenant  Winslow,  who  had  been  shot  through  the 
hand,  was  obliged  to  order  the  launches  to  with 
draw  from  their  perilous  position.  The  Marble- 
head  and  the  Nashville,  together  with  the  revenue 
cutter  Windom,  though  they  had  not  been  able  to 
drive  the  Spaniards  from  their  cover  on  the  beach, 


THE   CUBAN    BLOCKADE 


155 


had  wrecked  the  cable  station ;  and  as  the  boats  had 
been  fired  on  from  the  lighthouse  at  the  harbour 
mouth,  it  was  also  demolished.  The  Eagle,  mean 
while,  destroyed  an  outlying  lighthouse  (Piedras 
Key)  and  lightship  (Diego  Perez  Island),  and  sent 
ashore  their  keepers — who  had  not  been  paid  for 
months,  and  in  one  case  had  had  no  food  for  three 
days.  The  American  loss  in  the  launches  was 
twelve  men  wounded,  of  whom  two  died. 

The  severing  of  the  ocean  cables  landing  in 
Cuba  was  part  of  the  plan  for  a  complete  blockade 
of  the  island.*  A  specially  fitted  steamer,  the  Adria, 
was  commissioned  for  this  difficult  and  frequently 
dangerous  work,  but  she  proved  a  failure.  Better 
results  were  gained  by  the  St.  Louis  and  the  Wom- 
patuck.  The  big  liner  and  her  small  consort,  a  tug 
bought  from  the  Standard  Oil  Company,  had  little 
equipment  for  fighting,  but  Captain  Goodrich  and 
Lieutenant  Jungen,  their  commanding  officers,  on 
May  1 8th  took  them  under  the  batteries  at  the 
mouth  of  the  harbour  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  and 
severed  the  cable  running  to  Jamaica.  On  the  fol 
lowing  day  they  were  repulsed  in  an  attempt  to 
cut  the  French  line  near  its  landing  at  Guanta- 
namo ;  but  on  the  2oth  Captain  Goodrich  found  and 
broke  it  off  the  Haitian  coast,  f  and  a  few  days  later 
he  reported  to  the  Navy  Department  his  belief  that 


*  This  step  was  decided  upon  only  after  much  hesitation  in  Wash 
ington.  Sampson's  first  orders  were  to  cut  no  cables,  and  on  April 
27th  Secretary  Long:  telegraphed  :  "  We  are  considering  the  advantage 
of  declaring  telegraph  cables  neutral."  Three  days  later,  when  it  was 
known  that  Cervera  had  sailed  from  the  Cape  Verde  Islands,  Sampson 
was  authorized  to  destroy  the  cables  on  the  south  coast  of  Cuba.  Of 
course  it  was  unnecessary  to  cut  those  that  ran  northward  to  the 
United  States 

f  It  was  claimed  by  the  Spaniards — and  correctly,  it  appears — that 
this  was  a  breach  of  international  law.  A  neutral  cable  within  the 
enemy's  territorial  waters  must  take  the  chances  of  war ;  in  neutral 
waters,  or  in  the  high  seas,  it  is  protected  by  the  rights  of  neutrals 
(The  Spanish- American  War,  by  Captain  Severe  Gomez  Nunez,  trans 
lated  and  published  by  the  United  States  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence, 
page  58). 

II 


I56 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 


"  the  island  of  Cuba  is  now  isolated,  telegraphically 
speaking."  This  same  announcement  was  made 
more  than  once,  but  always  prematurely,*  for  when 
Santiago  fell  it  still  had  its  cables  to  Havana  and 
Madrid.  It  was  fortunate  for  the  American  forces, 
and  perhaps  for  the  Spaniards,  too,  that  such  was 
the  case,  for  these  wires  carried  to  Cervera  the 
orders  that  sent  his  squadron  from  its  stronghold  in 
Santiago  harbour  to  destruction  under  Sampson's 
guns,  precipitating  the  fall  of  the  Cuban  city  and 
bringing  near  the  end  of  the  war. 


*  The  mistake  may  have  been  due  to  the  fact  (reported  by  Admiral 
Sampson,  July  igth)  that  the  Spaniards  had  laid  dummy  cables,  so 
that  it  was  almost  impossible  to  know  when  a  "live  wire"  had  been 
cut. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE    COMING    OF    CERVERA 

MEANWHILE,  in  the  early  days  of  May,  the 
situation  in  the  West  Indies  was  changed  by  the 
appearance  of  Cervera's  fleet  as  a  factor — indeed,  as 
the  central  factor — in  the  campaign.  Although  its 
strength  was  small  in  comparison  with  the  whole 
American  naval  force  in  the  Atlantic,  the  Spanish 
squadron  was  powerful  enough,  with  Sampson's 
ships  scattered  in  Cuban  waters,  and  a  long  stretch 
of  scantily  protected  coast  before  it,  to  threaten 
grave  danger  at  almost  any  point  at  which  it  might 
strike.  To  insure  the  command  of  the  sea,  and  to 
make  feasible  the  invasion  of  Cuba,  it  must  be  met 
and  vanquished. 

Cervera's  departure  from  St.  Vincent  on  April 
29th  with  the  four  cruisers,  Maria  Teresa  (flagship ; 
Captain  Concas),  Cristobal  Colon  (Captain  Moreu), 
Vizcaya  (Captain  Eulate),  and  Almirante  Oquendo 
(Captain  Lagaza),  and  the  three  torpedo-boat  de 
stroyers,  Furor  (flagship  of  Captain  Villamil,  com 
manding  the  flotilla ;  the  Furor  commanded  by 
Lieutenant  Carlier),  Pluton  (Lieutenant  Vazquez), 
and  Terror  (Lieutenant  de  la  Rocha),  was  re 
ported  to  the  Navy  Department  on  the  same 
day.  Secretary  Long  immediately  informed  Samp 
son  that  the  Spanish  fleet  had  sailed  westward, 
probably  for  Cuba,  but  possibly  to  strike  at  the 
coast  of  the  United  States  or  to  intercept  the 
Oregon.  With  equal  promptitude  he  despatched 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


the  Harvard  and  St.  Louis,  which  were  at  New 
York,  waiting  for  orders,  to  cruise  off  Martinique 
and  Guadeloupe  to  watch  for  the  Spaniards  and 
cable  the  earliest  news  of  their  movements.  Two 
days  later  (May  ist)  another  of  the  American  liners, 
the  Yale,  was  sent  out  to  circle  about  Porto  Rico. 
It  was  not  thought  likely  that  Cervera  would  make 
direct  for  Cuba  without  calling  at  some  of  the  in 
tervening  islands,  either  for  coal,  for  communica 
tion  with  Madrid,  or  for  news  of  the  military  situa 
tion  ;  and  it  was  fully  expected  that  one  of  these 
speedy  scouts  would  be  able  to  give  ample  warn 
ing  of  his  approach. 

Behind  this  first  line  of  the  American  naval  de 
fences  was  Sampson's  fleet,  which  was  now  called 
upon  to  present  a  double  front  to  the  enemy.  To 
meet  the  emergency  it  was  divided  into  two  bodies. 
With  the  most  powerful  fighting  ships  the  admiral 
faced  westward  to  meet  Cervera,  leaving  Commo 
dore  Watson  *  to  maintain  the  blockade  with  a 
squadron  consisting  mainly  of  auxiliaries  and 
"  mosquito  "  craft.  A  thousand  miles  to  the  north, 
at  Hampton  Roads,  the  central  point  of  the  eastern 
coast,  was  Schley,  with  the  Flying  Squadron,  ready 
to  sally  forth  against  the  Spaniards  if  they  should 
make  any  attempt  to  strike  at  American  seaports. 

It  was  calculated  that  Cervera  would  reach  West 

Indian  waters  about   May  8th  —  a   reckoning  that 

proved  to  be  based  upon  an  overesti- 

sampson  moves   mate  Qf  his  SqUaciron's  speed.     Dur- 

ing  the  first  three  days  of  the  month 
Sampson  was  at  Key  West  with  his 
flagship,  the  New  York,  and  his  two  battle  ships, 
the  Iowa  and  Indiana,  taking  on  coal  and  supplies 
and  making  preparations  for  the  expected  fight.  In 

*  To  relieve  Admiral  Sampson  of  part  of  his  tremendous  burden  of 
work  and  responsibility,  Commodore  J.  Crittenden  Watson,  who  had 
been  serving  as  governor  of  the  United  States  Naval  Home,  was  ap 
pointed  (May  6th)  to  command  the  blockading  squadron,  under  the 


THE  COMING  OF  CERVERA 


159 


the  early  morning  of  the  4th  the  three  great  war 
ships  slipped  out  singly,  to  rendezvous  a  few  hours 
later  at  Juruco  Cove,  a  dozen  miles  east  of  Havana. 
The  small  cruiser  Detroit  also  met  them  here,  and 
the  four  vessels  steamed  eastward  toward  San  Juan, 
Porto  Rico,  which  both  Sampson  and  the  Navy 
Department  regarded  as  the  admiral's  probable 
meeting  place  with  the  Spaniards.  On  their  way, 
in  the  Nicholas  Channel,  they  picked  up  the  moni 
tors  Terror  and  Amphitrite,  the  small  cruiser 
Montgomery,  the  torpedo  boat  Porter,  the  tug 
Wompatuck,  and  the  collier  Niagara.  It  was  a 
heavily  armed  but  not  a  swiftly  moving  squadron. 
It  could,  of  course,  go  no  faster  than  its  slowest 
vessels,  and  the  monitors  were  credited,  at  their 
best  pace,  with  only  ten  knots  an  hour.  Every  one 
of  Cervera's  vessels  was  rated  at  fully  twice  that 
speed.  That  a  slow  fleet  should  set  out  in  search 
of  a  swift  one  was  an  anomaly  which  the  Navy 
Department  would  doubtless  have  avoided  had  it 
been  possible.  Had  the  United  States  possessed 
only  two  or  three  more  battle  ships  or  good  ar 
moured  cruisers,  it  would  not  have  been  necessary 
to  undertake  an  offensive  movement  with  vessels 
designed,  as  the  monitors  were,  for  coast  defence. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Sampson  could  not  make 
anything  like  ten  knots  an  hour,  even  by  taking  the 
monitors  in  tow  of  the  New  York  and  the  Iowa. 
He  had  expected  to  reach  San  Juan  in  five  days' 
steaming;  it  took  him  more  than  seven.  On  his 
way  (May  6th)  he  sent  the  Montgomery  in  to  Cape 
Haitien,  on  the  north  coast  of  Haiti,  where  she 
found  a  despatch  from  Secretary  Long : 

admiral's  orders.  His  "broad  pennant"  was  hoisted  successively  on 
the  Cincinnati,  the  Dolphin,  and  other  vessels.  At  the  same  time 
Commodore  George  C.  Remey  was  sent  from  the  Portsmouth  (New 
Hampshire)  navy  yard  to  take  charge  of  the  station  at  Key  West,  the 
great  naval  base  of  the  war.  Later  (June  2ist)  his  command  was  ex 
tended  to  include  "  all  vessels  within  signalling  distance  " — being  still, 
of  course,  subordinate  to  Sampson. 


!6o  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Do  not  risk  so  crippling  your  vessels  against  fortifica 
tions  as  to  prevent  trom  soon  afterward  successfully 
righting  Spanish  fleet,  composed  of  Pelayo,  Carlos  V,* 
Oquendo,  Vizcaya,  Maria  Teresa,  Cristobal  Colon,  four 
deep-sea  torpedo  boats,  if  they  should  appear  on  this  side. 

Sampson  replied  with  a  request  that  the  Ameri 
can  liners  should  be  ordered  to  meet  him  at  St. 
Thomas.  "  Lacking  the  services  of  these  vessels," 
he  told  the  Navy  Department,  "  I  will  have  to  re 
turn  to  the  west  immediately.  I  shall  await  answer 
to  this  request  at  Cape  Haitien,  and  if  granted  I 
will  proceed  to  San  Juan,  probably  destroying  for 
tifications,  establishing  a  temporary  base  at  Culebra 
Island,  to  the  east  of  Porto  Rico,  as  entrance  to  San 
Juan  is  obstructed."  f 

Secretary  Long  replied  that  the  scouts  had  been 
ordered  to  St.  Thomas  to  await  Sampson's  instruc 
tions,  and  on  May  nth  the  squadron  left  Cape  Hai 
tien,  moving  slowly  eastward,  and  sighting  the 
lights  of  San  Juan  at  three  o'clock  the  next  morn 
ing.  At  half  past  three  breakfast  was  served ;  at 
four  "  all  hands  "  was  sounded  for  the  final  clearing 
for  action.  All  this  time  the  ships  were  slowly  mov 
ing  in  toward  the  sleeping  city.  "  One  who  was 
there,"  said  a  correspondent  who  was  with  the  fleet, 
"  knows  how  the  tiger  feels  as  it  creeps  up  on  its 
prey." 

The  harbour  of  San  Juan  is  a  wide  bay  sheltered 
from  the  Atlantic  by  a  long,  narrow  island,  which 
at  its  eastern  end  approaches  the  mainland  of  Porto 
Rico  so  closely  that  it  is  practically  a  peninsula. 
The  city,  a  place  of  about  thirty  thousand  people, 
lies  at  the  western  end  of  the  island,  facing  toward 

*  The  whereabouts  of  the  Spanish  battle  ships  Pelayo  and  Empera- 
dor  Carlos  V  was  not  positively  known  at  this  date.  It  was  several 
times  reported  that  they  had  sailed  or  were  about  to  sail  for  American 
waters.  Secretary  Lone:  was  stating  Cervera's  squadron  at  its  maxi 
mum  of  possible  strength. 

f  Admiral  Sampson  had  been  notified  by  Secretary  Long  (April 
2gth)  of  a  reoort,  which  seems  to  have  been  correct,  that  the  Spaniards 
had  sunk  hulks  loaded  with  stones  at  the  entrance  of  San  Juan  harbour. 


THE  COMING  OF  CERVERA        161 

the  bay,  and  partly  screened  from  the  ocean  by  a 
ridge  of  high  ground  that  rises  abruptly  along  the 
beach  some  sixty  feet  above  high  tide.  On  the 
westernmost  point  of  the  ridge,  directly  overlooking 
the  harbour  entrance,  stands  the  Morro  Castle,  an 
extensive  but  antiquated  stone  fortress.  The  other 
gate-post  of  the  harbour  is  Cabras  Island,  and  just 
inside  of  this  is  Fort  Canuelo,  a  small  work  built 
on  a  sand  bar. 

Admiral  Sampson  had  carefully  formulated  his 

plan  of  attack,  and  had  sent  detailed  instructions, 

in  writing,  to  each  of  his  captains  on 

Bombardment  the  previous  day>  His  fiye  armoUr- 
of  San  Juan,  111  1  •  i  111  1 

May  I2>  clads  advanced  in  column,  led  by  the 

Iowa,  the  most  powerful  vessel  in  the 
fleet,  to  which  the  admiral,  in  expectation  of  heavy 
fighting,  had  temporarily  transferred  his  flag.  The 
Indiana,  the  New  York,  the  Amphitrite,  and  the 
Terror  followed  in  order.  In  advance  of  all,  a  thou 
sand  yards  ahead  of  the  Iowa,  the  Detroit  sounded 
her  way  across  the  harbour  mouth  and  under  the 
Morro,  with  orders  to  signal  when  she  found  the 
water  shoaling  to  ten  fathoms.  Five  hundred  yards 
to  starboard  of  the  column,  the  little  Wompatuck 
steamed  inshore,  off  Cabras  Island,  to  anchor  a  boat 
at  the  ten-fathom  mark — this  to  serve  as  a  "  turning 
stake  "  for  the  steersmen  of  the  fighting  ships  when 
shore  marks  might  be  hidden  by  smoke.  The 
Montgomery,  bringing  up  the  rear  of  the  squadron, 
was  instructed  to  take  her  station  east  of  the  har 
bour  entrance  and  silence  Fort  Canuelo  if  its  guns 
were  fired.  Both  the  small  cruisers,  and  the  Por 
ter — which  came  up  close  alongside  of  the  Iowa, 
screened  by  the  big  battle  ship — were  to  watch  for 
any  of  Cervera's  vessels  that  might  sally  out  of  the 
bay.  If  one  of  the  Spanish  torpedo-boat  destroyers 
should  make  a  dash  at  Sampson's  ironclads,  the  De 
troit  and  the  Montgomery  were  to  sink  it  or  drive  it 
back ;  if  a  cruiser  should  come  out,  the  Porter  was 


* 
j62  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

to  rush  in  and  torpedo  it — at  the  imminent  risk,  of 
course,  of  her  own  destruction. 

At  sixteen  minutes  past  five,  when  the  Iowa  was 
about  a  mile  and  a  quarter  from  the  Morro,  now 
clearly  visible  in  the  dawning  light,  with  the  De 
troit  halfway  between  the  flagship  and  the  shore, 
the  first  shot  of  the  action  was  fired  from  a  six- 
inch  gun  in  the  battle  ship's  bows,  and  her  whole 
starboard  battery  immediately  followed  it  up.  She 
was  now  opposite  the  mouth  of  the  bay,  and  the 
officers  on  her  deck — all  the  American  officers 
scorned  the  protection  of  the  conning  towers — 
could  see,  to  their  great  disappointment,  that  Cer- 
vera's  squadron  was  not  inside.  No  Spanish  flags 
were  in  sight  in  the  harbour  or  on  the  fortifications, 
and  the  garrison  was  apparently  taken  wholly  by 
surprise.  Eight  minutes  passed  before  there  was 
any  reply  to  the  attack ;  then  the  old  muzzle-loading 
guns  in  the  Morro  opened  fire,  seconded  by  the 
more  formidable  weapons — six-inch  Krupp  guns — 
in  some  newly  built  batteries  farther  east  on  the 
shore  bluff. 

In  the  absence  of  Cervera's  fleet,  Sampson's  ex 
pedition  had  failed  of  its  main  purpose,  but  he  did 
not  countermand  his  orders  for  an  attack  upon  the 
San  Juan  batteries.  To  use  the  words  of  his  report 
to  the  Navy  Department,  he  had  determined  "  to 
develop  their  position  and  strength,  and  then,  with 
out  waiting  to  reduce  the  city  or  subject  it  to  a 
regular  bombardment — which  would  require  due 
notice — turn  to  the  west,"  toward  Cuba  or  Key 
West. 

At  a  speed  of  four  knots  an  hour,  the  five  ar- 
mourclads  steamed  in  front  of  the  Morro,  each  ship 
pouring  in  her  full  fire  as  she  passed.  Then,  led 
by  the  Iowa,  the  column  turned  seaward  and  out 
of  range.  From  the  flagship's  opening  shot  to  the 
last  discharged  by  the  Terror,  the  first  round  of  the 
engagement  had  lasted  nearly  an  hour.  The  enemy 


164  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

had  not  suffered  severely;  although  the  breeze  was 
very  light,  there  was  a  long,  rolling  swell  that  made 
Sampson's  vessels,  especially  the  monitors,  poor 
gun  platforms,  and  the  American  gunners  scarcely 
got  the  proper  distance  and  elevation  in  their  brief 
turn  in  the  firing  line.  The  Spaniards'  marksman 
ship  was  very  much  worse  still,  and  not  a  ship  had 
been  touched,  though  the  three  small  vessels  in  par 
ticular  had  been  subject  to  a  heavy  fire  at  such  close 
range  that  the  admiral  was  alarmed  for  their  safety 
— especially  for  that  of  the  Detroit,  which  kept  her 
place  in  front  of  the  Morro.  After  the  first  round 
he  ordered  them  out  to  sea,  where  they  remained 
to  the  end  of  the  battle,  in  company  with  the  Wom- 
patuck,  the  collier  Niagara,  and  two  newspaper 
tugs.  These  last  had  accompanied  the  fleet  from 
Key  West — uninvited  and  not  wholly  welcome 
companions,  whose  presence  was  a  novel  feature  in 
naval  warfare. 

Circling  around  at  four  or  five  miles'  distance 
from  shore,  the  armourclads  passed  a  second  and 
then  a  third  time  before  the  fortifications,  which 
Sampson  found  to  be  much  stronger  than  he  had 
expected.  In  these  rounds,  using  the  heavy  guns 
only — their  gunners  had  complained  that  the  smoke 
from  the  rapid-fire  batteries  made  it  difficult  to 
aim — the  American  fire  was  much  more  accurate, 
while  the  enemy's  shooting  improved  little.  The 
Spaniards  scored  only  three  hits  in  the  three  hours' 
artillery  duel.  Two  shells  struck  the  Iowa,  one 
doing  no  damage,  the  other,  which  exploded  on  the 
battle  ship's  deck  as  she  withdrew  after  the  second 
round,  wounding  three  men ;  a  third  reached  the 
New  York  at  nearly  three  miles'  range,  as  the 
action  ended,  destroying  a  boat,  and  killing  one  and 
wounding  four  of  a  gun  crew. 

The  five  American  armourclads  fired,  in  all, 
eight  hundred  and  ninety-four  shells,  and  the  exe 
cution  they  did  was  considerable.  The  stone  walls 


THE   COMING   OF   CERVERA  165 

of  the  Morro  were  riddled,  and  during  the  latter 
part  of  the  battle  the  old  fortress  was  veiled  in  a 
cloud  of  dust  from  its  shattered  masonry,  as  well 
as  smoke  from  its  own  guns ;  yet  these  were  served 
to  the  last,  their  fire  diminishing  under  the  hail 
of  shot,  but  never  being  silenced.  As  the  fleet  with 
drew  they  sent  shells  after  it  almost  as  long  as  it 
was  in  sight.  Many  of  the  American  projectiles 
wasted  themselves  on  the  sea  wall  below  the  Morro, 
which  was  built  with  embrasures  that  made  it  look 
like  part  of  the  fort.  Many  others  passed  over  the 
batteries  into  the  town,  where  they  did  great  dam 
age.  This  bombardment  of  noncombatants,  with 
out  the  "  due  notice "  of  which  Sampson  had 
spoken,  must  be  set  down  as  one  of  the  shocking 
but  inevitable  incidents  of  war.  It  can  not  be 
termed  purely  an  accident,  for  the  Terror  deliber 
ately  fired  some  of  her  ten-inch  shells  over  the  bluff, 
"  hoping,"  Captain  Ludlow  said  in  his  official  re 
port,  "  to  strike  any  vessel  in  the  inner  harbour  "- 
which  would  scarcely  seem  to  have  been  necessary, 
when  it  was  known  that  Cervera's  ships  were  not 
there ;  and  missiles  fired  in  this  somewhat  random 
fashion  were  as  likely  to  fall  in  the  city  as  in  the 
port.  .  Of  twenty  persons  killed  in  San  Juan,  it  is 
stated  that  fourteen  were  civilians. 

At  a  quarter  to  eight  o'clock  Sampson  signalled 
"  Form  column,  course  northwest,"  and  the  fleet 
slowly  steamed  away  from  land,  reluctantly  ceasing 
its  fire  as  it  drew  out  of  range.  Its  last  shot  came 
from  the  after  turret  of  the  rear-guard  ship,  the 
Terror,  at  8. 1 5 ;  and  the  action  was  over,  though 
the  Spanish  gunners  continued  to  waste  their  am 
munition  for  a  quarter  of  an  hour. 

Viewed  as  the  sole  achievement  of  a  two-weeks' 
cruise  by  a  fairly  powerful  fleet,  the  bombardment 
of  San  Juan  was  a  disappointment.  Had  Cervera's 
squadron  been  there,  the  case  would  have  been 
entirely  different ;  and  Sampson,  of  course,  was  no 


1 66  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

whit  blamable  for  his  failure  to  encounter  the  Span 
iards  where  both  the  admiral  and  the  strategists  at 
Washington  had  expected  to  find  them.  In  itself, 
though  the  manoeuvres  of  the  attacking  fleet  were 
well  planned  and  efficiently  executed,  the  action  was 
resultless  and  indecisive.  It  gave  the  captain-gen 
eral  of  Porto  Rico,  Macias,  an  opportunity  to  issue 
one  of  the  usual  Spanish  bulletins,  optimistic  be 
yond  the  verge  of  mendacity,  declaring  that  his 
redoubtable  gunners  had  repulsed  the  Yankee 
ships. 

Sampson  could  no  doubt  have  forced  the  sur 
render  of  the  Porto  Rican  capital — not,  perhaps, 
without  loss — but  there  was  no  adequate  military 
advantage  to  be  gained  by  doing  so.  He  could  hold 
the  place  only  by  keeping  his  squadron  there,  leaving 
Havana  open  to  entry  by  a  force  as  strong  as  Cer- 
vera's.  As  it  was,  he  had  not  fulfilled  his  announced 
intention  of  destroying  the  fortifications.  His 
ships,  though  practically  unscathed  by  the  enemy's 
fire,  had  suffered  many  slight  injuries  from  the  con 
cussion  of  their  own  heavy  guns ;  the  Indiana's  en 
gines  were  out  of  order;  the  monitors  had  proved 
themselves  a  drag  upon  the  squadron's  move 
ments  ;  he  would  soon  be  in  need  of  coal ;  and  with 
no  clew  to  Cervera's  whereabouts  it  was  useless,  as 
well  as  scarcely  practicable,  to  prolong  the  cruise. 
That  afternoon  he  informed  Secretary  Long : 

Have  received  no  information  of  Spanish  armed  ves 
sels.  The  Spanish  fleet  is  not  here.  The  United  States 
fleet  in  great  need  of  repairs;  was  seven  days  from  Ha 
vana  to  San  Juan.  If  I  can  not  obtain  information  of  the 
Spanish  squadron  by  Yale  at  St.  Thomas,  I  will  leave  to 
morrow  for  blockade,  Cuba. 

This  despatch  was  cabled  to  Washington  from 
St.  Thomas  by  the  Yale,  which  fell  in  with  Samp 
son's  fleet  as  it  left  San  Juan.  She  had  been  on  her 
cruising  station  off  Porto  Rico  since  May  6th,  and 
had  several  times  reconnoitred  San  Juan  harbour, 


THE   COMING  OF   CERVERA  167 

where  she  had  observed  two  small  gunboats  and  a 
transport. 

There  was  no  news  of  Cervera  at  the  Danish 
island,  and  Sampson  moved  westward.  On  the 
I4th  he  was  off  Puerto  Plata,  in  Santo  Domingo, 
when  a  newspaper  despatch  boat  brought  him  the 
unexpected  report  that  Cervera,  instead  of  making 
for  American  waters,  had  taken  his  squadron  back 
to  Spain,  and  was  in  the  harbour  of  Cadiz.  The  ad 
miral  immediately  sent  the  Porter  speeding  into 
Puerto  Plata,  with  despatches  requesting  that  if  this 
latest  intelligence  were  confirmed,  the  Navy  De 
partment  should  send  a  collier  to  San  Juan,  and 
that  Commodore  Remey,  at  Key  West,  should 
order  the  dynamite  cruiser  Vesuvius  to  the  same 
rendezvous.  With  the  Spanish  fleet  out  of  the 
West  Indies,  he  had  resolved  to  return  to  the  Porto 
Rican  capital,  to  complete  his  work  there  and  cap 
ture  the  place.  But  Secretary  Long's  reply  in 
formed  him  that  the  elusive  squadron  had  at  length 
been  sighted,  and  ordered  him  to  "  proceed  with  all 
possible  despatch  to  Key  West." 

Cervera  left  St.  Vincent  with  orders  to  sail  for 
the  Antilles,  calling  at  some  neutral  port  for  in 
formation  ;  then  to  make  for  either 

Cuba  °r  P°rt°  Ric°>  aS  hi.S  "  skill>  dis~ 

cretion,  and  courage  "  might  suggest. 
Besides  the  poor  condition  of  some  of  his  ships,  he 
was  heavily  handicapped,  in  setting  forth  to  face  an 
enemy  whose  strength  was  greatly  superior  to  his 
own,  by  the  fact  that  no  adequate  provision  had 
been  made  for  furnishing  him  with  coal.  No  sup 
ply  ships  accompanied  his  fleet.  The  torpedo-boat 
destroyers,  with  their  small  coal  capacity,  were  de 
pendent  upon  the  cruisers.  A  British  steamer 
which  cleared  for  the  Cape  Verde  Islands  from 
Norfolk,  Virginia,  on  April  15,  with  three  thousand 
tons  of  coal,  may  have  been  intended  for  his  use, 
but  she  was  stopped  by  the  United  States  Govern- 


j68  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

ment  as  she  left  port.  About  the  time  of  his  start 
from  St.  Vincent  a  quantity  of  coal  was  purchased 
in  England  and  shipped  to  the  West  Indies  on 
three  British  ocean  tramps,  in  the  somewhat  vague 
hope  that  it  would  escape  the  American  blockaders 
and  reach  Cervera.  These  colliers  did  get  to  San 
Juan,  whence  one,  the  Restormel,  was  sent  on  to 
Curasao,  and  thence  to  Santiago  de  Cuba,  where 
it  was  captured  (May  25th)  by  the  St.  Paul, 
almost  within  gunshot  of  the  harbour  in  which 
the  Spanish  fleet  lay.  Another,  the  Twicken 
ham,  appeared  at  Martinique  with  four  thousand 
tons  of  coal  consigned  to  the  Spanish  consul.  Per 
mission  to  land  her  contraband  cargo  being  re 
fused,  she  sailed  for  Kingston,  Jamaica,  and  on  her 
way  was  captured  by  the  St.  Louis,  on  June  loth. 
Crossing  the  Atlantic  the  three  torpedo-boat 
destroyers  were  taken  in  tow  by  the  Teresa,  Oquen- 
do,  and  Colon,  the  Vizcaya  having  all  she  could  do 
to  propel  herself.  Slow  progress  was  made,  the 
best  day's  run  recorded  in  the  Colon's  log,  which 
has  been  published  by  the  United  States  Navy 
Department,  being  two  hundred  and  eighteen 
knots.  On  the  evening  of  May  loth,  nearly  twelve 
days  from  St.  Vincent,  the  squadron  was  approach 
ing  the  lesser  Antilles,  and  that  night  the  ships 
were  cleared  for  action  and  the  men  stood  at  their 
guns.  No  American  vessels  were  sighted,  how 
ever.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  nth  Martinique  was 
reached,  and  the  Furor  went  into  the  port  of  Fort 
de  France,  in  order,  no  doubt,  to  communicate 
with  Madrid  and  collect  any  information  that  might 
be  useful.  The  cruisers  lay  in  the  offing  till  she 
rejoined  them,  when  Cervera  shaped  his  course  for 
Curagao — either  in  obedience  to  orders  from  Mad 
rid,  or  for  the  reason  that  he  had  not  coal  enough 
to  take  him  to  Havana,  and  that  the  Dutch  island, 
lying  south  of  the  direct  route  to  Cuba,  offered  a 
safe  and  convenient  stopping  place.  He  probably 


THE   COMING   OF   CERVERA 


169 


heard,  at  Martinique,  of  Sampson's  eastward  cruise, 
news  of  which  would  come  from  Cape  Haitien. 

On  leaving  Martinique  the  Terror  was  sent  back 
to  Fort  de  France,  apparently  owing  to  an  accident 
to  her  boilers.*  She  was  repaired  there,  and  sub 
sequently  (May  25th)  left  for  San  Juan,  where  we 
shall  hear  of  her  again. 

At  Willemstadt,  the  port  of  Curasao,  which  he 
reached  on  the  morning  of  May  Hth,  Cervera  re 
quested  permission  to  coal  his  ships.  The  Dutch 
officials  insisted  upon  a  strict  observance  of  the 
rules  of  neutrality,  which  allow  a  belligerent  only 
so  much  fuel  as  is  necessary  to  carry  him  to  the 
nearest  port  on  his  route;  and  they  would  permit 
only  two  of  the  cruisers  to  enter  the  harbour.  The 
Teresa  and  the  Vizcaya  went  in,  the  rest  of  the 
squadron  waiting  outside.  On  the  night  of  the  I5th 
the  fleet  was  again  in  motion,  steering  northwest, 
toward  Cuba.  It  made  slower  progress  than  ever, 
the  condition  of  the  Vizcaya's  engines  necessitating 
a  stop  for  repairs ;  and  Cervera  found  it  impossible 
to  reach  Havana  with  the  coal  he  had.  On  the 
morning  of  the  i8th  the  flagship  signalled :  "  Ad 
miral  intends  making  port  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  " ; 
and  soon  after  sunrise  on  the  I9th  the  Teresa  led 
the  way  into  the  harbour  about  which 

Cervera  reaches  the  war  wag  tQ  centre  fQr  the  next  t  Q 
Santiago,  ,  .,  ,  .  .  , 

May  19.  eventful  months.     At  night,  in  cross 

ing  the  Caribbean,  the  gun  crews  had 
again  stood  at  their  stations  in  readiness  for  an  en 
counter,  but  again  no  enemy  had  been  sighted. 
Meanwhile,  the  movements  of  the  Spanish  ad- 

*  The  Colon's  log,  as  published  by  the  Navy  Department,  states 
that  she  coaled  the  Terror  at  Curasao  on  May  i5th,  but  apparentlv  the 
name  "  Terror"  must  be  a  misprint  or  mistake  for  "  Furor."  All  the 
other  evidence  is  that  the  Terror  did  not  go  beyond  Martinique  with 
Cervera.  For  instance,  Lieutenant  Muller,  who  as  second  in  command 
of  the  port  of  Santiago  had  abundant  opportunity  of  ascertaining  the 
facts  he  recorded  from  the  officers  of  Cervera's  squadron,  states  that 
she  was  left  behind  at  Martinique.  Captain  Cotton  of  the  Harvard 
reported  her  to  be  lying  disabled  at  Fort  de  France  on  May  i4th. 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

miral,  simple  and  straightforward  as  they  were,  had 
caused  an  extraordinary  amount  of  perplexity  to 
the  American  strategists.  There  were  all  sorts  of 
rumours  and  conjectures,  to  which  the  newspapers 
gave  wide  circulation,  but  there  was  a  singular  ab 
sence  of  authentic  news.  The  first  American  ves 
sel  to  report  Cervera's  squadron  was  the  Harvard, 
which  put  in  at  St.  Pierre,  Martinique,  on  May 
nth,  and  learned  that  the  Furor  had  called  that 
day  at  Fort  de  France,  a  dozen  miles  away.  Cap 
tain  Cotton,  the  Harvard's  commander,  was  in 
formed  by  the  governor  of  Martinique  that  he  could 
riot  leave  port  until  twenty-four  hours  after  the 
Spanish  vessel's  departure.  On  the  following 
morning  he  was  warned  by  some  American  sympa 
thizers — who  were  a  small  minority  in  the  little 
French  colony — that  the  Spaniards  were  lying  off 
St.  Pierre  in  readiness  to  catch  him,  and  that  his 
departure  would  be  signalled  to  them  from  the  hills. 
"  That  we  were  expected  to  go  to  sea  last  night," 
he  says  in  a  report  dated  May  I3th,  "  was  evidenced 
by  the  lively  signalling  going  on  on  shore ;  and  that 
the  Spanish  squadron  was  so  distributed  as  to  give 
us  the  least  possible  chance  of  escape  I  have  no 
doubt."  It  appears  that  the  captain  or  his  inform 
ants  had  an  overactive  imagination,  as  Cervera,  at 
the  time,  was  under  way  for  Curasao. 

To  guard  against  his  supposed  peril,  Captain 
Cotton  applied  for  permission  to  remain  seven  days 
at  St.  Pierre,  to  make  "  necessary  repairs  to  boilers 
and  engines  " — another  exhibition  of  imaginative 
powers.  The  request  was  granted,  but  on  the 
morning  of  the  I5th  a  despatch  from  Washington 
informed  him  that  the  Spaniards  had  reached  Cu- 
raqao,  and  ordered  him  to  follow  and  endeavour  to 
overtake  them — whereupon  he  notified  the  gov 
ernor  that  his  repairs,  "  not  having  required  as  long 
a  time  as  was  anticipated,  were  completed,"  and  that 
he  proposed  to  sail  the  next  day.  Before  he  got 


THE   COMING   OF   CERVERA 


171 


off,  however,  orders  came  from  Sampson  to  cruise 
in  the  Mona  Passage,  between  Haiti  and  Porto 
Rico. 

Cervera  being  reported  from  the  southeastern 
end  of  the  Caribbean,  making  it  clear  that  his  des 
tination  was  Cuba  and  not  the  United  States  coast, 
Secretary  Long  at  once  ordered  Schley's  flying 
squadron  from  Hampton  Roads  to  Charleston 
(May  1 3th),  and  thence,  on  May  ijjth,  to  Key  West. 
The  cruiser  Minneapolis  and  the  liner  St.  Paul,  also 
lying  at  Hampton  Roads,  were  hurried  southward, 
and  on  the  I5th,  when  the  American  consul  at 
Curagao  had  sent  word  of  Cervera's  arrival,  these 
two  swift  scouts  were  ordered  to  follow  the  Spanish 
fleet,  which  was  now  supposed,  on  the  strength  of 
a  report  from  London,  to  be  bound  for  the  Gulf 
of  Venezuela,  to  take  coal  from  colliers  that  might 
meet  it  there.  Similar  instructions  were  sent  to  the 
Harvard,  as  has  been  stated. 

Before  these  latter  orders  could  be  carried  out, 
Sampson,  on  his  way  back  from  San  Juan,  had 
issued  another  set.  The  admiral's  plan  was  to 
patrol  the  passages  by  which  Cervera  might  make 
his  way  northward  through  the  island  chain  of  the 
Antilles.  He  assigned  the  Yale  and  the  St.  Paul  to 
the  waters  between  Jamaica,  Cuba,  and  Haiti ;  the 
Harvard  to  the  Mona  Passage ;  and  the  St.  Louis 
to  cruise  south  of  Porto  Rico  to  St.  Thomas.  The 
conflict  of  orders  naturally  caused  some  confusion, 
and  suggested  allusions  to  Dewey's  go'od  fortune 
in  being  ten  thousand  miles  from  Washington,  at 
the  end  of  a  severed  cable ;  but  such  criticism  was 
superfluous.  It  was  entirely  proper  that  the  Navy 
Department  should  direct  the  movements  of  vessels 
which,  as  frequently  happened,  were  in  touch  with 
it  but  not  with  the  admiral.  That  it  had  entire  con 
fidence  in  Sampson  was  shown  by  such  despatches 
as  that  sent  to  Captain  Cotton  at  Martinique,  on 
May  i6th,  authorizing  him  to  obey  the  admiral's 

12 


Ij2  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

orders  rather  than  the  department's,  if  conflicting 
instructions  had  been  received. 

The  consul  at  Curasao  reported  the  Spanish 
fleet  on  May  I4th,  and  Secretary  Long  ordered  him 
to  protest  against  its  being  allowed  to  coal.  On  the 
1 6th,  apparently  from  a  European  agent,  the  secre 
tary  was  informed  that  it  carried  munitions  essen 
tial  to  the  defence  of  Havana,  and  had  imperative 
orders  to  reach  either  the  Cuban  capital  or  some 
harbour  connected  with  it  by  railroad.  Cienfuegos 
was  the  port  best  fulfilling  this  condition,  and  it  was 
thought  so  probable  that  Cervera  would  make  for  it 
that  as  soon  as  Schley  was  ready  to  leave  Key 
West  he  was  instructed  to  go  there  at  once. 

On  his  way  back  from  San  Juan  Sampson  left 
his  squadron  off  the  north  coast  of  Cuba  and  hur 
ried  on  to  Key  West,  where  he  found 
schicy  starts  Schley  on  his  arrival  (May  i8th).  On 

for  Cienfuegos,       jt  .  r   _,«  ...     ^  .»• 

May  19.  tne  morning  of  the  iQth — at  the  very 

hour  when  Cervera  was  entering  San 
tiago — Schley  started  for  Cienfuegos  with  the 
cruiser  Brooklyn  (flagship),  the  battle  ships  Massa 
chusetts  and  Texas,  and  the  yacht  Scorpion.  Near- 
ing  his  destination  on  the  afternoon  of  the  2ist,  the 
commodore  heard  guns  which  he  took  for  a  salute 
fired  in  welcome  to  the  Spanish  fleet ;  and  on  the 
next  morning,  standing  in  close  to  reconnoitre,  he 
saw  so  much  smoke  rising  from  the  harbour  that  he 
was  confirmed  in  his  belief  that  he  had  trapped  the 
enemy — a  belief  which,  it  is  said,  was  not  shared  by 
many  of  his  officers.*  To  verify  it  by  observation 
from  the  ships  was  impossible,  the  port,  like  that 
of  Santiago,  being  a  deep  bay  screened  from  the 
sea  by  fortified  heights ;  and  no  attempt  was  made 
at  communication  with  the  insurgents,  or  at  such 
a  feat  of  scouting  as  was  afterward  accomplished  at 


*  So  reported  by  Lieutenant  Hood,  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
Hawk. 


THE   COMING   OF   CERVERA 


173 


Santiago  by  Lieutenant  Blue.  It  was  at  this  point 
that  Commodore  Schley  first  displayed  that  lack  of 
push  and  energy  which  was  so  disappointing  in 
view  of  his  previous  record  of  admirable  service. 
For  three  days  he  lay  off  the  harbour  mouth.  The 
Scorpion  had  been  detached  to  cruise  eastward,  but 
on  the  22d  and  23d  the  squadron  was  joined  by  the 
battle  ship  Iowa,  the  gunboat  Castine,  the  torpedo 
boat  Dupont,  and  the  collier  Merrimac. 

A  few  hours  after  Schley  left  Key  West  it  was 
learned  at  Washington  that  Cervera  had  that  morn 
ing  (May  1 9th)  arrived  at  Santiago.  The  news 
came  through  Colonel  James  Allen,  of  the  signal 
corps,  who  received  it  from  an  agent  in  Havana ; 
and  the  prompt  reporting  of  this  most  crucial  piece 
of  intelligence  in  the  entire  campaign  is  a  feat  for 
which  the  signal  service  deserves  full  credit.*  The 
information  transmitted  was  not  entirely  correct. 
The  first  despatch  stated :  "  Five  f  Spanish  vessels 
arrived  at  Santiago  de  Cuba  "  ;  the  second,  received 
on  the  2oth :  "  Pelayo  and  four  cruisers  in  San 
tiago.  No  destroyers  or  torpedo  boats  arrived 
there  " ;  but  these  were  errors  of  detail  only. 

On  the  assurance  of  General  Greely,  the  chief 
signal  officer,  that  his  information  from  Santiago 
was  trustworthy,  it  was  at  once  credited  at  Wash 
ington  and  recognised  as  the  key  to  the  whole  situa 
tion.  It  was  less  easy  for  Sampson  and  Schley — 
especially,  as  it  proved,  the  latter — to  accept  it.  On 
the  2oth,  in  reply  to  a  despatch  from  Secretary 
Long,  "  strongly  advising "  him  to  order  Schley 
to  Santiago  immediately,  Sampson  telegraphed 
from  Key  West  that  he  was  in  favour  of  the  commo- 

*  Cervera's  arrival  was  bulletined  in  Madrid  on  the  same  day  (May 
ioth\  but  in  America  no  reliance  was  placed  in  an  announcement  that 
might  be  inaccurate  or  intentionally  falsified. 

t  This  was  the  truth,  but  not  quite  the  whole  truth.  Cervera  had 
only  five  ships  actually  with  him  when  he  reached  Santiago.  The 
Furor  had  dropped  behind,  and  arrived  three  hours  later  than  the  rest 
of  the  squadron. 


174 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


dore  remaining  at  Cienfuegos  for  the  present,  but 
had  instructed  him  to  communicate  with  the  Min 
neapolis  and  the  Harvard,  which  were  ordered  to 
reconnoitre  Santiago.  These  instructions  went  to 
Schley  in  duplicate  by  the  Iowa  and  the  Dupont, 
reached  him  on  the  22d,  and  were  at  once  carried 
out,  the  Scorpion  being  detached  to  inquire  for 
news  from  the  scouting  ships. 

Sampson  also  sent  a  private  letter  to  the  com 
modore  on  the  2oth,  in  which  he  thus  stated  the 
situation : 

DEAR  SCHLEY:  The  Iowa  leaves  this  morning  at  n 
o'clock,  bound  for  Cienfuegos.  The  Marblehead  and  the 
Eagle  will  both  be  ready  to  depart  to-night  and  join  you. 

Enclosed  is  a  telegram  *  received  at  Key  West,  May 
igth,  marked  "  A."  After  duly  considering  this  telegram 
I  have  decided  to  make  no  change  in  the  present  plan — 
that  is,  that  you  hold  your  squadron  off  Cienfuegos. 

If  the  Spanish  ships  have  put  into  Santiago  they  must 
come  either  to  Havana  or  Cienfuegos  to  deliver  the  muni 
tions  of  war  which  they  are  said  to  bring  for  use  in  Cuba. 
I,  therefore,  am  of  the  opinion  that  our  best  chance  of 
success  in  capturing  these  ships  will  be  to  hold  the  two 
points — Cienfuegos  and  Havana— with  all  the  force  we 
can  muster. 

If,  later,  it  should  develop  that  these  vessels  are  at 
Santiago,  we  could  then  assemble  off  that  port  the  ships 
best  suited  for  the  purpose  and  completely  blockade  it. 

Meanwhile  there  had  been  more  correspond 
ence  between  Key  West  and  Washington,  and  early 
in  the  morning  of  the  2ist  Sampson,  now  fully  ac 
cepting  the  signal-service  news,  sent  the  following 
despatch  to  Schley,  by  the  Marblehead : 

Spanish  squadron  probably  at  Santiago  de  Cuba,  four 
ships  and  three  torpedo  destroyers.  If  you  are  satisfied 
that  they  are  not  at  Cienfuegos,  proceed  with  all  despatch, 
but  cautiously,  to  Santiago  de  Cuba,  and  if  the  enemy  is 
there  blockade  him  in  port. 

The  admiral  was  so  anxious  to  insure  the 
prompt  delivery  of  these  instructions  that  a  few 

*  This  was  the  despatch  reporting  Cervera's  arrival  at  Santiago. 


THE  COMING  OF  CERVERA        175 

hours  later  he  sent  a  duplicate  of  them  by  the 
Hawk,  adding  as  an  indorsement : 

It  is  thought  the  inclosed  instructions  will  reach  you 
by  two  o'clock  A.  M.,  May  23d.  This  will  enable  you  to 
leave  before  daylight  (regarded  very  important)  so  that 
your  direction  may  not  be  noticed,  and  be  at  Santiago 
A.  M.,  May  24th. 

This  second  despatch  *  was  sent  by  the  Hawk, 
whose  commander,  Lieutenant  Hood,  was  specially 
and  emphatically  urged  to  get  it  into  Schley's 
hands  at  the  earliest  possible  moment.  He  reached 
Cienfuegos  on  the  morning  of  the  23d,  having 
passed  the  Marblehead,  which  came  up  early  the 
next  day  in  company  with  the  yachts  Vixen  and 
Eagle,  and  was  sent  back  to  Sampson  with  letters 
in  which  the  commodore  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that 

it  would  seem  to  be  extremely  unwise  to  chase  up  a 
probability  at  Santiago  de  Cuba  reported  via  Havana, 
no  doubt  as  a  ruse.  I  shall  therefore  remain  off  this  port 
with  this  squadron.  .  .  . 

I  think  I  have  them  here  almost  to  a  certainty. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  24th,  in  answer  to  sig 
nals  displayed  on  shore,  Commander  McCalla,  of 
the  Marblehead,  landed  and  commu- 
schiey  moves       nicated  with  some  Cuban  insurgents. 

on  Santiago,  TT  ,  ,      ,  &.  . 

May  24.  He   gave   them   needed   ammunition, 

and  clothing,  probably  no  less  needed, 
and  learned  from  them  that  the  Spanish  fleet  was 
not  in  the  harbour.  His  report  at  last  convinced 
the  commodore  that  he  was  blockading  the  wrong 
port,  and  at  sunset  he  started  his  squadron  east 
ward,  leaving  the  Castine  to  watch  Cienfuegos,  and 
sending  the  Dupont  to  Key  West  to  report  his 
movements. 


*  Later  in  the  day  Sampson  telegraphed  to  Washington  :  "  Schley 
has  been  ordered  to  Santiago  de  Cuba."  It  will  be  seen,  however,  that 
the  order,  though  it  made  the  admiral's  wishes  tolerably  plain,  was 
only  a  conditional  one,  and  left  the  commodore  at  liberty  to  prefer  his 
own  judgment. 


!^6  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Notwithstanding  the  urgency  of  its  errand, 
Schley's  fleet — now  consisting  of  the  Brooklyn,  the 
Iowa,  the  Massachusetts,  the  Texas,  the  Marble- 
head,  the  Vixen,  the  Eagle,  and  the  collier  Mer- 
rimac — made  slow  progress.  The  sea  was  rough, 
and  the  Eagle  could  make  no  more  than  six  knots 
an  hour;  and  though  his  fighting  force  would  not 
have  been  perceptibly  diminished  by  leaving  her 
behind,  the  commodore  held  back  the  other  ships 
to  her  speed.  On  the  26th,  however,  as  her  coal 
ran  short,  he  ordered  her  to  Port  Antonio,  Jamaica, 
and  late  that  afternoon  the  rest  of  the  squadron 
arrived  off  Santiago. 

It  found  there  the  Minneapolis,  the  St.  Paul, 
and  the  Yale.  None  of  them  had  seen  the  Span 
iards,  and  Schley  afterward  asserted  *  that  Cap 
tain  Sigsbee  expressed  his  belief  that  the  hostile 
fleet  was  not  in  the  harbour.  This  the  captain 
denied,  saying  that  "  every  officer  on  board  the  St. 
Paul  knew  that  I  believed  Cervera  to  be  at  San 
tiago."  The  capture  of  the  collier  Restormel  on 
the  previous  day  certainly  indicated  that  such  was 
the  case.  But  without  attempting  to  institute  a 
blockade,  as  Sampson  had  ordered,  or  even  to 
ascertain  whether  the  Spaniards  were  there  or  not, 
Commodore  Schley  signalled  to  his  squadron  the 
unexpected  order  that  it  should  make  for  Key 
West,  going  by  the  southern  side  of  Cuba. 

Schlev's  reason  for  his  withdrawal,  as  explained 
in  his  official  report,  was  that  some  of  his  ships 
were  short  of  coal,  and  that  he  believed  he  could 
still  block  any  attempt  of  Cervera's  to  reach  Ha 
vana  through  the  Yucatan  Channel,  while  Samp 
son  was  on  guard  on  the  other  side  of  Cuba.  The 
explanation  is  a  very  unsatisfactory  one.  There 
were  then  on  board  the  Brooklyn  940  tons  of  coal ; 


*  Rear-Admiral  Schley's  statement  of  February  20,   1890,   to  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs,  and  Captain  Sigsbee's  reply  to  it. 


THE   COMING   OF   CERVERA 


the  Iowa  had  762  tons,  the  Massachusetts  789,  the 
Texas  394,  the  Marblehead  116;  and  there  were 
4,300  tons  on  the  Merrimac.  The  rough  sea  made 
it  difficult  to  transfer  fuel  from  the  collier  to  the 
men-of-war,  but  there  were  sheltered  spots  within 
reach  where  it  could  have  been  done  without  trou 
ble.  As  was  afterward  stated  in  a  communication 
from  the  Navy  Department  to  the  United  States 
Senate,  "  there  was  coal  enough  to  return  to  Key 
West,  and  therefore  to  remain  at  Santiago  till  fur 
ther  supplies  came.  He  [Schley]  could  have 
counted  on  the  department's  sending  him  a  further 
coal  supply."  *  His  position  was  no  doubt  diffi 
cult,  but  nothing  short  of  an  imperative  necessity 
should  have  led  him  to  abandon  it.  He  has  been 
criticised  for  wasting  three  days  at  Cienfuegos ;  but 
the  commodore,  hitherto  reputed  an  able  and  gal 
lant  officer,  made  a  much  graver  error  of  judgment, 
and  one  that  might  have  had  the  most  serious  con 
sequences,  in  failing  to  strain  every  nerve  to  hold 
his  station  off  Santiago. 

Schley's  westward  start  was  delayed  by  an  acci 
dent  to  the  Merrimac,  which  disabled  her  machin 
ery.  The  Yale  was  ordered  to  take  the  collier  in 
tow,  but  this  proved  a  difficult  operation,  the  tow- 
line  breaking  again  and  again  ;  and  the  squadron  had 
moved  only  a  few  miles  when  the  Harvard  over 
took  it,  on  the  morning  of  the  27th.  She  brought 
from  the  Mole  St.  Nicholas,  Haiti,  an  urgent  de 
spatch  from  Secretary  Long,  informing  Schley  that 


*  This  statement  was  drawn  up  in  answer  to  the  Senate's  request 
(January  23,  1899)  for  the  facts  on  which  nominations  for  promotion 
were  made.  It  was  signed  by  Secretary  Long,  and  verified  by  a  board 
consisting  of  Captain  Evans,  Captain  Taylor,  Lieutenant  Sears,  Schley's 
flag  lieutenant  on  the  Brooklyn,  and  Ensign  Ward. 

The  quantity  of  coal  on  board  the  vessels  of  the  Flying  Squadron 
on  May  26th  is  given  above  as  it  appears  in  this  same  official  statement. 
Slightly  different  figures  are  furnished  to  the  writer  by  the  Bureau  of 
Steam  Engineering,  which  states  the  amount  thus  :  Brooklyn,  i,coo 
tons  ;  Iowa,  858  tons  ;  Texas,  468  tons  ;  Massachusetts,  878  tons  ;  Mar 
blehead,  184  tons. 


!^8  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

all  reports  indicated  that  Cervera  was  at  Santiago, 
and  begging  him  to  secure  positive  information — 
which,  the  secretary  suggested,  could  be  done  by 
communicating  with  the  insurgents,  or  by  sending 
a  scout  to  one  of  the  hills  overlooking  the  harbour. 
Still  the  commodore  did  not  change  his  mind. 
He  signalled  his  captains :  "  Can  you  fetch  into  the 
port  of  Key  West  with  coal  remaining?"  and  re 
plied  to  Washington,  by  the  Harvard : 

Can  not  remain  off  Santiago  present  state  squadron 
coal  account.  .  .  .  Much  to  be  regretted,  can  not  obey 
orders  of  the  department.  Have  striven  earnestly;  forced 
to  proceed  for  coal  to  Key  West  by  way  of  Yucatan  Pas 
sage.  Can  not  ascertain  anything  respecting  enemy 
positive. 

During  the  27th,  however,  the  sea  moderated, 
and  it  was  found  possible  for  the  Texas  and  the 
Marblehead  to  take  fuel  from  the  Merrimac,  the 
squadron  lying  that  night  about  forty  miles  west 
of  Santiago.  On  the  28th  the  Vixen  also  coaled, 
and  at  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  Schley  signalled 
an  order  to  return  to  the  harbour  mouth.  Arriv 
ing  there  at  dusk,  the  Vixen  and  the  Marblehead 
were  sent  in  close  to  watch  the  entrance,  the  other 
ships  lying  about  ten  miles  out.  Next  morning 
they  circled  in  nearer,  and  saw  the  Colon  and 
two  other  Spanish  cruisers  lying  in  the  channel. 
There  could  be  no  further  question  as  to  Cervera's 
whereabouts — though  it  was  not  until  June  3d  that 
all  his  six  vessels  were  positively  known  to  be  with 
him — and  the  St.  Paul  was  sent  off  to  take  the 
news  to  Sampson. 

The  admiral  had  left  Key  West  on  May  2ist, 
and  gathered,  off  Havana,  a  squadron  that  included 
the  New  York,  the  Indiana,  the  monitors  Puritan 
and  Miantonomoh,  the  cruisers  New  Orleans,  De 
troit,  and  Montgomery,  and  several  gunboats  and 
torpedo  boats — besides  the  monitor  Amphitrite, 
the  cruiser  Cincinnati,  and  the  dynamite  gunboat 


THE    COMING   OF    CERVERA  179 

Vesuvius,  which  joined  him  on  the  25th.  He 
cruised  slowly  backward  and  forward  in  the 
Nicholas  Channel,*  expecting  to  meet  Cervera, 
who,  according  to  Sampson's  calculations,  was 
likely  to  leave  Santiago  before  Schley  could  inter 
cept  him,  and  to  make  for  Havana  by  the  north 
coast  of  Cuba.  At  the  same  time,  as  it  was  pos 
sible  that  the  Spaniards  might  go  south  of  the 
island,  and  through  the  Yucatan  Channel,  he  was 
prepared  to  fall  back  at  short  notice  and  cover 
Havana  from  the  west  as  well  as  from  the  east. 
No  lights  were  shown  at  night,  and  three  different 
"  orders  of  battle "  had  been  given  to  the  com 
mander  of  each  ship,  to  be  used  according  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  expected  encounter.  De 
spatches  passed  frequently  between  the  admiral  and 
Washington,  but  it  was  less  easy  to  keep  in  touch 
with  Schley — whose  command,  hitherto  rated  as  an 
independent  one,  by  an  order  dated  May  24th 
was  directly  subordinated  to  Sampson's  instruc 
tions.  The  change  was  no  mark  of  censure  to 
Schley,  who  had  been  informed  by  Secretary  Long, 
at  the  time  of  his  appointment  to  the  Flying  Squad 
ron,  that  if  his  ships  should  join  Sampson's  the  lat 
ter  would  have  command  of  the  whole  fleet. 

On  May  26th  Sampson  despatched  the  Vesu 
vius  to  Schley  with  another  message,  assuring  him 
that  Cervera  was  at  Santiago ;  and  next  day,  when 
the  Wasp  brought  the  commodore's  letter  of  May 
23d,  the  same  courier  was  sent  back  with  an  urgent 
order  that  he  should  "  proceed  with  all  possible 
despatch  to  Santiago  to  blockade  the  port."  f 
Later  that  day  the  admiral  heard  from  Wash 
ington  that  Schley  had  informed  the  Navy  Depart 
ment  that  he  was  about  to  start  from  Cienfuegos, 

*  This  is  the  passage  between  the  Cuban  keys,  off  Cardenas  and 
Sagua,  and  Salt  Key  Bank.  It  is  the  narrowest  part  of  the  wide  chan 
nel  along:  the  north  coast  of  Cuba. 

t  Schley  had  already  started  when  this  reached  Cienfuegos. 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


but  could  not  blockade  the  Spaniards  for  lack 
of  coal. 

It  is  easy  to  understand  that  with  the  situation 
in  so  critical  and  uncertain  a  state  it  was  a  time 
of  great  anxiety  for  Sampson.  This  last  news  de 
cided  him  to  cut  loose  from  Havana,  and  go  with 
his  own  ships  to  the  central  point  of  the  campaign 
—  the  spot  where  the  enemy's  naval  power  lay.  To 
do  so  he  must  first  return  to  Key  West  for  coal  ; 
but  he  sent  on  the  New  Orleans  and  the  collier 
Sterling  direct  to  Santiago,  with  a  message  to 
Schley  instructing  him  "  to  remain  on  the  blockade 
at  all  hazards,"  and  adding  an  order  that  the  collier 
should  be  sunk  in  the  mouth  of  the  harbour  so  as 
to  close  the  entrance. 

From     Key    West    Sampson    telegraphed    to 

Washington  that  "  the  failure  of  Schley  to  continue 

blockade  must  be  remedied  at  once 

Sampson  moves    jf  possible,"  and  on  the  evening  of  the 

on  Santiago,  -11  ,    1  •  -,i 

May  29.  2gt\\  he  was  at  sea  again,  taking  with 

him  the  battle  ship  Oregon,  the 
yacht  Mayflower,  and  the  torpedo  boat  Porter.  To 
the  former,  fresh  from  her  great  voyage  around 
Cape  Horn,  he  signalled  :  "  Can  you  make  thirteen 
knots  an  hour?  "  "  Fourteen  if  necessary,"  replied 
the  Oregon,  and  the  squadron  speeded  off.  On 
the  3Oth  it  met  the  St.  Paul,  with  the  news  that 
Schley  had  seen  Cervera's  ships.  This  same  wel 
come  intelligence  had  reached  Washington  the  day 
before,  shortly  after  Secretary  Long,  in  his  extreme 
anxiety  about  the  situation  at  Santiago,  had  sent 
Schley  the  following  despatch  in  triplicate,  address 
ing  it  to  each  of  the  three  nearest  cable  stations  — 
Port  Antonio  and  Kingston,  in  Jamaica,  and  the 
Mole  St.  Nicholas,  in  Haiti  : 

It  is  your  duty  to  ascertain  immediately  if  the  Span 
ish  fleet  is  in  Santiago,  and  report.  Would  be  discredit 
able  to  the  navy  if  that  fact  were  not  ascertained  immedi 
ately.  All  military  and  naval  movements  depend  upon 
that  point. 


CHAPTER   X 

THE   BLOCKADE   OF   SANTIAGO 

SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA  *  is  almost  the  most  ancient 
European  settlement  in  America.  Founded  in  1514 
by  Spanish  colonists  sent  from  Santo  Domingo  by 
Diego  Columbus,  it  was  for  a  time  the  capital  of 
Cuba.  In  1873  it  was  the  scene  of  the  shooting 
of  the  Virginius  prisoners.  Other  notable  names  in 
its  annals  are  those  of  Antommarchi,  Napoleon's 
physician  and  biographer  at  St.  Helena,  who  set 
tled  here  after  the  emperor's  death ;  of  Adelina 
Patti,  who  is  said  to  have  made  her  first  public 
appearance  in  Santiago,  shortly  before  her,  recorded 
debut  in  New  York ;  and  of  the  notorious  "  Boss  " 
Tweed,  who  made  it  his  first  hiding  place  after  his 
flight  from  the  United  States.  But  the  old  city 
•was  destined  to  have  more  history  between  May 
and  August  of  1898  than  it  had  had  in  its  four  cen 
turies  of  previous  existence. 

No  American  war  ships  appeared  off  Santiago 
until  May  i8th,  when  the  St.  Louis  and  the  Wom- 
patuck  cut  the  cable  to  Jamaica.  Cervera's  squad 
ron  arrived  on  the  I9th.  During  the  following 
week  the  St.  Paul  watched  the  harbour  entrance, 
and  her  commander,  Captain  Sigsbee,  formerly  of 
the  Maine,  made  sketches  of  it.  On  the  26th 
Schley  came  up,  withdrew  at  once,  and  returned  on 


*  Santiago  de  Cuba — commonly  abbreviated  to  "Santiago"  by 
Americans,  to  "  Cuba"  by  its  own  citizens— is  named  after  the  patron 
saint  of  old  Spain,  St.  James  the  elder,  whose  body  is  supposed  to  lie 
at  Santiago  de  Compostella,  near  Corunna. 


!g2  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

the  28th ;  but  even  yet  there  was  no  close  block 
ade  of  the  port.  The  Spaniards  had  plenty  of  time 
to  continue  their  voyage  unmolested,  had  they 
been  able  to  fill  their  empty  bunkers.* 

There  was  coal  at  Santiago.     The  navy  depot 

had   twenty-three   hundred   tons    of   Welsh    steam 

coal,  and  fuel  was  requisitioned  from 

cervera  coals       the    juragua    mines    (owned    by    an 

at  Santiago,  A  •  1      r  1 

May  19-25  American    company),    and    from    the 

little  local  railway ;  but  there  were  no 
proper  appliances  for  getting  it  aboard.  The 
cruisers  could  not  come  up  to  the  coaling  piers, 
which  were  in  such  shallow  water  that  only  light 
ers  could  lie  at  them,  and  not  more  than  two 
boats  could  be  loaded  at  once.  When  baskets 
were  ordered  for  carrying  the  coal,  very  few  could 
be  found  in  the  city.  It  was  almost  equally  dif 
ficult  to  supply  the  fleet  with  the  fresh  water  it 
needed. 

Work  went  on  day  and  night,  and  some  of  the 
ships  were  able  to  move  on  the  morning  of  May 
25th,  when  the  Colon  went  down  to  a  position  in 
side  the  harbour  mouth.  She  was  just  in  time  to 
witness  the  St.  Paul's  capture  of  the  collier  Re- 
stormel — a  disaster  which  it  would  seem  that  she 
might  have  prevented.  Lieutenant  Miiller  f  ex 
plains  that  she  could  not,  in  his  opinion,  have 
reached  the  scene  in  time ;  that  she  could  not  spare 
the  fuel  that  would  have  been  burned  in  a  chase ; 
and  that  the  sea  was  so  rough  that  she  might  have 


*  For  some  days  after  Sampson's  arrival,  with  good  luck,  they 
might  have  escaped  with  little  loss.  As  late  as  June  \$ih  the  admiral 
warned  his  captains  that  through  carelessness  in  maintaining  positions 
there  were  times  when  "the  fleet  is  so  scattered  that  it  would  be  per 
fectly  possible  for  the  enemy  to  come  out  of  the  harbour  and  meet  with 
very  little  opposition."  Gradually,  however,  the  blockade  became 
more  and  more  perfect,  especially  at  night. 

t  Combates  y  Capitulation  de  Santiago  de  Cuba,  by  Lieutenant 
Jose  Muller  y  Tejeiro,  who  was  second  in  command  of  the  local  naval 
office  during  the  siege.  The  United  States  Navy  Department  has  pub 
lished  a  translation  of  most  of  this  interesting  record. 


THE    BLOCKADE    OF    SANTIAGO  183 

grounded  in  going  down  the  channel.  All  this 
would  scarcely  have  prevented  most  of  the  Ameri 
can  captains  from  an  effort  to  reach  the  enemy, 
had  the  case  been  reversed. 

In  the  afternoon  of  that  day  (May  25th)  the 
Vizcaya  joined  the  Colon,  both  ships  anchoring 
where  their  broadsides  commanded  the  channel, 
but  neither  vessel,  it  appears,  being  sighted  by  the 
St.  Paul.  Coal  was  still  coming  out  to  them  in 
lighters.  The  Pluton  had  reconnoitred  outside 
on  the  24th ;  on  the  29th  both  of  the  destroyers 
went  out,  but  attempted  no  attack,  though  Schley's 
squadron  was  in  sight. 

That  morning  (May  29th)  the  lookouts  of  the 
Flying  Squadron  saw  the  Colon  and  the  Vizcaya, 
and  observed  the  masts  of  a  third  cruiser  farther  up 
the  channel.  Here  was  Schley's  opportunity.  Two, 
at  least,  of  the  Spanish  ships — the  ships  whose  de 
struction  was  the  grand  object  of  the  American 
strategy,  the  ships  which  the  strength  of  the  Ameri 
can  navy  had  been  vainly  seeking  for  weeks — lay 
in  plain  sight,  within  easy  range,  and  probably 
without  sufficient  steam  to  manoeuvre.  It  can 
hardly  be  doubted  how  Nelson,  or  Dewey,  or 
Sampson,  would  have  followed  up  such  a  discovery. 
They  would  have  struck  at  the  enemy  at  once,  and 
with  all  their  strength.  Unfortunately,  Schley  did 
nothing  of  the  sort.  Captain  Evans  records  that 
in  expectation  of  an  immediate  attack  he  cleared 
the  Iowa's  decks  for  action;  but  the  commodore 
gave  no  signal  to  engage.  Throughout  the  2o,th 
and  the  3oth  he  lay  off  the  harbour  mouth — main 
taining  a  close  blockade,  as  he  subsequently  re 
ported  ;  but  his  idea  of  a  close  blockade  seems  to 
have  differed  materially  from  Sampson's.  Captain 
Evans  states  that  the  squadron — which  cruised  in 
column,  following  the  movements  of  the  flagship 
— remained  from  five  to  ten  miles  off  shore,  and 
a  meeting  place  was  appointed,  in  case  the  ves- 


1 84  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

sels    should    become    separated,    twenty-five    miles 
away.* 

Not  until  the  afternoon  of  May  3ist  did  Schley 
attempt  an  offensive  movement.  Transferring  his 
pennant  to  the  Massachusetts,  he  moved  in  to 
within  five  miles  of  the  harbour  entrance,  followed 
by  the  New  Orleans,  which  had  joined  him  on  the 
3Oth,  and  by  the  Iowa.  Only  a  few  shots  were 
exchanged,  at  too  long  range  for  damage  on  either 
side,  though  the  Spaniards — too  easily  elated,  as 
usual — believed  that  they  had  hit  two  of  the  Ameri 
can  ships,  and  the  officer  who  wrote  the  Colon's 
log  cheerfully  recorded  that  the  assailants  "  retired 
in  disorder."  Schley  reported  to  Washington  that 
his  reconnaissance  "  was  intended  principally  to 
injure  or  destroy  the  Colon."  This  makes  it  dif 
ficult  to  understand  why  the  commodore's  order 
was  to  engage  at  a  distance  of  seven  thousand 
yards,  and  why  the  firing,  which  lasted  only  about 
ten  minutes,  was  actually  done  at  a  still  greater 
range — from  eight  thousand  to  eleven  thousand 
yards,  f  The  elevating  gear  of  some  of  the  Iowa's 
guns  was  strained  by  firing  at  so  high  an  angle/ 
Next  morning  (June  ist)  Sampson  arrived,  and, 

*  In  the  chapter  contributed  by  Captain  Evans  to  W.  A.  M.  Goode's 
With  Sampson  through  the  War. 

Lieutenant  Miiller,  the  Spanish  historian,  thus  chronicles  Schley's 
movements : 

"May  28. — At  4.30  P.  M.  six  large  ships  were  signalled,  disappear 
ing  to  the  south  at  nightfall. 

"May  29. — At  7,  seven  hostile  ships  were  sighted,  reconnoitring 
the  coast  at  a  distance  of  about  eight  miles  ;  they  withdrew  to  the  south 
before  dark. 

"May  30.— At  5.30  the  hostile  fleet  was  signalled  approaching  to 
within  nine  miles  of  the  harbour. 

"May  31. — The  ships  disappeared,  as  usual,  to  the  south  before 
dark." 

After  Sampson's  arrival,  on  June  ist,  Lieutenant  Muller  notes  that 
"from  that  time  on  the  hostile  ships,  which  were  afterward  increased 
in  number,  established  day  and  night  a  constant  watch,  without  with 
drawing  at  nightfall,  as  they  used  to  do." 

t  So  stated  by  Captain  Evans  and  Captain  Higginson,  who  add 
that  with  their  gun  sights  set  at  these  ranges  most  of  their  shots  fell 
short.  "  Do  not  go  in  any  closer"  was  signalled  to  the  squadron. 


THE    BLOCKADE    OF    SANTIAGO  185 

probably  in  expectation  that  the  enemy,  thus  rein 
forced,  would  make  a  more  persistent  attack,  the 
two  Spanish  cruisers  withdrew  further  into  the  har 
bour,  out  of  sight  from  the  sea. 

The  admiral,  on  his  arrival  off  Santiago,  found 
Schley's  squadron  cruising  in  column  west  of  the 
harbour  entrance.  The  commodore  had  not  car 
ried  out  his  instructions  regarding  the  Sterling, 
which  had  joined  him  on  May  3Oth ;  and  Sampson 
decided  to  use  the  other  collier,  the  Merrimac, 
which  was  a  larger  ship  and  more  likely  to  block 
the  channel.  He  had  discussed  the  manoeuvre,  on 
the  way  from  Key  West,  with  Naval  Constructor 
Richmond  P.  Hobson,*  and  the  young  officer  had 
shown  so  enthusiastic  an  interest  in  it  that  at  his 
urgent  request  the  admiral  intrusted  him  with  its 
execution,  though  this  involved  the  removal  of  the 
captain  of  the  Merrimac,  Commander  J.  M.  Miller, 
from  his  ship. 

As  worked  out  by  Lieutenant  Hobson,  the  plan 
was  to  steam  into  the  channel  just  before  day 
light,  and  at  the  narrowest  point — 

which     is     Only     a     sh°rt     distanCC     in~ 

side  the  entrance,  a  little  more  than 
a  hundred  yards  from  the  nose  of  the  Morro — to 
swing  the  big  collier  round,  drop  anchors  at  stern 
and  bow,  and  sink  her  by  opening  her  sea  valves 
and  exploding  torpedoes  along  her  sides.  He 
needed  six  assistants — two  in  the  engine  and  boiler 
rooms,  one  at  each  anchor,  one  at  the  wheel,  and 

*  It  has  been  popularly  supposed  that  Lieutenant  Hobson  originated 
the  Merrimac  adventure,  but  such  was  not  the  case.  He  has  himself 
recorded  the  fact  that  Admiral  Sampson  first  discussed  the  subject  with 
him  on  May  2gth,  the  day  on  which  the  New  York  left  Key  West. 
The  admiral's  despatch  to  Commodore  Schley,  dated  May  2yth,  when 
he  ordered  the  Sterling  to  Santiago,  contains  an  accurate  outline  of  the 
manoeuvre  :  "  I  believe  it  would  be  perfectly  practicable  to  steam  this 
vessel  into  position  and  drop  all  her  anchors,  allow  her  to  swing  across 
the  channel,  then  sink  her  either  by  opening  the  valves  or  whatever 
means  may  be  best  in  his  [Schley's]  judgment."  It  is  said  that  the 
idea  was  first  suggested  to  Sampson  by  Commander  Converse  of  the 
Montgomery. 


186 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


one  to  help  with  the  torpedoes.    The  men  on  deck 
were  to  lie  on  their  faces  at  their  stations,  with  a 


Sketch  map  of  the  harbour  of  Santiago  de  Cuba. 

cord  tied  to  their  wrists,  with  which  Hobson,  on 
the  bridge,  was  to  signal  the  moment  for  action. 
Then  the  anchors,  lashed  over  the  side,  were  to  be 


m  \ 

I  XTNIV 

THE  BLOCKADE  (^SANTIAGO          187 

cut  loose,  and  the  men  were  to  jump  overboard  and 
swim  to  a  lifeboat  towing  behind.  As  the  ship 
swung  athwart  the  channel — she  was  three  hundred 
and  thirty-three  feet  long,*  and  the  charts  showed  a 
point  at  which  the  deep  water  was  only  about  three 
hundred  and  fifty  feet  wide — the  lieutenant  was  to 
fire  the  torpedoes,  which  were  connected  with  the 
bridge  by  electric  cables,  and  then  follow  his  men 
overboard.  The  details  were  carefully  arranged, 
even  to  the  specification  that  the  crew's  uniform 
was  to  consist  of  one  suit  of  woollen  underwear,  two 
pairs  of  socks,  a  life  preserver,  and  a  revolver  belt, 
with  revolver  and  cartridges. 

To  take  an  unarmed  vessel  close  under  the 
enemy's  batteries  and  sink  her  there,  trusting  for 
escape  to  luck  and  a  lifeboat,  was  an  undertaking 
of  such  manifest  peril  that  to  man  the  Merrimac  a 
signal  was  made  for  volunteers.  In  the  American 
navy  "  the  danger's  self  is  lure  alone,"  and  hun 
dreds  of  officers  and  men  at  once  proffered  their 
services.  The  six  selected  were  Daniel  Montague, 
chief  master  at  arms  of  the  New  York ;  Gunner's 
Mate  Charette,  of  the  New  York;  and  Boatswain 
Mullen,  Coxswain  Deignan,  Machinist  Phillips,  and 
Water-Tender  Kelly,  all  of  the  Merrimac. 

It  took  so  long  to  get  the  collier  ready  that  it 
was  after  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  June  2d 
when  Sampson,  who  had  gone  on  board  to  say  fare 
well  to  her  brave  crew,  left  her,  and  she  started 
for  the  harbour  mouth.  As  she  steamed  in  it  grew 
so  light  that  the  admiral  sent  the  Porter  speeding 
after  her  to  order  her  back,  thinking  it  wiser  to 
postpone  the  attempt  till  the  following  night. 

The  day  (June  2d)  passed  uneventfully,  and  at 
night  the  Merrimac  was  ready  for  a  second  attempt. 
A  few  changes  had  been  made  in  her  equipment. 

*  The  Merrimac  was  a  five-thousand-ton  ship,  the  largest  of  the 
Navy  Department's  fleet  of  colliers.  She  had  about  twenty-three  hun 
dred  tons  of  coal  in  her  hold  when  she  sank. 

13 


1 88          THE  SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR 

To  minimize  the  chance  of  failure  in  the  apparatus 
for  igniting  the  torpedoes,  it  was  arranged  that  each 
should  be  fired  with  a  separate  battery.  As  this 
necessitated  the  services  of  another  pair  of  hands, 
Coxswain  Clausen,  of  the  New  York,  was  added 
to  the  ship's  company ;  *  and  as  one  of  the  original 
six,  Mullen,  was  exhausted  by  the  mental  and 
physical  strain,  Coxswain  Murphy,  of  the  Iowa, 
took  his  place.  A  lifeboat  and  a  catamaran  were 
slung  over  the  side  of  the  vessel,  and  Cadet  Joseph 
W.  Powell,  of  the  New  York,  was  ordered  to  follow 
her  to  the  harbour  mouth  with  the  flagship's  steam 
launch,  and  wait  there  on  the  chance  of  picking  up 
her  crew  should  they  succeed  in  escaping. 

Mr.  Crank,  the  assistant  engineer  of  the  Mer- 
rimac,  took  the  ship  to  the  starting  point  of  her 
run,  and  left  her,  very  reluctantly,  at  the  last  mo 
ment,  being  taken  off  by  Cadet  Powell's  launch. 
It  was  about  half  past  three  o'clock,  with  the  moon 
shining  brightly  above  the  western  horizon.  Lieu 
tenant  Hobson  steered  straight  for  the  Morro,  and 
was  within  five  hundred  yards  of  the  point  when 
the  first  shot  came  from  a  picket  boat  that  lay 
under  the  west  bank  of  the  channel.  It  was  a 
plucky  challenge,  for  the  Spaniards  in  the  little 
craft  could  hardly  have  guessed  that  the  big  vessel 
that  came  driving  right  up  to  them  was  unarmed. 
In  a  few  minutes  there  was  a  heavy  fire  on  both 
sides,  while  the  Merrimac  passed  in,  her  engines 
stopped,  but  her  own  momentum  and  a  strong  tide 
carrying  her  on. 

As  she  reached  the  spot  that  had  been  picked 
out,  on  the  chart,  as  the  place  to  sink  her,  the  sea 
valves  were  thrown  open,  and  Hobson  gave  the 
order  to  explode  the  torpedoes.  Only  two  of  them 
could  be  discharged ;  the  others  had  had  their  wires 
or  batteries  broken  by  the  enemy's  fire.  The  ship 

*  The  newspaper  storv  of  the  Merrimac  represented  Clausen  as  a 
stowaway — a  picturesque  bit  of  fiction. 


THE    BLOCKADE    OF    SANTIAGO  189 

was  not  sinking  fast  enough,  nor  could  she  be 
swung  fairly  across  the  channel ;  her  steering  gear 
was  shot  away,  and  her  stern  anchor  had  been  pre 
maturely  cut  loose  by  a  shell.  The  tide  swept  her 
steadily  in.  A  tremendous  fire  came 
sinking  of  the  £rom  tjie  batteries  and  troops  on 

Mernmac,  .  •     ,       ^.         •, 

,une  shore ;    eight  *    electric    mines    were 

fired  in  the  channel;  torpedoes  were 
discharged  by  two  Spanish  vessels — the  Pluton  and 
the  cruiser  Reina  Mercedes ;  and  finally  the  Mer- 
rimac  went  down  between  Soldados  Point  and 
Smith  Key,  where  she  lay  with  her  masts  and 
smokestack  out  of  the  water,  obstructing  but  by  no 
means  blocking  the  fairway. 

Her  lifeboat  had  disappeared,  but  the  catamaran 
floated,  and  all  the  crew  reached  it  and  clung  to 
it.  Boats  came  out  to  the  wreck  with  lanterns,  but 
the  men  were  not  discovered ;  and  Hobson  ordered 
silence,  fearing  that  even  an  offer  to  surrender 
might  be  answered  with  bullets,  and  expecting  that 
at  daylight  a  responsible  officer  would  come  out  to 
reconnoitre.  The  catamaran  was  fastened  to  the 
sunken  hulk  by  a  rope;  and  with  only  their  heads 
above  water  and  their  teeth  chattering  with  cold, 
the  refugees  had  held  their  position  for  an  hour, 
when,  just  after  sunrise,  a  steam  launch  came  down 
the  harbour.  As  it  passed,  thirty  yards  away,  Lieu 
tenant  Hobson  hailed,  inquiring  if  any  Spanish 
officer  was  aboard,  and  saying  that  an  American 
officer  wished  to  surrender  himself  and  seamen  as 
prisoners  of  war.  A  Spaniard,  who  proved  to  be 
Admiral  Cervera  himself,  stepped  forward  and 

*  So  Lieutenant  Hobson  asserts.  Lieutenant  Mailer,  who  gives  the 
Spanish  side  of  the  story,  says  that  only  three  mines  were  fired. 

During  the  day  (June  ?d\  two  of  the  Spanish  torpedoes  were  found 
outside  the  harbour  by  the  Porter,  having  drifted  out  with  the  tide. 
One  was  taken  aboard  as  a  trophy,  the  other  sank. 

The  Merrimac's  lifeboat  was  picked  up  by  men  from  the  Colon,  on 
June  6th.  The  Spanish  cruiser's  log  for  that  day  says  :  "  Secured  the 
Marymak's  boat,  repaired  it,  and  supplied  it  with  a  new  rudder." 


190 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 


helped  Hobson  to  board  the  launch ;  and  the  lieu 
tenant  and  his  men,  who  were  very  courteously 
treated  by  their  captors,  were  taken  to  the  Reina 
Mercedes  and  thence  to  the  Morro.  They  were 
afterward  moved  to  the  Reina  Mercedes  Barracks 
in  Santiago,  where  they  were  confined  till  released 
on  July  5th. 

It  is  easy  to  say,  after  the  event,  that  it  would 
have  been  almost  a  miracle  had  the  Merrimac 
manoeuvre  proved  successful.  To  block  a  chan 
nel  has  never,  even  under  the  most  favourable  cir 
cumstances,  proved  an  easy  operation.  In  the  civil 
war,  for  instance,  it  was  again  and  again  attempted 
unsuccessfully — notably  at  Charleston,  in  Decem 
ber,  1 86  r.  The  work  there  was  done  by  an  officer 
who  knew  the  harbour  well,  having  spent  four 
years,  shortly  before  the  war,  in  improving  it ;  there 
was  no  hindrance  from  the  enemy ;  no  less  than 
sixteen  ships,  loaded  with  stone,  were  carefully 
towed  into  position  and  scuttled ;  and  yet  the  chan 
nel  remained  navigable. 

The  sinking  of  the  Merrimac  was  the  most  pic 
turesque  exploit  of  personal  courage  performed 
during  the  war,  and  as  such  it  has  brought  its  re 
ward  to  the  brave  men  who  undertook  it.  At  the 
same  time,  it  is  no  detraction  of  their  achievement 
to  say  that  other  soldiers  and  sailors  performed 
deeds  that  were  less  showy  but  no  less  truly  heroic. 
Many  of  these,  no  doubt,  will  never  be  chronicled ; 
others  are  to  be  found  in  the  formal  records  of  the 
official  reports.  Among  the  many  instances  that 
might  be  given,  here  is  one  that  occurred  off  San 
tiago  just  four  days  earlier : 

Assistant-Engineer  J.  P.  Morton  of  the  Vixen 
officially  reports  the  conduct  of  P.  Johnson  and  G. 
Mahoney,  two  of  the  Vixen's  firemen,  on  the  night 
of  May  28,  1898,  when  "  the  lower  front  manhole 
gasket  of  boiler  A  blew  out,  sending  out  a  large 
stream  of  boiling  water  and  steam  into  the  fire- 


THE    BLOCKADE    OF    SANTIAGO  \g\ 

room,  driving  the  men  from  the  fireroom  and  low 
ering  the  water  in  the  boiler  below  the  gauge  glass. 
Upon  calling  for  volunteers  to  haul  the  fires  the 
two  men  above  mentioned  responded,  went  below, 
and  with  the  scalding  water  blowing  into  their 
faces,  and  subject  to  the  most  intense  heat,  suc 
ceeded  in  hauling  the  fires  and  thereby  saving  the 
boiler  from  injury  and  the  ship  from  great  damage." 
And  Lieutenant  Sharp,  commanding  officer  of 
the  Vixen,  in  forwarding  the  report,  adds :  "  Assist- 


|  Brooklyn.  Porter    t 

Texas    I  |  tNewYork 

Massachusetts1         I  * 


Sampson's  first  order  of  blockade  off  Santiago  de  Cuba. 

ant-Engineer  Morton  says  nothing  of  his  own 
conduct;  when  the  gasket,  having  been  refitted, 
again  blew  out,  he,  with  Johnson,  hauled  the  fires 
a  second  time." 

Sampson's  first  order  of  blockade,  issued  June 
2d,  arranged  his  fleet  in  two  squadrons,  the  first 
consisting  of  the  New  York,  the 
Iowa>  the  Oregon,  the  New  Orleans, 
the  Mayflower,  and  the  Porter,  under 
the  admiral's  direct  command;  the  second,  under 
Commodore  Schley,  including  the  Brooklyn,  the 


I92 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


Massachusetts,  the  Texas,  the  Marblehead,  and  the 
Vixen.  Both  squadrons  formed  a  single  line,  drawn 
in  a  semicircle  off  the  harbour  mouth,  Sampson's 
ships  on  the  east  and  Schley's  on  the  west,  the 
battle  ships  in  the  centre  of  the  line,  and  the 
swifter  cruisers  on  the  flanks.  In  the  daytime  the 
distance  from  the  Morro  was  to  be  six  miles;  at 
night  the  blockaders  were  to  draw  in  closer. 

This  simple  plan  was  soon  modified,  Sampson 
devoting  much  care  and  thought  to  its  elaboration, 


Sampson's  final  arrangement  of  the  night  blockade  off 
Santiago  de  Cuba. 

and  finally  evolving  a  remarkably  effective  forma 
tion.  In  this  perfected  arrangement  the  night 
watch  was  drawn  up  in  three  lines.  The  first,  a 
mile  from  the  Morro,  consisted  of  three  picket 
boats — steam  launches  from  the  men-of-war;  the 
second,  two  miles  out,  of  three  videttes,  chosen 
from  the  smaller  vessels  of  the  fleet ;  the  third,  from 
three  to  four  miles  from  shore,  of  the  battle  ships 
and  cruisers.  The  novel  and  ingenious  feature  of 


THE   BLOCKADE   OF   SANTIAGO  193 

the  blockade  was  the  advancing  of  one  battle  ship 
to  the  line  of  videttes,  where  it  held  a  searchlight 
steadily  upon  the  entrance  of  the  harbour,  making 
it  impossible  for  even  a  small  boat  to  slip  out  un 
seen;  while  one  of  her  sister  ships  lay  close  at 
hand,  ready  to  use  her  guns  in  case  of  fire  from  the 
enemy. 

Throughout  the  blockade,  with  the  exception  of 
an  occasional  rifle  shot  at  the  picket  boats,  the 
Spaniards  never  fired  upon  the  American  ships  at 
night,  though  the  latter  constantly  lay  within  a 
moderate  range.  This  fact,  which  caused  no  little 
wonderment  at  the  time — for,  as  was  said  by  Cap 
tain  Chadwick,  of  the  New  York,  "  we,  had  the 
case  been  reversed,  would  not  have  been  so  for 
bearing  " — was  due  in  part,  perhaps,  to  that  dis 
inclination  for  the  offensive  which  seems  to  be  a 
traditional  and  characteristic  trait  of  the  Spanish 
military  genius ;  but  it  may  probably  be  explained 
more  directly  by  their  lack  of  good  guns  and 
shortage  of  ammunition.  The  Morro  battery, 
just  east  of  the  Morro  Castle — which  latter  was 
armed  with  ancient  bronze  cannon — had  only  five 
guns  as  large  as  sixteen-centimetre  (six-inch)  cali 
bre,  and  these  were  muzzle-loaders.  The  Socapa 
battery,  on  the  other  side  of  the  entrance,  had  two 
good  sixteen-centimetre  Hontoria  guns,  taken 
from  the  cruiser  Reina  Mercedes.  Two  similar 
weapons,  together  with  two  howitzers  of  fifteen 
centimetres,  and  two  nine-centimetre  Krupp  guns, 
were  mounted  at  Punta  Gorda,  nearly  a  mile  up  the 
harbour.  There  were  other  small  batteries  along 
the  channel,  at  Estrella  Point  and  along  the  hill 
side  under  the  Socapa,  but  these  had  no  heavy 
guns.  The  guns  from  the  Mercedes  were  set  in 
place  during  the  first  two  weeks  of  June ;  later  in 
the  month  three  twenty-one-centimetre  howitzers 
were  mounted  at  the  Socapa  and  two  in  the  Morro 
battery. 


194 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


After  his  brief  and  cautious  bombardment  of 
May  3  ist,  Schley  had  reported  that  the  Spanish 
fortifications  were  "  well  provided  with  long-range 
guns  of  large  calibre."  Sampson  estimated  their 
strength  more  accurately  when  he  said,  in  the  in 
structions  he  issued  on  the  day  after  his  arrival 
(June  2d)  :  "  It  is  not  considered  that  the  shore  baf- 
teries  are  of  sufficient  power  to  do  any  material 
injury  to  battle  ships."  But  for  the  certainty  that 
the  channel  was  mined,  it  may  be  taken  for  granted 
that  the  admiral  would  speedily  have  forced  an  en 
trance  into  the  bay,  and  would  have  destroyed  or 
captured  Cervera's  fleet  without  waiting  for  the 
army.  No  doubt  he  remembered  Farragut's 
tk  Damn  the  torpedoes !  "  but  he  also  remembered 
the  fate  of  the  Maine — a  fate  that  probably  awaited 
the  first  ship  to  enter. 

It  is  noteworthy,  too,  that  the  Spaniards  never 
made  an  attempt  at  attacking  with  their  torpedo 
cruisers.  In  bolder  hands  these  might  have  proved 
dangerous  weapons,  and  in  the  early  days  of  the 
blockade  they  caused  much  anxiety.  '  The  end 
to  be  attained  justifies  the  risk  of  torpedo  attack, 
and  that  risk  must  be  taken,"  Sampson  said  in  an 
order  dated  June  7th.  There  were  several  false 
alarms.  The  first  was  on  the  night  of  May  2Qth, 
when  the  Vixen  signalled,  "  Enemy's  torpedo  boat 
sighted,"  and  after  some  random  firing  it  was  dis 
covered  that  the  supposed  torpedo  boat  was  a  train 
on  the  narrow-gauge  railway  that  runs  along  the 
beach  near  Fort  Aguadores.*  A  few  nights  later 
the  New  Orleans  gave  the  alarm,  and  a  stream  of 
shot  was  hurled  at  a  mysterious  dark  object,  which 
proved,  when  the  valorous  Yankee  dashed  in  to 
cut  off  its  retreat,  to  be  a  floating  mass  of  sea 
weed.  After  this,  Sampson's  perfecting  of  the 
blockade,  and  especially  his  effective  use  of  search- 

*  Reported  by  Captain  Higginson  of  the  Massachusetts,  August  5th. 


THE   BLOCKADE   OF   SANTIAGO 


195 


lights,  lessened  the  danger,  and  greatly  relieved  the 
strain  upon  his  crews. 

On  the  morning  of  the  Merrimac's  dramatic 
suicide  (June  3d)  Cadet  Powell's  steam  launch, 
though  it  was  observed  and  fired  at,  waited  off  the 
Morro  until  hope  for  the  escape  of  Hobson  and  his 
men  was  abandoned.  Their  fate  was  not  known  to 
the  fleet  till  the  afternoon,  when  a  Spanish  tug 
came  out  flying  a  flag  of  truce,  and  the  Vixen, 
which  Sampson  sent  to  meet  her,  found  that  she 
carried  Cervera's  chief  of  staff,  Captain  Busta- 
mente,  with  a  message  announcing  that  the  collier's 
crew  were  prisoners.  The  message,  sent  in  recog 
nition  of  the  dramatic  bravery  of  their  exploit,  was 
a  fine  piece  of  courtesy  on  the  part  of  the  Spanish 
admiral. 

With  the  powerful  fleet  now  under  his  com 
mand,  Sampson  was  not  content  with  merely  lying 
off  Santiago  and  waiting  for  the  Spanish  ships  to 
come  out.  His  next  moves  against  the  enemy  were 
his  bombardment  of  the  harbour  defences  on  June 
6th,  and  the  attack  on  Guantanamo  Bay  on  the  7th. 

The  former  was  intended  to  destroy  the  Span 
ish  batteries,  or  at  least  to  injure  and  weaken  them 
enough  to  make  it  safe  for  the  block- 

ading  squadron  to  close  in  around  the 
entrance  of  the  harbour.  The  admiral 
issued  an  order  of  battle  on  the  5th,  and  after  sun 
rise  the  next  morning  his  two  divisions  formed  in 
a  double  column,  heading  inshore.  At  twenty 
minutes  to  eight  a  tremendous  fire  was  opened  with 
every  gun  that  could  be  brought  to  bear,  Samp 
son's  ships,  on  the  east,  bombarding  the  Morro  and 
Fort  Aguadores,  about  three  miles  further  east; 
Schley's,  on  the  west,  devoting  their  attention  to 
the  Socapa. 

The  hail  of  projectiles  hurled  upon  the  Spanish 
batteries  during  the  next  three  hours  was  probably 
the  heaviest  ever  fired  from  the  guns  of  a  fleet,  not 


I0y6  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

excepting  the  British  bombardment  of  Alexandria 
in  1882.  Beginning  at  three  miles'  distance,  the 
ships  worked  in  until  they  were  within  two  thou 
sand  yards  of  the  forts,  where  they  used  their  rapid- 
fire  weapons  as  well  as  their  big  rifles,  about  two 
thousand  shots  being  fired  in  all.  It  was  a  still, 
misty  morning,  with  no  swell  to  disconcert  the 
American  gunners,  though  ,  heavy  showers  occa 
sionally  obscured  their  aim. 

In  the  afternoon  Sampson  reported  to  Wash 
ington  *  that  he  had  "  silenced  the  works  quickly 
without  injury  of  any  kind."  "  Silenced,"  in  the 
report  of  a  bombardment,  is,  of  course,  a  very  in 
definite  word.  It  may  merely  mean  that  the  gun 
ners  have  been  driven  to  shelter,  to  return  when  the 
enemy's  fire  ceases  ;  and  such  seems  to  have  been  the 
case  in  this  instance.  The  batteries  were  frequently 
hit — they  had  three  men  killed  and  forty  wounded, 
principally  in  the  Morro ;  but  little  or  no  injury  was 
done  to  the  guns.  It  was  a  signal  proof  of  the 
difficulty  of  firing  effectively  from  shipboard  upon 
fortifications  that  stand  high  above  the  water. 
Most  of  the  American  shells  shattered  themselves 
against  the  rocks  of  the  Morro  and  the  Socapa. 
Many  passed  over  the  heights,  and  fell  inland,  or 
in  the  waters  of  the  inner  bay.  Here,  indeed,  the 
principal  damage  was  done.  Most  of  the  village  on 
Smith  Key  was  destroyed,  some  of  its  inhabitants 
only  escaping  by  standing  waist  deep  in  the  water. 
The  Reina  Mercedes,  moored  near  the  key,  was 
struck  by  thirty-five  shells,  and  was  twice  set  on 
fire;  her  second  officer,  Commander  Acosta,  and 
five  seamen  were  killed,  and  twelve  wounded. 

The  reply  of  the  batteries  was  feeble  and  ineffec- 


*  Until  he  had  a  cable  station  at  Playa  del  Este,  on  Guantanamo 
Bay,  Sampson's  usual  method  of  communicating  with  Washington, 
while  off  Santiago,  was  by  sending  a  despatch  boat — which  sometimes, 
as  in  the  present  case,  was  a  newspaper  tug — to  the  Mole  St.  Nicholas, 
Haiti.  The  station  at  Playa  del  Este  was  opened  on  June  2ist. 


THE    BLOCKADE   OF   SANTIAGO 


I97 


tive.  The  six-inch  guns  in  the  Socapa  fired  forty- 
seven  shots,  those  at  Punta  Gorda,  which  seldom 
had  a  ship  in  line,  only  seven.  None  of  the 
American  vessels  was  injured,  though  the  Massa 
chusetts  was  hit  once,  and  another  shot  went 
through  her  flag. 

During  the  bombardment  the  Suwanee  entered 
the  mouth  of  the  small  harbour  of  Cabanas,  about  a 
mile  and  a  half  west  of  the  Socapa,  and  silenced 
a  battery  there.  In  the  afternoon  she  made  a  land 
ing  further  west,  at  Aserraderos,  where  for  three 
days  she  lay  landing  arms  and  ammunition  for  a 
Cuban  force  under  Colonel  Cebreco,  a  part  of  Gen 
eral  Jesus  Rabi's  brigade. 

This  communication  with  the  insurgents  led 
to  one  of  the  notable  individual  exploits  of  the  war. 
Commander  Delehanty  of  the  Su- 
Lieutenant  wance,  being  ordered  by  Sampson  to 
fxpioit*C<  ting  £et  positive-  assurance  of  the  presence 
June  u',  i2.  of  Cervera's  ships  in  the  blockaded 
harbour,*  and  believing,  as  he  after 
ward  reported,  that  "  reliable  information  could  not 
be  secured  through  the  insurgent  forces,  assigned 
the  task  to  his  second  officer,  Lieutenant  Victor 
Blue,  who  had  been  ashore,  only  a  few  days  be 
fore,  on  a  mission  to  the  Cubans  in  Matanzas  prov 
ince.  Wearing  his  uniform  and  side-arms,  Lieu 
tenant  Blue  landed  at  Aserraderos  on  the  nth  and 
went  inland  to  the  camp  of  General  Rabi,  who  fur 
nished  him  with  a  guide  and  a  mule,  and  sent  him 
on  to  an  insurgent  post  nearer  Santiago.  Here  he 
found  three  other  guides,  with  whom  he  made  his 
way  through  the  Spanish  lines  to  a  hilltop  over 
looking  the  bay,  where  he  could  see  vessels  that 
were  unmistakably  Cervera's.  He  was  back  at  Rabi's 
camp  on  the  evening  of  the  I2th,  and  reported  on 

*  The  information  was  urgently  needed  to  disprove  the  report  that 
some  of  the  Spanish  ships  had  escaped,  and  had  been  sighted  off  the 
north  coast  of  Cuba.  See  p.  210. 


10,8  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

the  Suwanee  next  morning,  after  a  daring  journey 
of  seventy  miles  through  the  enemy's  country. 

A  fortnight  later  (June  25th)  the  same  officer 
went  ashore  again,  as  Sampson  desired  once  more 
to  verify  the  position  of  the  enemy's  squadron. 
Again  he  accomplished  his  mission  successfully, 
though  his  journey  was  more  dangerous  than  be 
fore,  the  Spaniards  having  occupied  the  hills  west 
of  Santiago  in  force,  with  intrenched  lines  at  sev 
eral  points,  in  expectation  of  an  attack  from  that 
direction  by  American  troops. 

The  operations  in  Guantanamo  Bay,  which  be 
gan  on  June  7th,  marked  a  step  of  cardinal  impor 
tance  in  the  naval  campaign — the 
operations  in  securing  of  the  first  American  foot- 

Guantanamo  1      i  1  i         /---    i  A 

Bay,  June  7.  nold  on  the  Cuban  coast.  As  a  sta 
tion  for  coaling,  cable  communica 
tion,  and  refitting,  it  proved  to  be  of  the  greatest 
value  to  Sampson's  ships.  The  admiral  might  in 
deed  have  found  it  difficult,  or  even  impossible,  to 
maintain  an  effective  blockade  of  Santiago  had  Key 
West,  nearly  a  thousand  miles  away,  remained  his 
only  available  base.  Especially  would  it  have  been 
so  in  case  of  stormy  weather.  It  was  only  by  the 
good  fortune  which  seemed  to  follow  the  American 
forces  throughout  the  war  that  Sampson's  fleet, 
in  waters  notorious  for  their  hurricanes,  encoun 
tered  few  rough  seas  and  no  serious  gale. 

The  seizure  of  the  bay  had  figured,  no  doubt, 
in  the  war  plans  discussed  at  Washington  before 
hostilities  began ;  and  when  Cervera  was  shut  in 
at  Santiago  the  American  strategists  naturally 
turned  their  attention  to  the  convenient  harbour 
that  lies  some  thirty-five  miles  farther  east.*  On 
May  28th  Secretary  Long  suggested  its  capture, 

*  Guantanamo  Bay  (then  called  Walthenham  Bay)  was  the  base  of 
the  British  attack  upon  Santiago  in  1741,  under  General  Wentworth 
and  Admiral  Vernon.  The  expedition  failed  because  Wentworth 
found  it  impossible  to  move  his  troops,  who  suffered  terribly  from  sick 
ness,  through  the  difficult  country  between  the  bay  and  Santiago. 


THE    BLOCKADE   OF    SANTIAGO 


I99 


both  to  Sampson — then  at  Key  West — and  to 
Schley ;  and  on  the  29th  he  telegraphed  the  former 
that  Captain  Goodrich,  who  had  reconnoitred  the 
place  on  his  cable-cutting  expedition  (May  I9th), 
reported  the  Spanish  position  there  to  be  very  weak. 
"  The  seizure  of,  immediately,  is  recommended," 
the  secretary  added. 

Nor  was  it  necessary  to  call  upon  the  army  to 
supply  a  garrison ;  the  navy  had  at  hand  a  suf 
ficient  force  of  its  own.  As  long  ago  as  April  i6th 
— five  days  before  war  began — an  order  was  sent 
to  New  York  to  organize  a  marine  battalion  imme 
diately.  Just  six  days  later  the  battalion  started 
southward  on  the  transport  Panther — six  hundred 
and  forty-seven  officers  and  men,  commanded  by 
Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  W.  Huntington,  and  divided 
into  five  companies  of  infantry  and  one  of  artillery, 
with  four  small  rapid-fire  guns.  On  April  29th  it 
reached  Key  West,  where  it  was  held  in  readiness 
for  just  such  service  as  was  now  in  prospect  at 
Guantanamo. 

The  bay  of  Guantanamo  consists  of  an  outer 
and  an  inner  basin,  connected  by  a  narrow  channel 
running  through  a  cluster  of  islands.  When  the 
Marblehead  and  the  Yankee  entered  the  outer 
basin,  on  the  morning  of  June  7th,  they  found  that 
the  Spanish  defences  consisted  of  the  gunboat 
Sandoval,  which,  after  firing  a  few  shots,  retreated 
into  the  upper  harbour;  an  old  fort  on  Toro  Key, 
near  the  town  of  Caimanera,  which  was  speedily 
silenced ;  and  a  blockhouse,  near  the  cable  station 
at  Playa  del  Este  ("  Eastern  Shore  "),  which  was 
shelled  and  demolished.  The  American  ships  did 
not  follow  the  Sandoval,  as  the  entrance  of  the 
inner  bay  was  known  to  be  laid  with  mines,  and 
the  outer  basin  afforded  the  sheltered  anchorage 
that  Sampson  needed.  Their  task  done,  the  Yankee 
returned  to  Santiago,  while  the  Marblehead  re 
mained  to  secure  possession,  which  was  clinched 


200 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


on  the  loth,  when  the  Panther  arrived  from  Key 
West,  by  landing  the  marine  battalion. 

The  marines  pitched  their  camp — which  they 
named  Camp  McCalla,  after  the  commander  of  the 
Marblehead — on  the  ridge  above  the  cable  station, 


Inner        Bay 


Sketch  map  of  part  of  Guantanamo  Bay. 

where  the  demolished  blockhouse  had  stood.  The 
site  chosen  was  not  an  easy  one  to  defend,  being 
conspicuously  set  in  a  clearing  on  the  brow  of  the 
ridge,  which  was  commanded  by  a  higher  hill  a 
little  farther  inland,  while  a  dense  growth  of 


THE    BLOCKADE   OF   SANTIAGO  2QI 

manigua  scrub,  affording  perfect  cover,  came  up 
within  fifty  yards  of  the  tents.  Apparently  no 
attack  was  expected ;  no  trenches  were  dug,  and 
the  artillery  was  not  sent  ashore. 

Under  the  fire  of  the  ships  the  Spaniards  had 
withdrawn  from  the  neighbourhood,  but  in  the 
evening  of  the  I2th  they  returned,  and  from  the 
safe  cover  of  the  bushes  opened  a  galling  fire  that 
never  ceased  for  three  days  and  nights.  The 
marines'  position  was  a  trying  one;  they  had  no 
shelter  and  could  get  no  rest ;  and  had  the  enemy's 
marksmanship  been  better  they  must  have  suffered 
severely.  Their  rapid-fire  guns  were  landed  on  the 
1 2th,  but  it  was  difficult  to  reply  effectively  to  the 
fire  of  the  Spanish  sharpshooters,  whose  smokeless 
powder  gave  little  sign  of  their  whereabouts.  That 
night  the  enemy  came  in  some  force  up  to  the  edge 
of  the  clearing,  but  did  not  attempt  to  rush  the 
camp — perhaps  owing  to  the  furious  firing  of  the 
marines,  who,  almost  exhausted  by  the  strain,  ob 
served  no  fire  discipline,  and  poured  away  their 
ammunition  in  a  wild  fusillade. 

On  the  next  day  (June  I3th)  shelter  trenches 
were  dug,  and  some  Cubans  came  into  camp  with 
useful  reports  of  the  enemy's  movements.  Acting 
on  their  information,  Captain  George  F.  Elliott  was 
sent  out,  on  the  I4th,  with  two  companies  of 
marines  and  fifty  Cubans,  to  destroy  a  well  from 
which  the  Spaniards  had  been  drawing  their  water 
supply.  Captain  Elliott  marched  six  miles  through 
the  scrub,  in  a  heat  so  intense  that  twenty-three  of  his 
men  were  prostrated,  though  all  of  them  recovered ; 
and  not  only  did  he  succeed  in  choking  the  well,  but 
he  attacked  and  routed  a  Spanish  force  whose  num 
bers  were  variously  reported  at  from  two  hundred 
to  five  hundred,  killing  forty  or  more  of  them,  tak 
ing  eighteen  prisoners,  and  capturing  a  heliograph 
signal  apparatus.  The  prisoners,  who  belonged  to 
the  Sixty-fourth  Regiment  of  the  line,  told  their 


202  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

captors  that  the  soldiers  at  Guantanamo  had  only 
rice  for  rations,  and  had  six  months'  pay  due  them. 

As  the  Spaniards  were  bringing  reinforcements 
over  the  bay  from  Caimanera,  Sampson  next  day 
(June  1 5th)  detached  the  Texas  and  the  Suwanee 
to  join  the  Marblehead  in  an  attack  upon  the  de 
fences  of  the  inner  bay,  and — if  it  could  be  reached 
— upon  the  Sandoval,  which  had  been  carrying  the 
troops  across.  The  ships  bombarded  the  fort  on 
Toro  Key  till  there  was  nothing  left  to  fire  at,  but 
did  not  venture  to  run  over  the  mines  into  the 
inner  bay,  and  the  gunboat  again  escaped.  In 
passing  through  the  channel  west  of  Hospital 
Key,  both  the  Texas  and  the  Marblehead  had 
already  risked  serious  injury  or  even  destruction. 
Each  struck  her  propeller  against  a  contact  mine, 
which  failed  to  explode  only  because  it  was  in- 
crusted  with  a  thick  growth  of  barnacles.  Grati 
tude  for  the  vessels'  escape  may  fairly  be  divided 
between  "  divine  care,"  to  which  the  gallant  and 
devout  Captain  Philip  attributed  it  in  his  report, 
and  the  Spaniards'  neglect  to  maintain  a  proper  in 
spection  of  their  defences.  A  number  of  these  tor 
pedoes,  which  were  of  French  manufacture,  and 
contained  forty-six  and  a  half  kilogrammes  (one 
hundred  and  two  pounds)  of  guncotton,  were  after 
ward  dragged  up  in  the  channel. 

Besides  destroying  the  Toro  Key  fort,  the  men- 
of-war  shelled  Point  Hicacal,  from  which  some  in 
fantry  had  fired  on  them.  The  operation  was 
repeated  on  the  I7th,  and  the  point  was  swept  so 
clear  of  cover  that  the  Spaniards  made  no  further 
attempt  to  hold  it. 

The  whole  loss  of  the  marines,  during  ten  days 
of  more  or  less  constant  fighting,  was  six  killed 
and  sixteen  wounded,  among  the  former  being 
Surgeon  John  Blair  Gibbs,  a  New  York  physician 
of  high  professional  standing,  who  had  sought  serv 
ice  from  patriotic  motives.  The  first  three  to  lose 


THE   BLOCKADE   OF   SANTIAGO 


203 


their  lives  were  a  sergeant  and  two  privates  who 
went  into  the  bush  as  a  scouting  party,  and  when 
their  bodies  were  found  it  was  thought  that  they 
had  been  mutilated  by  the  enemy.  It  was  unfor 
tunate  that  this  shocking  allegation — too  shocking 
to  be  credible  in  a  war  with  a  civilized  foe — found 
its  wray  into  the  official  reports,  being  forwarded  by 
Commander  McCalla  to  Admiral  Sampson,  and  by 
him  to  Washington,  where  of  course  it  aroused 
widespread  horror  and  indignation.  The  charge 
was  afterward  retracted,  the  apparent  mutilation 
being  attributed  to  the  effect  of  Mauser  bullets  at 
short  range.  The  fact,  so  well  established  later, 
that  the  small-calibre  projectile  fired  by  the  Spanish 
rifle  inflicts  a  remarkably  clean  wound,  makes  it 
seem  more  probable  that  the  ghastly  work  was  done 
by  some  of  those  gruesome  scavengers  of  Cuba — 
the  buzzards  or  the  land  crabs. 

The  Spanish  forces  at  Guantanamo  and  Caima- 
nera,  numbering  some  seven  thousand  men  under 
General  Felix  Pareja,  were  known  to  be  in  great 
straits  for  food.  The  stories  told  by  the  marines' 
prisoners  were  confirmed  by  a  letter  sent  by  General 
Pareja  to  Santiago,  and  intercepted  by  the  Cubans, 
who  hanged  the  messenger.  It  told  how  on  the  7th 
seven  ships — the  general's  enemies  multiplied  like 
Falstaff's  men  in  buckram — had  attacked  Playa  del 
Este ;  that  his  guns  were  not  powerful  enough  to 
make  any  effective  defence ;  and  that  "  the  Ameri 
can  squadron  in  possession  of  the  outer  bay  has 
taken  it  as  if  for  a  harbour  of  rest,  they  having 
anchored  as  if  in  one  of  their  own  ports."  As  to 
his  own  situation  the  general  said  : 

The  forces  of  the  brigade  here  are  in  good  spirits. 
I  continue  serving  out  half  rations  of  everything,  and  in 
that  way  I  expect  to  reach  only  the  end  of  the  month, 
above  all  in  bread,  as  I  have  no  flour  of  any  kind,  and 
no  way  of  getting  any,  on  account  of  there  having  been 
no  corn  for  some  time.  Quinine  for  the  hospitals  the 
same.  Town  in  needful  circumstances. 
14 


CHAPTER   XI 

THE  SANTIAGO   EXPEDITION 

UP  to  this  point  the  navy,  on  the  American  side, 
had  been  practically  the  sole  actor  on  the  stage  of 
war.  The  army  missed  its  chance  of  an  early  blow 
at  the  enemy,  as  has  already  been  told,  by  its  un 
readiness  for  immediate  action ;  but  when  the  plans 
for  an  attack  upon  Havana  were  perforce  postponed, 
the  organization  of  an  invading  force  was  still 
pushed  as  energetically  as  possible.  Besides  this  im 
mediate  task,  the  powers  of  the  War  Department 
were  tremendously  taxed  by  the  rapid  increase  of 
the  volunteer  forces,  and  the  necessity  for  furnishing 
the  recruits  with  equipments.  The  full  nominal 
strength  of  the  army  mounted  within  five  weeks 
from  less  than  30,000  to  a  little  more  than  280,000. 
The  first  call  for  125,000  volunteers  was  followed  by 
another  (May  25th)  for  75,000  more,  and  Congress 
authorized  the  enlistment  of  four  special  forces — ten 
regiments  of  volunteer  infantry  composed  of  "  im- 
munes,"  or  men  not  liable  to  yellow-fever  infection ; 
three  regiments  of  cavalry,  one  of  which  was  to  be 
come  famous  as  the  "  Rough  Riders  " ;  a  volunteer 
signal  corps,  and  an  engineer  brigade  of  3,500  men. 

The  actual  enlisted  strength  rose  very  close  to 
the  same  figure,  reaching,  in  August,  a  maximum  of 
58,688  regulars  and  216,029  volunteers,  or  274,717 
in  all.  Less  than  one  fifth  of  this  great  army  saw 
service  in  the  field — a  fact  which  certainly  justifies 
the  opinion  of  the  commanding  general,  whose 
plans,  submitted  shortly  before  the  war  began,  sug- 
204 


THE   SANTIAGO   EXPEDITION 


205 


gested  the  immediate  calling  out  of  50,000  volun 
teers,  with  40,000  more  to  be  held  in  reserve  and  to 
garrison  coast  defences.  General  Miles,  to  use  his 
own  words,  "  deemed  it  of  the  first  importance  to 
well  equip  such  a  force,  rather  than  to  partly  equip 
a  much  larger  number  "  ;  but  his  views  were  over 
ruled — not  for  the  only  time  in  the  campaign. 

At  the  end  of  May  the  War  Department  began  to 
collect  its  fleet  of  transports  at  Tampa,  where  about 
16,000  troops  (the  Fifth  Corps,  com- 
rbFaiSae  manded  by  Major-General  Shafter) 
were  encamped,  with  as  many  more 
within  easy  reach  at  Fernandina  and  Mobile,  be 
sides  some  40,000  at  Chickamauga.  On  May  24th 
Sampson  was  instructed — somewhat  prematurely 
— to  be  prepared  to  convoy  forty  troopships, 
carrying  30,000  men,  to  Cuba.  Three  days  later 
the  estimate  of  the  force  prepared  to  move  sud 
denly  dropped  to  10,000,  and  Secretary  Long  cabled 
to  Schley,  who  was  supposed  to  be  blockading  San 
tiago,  that  if  Cervera's  squadron  was  in  the  harbour 

immediate  movement  against  it  and  the  town  will  be 
made  by  the  navy  and  division  of  about  ten  thousand  men 
of  the  American  troops,  which  are  ready  to  embark. 

A  similar  despatch  was  sent  to  Sampson,  then  at 
Key  West : 

If  the  Spanish  division  is  proved  to  be  in  Santiago 
de  Cuba  it  is  the  intention  of  the  department  to  make 
descent  immediately  upon  that  port  with  ten  thousand 
men,  United  States  troops.  You  will  be  expected  to  con 
voy  transports,  probably  fifteen  or  twenty,  going  in  per 
son  and  taking  with  you  the  New  York  and  Indiana  and 
the  Oregon,  and  as  many  smaller  vessels  with  good  bat 
teries  as  can  possibly  be  gathered,  to  guard  against  pos 
sible  attack  by  Spanish  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  etc. 

Rut  Sampson  could  not  wait  for  the  unready  expe 
dition,  and  sailed  for  Santiago  on  the  29th,*  leaving 
the  Indiana  for  convoy  duty.  Two  days  later  a  de- 

*  Page  1 80. 


2o6  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

spatch  was  sent  after  him,  from  Washington,  telling 
him  that  25,000  men  were  "  now  embarking  at 
Tampa."  On  June  3d,  however,  he  was  informed 
that  "  General  Shafter  expects  to  start  from  Tampa 
on  June  4th  with  18,000  or  20,000  men." 

To  these  puzzling  messages  Sampson  replied,  on 
the  4th,  with  a  telegram  giving  information  of  the 
Spanish  forces  at  Santiago,*  and  continuing : 

With  superior  force  and  insurgent  forces,  which  are 
ready,  though  mostly  needing  arms,  Santiago  de  Cuba 
must  fall,  together  with  ships  in  port,  which  can  not  be 
entered  against  obstructions  and  mines. 

To  his  report  of  the  bombardment  of  June  6th  the 
admiral  added  (June  /th) : 

If  ten  thousand  men  were  here,  city  and  fleet  would 
be  ours  within  forty-eight  hours.  Every  consideration 

*  This  telegram  appears  in  three  different  forms  in  the  printed  re 
ports  of  the  War  and  Navy  Departments.  In  Sampson's  report  the 
estimate  of  the  Spanish  force  is  given  thus:  "Have  received  reliable 
information  from  Cuban  officers  the  Spanish  force  in  this  vicinity  of 
Santiago  consists  of  7,000  men,  intrenched  in  Juraguacito  and  Daiquiri ; 
5,000  men  in  Santiago  de  Cuba ;  in  Morro  de  Cuba,  400  men  ;  at  other 
points  in  the  bay,  100  men,  with  small  rapid-fire  gun  and  submarine 
mines  at  various  points." 

In  the  Bureau  of  Navigation's  report  on  "  Operations  in  Conjunc 
tion  with  the  Army,"  the  figures  appear  thus  :  "  7,000  men  intrenched 
in  Juraguacito  and  Daiquiri,  5,000  men  at  Morro  de  Cuba,  400  men  at 
other  points  in  the  bay,  500  men  with  small  Hotchkiss  37  mm.  rapid- 
fire  guns,  and  submarine  mines  at  various  points." 

In  the  Secretary  of  War's  report  they  are  given  as  "  7,000  men  in 
trenched  in  Juraquacito  and  Daiquiri ;  5,000  at  Morron  de  Cuba  ;  4,000 
at  other  points  ;  in  bay  500,  with  small  Hotchkiss  gun." 

It  would  appear  that  the  wording  of  an  official  cipher  despatch  is 
not  so  fixed  and  unalterable  a  thing  as  might  be  supposed.  Perhaps 
none  of  these  variant  versions  gives  the  admiral's  estimate  exactly  as  he 
intended  it.  It  seems  improbable  that  7,000  men  would  be  located  in 
Juraguacito  and  Daiquiri,  when  the  Spanish  commander  was  of  course 
unaware  that  Shafter  would  land  in  that  quarter,  and  was  preparing, 
as  Lieutenant  Blue  found,  to  resist  an  attack  on  the  other  side  of  Santi 
ago.  It  may  perhaps  be  conjectured  that  Sampson  meant  7,000  to  be 
his  figure  for  the  whole  force  of  the  Spaniards.  Other  reasons  for  this 
supposition  are,  first,  that  7,000  was  very  near  their  actual  strength  ; 
second,  that  it  agrees  well  enough  with  the  admiral's  estimate  (reported 
June  nth)  of  about  12,000  regulars  and  3,000  militia  between  Santiago 
and  Guantanamo ;  and  third,  that  in  speaking  of  the  American  expe 
dition  he  uses  the  terms  "  superior  force  "  in  one  despatch,  and  "  10,000 
men  "  in  another,  as  if  synonymous — the  inference  being  that  he  be 
lieved  the  Spaniards  to  have  less  than  10,000. 


THE   SANTIAGO   EXPEDITION 


207 


demands  immediate  army  movement.  If  delayed,  city  will 
be  defended  more  strongly  by  guns  taken  from  fleet. 

Sampson  has  been  criticised  for  this  misleading  esti 
mate,  as  it  has  been  termed,  of  the  task  Shafter  had 
to  undertake.  It  may  be  answered  that  "  ten  thou 
sand  men  "  was  not  his  own  suggestion  for  the 
strength  of  the  expedition;  it  was  the  figure  given 
him  from  Washington  as  far  back  as  May  27th. 
Moreover,  the  delay  that  followed  strengthened  the 
enemy's  position,  as  he  had  foretold. 

The  delay  was  a  disconcerting  one  to  the  navy, 
as  vessels  for  the  convoy  had  been  withdrawn  from 
the  blockade,  and  were  lying  idle  at  Key  West.  On 
the  5th  Sampson  telegraphed  to  Washington  that  it 
was  "  very  important  we  should  know  immediately 
whether  the  army  expedition  has  sailed."  The  Navy 
Department  forwarded  the  message  to  the  War  De 
partment,  and  suggested  "  that  urgent  measures  be 
taken  to  terminate  the  present  delay." 

Affairs  at  Tampa  were  in  a  state  of  almost  inex 
tricable  confusion.  "  The  capacity  of  the  place  had 
been  greatly  exceeded,"  as  General  Shafter  very 
conservatively  phrased  it.  The  port  was  approached 
by  a  single-track  railroad,  which  proved  unequal 
to  the  demands  upon  it.  For  miles  the  line  was 
choked  with  freight  cars,  which  could  not  be  un 
loaded  with  any  promptitude.  Few  had  labels  show 
ing  their  contents,  and  consignments  could  not  be 
found  when  wanted.  There  were  instances  of  pro 
visions  spoiling  on  the  railway  while  soldiers  suf 
fered  from  insufficient  rations,  and  some  of  the  vol 
unteers  were  actually  seen  begging  for  food  in  the 
streets.  No  storage  facilities  had  been  provided. 
The  little  local  post  office  was  overwhelmed  with 
the  sudden  increase  of  business,  and  could  not  dis 
tribute  the  freight  bills.  At  Port  Tampa,  where 
about  thirty  transports  had  been  collected  by  the 
end  of  May,  the  docking  space  was  limited,  there 
being  wharf  room  for  only  eight  vessels ;  the  chan- 


208  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

nel  was  narrow  and  overcrowded,  and  one  ship,  the 
Florida,  was  disabled  by  a  collision  while  loading. 

It  was  useless  to  send  urgent  messages  from 
Washington ;  the  officers  in  charge  of  loading  the 
transports  toiled  day  and  night,  but  their  best  exer 
tions  were  sorely  handicapped  by  the  adverse  con 
ditions  under  which  they  had  to  work — conditions 
due,  primarily,  to  a  lack  of  systematic  and  intelligent 
prevision  on  the  part  of  those  responsible  -for  the 
equipment  of  the  troops.  One  of  the  heads  of  the 
army  staff  subsequently  testified  before  the  commis 
sion  that  investigated  the  conduct  of  the  campaign, 
that  when,  war  being  imminent,  he  suggested  the 
purchase  of  supplies  for  his  branch  of  the  service,  he 
was  informed  that  "  the  policy  was  to  wait " — a 
policy  curiously  suggestive  of  the  Spanish  motto  of 
"  mafiana."  At  the  same  time,  much  of  the  blame 
may  fairly  be  traced  to  Congress,  with  its  eagerness 
for  hostilities,  and  its  persistent  refusal  to  provide  a 
military  organization  adequate  to  the  needs  of  war. 

On  May  3Oth  General  Miles  left  Washington  to 
give  his  personal  assistance  to  the  task  of  embark 
ing  the  expedition.  From  Tampa  he  telegraphed  to 
the  War  Department  (June  5th) : 

This  expedition  has  been  delayed  through  no  fault  of 
any  one  connected  with  it.  It  contains  the  principal  part 
of  the  army,*  which  for  intelligence  and  efficiency  is  not 
exceeded  by  any  body  of  troops  on  earth.  It  contains 
fourteen  of  the  best-conditioned  regiments  of  volunteers, 
the  last  of  which  arrived  this  morning.  Yet  these  have 
never  been  under  fire.  Between  thirty  and  forty  per  cent 
are  undrilled,  and  in  one  regiment  over  three  hundred 
men  had  never  fired  a  gun.  .  .  .  This  enterprise  is  so 
important  that  I  desire  to  go  with  this  army  corps  or  to 
immediately  organize  another  and  go  with  it  to  join  this 
and  capture  position  number  2.f 

The  answer  to  General  Miles's  request  for  serv 
ice  was  an  inquiry  how  soon  he  could  have  an  ex 
peditionary  force  ready  for  Porto  Rico.  It  is 

*  That  is,  the  regular  army.  t  Porto  Rico. 


THE   SANTIAGO   EXPEDITION 


209 


scarcely  strange  that  there  should  have  been  some 
impatience  at  Washington,  as  appears  in  the  per 
emptory  order  transmitted  to  Shafter  by  Secretary 
Alger  on  June  7th : 

The  President  directs  you  to  sail  at  once  with  what 
force  you  have  ready. 

Shafter's  reply  was :  "  I  will  sail  to-morrow 
morning.  Steam  can  not  be  gotten  up  earlier " ; 
and  Miles  added : 

From  the  commanding  general  down  to  the  drummer 
boys,  every  one  is  impatient  to  go,  and  annoyed  at  the 
delay. 

On  the  8th  nearly  sixteen  thousand  men  were 
on  board  the  transports,  and  the  fleet  was  actually 
under  way  for  Key  West,  when  there  came  an  un 
expected  and  unfortunate  interruption. 

The    converted    yacht    Eagle,    after    her    brief 

service  with  the  Flying  Squadron,*  had  rejoined 

the   north   coast   blockade.      On   the 

The  Eagle  night  of  June  7th   she  was  cruising 

sights  a  phan-         .     °  t         XT^  .«'/•«  ,  ,  .  6 

tom  fleet, June  7.  m  tne  Nicholas  Channel,  when  she 
sighted  a  strange  ship,  which  did  not 
answer  her  signals.  She  ran  nearer,  and  made  out 
four  vessels,  two  large  and  two  small,  heading  east 
ward  in  column,  with  no  lights  showing  except  one 
at  the  stern  of  each  ship.  For  more  than  half  an 
hour  she  watched  them,  steaming  parallel  with  their 
course,  and  within  a  mile  of  them ;  and  as  the  private 
night  signal  had  been  made  twice  without  bringing 
a  reply — "  an  omission*"  says  her  commander,  Lieu 
tenant  Southerland,  "  which  would  have  been  almost 
criminal  in  a  United  States  man-of-war  " — it  was 
concluded  that  the  four  vessels  were  enemies.  The 
Eagle  was  headed  for  Key  West,  and  Commodore 
Remey,  in  command  there,  at  once  informed  Wash 
ington  of  the  news  she  brought : 

*  Page  176. 


2io  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Spanish  armoured  cruiser,  Spanish  cruiser  second- 
class,  and  Spanish  torpedo-boat  destroyers  seen  by  Eagle 
near  Nicholas  Channel,  Cuba.  Delay  convoy. 

It  scarcely  seemed  possible  that  four  of  Cervera's 
ships  had  slipped  out  and  escaped  Sampson's  vigi 
lant  watch,  or  that  another  squadron,  of  whose  move 
ments  the  American  strategists  had  no  information, 
had  arrived  from  Spain ;  and  the  Eagle's  disturbing 
statement  might  have  been  dismissed  at  once  had  it 
not  been  confirmed  by  the  Resolute,  which  came 
into  Key  West  a  few  hours  later  and  reported  that 
she  had  been  chased  by  four  strange  vessels,  near 
the  scene  of  Lieutenant  Southerland's  nocturnal 
adventure.  It  was  manifestly  unsafe  to  send  out  a 
fleet  of  unprotected  transports  loaded  with  troops, 
when  hostile  war  ships  were  directly  in  their  path, 
and  on  receipt  of  the  news  from  Remey  Secretary 
Alger  at  once  telegraphed  to  Shafter  (June  8th) : 

Wait  until  you  get  further  orders  before  you  sail. 
Answer  quick. 

Shafter's  answer,  sent  the  same  afternoon,  was: 

Message  received.  Vessels  are  in  the  stream,  but  will 
be  able  to  stop  them  before  reaching  the  Gulf. 

The  transports  were  recalled,  and  the  vessels 
waiting  at  Key  West  to  convoy  them  were  ordered 
out  to  cruise  in  search  of  the  mysterious  Spanish 
squadron.  No  trace  of  it  cou^d  be  found.  Sampson, 
when  he  heard  of  it,  promptly  declared  it  a  myth, 
and  cabled  his  opinion  to  Secretary  Long.  He 
cited  another  case  of  false  alarm — a  double  one — 
that  had  just  come  under  his  notice.  The  Yankee, 
returning  to  Santiago  from  the  Mole  St.  Nicholas, 
had  reported  that  on  the  night  of  the  Qth  she  passed 
"  a  squadron  of  eight  vessels,  one  of  which  was  a 
battle  ship."  The  "  eight  vessels  "  proved  to  be  the 
Resolute  (an  Old  Dominion  liner)  and  five  smaller 
auxiliaries,  one  of  which — the  Scorpion — -had 
sighted  the  Yankee  and  fired  upon  her,  mistaking 


THE    SANTIAGO   EXPEDITION  211 

her  for  a  Spanish  torpedo-boat  destroyer.  "  This/' 
said  Sampson,  "  shows  how  easily  the  most  experi 
enced  may  be  deceived  at  night  at  sea  " ;  and  he 
telegraphed  to  Washington  (June  loth) : 

Have  no  confidence  in  the  report  of  Eagle  as  to  na 
tionality  or  character  of  the  vessels,  and  consider  very  un 
wise  to  suspend  operations  on  this  account.  Armoured 
vessel  was  probably  Talbot  [a  British  cruiser].  .  .  .  De 
lay  seems  to  me  most  unfortunate. 

And  again  the  following  day : 

The  vessels  seen  by  the  Eagle  were  the  Armeria, 
Scorpion,  and  Supply.  They  were  in  just  that  position  at 
time  named. 

On  the  1 3th  Lieutenant  Blue's  daring  expedition 
enabled  the  admiral  to  report  positively  that  Cer- 
vera's  six  ships  were  still  in  Santiago  harbour.  By 
this  time  the  transports  were  once  more  under 
orders  to  sail,  and  some  of  them  started  that  after 
noon,  the  rest  getting  under  way  on  the  i/j-th. 

Campaigns  are  not  won  by  commanders  who 
never  make  a  mistake  and  by  armies  whose  organi 
zation  is  faultless,  for  such  commanders  and  such 
armies  do  not  exist.  Warfare — even  victorious  war 
fare — with  all  its  outward  show  of  pomp  and  glory, 
generally  proves  on  closer  acquaintance  to  be  more 
full  of  blunders  and  errors  than  of  brilliant  achieve 
ments.  Shafter's  expedition  against  Santiago  was 
successful — sweepingly  successful — not  because  its 
management  was  without  blot  or  blemish,  but  be 
cause  it  fought  with  unsurpassed  valour  against  an 
enemy  inferior  in  numbers  and  weaker  in  resources. 

Its  embarkation  was  of  a  piece  with  the  state  of 
confusion  characteristic  of  the  camp  at  Tampa.  The 
transports,  which  had  been  fitted  out  for  the  much 
shorter  voyage  to  Havana,  proved  unable  to  accom 
modate  anything  like  the  number  of  men  for  which 
they  had  been  rated.*  The  degree  of  system  in 

*  "The  quarter  master-general  was  not  told  in  advance  of  the  pro 
posed  size  of  Shafter's  expedition,  or  its  destination.     Had  it  been 


212  THE   SPANISH- AMERICAN   WAR 

the  assignment  of  troops  to  the  different  ships 
may  be  judged  from  the  statement  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Roosevelt  that  when  the  depot  quarter 
master  allotted  a  transport  to  the  Rough  Riders, 
he  found  that  the  same  vessel  had  already  been 
allotted  to  two  other  regiments ;  and  when  she 
came  up  to  the  wharf  there  was  an  exciting  race  to 
seize  her. 

The  commissary  supplies  taken  with  the  expedi 
tion  were  ample  in  quantity,  though  the  quality  of 
some  of  them  has  been  a  subject  of  controversy. 
There  was  plenty  of  ammunition  for  the  small  artil 
lery  force.  The  medical  stores  were  found  inade 
quate.  Only  three  ambulances  were  embarked ;  the 
surgeon-general's  orders  prescribed  two  for  each 
regiment,  but  Colonel  Jacobs,  chief  quartermaster  of 
the  corps,  testified  that  the  commanding  general 
ordered  them  left  behind.*  Before  blaming  Shafter 
for  what  proved  to  be  a  serious  omission,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  his  orders  to  hurry  were  impera 
tive,  and  that  space  on  the  transports  was  at  a  pre 
mium.  Practically  nothing  had  been  done  to  fit 
the  clothing  of  the  troops  for  service  in  the  tropics, 
and  the  regulars  went  to  Cuba  in  the  uniforms  they 
had  perhaps  been  wearing,  two  months  before,  in 
Dakota  or  Montana.  Some  of  the  regiments  carried 
overcoats  as  well  as  blankets. 

There  are  discrepancies  in  different  accounts  of 
the  expedition's  equipment,  due,  apparently,  to  the 
difficulty  of  exact  knowledge  as  to  what  was  taken 

done,  there  would  have  been  a  vast  difference  in  the  war-transportation 
work." — Statement  of  Colonel  Bell,  of  the  transportation  division  of 
the  quartermaster-general's  office,  before  the  War  Investigation  Com 
mission,  December  2,  1808. 

*  Lieutenant  Miley  (In  Cuba  with  Shafter,  p.  44")  states  that  seven 
ambulances  were  taken  ;  so  does  the  report  of  Quartermaster-General 
Ludington  ;  but  Surgeon -General  Sternberg's  report  gives  the  number 
as  three,  and  the  report  of  the  War  Investigation  Commission  (p.  84^ 
adopts  his  figure.  Shatter's  report  assorts  that  "  as  many  were  taken 
as  was  thought  necessary,  judging  from  previous  campaigns."  The 
general  fails  to  specify  which  campaigns  justified  him  in  landing  an 
army  of  invasion  practically  without  ambulances. 


THE   SANTIAGO   EXPEDITION  213 

and  what  left  behind,  and  what,  after  being  carried 
to  Santiago,  was  sent  north  again  without  being  un 
loaded.  Even  the  number  of  men  who  sailed  is 
variously  stated.  General  Shafter's  official  report 
puts  it  at  815  officers  and  16,072  men.  General 
Miles,  who  was  at  Tampa,  reported  803  officers  and 
14,935  men.  The  figure  given  by  Secretary  Alger 
to  the  War  Investigation  Commission  was  16,988. 
Lieutenant  Miley,  of  Shafter's  staff — a  careful  and 
well-informed  statistician  —  says  819  officers  and 
15,058  men.* 

The  corps  consisted  of  the  following  com 
mands  : 

FIRST   DIVISION   (BRIGADIER-GENERAL   KENT) 

First  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  Hawkins). — 
Sixth  Infantry  (Lieutenant-Colonel  Egbert),  Six 
teenth  Infantry  (Colonel  Theaker),  and  Seventy- 
first  New  York  Volunteers  (Colonel  Downs). 

Second  Brigade  (Colonel  Pearson). — Second  In 
fantry  (Lieutenant-Colonel  Wherry),  Tenth  Infantry 
(Lieutenant-Colonel  Kellogg),  and  Twenty-first  In 
fantry  (Lieutenant-Colonel  McKibbin). 

Third  Brigade  (Colonel  Wikoff). — Ninth  Infan 
try  (Lieutenant-Colonel  Ewers),  Thirteenth  Infan 
try  (Lieutenant-Colonel  Worth),  and  Twenty-fourth 
Infantry  (Lieutenant-Colonel  Liscum). 

SECOND    DIVISION    (BRIGADIER-GENERAL    LAWTON) 

First  Brigade  (Colonel  Van  Horn). — Eighth  In 
fantry  (Major  Conrad),  Twenty-second  Infantry 
(Lieutenant-Colonel  Patterson),  and  Second  Massa 
chusetts  Volunteers  (Colonel  Clark). 

Second  Brigade  (Colonel  Miles). — First  Infantry 
(Lieutenant-Colonel  Bisbee),  Fourth  Infantry 
(Lieutenant-Colonel  Bainbridge),  and  Twenty-fifth 
Infantry  (Lieutenant-Colonel  Daggett). 

*  In  Cuba  with  Shafter,  p.  44. 


214 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


Third  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  Chaffee). — 
Seventh  Infantry  (Colonel  Benham),  Twelfth  Infan 
try  (Lieutenant-Colonel  Comba),  and  Seventeenth 
Infantry  (Lieutenant-Colonel  Haskell). 

CAVALRY   DIVISION    (MAJOR-GENERAL  WHEELER) 

First  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  Sumner). — 
Third  Cavalry  (Major  Wessels),  Sixth  Cavalry 
(Lieutenant-Colonel  Carroll),  and  Ninth  Cavalry 
(Lieutenant-Colonel  Hamilton). 

Second  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  Young). — 
First  Cavalry  (Lieutenant-Colonel  Viele),  Tenth 
Cavalry  (Major  Norvell),  and  First  Volunteer  Cav 
alry,  popularly  designated  as  the  Rough  Riders 
(Colonel  Leonard  Wood). 

The  cavalry  division  sailed  without  horses,  be 
cause  there  was  no  room  for  them  on  the  transports, 
and  because  it  was  reported,  quite  correctly,  that 
mounted  troops  would  be  of  little  use  in  the  rough 
country  around  Santiago.  The  animals  were  left 
at  Tampa,  and  only  two  squadrons  (about  five  hun 
dred  men)  of  each  regiment  went  to  Cuba.  Armed 
with  their  cavalry  carbines,  the  three  thousand  men 
of  the  division  fought  as  infantry  throughout  the 
campaign. 

There  were  four  light  batteries :  Batteries  E 
(Captain  Capron)  and  K  (Captain  Best)  of  the  First 
Artillery,  and  A  (Captain  Grimes)  and  F  (Captain 
Parkhurst)  of  the  Second  Artillery.  Each  consisted 
of  four  three-inch  guns,  and  all  were  under  the  com 
mand  of  Major  Dillenback,  of  the  Second  Artillery. 
There  were  also  Batteries  G  (Captain  Ennis)  and  H 
(Captain  Cummins)  of  the  Fourth  Artillery,  each 
equipped  with  two  five-inch  siege  rifles  and  four 
3. 6-inch  mortars ;  and  two  machine-gun  detach 
ments,  one  of  four  Catlings,  commanded  by  Lieu 
tenant  Parker,  of  the  Thirteenth  Infantry,  and  one 
of  an  equal  number  of  one-pound  Hotchkiss  guns, 
manned  by  men  of  the  Tenth  Cavalry,  under  Lieu- 


THE   SANTIAGO   EXPEDITION  215 

tenant  Hughes.  Besides  these,  the  Rough  Riders 
had  two  rapid-fire  Colts,  presented  by  members  of 
the  regiment,  and  a  dynamite  gun. 

An  engineer  battalion,  under  Captain  Burr,  ac 
companied  the  expedition,  as  did  also  a  signal  corps 
and  balloon  detachment  commanded  by  Major 
Greene.  An  entire  division  of  infantry — Brigadier- 
General  Snyder's — consisting  of  volunteer  regi 
ments,  was  left  at  Tampa  for  lack  of  ships  to  carry 
it  and  time  to  embark  it.  To  make  up  for  this,  a 
detachment  was  shipped  from  Mobile,  which  in 
cluded  the  Third  Infantry  (Colonel  Page),  the 
Twentieth  Infantry  (Major  McCaskey),  and  Major 
Rafferty's  squadron  of  the  Second  Cavalry, 
mounted — the  only  mounted  cavalry  in  the  expedi 
tion.  It  formed  an  independent  brigade,  under  the 
command  of  Brigadier-General  Bates. 

Two  other  general  officers  accompanied  the  ex 
pedition — Major-General  Breckinridge,  inspector- 
general  of  the  army,  and  Brigadier-General  Ludlow, 
of  the  engineer  department.  In  the  field,  the  latter 
took  command  of  the  first  brigade  of  Lawton's  divi 
sion,  replacing  Colonel  Van  Horn,  who  was  seri 
ously  injured  on  the  day  before  the  landing  at  Dai 
quiri.  The  chief  commissary  of  the  expedition  was 
Colonel  Weston,  the  chief  quartermaster  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  Humphrey. 

On  June  I4th  the  transports  rendezvoused  at 
Egmont  Key,  outside  of  Tampa  harbour,  where  five 
of  the  smaller  men-of-war  were  wait- 
™«  1°  escort  them  southward.  Off 
the  lortugas,  on  the  evening  ot  the 
1 5th,  they  met  the  Indiana,  whose  chief  officer,  Cap 
tain  Taylor,  took  over  the  command  of  the  convoy 
from  Commander  Hunker  of  the  Annapolis.  From 
this  point  the  course  was  to  the  southeast,  toward 
Santiago.  The  transports  moved  sjowly ;  they  had 
two  scows  and  a  water  boat  to  tow,  and  there  was 
a  good  deal  of  straggling.  One  or  two  of  them  had 


2i6  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

to  put  in  at  Great  Inagua,  in  the  Bahamas,  for 
water.  Two — the  Yucatan,  carrying  the  Rough 
Riders,  and  the  City  of  Washington — fell  so  far  be 
hind  that  the  Bancroft  and  the  Wasp  were  sent  back 
to  protect  them,  and  they  reached  Santiago  several 
hours  later  than  the  rest  of  the  fleet.  Captain  Taylor 
had  been  instructed,  if  possible,  to  form  a  fast  divi 
sion  and  hurry  some  of  the  vessels  forward,  in  order 
to  reinforce  the  marines  at  Playa  del  Este,  who  were 
reported  as  being  hard  pressed ;  but  Shafter  did  not 
wish  to  divide  his  army,  and  Taylor  found  his  hands 
full  without  reorganizing  his  unwieldy  flotilla. 

The  transports  had  all  been  freight  vessels,  and 
their  lack  of  proper  ventilation  and  accommodations 
caused  discomfort  among  the  troops ;  but  the  voy 
age  was  uneventful,  no  enemy  appearing,  and  the 
most  serious  mishap  being  the  loss  of  one  of  the 
two  scows,  which  was  much  needed  for  landing 
Shafter's  artillery. 

While  waiting  for  the  army,  Sampson  had  been 
reconnoitring  possible  landing  places  near  San 
tiago,  and  testing  the  Spanish  defences.  To  prevent 
any  strengthening  of  the  harbour  works  he  bom 
barded  them  heavily  on  the  i6th.  Once  more  the 
batteries  were  "  quickly  silenced,"  but  the  injuries 
inflicted  again  proved  slight.  The  Morro  and  the 
Socapa  reported  three  men  killed  and  eighteen 
wounded,  but  no  guns  dismounted,  though  one  of 
the  six-inch  weapons  in  the  Socapa  was  temporarily 
disabled  by  being  buried  in  debris.  On  the  follow 
ing  day  two  steam  cutters  from  the  New  York  and 
the  Massachusetts  attempted  to  enter  Cabanas  Bay, 
the  nearest  harbour  to  the  west,  but  were  driven  off 
by  a  heavy  fire  from  shore. 

The  Vesuvius,  which  joined  the  blockading  fleet 
on  the  1 3th,  was  having  her  first  test  in  warfare  at 
this  time.  Every  night  she  ran  in  close  to  the  har 
bour  mouth  and  fired  three  of  her  dynamite  shells. 
Their  tremendous  explosions  undoubtedly  had  a 


THE    SANTIAGO   EXPEDITION 

moral  effect  upon  the  Spaniards,  although — largely 
owing  to  the  difficulty  of  aiming  them  accurately — 
they  did  very  little  actual  damage.* 

On  June  i Qth  General  Calixto  Garcia,  commander 
of  the  insurgent  forces  in  eastern  Cuba,  reached 
Rabi's  camp  near  Aserraderos,  and  came  out  to  the 
New  York  to  see  Sampson.  The  Cuban  leader, 
though  the  conference  was  interrupted  by  his  sea 
sickness,  made  a  favourable  impression  upon  the 
American  admiral,  who  describes  him  as  a  man  "  of 
most  frank  and  engaging  manners  and  most  sol 
dierly  appearance."  His  arrival  was  a  sequel  to 
the  negotiations  begun  by  Lieutenant  Rowan  in 
the  first  days  of  the  war.  One  of  his  officers, 
Colonel  Hernandez,  who  had  accompanied  Rowan 
to  Washington,  went  back  to  Cuba  with  a  let 
ter  from  General  Miles  (dated  June  2cl)  informing 
Garcia  of  the  proposed  moVement  against  San 
tiago,  and  suggesting  that  he  could  render  valu 
able  assistance.  Garcia  replied — through  Sampson, 
who  cabled  his  message  to  Washington  —  that 
"  the  roads  were  bad  and  Cubans  scattered  " ;  but 
he  ordered  his  lieutenants  to  concentrate  their 
forces  about  the  three  chief  Spanish  military  posts 
in  the  province — Holguin  (where  ten  thousand 
troops  were  quartered),  Manzanillo,  and  Guantana- 
mo,  in  order  to  prevent  reinforcements  from  going 
to  Santiago.  He  himself  mustered  some  four  thou 
sand  men  near  Aserraderos,  and  readily  promised 
their  aid  in  return  for  the  arms,  clothing,  and  rations 


*  Lieutenant  Muller  speaks  of  "  the  Vesuvius  that  gave  us  so  much 
trouble."  He  says  that"  "one  of  her  projectiles,  which  fell  on  the 
northern  slope  of  the  Socapa,  tore  up  trees  right  and  left  for  a  distance 
of  twenty  metres.  Another  made  an  excavation  not  very  deep,  hut 
very  wide  ;  I  was  told  that  it  would  hold  twenty  horses.  Still  another 
dropped  in  the  water,  but  close  to  one  of  the  destroyers,  which  was 
violently  shaken,  as  also  ihe  Mercedes,  anchored  at  a  short  distance." 

Of  this  last  shot,  fired  on  the  night  of  June  isth,  an  officer  of  the 
Pluton  told  Mr.  Ramsden,  the  British  consul  at  Santiago,  that  its  ex 
plosion  lifted  the  small  vessel  out  of  the  water,  throwing  every  one  on 
board  off  his  feet. 


2i8  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

given  him  from  the  fleet's  stores.  He  had  recently 
received  a  cargo  of  rifles  and  ammunition  from  the 
United  States,  landed  at  Banes  by  the  Florida. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2oth  the  Wompatuck, 
which  Captain  Taylor  had  sent  ahead  to  herald  the 
approach  of  the  army,  reached  Samp- 
shafter  reaches  SOn's  fleet,  and  about  noon  the  trans- 
junHo0'  ports  came  in  sight.  The  admiral  sent 

Captain  Chadwick,  on  the  Gloucester, 
to  invite  Shafter  up  to  the  blockading  line ;  and  on 
his  arrival  Sampson  went  on  board  of  the  general's 
headquarters  ship,  the  Seguranga.  In  the  afternoon 
the  Seguranga  took  both  commanders  to  Aserra- 
deros,  where  they  landed — Garcia  not  caring  for  an 
other  experience  afloat — and  conferred  with  the  Cu 
ban  leader  and  Generals  Rabi  and  Castillo.  It  is 
scarcely  probable,  if  the  campaign  were  to  be  fought 
over  again,  that  the  American  admiral  and  major- 
general  would  begin  it  by  a  visit  to  an  insurgent 
camp,  while  an  American  army  corps  waited  off 
shore. 

It  was  arranged,  at  Aserraderos,  that  at  sun 
rise  on  the  22d  a  feint  of  landing  should  be  made  at 
Cabanas,  while  the  real  debarkation  should  be  be 
gun  at  Daiquiri ;  that  a  Cuban  force  under  General 
Castillo  should  engage  the  Spanish  detachment  in 
the  rear,  while  Rabi  supported  the  attack  at  Cabanas. 

On  the  2  ist  Shafter  summoned  his  division  and 
brigade  commanders  to  receive  their  landing  orders, 
and  the  Bancroft  brought  them  to  the  Seguranga — 
a  task  which,  as  Commander  Clover  reported,  meant 
more  than  twenty  miles  steaming  among  the  scat 
tered  transports.  The  sea  was  rough,  and  the  transfer 
of  the  officers  from  vessel  to  vessel  was  difficult  and 
even  dangerous.  It  was  in  boarding  the  Bancroft 
that  Colonel  Van  Horn,  who  was  to  have  led  the 
first  brigade  ashore  in  the  morning,  received  the  in 
jury  which  disabled  him,  and  from  which  he  died  a 
few  months  later. 


THE   SANTIAGO   EXPEDITION 


219 


Next  day  (June  22d)  the  plan  already  outlined 
was  successfully  carried  out,  except  that  the  Cubans 
entirely  failed  to  intercept  the  enemy's 
retreat-  The  fleet  bombarded  all  the 
Spanish  defences  for  nearly  twenty 
miles  along  the  coast,  from  Daiquiri  to  Cabanas. 
Off  this  latter  point  the  Texas  was  struck  by  a 
shell  from  the  Socapa,  which  killed  one  man  and 
wounded  eight.  The  landing  at  Daiquiri  was  car 
ried  out  with  a  good  deal  of  confusion,  yet  with 
creditable  rapidity.  Captain  Goodrich,  of  the  St. 
Louis,  who  was  in  command  on  behalf  of  the  navy, 
had  much  to  contend  with.  Half  a  dozen  men-of- 
war  had  shelled  the  country  about  the  bay,  with  a 
fire  heavy  enough,  as  the  captain  said,  "  to  drive  out 
the  whole  Spanish  army  in  Cuba,  had  it  been  there," 
but  the  transports  could  not  be  induced  to  go  any 
where  near  the  shore.  The  navy  had  no  control  over 
these  marine  hirelings,  and  their  captains — moved, 
perhaps,  by  a  conscientious  regard  for  their  owners' 
interest,  or  possibly  by  a  tender  care  for  their  own 
personal  safety — declined  to  face  any  avoidable  risk 
in  the  service  of  their  country.  As  a  result,  the 
boats — more  than  fifty  of  which  were  furnished  by 
the  men-of-war,  to  supply  the  army's  deficiency  in 
this  respect — had  to  make  a  voyage  of  several  miles 
to  carry  the  troops  ashore.  One  ship,  carrying  six 
hundred  men  who  were  to  have  landed  in  advance 
of  the  army,  did  not  put  in  an  appearance  till  the 
afternoon,  after  four  steam  launches  had  spent  hours 
in  searching  for  her. 

There  were  two  piers  in  the  little  bay  of  Daiquiri. 
One,  a  large  iron  structure  owned  by  an  American 
mining  company,  and  used  for  loading  ships  with 
iron  ore,  was  too  high  above  the  water  to  serve  as  a 
landing  stage.  The  troops  used  the  other,  a  small 
wooden  pier  which  the  Spaniards  had  unsuccessfully 
tried  to  burn.  The  pack  mules  and  officers'  horses 
were  thrown  overboard  and  left  to  swim  ashore — 
15 


220  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

which  a  few  of  them  failed  to  do.  The  first  soldier 
landed  a  few  minutes  before  ten  o'clock;  at  sunset 
about  six  thousand  men — Lawton's  division  and 
part  of  Wheeler's — were  on  Cuban  soil.  The  only 
loss  of  human  life  was  that  of  two  infantrymen, 
drowned  from  a  capsized  boat.  There  was  no  moles 
tation  from  the  enemy.  General  Rubin,  who  had 
been  stationed  at  Daiquiri  with  six  hundred  men 
and  two  guns,  withdrew  to  Siboney  as  soon  as  the 
bombardment  began,  losing  one  killed  and  seven 
wounded  ;  and  from  Siboney  he  continued  his  retreat 
to  a  position  in  front  of  Sevilla,  where  he  received 
considerable  reinforcements.  Here  the  first  fight 
ing  of  the  land  campaign  was  to  take  place. 

On  the  following  day  (June  23d),  while  the  de 
barkation  at  Daiquiri  continued,  Lawton's  and 
Wheeler's  troops  pushed  westward  to- 
ward  Siboney,  which  they  reached  in 
the  afternoon.  As  there  was  no  oppo 
sition  from  the  enemy,  Shafter  decided  to  put  the 
rest  of  his  men  and  material  ashore  in  the  bay  of 
Siboney — or  the  Ensenada  de  los  Altares  ("  bay  of 
the  altars."),  as  the  Spaniards  called  it — thus  bring 
ing  his  base  several  miles  nearer  Santiago.*  At  the 
same  time  he  placed  the  transports  under  the  per 
sonal  authority  of  Captain  Goodrich — an  order 
which  enabled  that  energetic  officer  to  board  each 
vessel  as  it  came  up  to  land  its  men,  and  take  it  close 
inshore.  There  was  no  pier  at  Siboney,  and  the 
soldiers  had  to  go  ashore  through  the  surf,  but  six 
thousand  more  were  landed  during  the  day. 

Shafter's  orders  for  the  arrangement  of  the  army 
ashore  directed  Lawton  to  lead  its  advance,  occupy 
ing  "  a  strong  defensive  position  "  a  little  way  be 
yond  Siboney,  on  the  road  toward  Santiago ;  Bates's 

*  In  General  Shafter's  report  the  distance  from  Daiquiri  to  Siboney 
is  stated  at  eight  miles,  in  General  Wheeler's  at  eleven,  in  Captain 
Goodrich's  at  four — which  shows  how  estimates  of  distance  vary,  even 
when  made  by  minds  trained  to  accuracy.  On  the  map  it  measures 
six  miles. 


THE   SANTIAGO   EXPEDITION 


221 


brigade  was  to  be  close  behind,  supporting  Law- 
ton  ;  Kent's  division  was  to  be  held  at  Siboney, 
where  it  landed ;  Wheeler's  was  to  bring  up  the  rear, 


222  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

taking  its  station  between  Siboney  and  Daiquiri.* 
But  Wheeler,  who  was  the  senior  officer  ashore — 
Shafter  remained  on  the  Seguranga  until  the  29th — 
partly  upset  this  programme.  The  gallant  veteran 
was  as  eager  to  get  at  the  enemy  as  he  had  ever 
been  thirty-five  years  before,  when  he  was  a  daring 
young  leader  of  Confederate  cavalry.  On  the  even 
ing  of  the  23d  he  ordered  the  commander  of  his 
second  brigade,  General  Young,  who  had  just 
reached  Siboney  from  Daiquiri,  to  move  forward,  in 
the  morning,  to  reconnoitre  General  Rubin's  posi 
tion  near  Sevilla.  He  had  received  information  of 
the  Spaniards'  whereabouts  from  General  Castillo, 
whose  men  had  had  a  skirmish  with  their  rearguard, 
and  had  been  driven  off  with  one  killed  and  nine 
wounded. 

The  main  road  from  Siboney  to  Santiago  runs 
inland  along  a  small  valley,  and  then  ascends  some 
three  hundred  feet  to  a  gap  in  the  hills,  at  a  point 
called  Las  Guasimas  ("  the  guasima  trees  "),  where 
it  turns  westward  to  Sevilla  and  thence  through  an 
undulating  country  to  the  capital  of  the  province. 
General  Castillo  had  pointed  out  another  trail,  which 
climbs  the  hillside  directly  above  Siboney,  and 
passes  along  the  high  ground  to  join  the  main  road 
at  Las  Guasimas,  about  three  miles  inland.  The 
former  is  an  ordinary  Cuban  highway,  rough  and 
narrow;  the  latter  a  mere  footpath  through  dense 
woods.  General  Young's  plan  of  attack  was  to  ad 
vance  a  squadron  of  the  First  Cavalry  and  another 


*  On  the  morning  of  June  24th  Shafter  sent  the  division  com 
manders,  through  Lieutenant  Miley,  a  message  repeating  and  empha 
sizing  these  instructions  : 

"  The  commanding  general  begs  me  to  say  it  is  impossible  to  ad 
vance  on  Santiago  until  movements  to  supply  troops  can  be  arranged. 
Take  up  strong  positions  where  you  can  get  water,  and  make  yourself 
secure  from  surprise  or  attack.  Lawton's  division  will  be  in  front, 
Kent's  near  Siboney,  Wheeler's  near  Daiquiri,  and  Bates's  command 
where  it  will  be  in  support  of  Lawton." 

Wheeler  had  moved  out  of  Siboney  before  this  message  reached 
him. 


THE   SANTIAGO   EXPEDITION 


223 


of  the  Tenth,  four  hundred  and  sixty-four  men  in 
all,  with  the  battery  of  Hotchkiss  guns — he  had  not 
been  able  to  get  rations  for  his  other  two  squadrons 
of  regulars — along  the  main  road,  while  his  other 
regiment,  the  Rough  Riders,  with  five  hundred  men, 
nearly  its  full  strength,  moved  forward  by  the  hill 
trail  to  join  them.  General  Castillo  was  to  support 
the  attack  with  eight  hundred  Cubans,  whom  he 
promised  to  bring  up  at  five  o'clock  the  next 
morning. 

At  half  past  five  Young's  men  were  ready  to 

move,  and  he  sent  Lieutenant  Rivers,  one  of  his 

aides,  to  notify  Castillo,  who  had  not 

skirmish  at         put  jn  an  appearance.     Rivers  came 

^uLG™*  'aS'  back  and  reP°rted  that  the  Cuban  gen 
eral  was  asleep,  and  his  sentries  would 
not  allow  him  to  be  aroused.  Young  then  gave  the 
order  to  march,  and  the  First  Cavalry  led  the  way 
forward,  followed  by  the  Hotchkiss  battery — of 
which  Captain  Watson,  Tenth  Cavalry,  was  in  tem 
porary  command  that  day — and  by  the  negro 
troopers  of  the  Tenth.  At  half  past  seven,  approach 
ing  the  enemy's  position,  the  column  was  halted 
in  an  open  space  and  scouts  were  sent  forward  to 
reconnoitre.  They  reported  the  Spaniards  in  plain 
sight  on  a  hill  above  the  gap  through  which  the  road 
passed. 

Young  advanced  two  of  his  guns  along  the  road 
to  draw  the  enemy's  fire,  while  he  deployed  his  men, 
keeping  them  covered  in  the  thick  chaparral,  for  an 
attack  upon  the  left  of  Rubin's  lines.  In  order  to 
allow  the  Rough  Riders,  who  had  a  more  difficult 
trail  to  follow,  time  to  reach  the  Spanish  right,  he 
waited  twenty  minutes  before  opening  fire.  During 
this  delay  General  Wheeler  rode  up  and  joined  him, 
but  made  no  change  in  his  arrangements.  The  two 
commanders  were  with  the  guns,  in  full  view  of  the 
Spaniards,  who  did  not  fire  until  the  Hotchkiss 
guns  began  the  fight.  The  enemy  then  replied  with 


224  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

rifle  volleys  from  behind  rough  breastworks  of  piled 
stones,  and  their  fire  was  so  hot  that  Young  ordered 
his  guns — which  he  had  to  use  sparingly,  as  they 
had  only  one  box  (fifty  rounds)  of  ammunition — 
under  cover  for  a  time.  Wheeler  even  sent  back  a 
message  to  Lawton,  saying  that  he  had  encountered 
"  a  bigger  force  of  the  enemy  than  he  had  antici 
pated,"  and  requesting  that  reinforcements  should 
be  hurried  forward — a  circumstance  which  he  neg 
lects  to  mention  in  either  of  his  published  narratives 
of  the  campaign. 

Meanwhile  his  troopers  were  creeping  forward 
through  dense  undergrowth  and  wrire  fences  till 
they  reached  a  position  close  under  the  Spanish 
lines.  Here  for  the  first  time  they  opened  fire,  ad 
vancing  upon  the  enemy's  front  and  left  flank,  and 
pressing  forward  with  the  greatest  courage  and  de 
termination  over  very  difficult  ground  and  up  a 
steep  slope. 

Colonel  Wood's  men  came  in  contact  with  the 
Spaniards  just  before  Young's  column  got  into 
action,  meeting  them  almost  face  to  face  in  the 
tropical  jungle.  It  has  been  stated  that  the  Rough 
Riders  were  ambushed,  but  the  term  can  not  be 
applied  to  an  encounter  so  deliberately  planned. 
The  volunteer  troopers,  knowing  that  the  enemy 
was  close  in  front,  were  moving  cautiously  through 
the  woods,  with  Captain  Capron's  troop  as  an  ad 
vance  guard,  but  without  flankers,  the  jungle  beside 
the  trail  being  too  dense.  Capron  had  sent  back 
word  that  he  thought  he  had  discovered  a  Spanish 
outpost,  and  Wood  had  begun  to  deploy  his  men 
into  the  forest,  when  they  received  a  sharp  fire  at 
short  range.  Several  of  the  Rough  Riders  fell,  one 
of  the  first  men  killed  being  Sergeant  Hamilton 
Fish,  a  member  of  a  well-known  New  York  family. 
A  Cuban  guide  who  was  at  the  head  of  the  column 
fled  at  the  first  fire ;  so  did  the  drivers  of  the  mules 
that  carried  the  Colt  guns,  leaving  the  animals  to 


THE   SANTIAGO   EXPEDITION 


225 


stray  off  into  the  forest.  They  were  trailed  and  re 
covered  after  the  fight. 

Deploying  both  to  the  right,  to  get  in  touch  with 
the  other  column,  and  to  the  left,  to  outflank  the 
enemy,  the  volunteer  cavalrymen  pushed  on  as 
bravely  as  the  regulars,  driving  the  Spaniards  before 
them  through  the  woods.  Rubin's  men  made  a 
brief  stand  at  some  ranch  buildings,  but  retreated 
before  the  advancing  Americans  came  to  close  quar 
ters,  and  about  an  hour  and  a  quarter  after  the  action 
began  the  brigade  had  captured  the  entire  position 
of  the  enemy,  who  "  fled  precipitately,"  according 
to  General  Young's  report ;  but  as  they  carried  all 
their  wounded  with  them,  their  disorder  may  have 
been  more  apparent  than  real. 

The  Spanish  account  of  the  action,  as  given  by 
Lieutenant  Miiller,  is  that  General  Rubin  was  at 
tacked  by  a  strong  American  force,  which  he  drove 
back,  but  that  he  withdrew  in  obedience  to  orders 
received  the  day  before  from  General  Linares.  Two 
days  later  Linares  issued  a  general  order,  in  which 
he  declared : 

Soldiers!  We  left  the  mineral  region*  because  I  did 
not  wish  to  sacrifice  your  lives  in  unequal  battle,  with 
musket  fire,  against  the  pompous  superiority  of  the  enemy, 
who  was  fighting  us  under  cover  of  his  armoured  ships, 
armed  with  the  most  modern  and  powerful  guns. 

Linares'  tactics  seem  to  have  been  weak  and  un 
decided.  Sampson's  guns  could  sooner  or  later 
have  rendered  untenable  any  position  within  three 
miles  of  the  shore,  but  a  more  determined  stand  at 
Las  Guasimas,  a  position  quite  as  well  suited  for 
defence  as  Caney  or  San  Juan,  might  at  least  have 
checked  Shafter's  advance  and  given  time  for  the 
arrival  of  reinforcements  from  Manzanillo.  The 
half-hearted  resistance  that  Rubin  offered  to  Young 

*  The  neighbourhood  of  Daiquiri  and  Juragua  (near  Siboney), 
where  there  are  extensive  iron  mines  owned  by  three  American  com 
panies. 


226  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

was  worse  than  useless,  and  his  hasty  retreat  before 
so  small  a  force  was  not  calculated  to  encourage  the 
defenders  of  Santiago. 

The  Spanish  force  at  Las  Guasimas  has  been 
variously  stated,  American  estimates  running  from 
twelve  hundred  to  four  thousand.  Colonel  Roose 
velt  gives  the  former  figure,  which  is  probably  near 
the  truth.  Wood's  official  report  puts  it  at  twenty- 
five  hundred,  but  commanding  officers  almost 
always  overestimate  the  numbers  opposed  to  them. 
Lieutenant  Miiller  asserts  that  only  part  of  Rubin's 
troops — seven  companies,  under  Major  Alcaniz, 
together  with  some  engineers  and  artillery,  perhaps 
eight  hundred  men  in  all — were  actually  in  the 
fight.  It  is  quite  possible  that  Rubin's  whole 
force  was  not  engaged,  though  the  Spanish  army 
officers  from  whom  Miiller  got  his  information 
were  by  no  means  unimpeachable  authorities.  The 
detailed  list  they  gave  of  the  American  regiments 
in  the  attacking  force  was  highly  imaginative,  in 
cluding  troops  that  were  not  within  miles  of  the 
place. 

Young's  attack  was  so  bold  that  the  Spaniards 
very  probably  regarded  his  four  squadrons  as  the 
advance  guard  of  a  much  larger  body.  Indeed, 
they  must  have  seen  other  American  troops  com 
ing  up  from  Siboney  along  the  valley  below  them. 
But  Young  deserves  credit  for  a  successful  stroke. 
With  nine  hundred  and  sixty-four  men  he  had 
driven  a  force  larger  than  his  own  from  a  strong 
position.  Bravery  is  expected  of  American  sol 
diers,  but  his  troops  had  fought  notably  well, 
though  practically  none  of  them  had  been  under 
fire  before,  and  the  Rough  Riders  had  never  fired 
a  Krag-Jorgensen  rifle  until  that  day,  having 
received  their  guns  only  just  before  they  left 
Tampa.  The  American  loss  was  sixteen  killed 
(eight  in  each  column)  and  fifty-two  wounded, 
the  dead  including  one  officer — Captain  Capron, 


THE   SANTIAGO   EXPEDITION  227 

whose  troop  led  the  advance  of  the  Rough  Riders.* 
As  for  the  enemy's  loss,  General  Young  reported 
that  forty-two  dead  bodies  were  seen ;  Colonel 
Wood,  that  the  Rough  Riders  alone  found  forty ; 
but  Colonel  Roosevelt,  in  his  interesting  record  of 
his  regiment's  share  in  the  campaign,  states  that 
these  figures  are  too  high,  and  that  after  going 
over  the  ground  carefully  he  counted  only  eleven 
dead  Spaniards,  probably  missing  two  or  three.  The 
Spanish  official  report  nearly  agrees  with  this,  ad 
mitting  only  nine  killed  and  twenty-seven  wounded. 
General  Wheeler,  in  his  book  on  the  campaign, 
records  that  General  Toral  told  him  that  the  Spanish 
loss  on  June  24  was  about  two  hundred  and  fifty, 
and  that  General  Escario  put  it  at  about  two  hun 
dred  ;  but  these  figures  are  incredible,  and  must  be 
the  result  of  a  misunderstanding. 

It  has  been  pointed  out  that  in  attacking  'the 
enemy's  position  with  a  divided  force,  General 
Young  violated  a  rule  of  tactics.  The  trails  along 
which  his  command  moved,  however,  were  nowhere 
more  than  a  mile  and  a  half  apart — much  less  than 
that  at  the  point  where  fighting  was  expected ;  and 
his  two  columns  were  out  of  touch  with  each  other 
for  only  a  brief  time.  Moreover,  Castillo  had 
assured  him  that  the  Cuban  outposts  covered  both 
roads.  And,  like  many  another  move  in  warfare,  the 
plan  was  vindicated  by  its  complete  success.  After 
the  fight,  Young  said  to  Wheeler :  "  General,  if  I 
had  lost  this  battle  and  lived  through  it,  you  would 
have  had  my  resignation/' 

The  day  was  an  oppressively  hot  one,  and 
Young's  men  were  too  much  exhausted  to  pursue 
the  Spaniards,  even  had  it  been  prudent  to  do  so. 
The  race  to  the  front — for  the  eagerness  of  the 

*  Captain  Allyn  K.  Capron  of  the  Rough  Riders  was  a  son  of  Cap 
tain  Allyn  Capron  of  the  First  Artillery,  who  commanded  one  of  Shaf- 
ter's  field  batteries.  Both  father  and  son  lost  their  lives,  the  former 
dying,  after  his  return  to  the  United  States,  of  a  fever  contracted  in 
Cuba. 


228  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

American  commanders  really  made  it  a  race — was 
now  taken  up  by  the  Ninth  Cavalry,  which  came 
up  an  hour  after  the  fight  closed,  and  relieved 
Young's  outposts.  Chaffee's  brigade  was  close 
behind,  and  Miles  had  also  been  ordered  forward 
when  Lawton  received  Wheeler's  request  for  rein 
forcements.  Naturally,  in  view  of  Shafter's  instruc 
tions,  Lawton  and  his  brigade  commanders  had  been 
surprised  to  find  that  Wheeler  was  in  front  of  them. 
On  the  night  before,  as  the  Rough  Riders'  dyna 
mite  gun  was  being  hurried  forward  from  Daiquiri, 
under  Wheeler's  orders,  to  join  Young's  attacking 
column,  its  captain,  Sergeant  Borrowe,  was  halted 
by  one  of  Lawton's  officers,  who  refused  to  let  him 
pass  to  the  front. 

Shafter,  no  doubt,  was  also  astonished  when  he 
heard  that  his  rearguard  division  had  pushed  for 
ward  and  won  a  sharp  fight,  but  he  accepted  the 
result  with  soldierly  readiness,  and  commended 
Wheeler  and  Young  in  his  official  report.  At  the 
same  time,  while  he  remained  on  the  Seguranga 
he  sent  daily  despatches  to  the  veteran  cavalry 
man  enjoining  him  not  to  bring  on  another  en 
gagement. 

Castillo  had  not  appeared  during  the  action  at 
Las  Guasimas,  but  after  it  was  over  a  column  of 
Cubans  came  up,  led  by  a  Frenchman,  who,  accord 
ing  to  General  Young,  "  was  in  a  very  bloodthirsty 
mood.  He  said  that  he  had  orders  from  Castillo 
to  follow  up  the  Spaniards  and  fight  them  wherever 
he  found  them.  I  ordered  him  to  go  back,"  Young 
adds,  "  and  would  not  have  him  near  me."  From 
this  time  the  insurgents  figured  less  prominently  in 
the  American  plans  of  campaign. 

If  the  mobilizing  of  Shafter's  corps  brought  to 
light  serious  weaknesses  in  the  organization  of  the 
United  States  army,  the  campaign  revealed,  on  the 
Spanish  side,  a  state  of  affairs  exceedingly  dis 
creditable  to  Spain's  military  administration  in 


THE    SANTIAGO    EXPEDITION 


229 


Cuba.  Few  or  none  of  the  preparations  that  ordi 
nary  foresight  would  have  suggested  had  been 
made.  When  Cervera's  squadron  first  lay  in  San 
tiago  harbour,  helpless  for  lack  of  coal,  and  the 
American  blockaders  gathered  outside,  the  least 
accomplished  strategist  might  have  seen  where  the 

war    was    about    to    centre ;    yet    no 
o11        timely  stePs  were  taken  to  gather  men 

and  supplies  at  the  threatened  point. 
Not  until  the  last  days  of  May  were  the  mediaeval 
batteries  at  the  harbour  mouth  reinforced  with  guns 
from  the  Reina  Mercedes.  There  had  been  a 
chronic  shortage  of  provisions,  and  nothing  was 
done  to  remedy  it.  Had  not  a  German  steamer 
come  in  on  May  7th  with  a  cargo  of  rice,*  the 
troops  would  have  fared  even  worse  than  they  did. 
With  more  than  thirty  thousand  soldiers  in  the 
province,  and  with  plenty  of  time  to  send  reinforce 
ments  to  the  garrison  of  Santiago,  no  effort  was 
made  to  do  so  in  season  to  render  effective  aid. 

Captain-General  Blanco's  first  defensive  move 
was  an  order  issued  on  June  2oth — almost  three 
weeks  after  the  beginning  of  the  blockade — consti 
tuting  the  forces  of  the  extreme  southeastern  dis 
trict,  extending  from  Manzanillo  to  Baracoa  and 
Guantanamo,  a  separate  army  corps,  under  Lieu- 
tenant-General  Arsenio  Linares.  Two  days  later 
Colonel  Frederico  Escario  left  Ma'nzanillo  for  San 
tiago  with  3,550  men  and  two  guns.  His  march 
was  a  difficult  one,  and  the  insurgents  constantly 
harassed  him,  killing  or  wounding  ninety-seven  of 
his  men,  but  failing  to  keep  him  out  of  Santiago, 
where  he  arrived  on  the  evening  of  July  3d — just 
too  late  for  the  decisive  fight  of  the  campaign.  It 

*  This  vessel,  the  Polaria,  was  bound  for  Havana,  but  put  in  at 
Santiago  on  hearing  of  the  blockade.  Lieutenant  Miiller  states  that 
she  carried  1,700  sacks  of  rice;  Commander  Jacobsen  of  the  German 
cruiser  Geier,  who  visited  Santiago  during  the  blockade,  and  whose  ac 
count  of  his  observations  has  been  published  by  the  Navy  Department, 
says  14,000  sacks. 


230  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

is  stated  in  General  Miles's  report  that  another 
body  of  Spaniards  started  to  Linares's  relief  from 
Holguin,  but  was  compelled  to  turn  back.  Gen 
eral  Pareja,  whom  Shafter  left  in  his  rear  at  Guan- 
tanamo,  never  attempted  a  hostile  movement,  and 
had  apparently  no  orders  to  do  so. 

On  withdrawing  Rubin's  brigade  from  Sevilla, 
Linares  posted  his  forces  along  a  line  beginning  on 
the  coast  at  Fort  Aguadores,  following  the  railroad 
from  that  point  to  its  terminus  at  Las  Cruces  on 
Santiago  Bay,  and  thence  running  northeastward,  his 
last  outpost  on  the  left  wing  being  in  the  village  of 
Caney,  four  miles  northeast  of  Santiago.  This  long 
line  was  thinly  held,  there  being,  according  to  Lieu 
tenant  Miiller,  3,000  around  the  city  and  as  far  in 
front  of  it  as  San  Juan ;  800  on  the  right  wing,  from 
Las  Cruces  to  Fort  Aguadores ;  and  520,  under 
General  Vara  del  Rey,  at  Caney — in  all  4,320  men, 
of  whom  about  two  thirds  were  Spanish  regulars, 
the  rest  being  mobilized  troops  (Spanish  militia), 
volunteers,  and  sailors  from  Cervera's  fleet.  Be 
sides  these,  there  was  in  Santiago  a  small  reserve 
force  of  cavalry,  police  (the  guardia  civile),  and  fire 
men ;  nearly  1,000  men  were  stationed  in  the  har 
bour  batteries — 450  at  the  Morro,  400  at  the  So- 
capa,  1 20  at  Punta  Gorda;  and  900  more,  under 
Colonel  Aldea,  were  intrenched  west  of  the  bay. 
These  figures  do  not  include  the  outlying  detach 
ments  at  Palma  Soriano,  San  Luis,  and  other  inland 
points. 

This  does  not  seem  to  be  the  best  disposition  that 
could  have  been  made.  Shafter  moved  straight  for 
ward  to  deliver  his  attack,  not  veiling  it  by  feint  or 
strategy,  and  the  defending  force*  might  have  been 
concentrated  more  effectively  to  meet  him.  It  may 
have  been  necessary  to  station  a  regiment  west  of 
the  bay,  but  the  garrison  of  the  harbour  forts  might 
well  have  been  diminished  to  strengthen  the  posi 
tion  in  front  of  Shafter's  advance.  Lieutenant  Miil- 


THE    SANTIAGO   EXPEDITION  231 

ler  accounts  for  the  effort  to  cover  so  wide  an  extent 
of  country  by  the  necessity  of  protecting  the  aque 
duct  that  supplied  Santiago  with  water,  and  of  hold 
ing  a  district  that  kept  the  troops  supplied  with  a 
certain  amount  of  fresh  food — presumably  mangoes, 
sweet  potatoes,  and  sugar  cane. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE   BATTLES    OF   CANEY   AND    SAN   JUAN 

ON  the  evening  of  June  24th — the  day  of  the 
action  at  Las  Guasimas — the  last  men  of  Kent's 
division  were  ashore  at  Siboney.  Six  comparatively 
uneventful  days  followed,  during  which  the  corps 
gradually  pushed  forward  and  occupied  the  hilly, 
wooded  country  about  Sevilla,  as  far  as  El  Pozo. 
The  field  batteries  were  disembarked  at  Daiquiri  on 
the  25th  and  26th.  The  first  tactical  problem,  that 
of  the  landing,  had  been  successfully  accomplished ; 
General  Shafter  was  now  struggling  with  the  second 
— that  of  getting  ashore  the  supplies  that  his  army 
needed  before  it  could  go  into  battle.  It  proved  an 
exceedingly  difficult  task,  owing  to  the  lack  of  tugs 
and  scows,  and  for  several  days  the  troops  lived  from 
hand  to  mouth,  provisions  being  landed  no  faster 
than  they  were  consumed.  Had  a  storm  driven 
the  fleet  from  the  coast  the  result  might  have  been 
serious,  or  even  disastrous.  Two  weeks  passed 
before  the  corps  had  three  days'  rations  in  ad 
vance. 

On  the  25th  and  26th  Garcia  and  2,978  of  his 
Cubans  were  carried  on  the  transports  from  Aserra- 
deros  to  Siboney.  On  the  27th  the  first  reinforce 
ments  arrived  from  the  United  States,  the  Thirty- 
third  and  part  of  the  Thirty-fourth  Michigan,  form 
ing  a  brigade  under  Brigadier-General  Duffield, 
being  landed  at  the  same  point.  These  regiments 
came  from  Camp  Alger. 
232 


THE   BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     233 

On  the  29th  Shafter  came  ashore,  and  estab 
lished  his  headquarters  about  a  mile  east  of  El  Pozo 
— that  is,  a  mile  behind  his  outposts — 

Cl°Se  tO  the  tKlil   alO11£  which  mOSt   °f 

the  army  was  encamped.  His  heavy 
guns  were  not  landed,  and  the  equipment  of  his 
corps  was  still  far  from  complete,  but  he  was  un 
willing — and  very  properly  so — to  delay  a  day 
longer  than  was  absolutely  necessary.  Coming 
into  the  tropics  in  the  rainy  season,  his  men  were 
certain,  if  the  campaign  were  prolonged,  to  find  the 
fevers  of  Cuba  a  more  deadly  foe  than  the  guns  of 
the  Spaniards.*  "  It  was  to  be  a  dash  or  nothing," 
as  Shafter  himself  said. 

General  Shafter  did  not  attempt  any  reconnais 
sance  in  person,  beyond  overlooking  the  country 
before  him  from  a  hill  near  his  headquarters.  He 
has  been  severely  criticised  for  failing  to  keep  in 
closer  touch  with  his  troops,  and  to  foresee  more 
exactly  the  difficulties  of  the  field  of  battle;  but  it 
must  be  remembered  that  he  was  a  man  of  sixty-one, 
exceedingly  stout,  and  that  his  health  suffered  seri 
ously  in  the  tropical  climate  and  under  his  tre 
mendous  burden  of  hard  work  and  responsibility. 
Besides  the  exhaustion  of  malaria,  he  was  enduring 
great  pain  from  an  attack  of  the  gout,  which  inca 
pacitated  him  from  putting  his  foot  into  a  stirrup. 


*  During:  nine  weeks,  while  the  Fifth  Corps  was  in  Cuba,  it  lost  318 
men  from  disease,  against  263  who  were  killed  in  action  or  died  of 
their  wounds. 

In  describing  the  conditions  under  which  he  went  into  battle,  Shaf 
ter  said  in  his  official  report :  "  These  preparations  were  far  from  what 
I  desired  them  to  be,  but  we  were  in  a  sickly  climate  ;  our  supplies  had 
to  be  brought  forward  by  a  narrow  wagon  road  which  the  rains  might 
at  any  time  render  impassable  ;  fear  was  entertained  that  a  storm 
might  drive  the  vessels  containing  our  stores  to  sea,  thus  separating  us 
from  our  base  of  supplies  ;  and,  lastly,  it  was  reported  that  General 
Pando,  with  8,000  reinforcements  for  the  enemy,  was  en  route  from 
Manzanillo,  and  might  be  expected  in  a  few  days."  The  movement  of 
Escario's  brigade  was  of  course  the  foundation  for  this  last  report. 
General  Pando,  it  afterward  appeared,  was  not  in  that  part  of  Cuba  at 
the  time. 


234 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


He  was  absolutely  compelled  to  let  other  men  repre 
sent  him  at  the  front. 

Generals  Wheeler,  Lawton,  and  Chaffee,  Colonel 
Derby  of  the  engineers,  and  other  officers,  had  been 
active  in  reconnoitring,  and  had  received  pretty 
full  information  as  to  the  Spanish  forces  and  posi 
tions  from  Cuban  peasants.  The  enemy's  weakness 
in  artillery  and  lack  of  supplies  were  also  learned, 
and  it  was  concluded  that  his  resistance  would  not 
be  strong.  Shafter  undoubtedly  underestimated  the 
task  he  was  about  to  set  his  men ;  but  his  mis 
take  was  shared  by  his  ablest  officers,  and  probably 
by  every  member  of  his  corps.  Wheeler,  who  had 
been  close  up  to  Caney,  asked  permission  to  attack 
at  that  point,  his  plan  being  to  concentrate  a  heavy 
artillery  fire  upon  it,  and  cut  off  the  retreat  of  its 
garrison,  which  was  known  to  be  small,  by  placing 
a  division  between  the  village  and  Santiago.  Shafter 
agreed  with  him  as  to  the  direction  of  the  first  at 
tack,  but  preferred  to  intrust  it  to  Lawton.  On  the 
29th  the  commanding  general  telegraphed  to  Wash 
ington  : 

Advance  pickets  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  Santiago. 
No  opposition.  Spaniards  have  evidently  withdrawn  to 
immediate  vicinity  of  the  town.  Expect  to  put  division 
on  Caney  road,  between  that  place  and  Santiago,  day  after 
to-morrow,  and  will  also  advance  on  Sevilla  road  to  San 
Juan  river,  and  possibly  beyond.  General  Garcia,  with 
three  thousand  men,  will  take  railroad  north  of  Santiago 
at  the  same  time  to  prevent  Pando  reaching  city. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  3Oth  Shafter  summoned 
his  division  commanders  to  a  council  of  war,  at 
which  his  plans  for  an  immediate  attack  were  for 
mulated.  Lawton's  division,  supported  by  Bates's 
brigade  and  by  one  battery  of  artillery  (Captain 
Capron's),  was  to  assault  Caney  at  daybreak ;  the 
other  two  divisions  were  to  march  straight  forward 
toward  Santiago  by  the  road  through  San  Juan, 
Kent's  deploying  to  the  left,  Wheeler's  to  the  right ; 
and  Lawton,  who  promised  to  take  Caney  in  two 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     235 

hours  at  most,  was  to  come  down  the  high  road 
from  that  village,  and  bring  his  left  in  line  with  the 
right  of  the  cavalry  division  in  time  for  the  attack 
upon  the  Spaniards'  central  position.  Captain 
Grimes's  battery,  posted  at  El  Pozo,  was  to  sup 
port  the  left  wing;  the  other  two  batteries  of  light 
artillery,  and  the  Catling  guns,  were  to  be  held  in 
reserve.  The  only  infantry  reserve  was  a  battalion 
of  the  Thirty-fourth  Michigan,  back  at  Siboney.* 
General  Duffield,  who  was  present  at  the  conference, 
was  ordered  to  move  the  Thirty-third  Michigan 
along  the  narrow-gauge  railroad  from  that  point  and 
threaten  the  Spanish  detachment  at  Fort  Agua- 
dores. 

General  Wheeler  was  not  at  the  council.  The 
veteran  cavalry  commander  was  lying  in  his  tent, 
exposure  to  heat  and  rain  having  brought  on  a  slight 
fever ;  and  though  he  had  not  reported  himself  unfit 
for  duty,  it  seems  that  Shafter,  or  possibly  one  of 
Shafter's  aids,  considered  him  so,  and  summoned 
his  senior  brigade  commander,  General  Sumner,  to 
headquarters  in  his  place. 

Lawton's  division  marched  toward  Caney  during 
the  night,  and  at  sunrise  next  morning  (July  1st) 
was  in  position  for  the  attack.  For  his  plan  of  action 
Lawton  gives  credit  to  General  Chaffee,  who  had 
made  a  very  thorough  reconnaissance  close  up  to 
the  enemy's  lines.  Chaffee's  own  brigade  was  to 
move  upon  the  village  from  the  east,  at  daybreak, 
and  capture  it.  Ludlow  was  to  occupy  the  road 
between  Caney  and  Santiago,  cutting  off  the  gar 
rison's  retreat.  Of  Miles's  three  regiments,  the 
First  Infantry  was  to  be  held  in  support  of  Capron's 
battery,  together  with  Troop  D  of  the  Second  Cav 
alry  ;  the  Fourth  and  the  Twenty-fifth  were  to  follow 
Ludlow.  Caney  taken,  the  division  was  to  ren 
dezvous  at  the  Ducrot  house,  on  the  Santiago  road, 

*  The  other  two  battalions  of  the  Thirty-fourth  Michigan,  and  the 
Ninth  Massachusetts,  reached  Siboney  on  the  Harvard  on  July  ist. 
16 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

and  thence  to  march  forward  and  join  Wheeler  and 
Kent  in  attacking  the  Spanish  lines. 

During   the   night,    Chaffee   personally   guided 

companies  of  the  Seventh  and  the  Twelfth  to  points 

where,  at  dawn,  they  could  seize  the 

Battle  of  Caney,     ^^    overlooking    the    village    On    the 

east.  The  first  shot  was  fired  by 
Capron's  battery  at  a  quarter  past  six,  with  a  range 
of  about  twenty-four  hundred  yards.  The  Spaniards 
had  no  artillery,  and  there  was  no  reply  till  Chaffee's 
skirmish  line  was  within  half  a  mile  of  the  trenches, 
when  the  Spaniards  opened  fire  with  unexpected 
spirit  and  effect,  and  for  three  hours  the  battle  was 
a  sharp  infantry  duel.  It  was  soon  clear  that  Law- 
ton's  estimate  had  been  far  too  sanguine,  and  that 
the  garrison  of  Caney,  though  greatly  outnumbered, 
had  heavy  odds  in  the  strength  of  its  defences,  and 
was  prepared  to  make  a  desperate  resistance.  The 
key  to  the  position  was  a  small  conical  hill  at  the 
southern  end  of  the  village,  on  the  top  of  which 
stood  an  old  masonry  fort.  In  front  of  this  were 
trenches — some  of  them  cut  in  solid  rock — and  wire 
entanglements.  There  were  also  five  blockhouses, 
with  connecting  trenches,  dotted  around  Caney,  and 
when  the  Spaniards  were  finally  driven  into  the 
village  they  continued  a  desperate  resistance  from 
its  houses  and  its  stone  church,  whose  walls  were 
loopholed  for  rifle  fire. 

The  defence  of  Caney  was  the  best  and  bravest 
bit  of  fighting  the  Spaniards  did  in  the  whole  war. 
It  was  worthy  of  the  finest  traditions  of  a  nation 
whose  most  famous  deeds  of  valour,  from  the  days 
of  Saguntum  to  those  of  Saragossa,  have  been  done 
in  defence  of  beleaguered  towns.  For  more  than 
ten  hours  General  Vara  del  Key's  five  hundred  men 
kept  at  bay  ten  times  their  number  of  American 
soldiers.  And  while  the  Spanish  resistance  was 
nothing  less  than  heroic,  the  action  was  equally 
creditable  to.  Lawton's  troops,  whose  attack  was 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN  237 

finally  successful  only  because  it  was  pushed  home 
with  unfaltering  courage  and  persistence.* 

The  fire  of  the  American  artillery  was  disap 
pointingly  ineffective,!  and  the  work  was  done  by 
hard  fighting  on  the  part  of  the  infantry.  The  first 
movement  to  get  at  close  quarters  with  the  enemy 
was  made  by  the  Seventeenth  Infantry,  forming 
Chaffee's  extreme  right,  who  advanced  along  a 
slightly  sunken  road  to  seize  a  low  ridge  command 
ing  the  village  on  the  northeast.  As  they  deployed 
through  a  gap  in  the  hedge  that  bordered  the  road, 
they  met  such  a  heavy  fire  that  they  had  to  with 
draw,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Haskell,  who  was  lead 
ing  his  men,  being  badly  wounded  by  three  bullets. 
The  regiment  was  moved  to  a  less  exposed  position 
still  further  to  the  right. 

The  Seventh  Infantry,  meanwhile,  came  up 
along  the  road,  deployed  behind  the  ridge,  advanced, 
and  held  it  under  a  heavy  fire,  which  caused  seri 
ous  losses,  and  to  which  they  could  make  little  reply, 
the  Spaniards  being  seldom  visible.  Their  loss  of 
thirty-three  men  killed  and  a  hundred  and  one 
wounded  was  far  heavier  than  that  of  any  other 
American  command.  General  Chaffee,  who  was 
with  them,  had  a  button  shot  from  his  coat,  and  a 
bullet  went  through  his  shoulder  strap. 

His  other  regiment,  the  Twelfth  Infantry,  was 
fighting  its  way  forward  a  little  farther  to  the  left, 
along  a  valley  that  led  close  under  the  Spanish  fort. 
Far  to  the  left,  Ludlow  was  gradually  closing  in  on 


*  "  On  the  ist  of  July,"  says  Lieutenant  Mxiller,  the  Spanish  histo 
rian  of  the  campaign,  "the  Americans  fought  with  truly  admirable 
courage.  .  .  .  Did  they  think  that  all  they  had  to  do  was  to  attack  our 
soldiers  en  masse  to  put  them  to  flight  ?  God  knows." 

f  General  Chaffee  reoorted  that  the  fire  of  Capron's  battery  was 
"  accurate  and  very  effective,"  but  though  the  guns  began  at  6.15  A.  M. 
it  was  more  than  eight  hours  later  when  the  fort  was  charged  and  cap 
tured  by  the  infantry.  Other  observers  agreed  with  General  Ludlow, 
whose  report  states  that  "  the  artillery  fire  was  too  distant  to  reduce  the 
blockhouses  or  destroy  the  intrenchments,  so  that  the  attack  was  prac 
tically  by  infantry  alone." 


238  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

the  southwest  side  of  the  village;  Miles  had  come 
up  in  line  with  him  on  the  south ;  and  when  Bates's 
brigade — which  had  had  to  march  up  from  Siboney 
during  the  night — arrived  and  occupied  the  gap  be 
tween  Miles  and  Chaffee,  Caney  was  surrounded  on 
three  sides  with  a  continuous  ring  of  fire.  Ludlow's 
two  regiments  of  regulars,  the  Eighth  and  the 
Twenty-second  Infantry,  were  hotly  engaged  with 
the  Spanish  riflemen  in  two  blockhouses  and  be 
hind  loopholed  walls.  His  third  regiment,  the 
Second  Massachusetts,  took  little  part  in  the  battle. 
Like  all  the  volunteers  except  the  Rough  Riders, 
they  carried  the  old  Springfield  rifles,  with  non- 
smokeless  cartridges,  and  when  they  tried  to  push 
a  line  of  skirmishers  toward  the  enemy  their  fire 
drew  so  heavy  a  return  that  they  were  ordered  to 
fall  back. 

Capron's  battery  kept  up  its  fire  almost  continu 
ously,  under  the  personal  direction  of  General  Law- 
ton,  until  about  two  o'clock ;  it  was  then  moved 
forward  to  a  new  position  south  of  Caney,  a  thou 
sand  yards  from  the  Spanish  lines.  Half  an  hour 
later,  judging  that  the  enemy  had  not  strength  left 
to  resist  a  charge,  Chaffee  ordered  the  Twelfth  to 
storm  the  stone  fort.  Lawton  had  authorized  him  to 
make  this  decisive  movement  at  his  discretion,  and 
it  was  executed  with  great  gallantry,  Bates's  ad 
vance  guard  and  some  of  Miles's  men  coming  up 
almost  simultaneously  on  the  other  side  of  the  hill. 
It  was  claimed,  indeed,  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Dag- 
gett,  of  the  Twenty-fifth,  that  the  credit  of  the  cap 
ture  was  due  to  his  regiment,  but  this  Chaffee 
branded  as  "  absurd,"  stating  that  the  first  com 
mand  to  reach  and  enter  the  fort  was  the  Twelfth ; 
next,  Bates's  two  regiments,  the  Third  and  the 
Twentieth ;  and  then  the  Twenty-fifth. 

This  point  of  vantage  captured,  the  assailants 
commanded  the  village;  but  fighting  lasted  fully 
two  hours  longer,  the  Spaniards  resisting  stubbornly 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     239 


as  they  fell  back  from  house  to  house.  When  Caney 
finally  became  untenable  under  the  overwhelming 
fire  poured  into  it,  the  surviving  defenders  fled  to 
ward  Santiago,  suffering  terribly  from  the  volleys 
of  Ludlow's  men — especially  of  the  Twenty-second 
— as  they  passed  his  lines.  At  five  o'clock  the  battle 
was  over,  and  Caney  had  been  taken,  at  a  heavy 
cost  to  its  captors,  for  the  division  had  lost  453  men 
killed  and  wounded.*  On  the  Spanish  side,  Gen 
eral  Vara  del  Rey  had  been  killed  at  noon ;  he  was 
wounded  in  both  legs,  and  as  he  was  being  carried 
to  the  rear  on  a  stretcher  another  bullet  despatched 
him.  Two  of  his  sons  had  fallen  with  him,  and  of 
his  520  men  about  300  were  dead  and  wounded, 
120  were  captured,  and  100  escaped  to  Santiago. 

A  considerable  body  of  Garcia's  Cubans  took 
part  in  the  battle  of  Caney  by  making  one  of  their 
characteristic  attacks  upon  an  outlying  blockhouse 
about  a  mile  from  the  village.  Although  they  are 

*  The  following  table  shows  the  strength  and  the  losses  of  the 
American  troops  at  Caney  : 


Strength, 
June  soth. 

Killed, 
July  ist. 

Wounded, 
July  ist. 

8 

I.udlow's  Brigade,  staff  

IT 

Eighth  Infantry  

506 

6 

48 

Twenty-second  Infantry  
Second  Massachusetts    

496 

QO7 

8 
8 

41 
37 

Miles's  Brigade  staff       

I3 

First  Infantry                     

4^2 

i 

Fourth  Infantry                      .    .  . 

465 

7 

35 

Twenty-fifth  Infantry  
Chaffee's  Brigade    staff       .... 

527 

20 

8 

25 

Seventh  Infantry  

016 

33 

IOT 

Twelfth  Infantry  
Seventeenth  Infantry             .  .    . 

Is 

so6 

I 

3i 

25 

Bates's  Brigade,  staff  
Third  Infantry 

48? 

2 

T, 

Twentieth  Infantry  
Capron's  Battery 

*t"3 

5Q6 
82 

I 

8 

Second  Cavalry  (estimated  }  

75 

Total  

6,654 

88 

355 

240  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR 

said  to  have  numbered  several  hundred,  while  the 
blockhouse  was  garrisoned  by  possibly  a  dozen 
men,  they  remained  about  a  mile  from  the  enemy, 
at  which  distance  they  poured  in  a  hot  but  harmless 
fire  until  their  ammunition  was  exhausted  and  Gen 
eral  Chaffee  refused  them  a  fresh  supply. 

On  the  other  hand,  Colonel  Miles  reported  that 
a  small  Cuban  detachment  —  forty  men  under  Cap 
tains  Vargas  and  Bravo  —  fought  bravely  with  his 
brigade. 

Meanwhile  the  other  two  divisions  had  moved 
forward  toward  the  San  Juan  River,  where,  accord 
ing  to  Shafter's  plan,  Lawton  was  to 


right,  after  taking  Caney.  There  was 
only  one  road  for  the  advance  —  a  rough,  narrow 
trail,  deep  in  mud  from  the  daily  rains,  crossing  the 
low  ground  that  stretched  between  the  hills  about 
El  Pozo  and  the  heights  of  San  Juan,  about  a  mile 
in  front  of  Santiago.  This  basinlike  depression  is 
traversed  by  three  rivers,  or,  rather,  good-sized 
brooks  —  the  Aguadores,  flowing  westward  from  El 
Pozo  ;  its  tributary,  the  creek  of  Las  Guamas,  com 
ing  down  southward  from  Caney;  and  a  stream 
marked  on  the  maps  as  the  Purgatorio  Creek,  ris 
ing  in  the  mountains  north  of  Santiago.  This  last 
passes  close  under  the  San  Juan  ridge,  and  in  the 
southwest  corner  of  the  basin  it  joins  the  Agua 
dores  to  form  the  San  Juan  River,  which  runs  down 
to  the  sea  at  Fort  Aguadores.  In  the  reports  of  the 
battle  of  July  1st  the  Aguadores  and  the  San  Juan 
are  frequently  confused. 

The  trail  from  El  Pozo  ran  through  dense  woods 
to  a  ford  of  the  Aguadores,  just  above  its  junction 
with  the  western  stream  ;  beyond  was  a  short  stretch 
of  open  country,  partly  cultivated  ;  then,  beyond 
the  second  brook,  the  ground  sloped  upward  to  the 
low  ridges  on  which  the  first  Spanish  lines  were 
posted. 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     241 

General  Wheeler  was  not  present  when  the 
Cavalry  Division  formed  at  sunrise.  He  had  not 
reported  sick — "  I  was  not  off  duty  for  a  single 
moment  during  the  campaign,"  he  declares  * — but 
Sumner,  the  senior  brigadier,  took  command  of  the 
division  by  Shafter's  order,  leaving  his  own  brigade 
to  Lieutenant-Colonel  Carroll  of  the  Sixth  Cavalry. 
The  other  cavalry  brigade  was  commanded  by  Colo 
nel  Wood,  of  the  Rough  Riders,  General  Young 
being  down  with  a  severe  attack  of  fever.  About 
nine  o'clock,  when  the  fighting  had  scarcely  begun, 
Wheeler,  ailing  as  he  was,  rode  to  the  front ;  and  it 
is  quite  clear,  from  his  narrative  of  the  engagement, 
that  he  regarded  himself  as  being  in  command  of  the 
two  divisions,  as  senior  officer  in  the  field,  f  Some, 
at  least,  of  the  other  officers  do  not  seem  to  have 
understood  so.  "  The  battle  was  fought  by  General 
Sumner  and  by  General  Kent,"  says  Colonel  Roose 
velt,  and  those  generals'  reports  bear  out  his  state 
ment.  In  the  afternoon,  when  the  Spanish  position 
had  been  captured,  Wheeler  sent  Shafter  a  message 
inquiring  whether  he  should  "  continue  command 
ing  and  supervising  as  I  am  now,"  or  "  resume  com 
mand  of  the  cavalry  division  and  displace  Sumner." 
Shafter  ordered  him  to  take  the  latter  course,  and 
Wheeler  so  notified  Sumner. 

Kent  had  his  division  ready  to  move  at  seven 
o'clock,  when  Lieutenant-Colonel  McClernand, 
Shafter's  adjutant-general,  gave  him  the  word  to  ad 
vance.  His  first  brigade  (General  Hawkins's)  was 
leading,  followed  by  the  third  (Colonel  WikofFs) 
and  the  second  (Colonel  Pearson's).  The  head  of  his 
column — formed  by  the  Sixth  Infantry — was  a  few 


*  The  Santiago  Campaign,  p.  119. 

t  "  I  had  been  directed  by  Colonel  McClernand,  General  Shafter's 
adjutant-general,  to  give  directions  to  General  Kent.  .  .  .  My  former 
instructions  and  the  general  custom  of  the  service  made  it  proper  that 
I  should  exercise  this  control  over  the  whole  line.  ...  I  also  gave  di 
rections  to  General  Sumner.  and,  through  my  staff  officers,  to  Colonel 
Carroll  and  Colonel  Wood."— The  Santiago  Campaign,  p.  43. 


242  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

hundred  yards  beyond  El  Pozo  when  he  received 
orders  to  allow  the  cavalry  division  right  of  way, 
and  his  troops  halted  along  the  trail.  There  was  a 
delay  of  three  quarters  of  an  hour,  which  Kent  and 
Hawkins  utilized  for  reconnoitring.  They  rode 
down  to  the  river,  forded  it,  and  observed  the  Span 
ish  position,  from  which  a  sharp  fire,  both  of  rifles 
and  of  artillery,  was  already  coming.  The  enemy's 
guns  were  replying  to  Grimes's  battery  at  El  Pozo, 
and  a  damaging  fusillade  was  attracted  by  the  sig 
nal-corps  balloon,  which  was  being  slowly  drawn 
forward  along  the  crowded  trail,  revealing  to  the 
Spaniards  the  precise  line  of  the  American  ad 
vance.*  The  balloon  was  finally  anchored  at  the 
main  ford  of  the  Aguadores,  making  the  passage 
of  the  stream  a  bloody  one. 

It  took  the  two  divisions  more  than  six  hours 
to  push  through  the  mile  and  a  half  of  woods  be 
tween  El  Pozo  and  the  river,  and  to  deploy  on  the 
further  bank  of  the  stream.  During  the  continual 
halts  and  delays  along  the  narrow  and  crowded  trail 
they  were  under  a  severe  fire,  to  which  they  could 
make  practically  no  reply,  the  enemy's  position  not 
being  in  sight.  It  was  impossible  to  tell  from  what 
quarter  the  Mauser  bullets,  fired  with  smokeless 
powder,  were  flying.  They  came,  as  General  Kent 
said  in  his  report,  or  seemed  to  come,  "  from  all 
directions,  not  only  from  the  front  and  the  dense 
tropical  thickets  in  our  flanks,  but  from  sharp 
shooters  apparently  posted  in  our  rear." 

Much  was  heard  of  these  Spanish  sharpshooters. 
It  is  probable  that  they  were  fewer  than  was  gen- 

*  For  this  costly  blunder  General  Greely's  annual  report,  on  behalf 
of  the  signal  corps,  emphatically  disclaims  responsibility:  "  The  forc 
ing  of  the  signal-corps  balloon  to  the  skirmish  line,  where  its  position 
is  reported  to  have  caused  serious  loss  to  the  troops  by  disclosing  their 
movements  and  attracting  the  enemy's  fire,  was  the  action  of  Major- 
General  Shafter,  through  his  chief  engineer,  Colonel  G.  McC.  Derby, 
in  the  face  of  professional  advice  given  him  by  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Maxfield  of  the  United  States  Volunteer  Signal  Corps,  who  was 
charged  with  the  practical  operation  of  the  balloon." 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     243 

erally  supposed,  for  a  reason  given  by  General 
Shafter,  who  says :  "  I  do  not  think  there  were  any 
sharpshooters  in  the  rear  of  our  lines.  The  Mau 
sers  have  a  range  of  two  miles,  and  it  was  dropping 
bullets  which  gave  this  impression."  Some,  how 
ever,  there  undoubtedly  were,  posted  here  and  there 
in  the  trees.  They  were  accused  of  deliberately 
firing  on  wounded  men  and  Red  Cross  attendants. 
It  is  doubtful  whether  they  could  be  proved  guilty 
of  this  crime  against  civilization ;  but  the  fact  that 
such  a  form  of  warfare  was  used  at  all  was  a  blemish 
upon  Spanish  chivalry.  "  Sniping  "  of  this  sort  may 
annoy  an  enemy,  and  certainly  adds  to  the  horrors 
of  war,  but  it  could  never  win  a  battle  or  change  the 
course  of  a  campaign. 

Kent's  and  Wheeler's  divisions  lost  nearly  a 
thousand  men  on  the  ist  of  July,  and  most  of  the 
loss  was  suffered  during  their  slow  and  toilsome 
advance  into  a  position  where  they  could  begin  to 
fight.  The  movement  was  one  to  be  commended  to 
students  of  strategy  as  a  warning  rather  than  as 
a  model.  It  would  scarcely  have  been  undertaken 
had  the  ground  been  more  thoroughly  studied  be 
forehand,  and  had  not  the  enemy  been  held  in  some 
thing  very  near  to  contempt.  If  the  defenders  of 
San  Juan  had  been  stronger  in  numbers,  had  their 
marksmanship  been  more  accurate,  had  they  been 
better  supported  by  artillery,  or  had  they  not  yielded 
and  fled  at  the  critical  moment  of  the  battle,  the 
attacking  force  might  have  been  annihilated.  As 
it  was,  the  two  divisions  lost  thirteen  per  cent  of 
their  strength  (reported  at  362  officers  and  7,391 
men)  in  killed  and  wounded. 

The  spirit  of  the  American  troops  was  signally 
displayed  by  their  unflinching  endurance  of  such 
a  trying  situation.  There  were,  of  course,  as  always 
happens,  individual  cases  of  straggling,*  but  among 

*  About    noon    Lieutenant-Colonel    McClernand,    stationed   at    El 
Pozo,  sent  back  this  message  to  Shafter's  headquarters  :  "  If  you  have 


244 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


the  regiments  there  was  only  one  partial  exception 
to  the  army's  record  of  heroism — an  exception 
which  any  but  the  most  censorious  historian  might 
have  passed  over  unnoticed  had  it  not  been  so  loudly 
advertised  by  the  bitter  controversies  subsequently 
waged  over  it.  The  facts  of  the  case,  though  they 
have  been  hotly  denied,  are  clearly  and  incontestably 
on  record.  Besides  the  official  reports  and  various 
published  accounts,  the  writer  has  the  personal  testi 
mony  of  a  correspondent  who  was  an  eyewitness. 

The  advance  was  well  under  way  when  Colonel 
Derby,  who  had  been  reconnoitring  from  the  bal 
loon — work  that  should  have  been  done  earlier — in 
formed  Kent  of  a  narrow  wood  road  that  branched 
to  the  left  from  the  main  trail,  and  led  to  another 
ford  of  the  San  Juan  River,  a  little  farther  down  the 
stream.  The  general  at  once  went  to  the  forks  of 
the  road,  with  his  staff.  The  two  leading  regiments 
of  Hawkins's  brigade,  the  Sixth  and  Sixteenth,  had 
already  passed,  marching  in  double  or  even  in  single 
file,  together  with  the  cavalry  troopers.  The  Sev 
enty-first  New  York,  coming  up  next,  was  ordered 
by  General  Kent  to  take  the  left-hand  trail.  It  did 
so,  but  its  first  battalion  had  gone  only  a  short  dis 
tance  when  it  fell  into  confusion  under  the  galling 
fire,  and,  as  the  general  says  in  his  report,  "  recoiled 
in  disorder." 

Such  an  incident  is  nothing  exceptional  with  raw 
troops  on  first  going  into  battle,  especially  under 
conditions  so  trying  as  those  of  the  advance  upon 
San  Juan.  There  were  many  instances  in  the  civil 
war,  some  in  the  case  of  regiments  that  afterward 
made  notable  records  as  fighters.  If  there  be  any 
word  of  blame,  it  must  be  for  the  officers  who  failed 

a  troop  of  cavalry  or  a  company  of  infantry  to  spare,  they  can  do  good 
work  out  here  stopping:  stragglers.  This  does  not  imply  any  reverse 
at  the  front,  but  the  firing  was  probably  hotter  than  some  like."  Shaf- 
ter  sent  him  Troop  A  of  the  Second  Cavalry,  and  later  in  the  after 
noon,  when  this  command  want  forward  with  the  artillery,  Troop  F 
took  its  place. 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     245 

to  rally  their  men.  General  Kent's  staff  to  a  certain 
extent  took  their  place,  and,  as  he  states,  "  formed 
a  cordon  behind  the  panic-stricken  men,"  who  were 
ordered  to  lie  down  in  the  thicket,  leaving  the  trail 
clear.*  The  other  two  battalions  of  the  volunteers 
came  forward  in  better  order,  but  they  were  halted, 
and  were  passed  by  Wikoff's  brigade  of  regular  in 
fantry — the  Thirteenth,  Ninth,  and  Twenty-fourth, 
which  moved  down  the  left-hand  road,  crossed  the 
river,  and  deployed  into  position  to  the  left  of  the 
lower  ford,  with  the  Thirteenth  on  the  right,  the 
Ninth  on  the  left.  All  this  was  done  under  a  heavy 
fire — how  heavy  may  be  judged  from  the  fact  that 
within  half  an  hour,  between  twelve  and  one  o'clock, 
the  brigade  had  four  commanders.  Colonel  Wikoff 
— the  ranking  American  officer  killed  in  the  war — 
was  mortally  shot  as  he  stood  near  the  river,  per 
sonally  directing  the  deployment  of  his  men,  and 
daringly  exposing  himself.  His  successor,  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Worth,  of  the  Thirteenth,  fell  five 
minutes  later,  severely  wounded;  in  another  five 
minutes  Lieutenant-Colonel  Liscum,  of  the  Twenty- 
fourth,  the  next  in  command,  was  also  wounded, 
leaving  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ewers,  of  the  Ninth, 
senior  officer  of  the  brigade,  f 

Farther  to  the  right,  the  Sixth  and  the  Sixteenth 
were  suffering  still  more  severely.  General  Haw 
kins  had  directed  these  regiments  to  push  forward, 
telling  them  that  they  would  reach  a  position  where 
they  could  enfilade  the  enemy's  works.  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Egbert,  commanding  the  Sixth,  made  his 
way  across  both  rivers,  and  after  halting  for  about  an 
hour  in  a  partly  sheltered  position  along  the  bank 
of  the  second — which  in  his  report  he  calls  the  San 


*  Nevertheless,  the  regiments  that  followed  were  more  or  less  im 
peded  by  being'  obliged  to  "step  over  prostrate  forms  of  men  of  the 
Seventy-first,"  as  General  Kent  and  other  officers  reported. 

t  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ewers  was  not  aware  of  this  until  after  the 
taking  of  the  hill.  It  is  a  fact  that  the  brigade  charged  with  no  officer 
actually  in  command. 


246  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Juan — exchanging  shots  with  the  lines  on  the  hill 
above,  he  boldly  moved  forward  into  the  open 
ground  beyond,  within  four  hundred  yards  of  the 
Spanish  trenches.  He  was  greeted  with  a  tremen 
dous  fusillade,  the  whole  fire  of  the  heights  being 
concentrated  upon  him.  Nearly  a  quarter  of  his 
men  were  killed  or  wounded  within  ten  minutes. 
To  save  the  rest  he  ordered  them  to  retreat  to  the 
river.  On  his  left,  at  the  same  time,  some  men  of 
the  Sixteenth  and  of  the  Thirteenth,  who  had 
advanced  beyond  the  main  bodies  of  their  regi 
ments,  also  fell  back ;  and  the  Tenth  Cavalry's 
Hotchkiss  gun  detachment,  which  had  fired  a  few 
shots  from  a  position  near  the  ford  of  the  Aguadores, 
had  been  forced  to  withdraw.  All  along  the  Ameri 
can  line  there  was  so  much  confusion,  and  the  losses 
had  been  so  heavy,  that  affairs  began  to  look  de 
cidedly  critical. 

Meanwhile  Kent  was  hurrying  his  remaining 
brigade — the  second,  Colonel  Pearson's — forward, 
the  Tenth  and  Second  Infantry  by  the  left-hand  trail, 
to  the  left  of  WikofFs  men,  the  Twenty-first  by  the 
main  road,  to  support  Hawkins ;  and  about  one 
o'clock  all  these  regiments  were  in  line  beyond  the 
river.  The  cavalry  division  was  already  in  position 
on  the  right  wing,  Colonel  Carroll's  brigade,  which 
led  the  way  across  the  river,  forming  the  first  line. 
Of  his  regiments,  the  Third  was  on  the  left,  next  to 
the  infantry  division ;  the  Sixth  was  in  the  centre, 
the  Ninth  on  the  extreme  right.  Wood's  brigade 
formed,  or  was  supposed  to  form,  a  second  line,  with 
the  Tenth  on  the  left,  the  First  in  the  centre,  and  the 
Rough  Riders  on  the  right;  but  owing  to  the  ex 
ceedingly  difficult  nature  of  the  ground  the  cavalry 
kept  even  less  of  orderly  formation  than  Kent's 
division,  and  in  the  charge  the  two  lines  mingled 
and  rushed  forward  together. 

The  American  lines  were  now  at  an  average  dis 
tance  of  about  six  hundred  yards  from  the  enemy's 


THE   BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     247 

works.  The  Spanish  position  was  a  strong  one,  its 
centre  being  Fort  San  Juan — a  large  brick  block 
house  with  loopholed  walls,  on  the  summit  of  a  ridge 
that  rose  about  a  hundred  and  fifty  feet  above  the 
low  ground  at  its  foot.  Along  the  crest  ran  four 
long  trenches  and  several  shorter  ones,  and  the  slope 
was  partially  protected  with  barbed-wire  entangle 
ments.  Farther  to  the  American  right,  in  front  of 
the  cavalry  division,  a  slightly  lower  hill  rose  in 
front  of  the  main  ridge.  On  this  detached  elevation 
— which  became  known  as  Kettle  Hill,  from  a  huge 
iron  sugar  caldron  on  its  top,  belonging  to  the  San 
Juan  ranch-house — was  posted  the  Spanish  advance 
guard,  "  favourably  positioned,"  as  General  Wheeler 
says,  "  but  not  strongly  fortified." 

There  is  some  doubt  as  to  the  direct  responsibil 
ity  for  what  followed.  General  Shafter,  in  his  narra 
tive  published  by  the  Century  Magazine,  states  that 
about  nine  o'clock  he  decided  to  send  the  main  col 
umn  forward  without  waiting  for  Lawton,  as  origi 
nally  intended.  "  They  understood,"  he  says,  "  that 
they  were  to  assail  the  Spanish  blockhouses  and 
trenches  as  soon  as  they  could  get  into  position."  It 
seems,  nevertheless,  that  some  at  least  of  the  com 
manders  did  not  so  understand  their  instructions. 
Both  in  his  official  report  and  in  his  book  on  the 
campaign,  General  Wheeler  describes  the  original 
plan  of  attack  in  which  Lawton  was  to  have  joined, 
and  adds  that  after  his  division  crossed  the  river 
he  ordered  an  assault  for  the  reason  that  "  it  was 
quite  evident  that  the  enemy  had  our  range  very 
accurately  established,  and  that  it  would  not  increase 
our  casualties  to  charge."  The  general  does  not  add 
that  his  men  had  already  been  in  position  for  two 
hours  or  more,  holding  their  ground  under  a  fire 
from  which  they  had  very  little  shelter.  Several 
messages  came  and  went  during  the  day  between 
Shafter  and  Lieutenant  Miley,  who  was  representing 
him  at  the  front;  but  no  mention  is  made  of  any 


248 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR 


that  passed  at  this  critical  moment  of  the  battle. 
Communication  with  the  corps  commander  was  by 
no  means  easy.  The  field  telegraph  had  been  ex 
tended  only  to  El  Pozo,  nearly  two  miles  from  the 
firing  line,  along  a  rough  and  narrow  trail  blocked 
with  wagons  and  wounded  men.* 

General  Hawkins  is  quoted  by  a  correspondent 
as  saying,  after  the  fight :  "  My  understanding  of  the 
orders  was  that  the  left  wing  was  to  wait  at  a  desig 
nated  place  on  the  road  to  San  Juan  for  Lawton 
to  come  up,  but  the  fire  was  so  hot  that  we  either 
had  to  go  on  and  take  the  ridge  or  to  retire." 

General  Kent's  report  does  not  locate  the  re 
sponsibility  for  his  division's  assault  upon  the  hill. 
It  does  state,  however,  that  early  in  the  morning 
Lieutenant-Colonel  McClernand,  Shafter's  adjutant- 
general,  pointed  out  a  green  knoll  which  was  to  be 
his  objective  on  the  left ;  but  when  his  left,  formed 
by  Pearson's  brigade,  had  crossed  the  river,  it 
"  passed  over  the  knoll  and  ascended  the  high  ridge 
beyond."  When  it  did  so,  Kent's  centre  and  right 
were  already  holding  the  Fort  San  Juan  Hill,  for  the 
capture  of  which  he  gives  credit  to  "  the  officers  of 
my  command,  whether  company,  battalion,  regi 
mental,  or  brigade  commanders,  who  admirably 
directed  the  formation  of  their  troops,  unavoidably 
intermixed  in  the  dense  thicket,  and  made  the  des 
perate  rush  for  the  distant  and  strongly  defended 
crest." 

Most  explicit  of  all — and,  it  must  be  said,  most 
positive  in  its  implied  contradiction  of  General 
Shafter's  version — is  the  report  of  General  Sumner. 
So  far  from  setting  out  with  the  plain  and  simple 
order  to  "  assail  the  Spanish  blockhouses  and 
trenches  as  soon  as  he  could  get  into  position,"  he 

*  It  may  be  recalled  at  this  point  that  in  Shafter's  despatch  of  June 
agth,  quoted  on  page  234,  he  announced  his  intention  of  advancing, 
two  days  later,  "on  the  Sevilla  road  to  the  San  Juan  river,  and  possi 
bly  beyond.'''1 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     249 

records  that  his  command  had  advanced  only  three 
quarters  of  a  mile  beyond  El  Pozo  when  he  had 
to  halt  it — though  already  under  fire — for  nearly  an 
hour  to  await  instructions.  Then,  after  crossing  the 
Aguadores,  he  was  directed  to  move  to  the  right, 
"  to  connect  with  Lawton's  left."  The  deployment 
completed,  and  there  being  no  news  of  Lawton, 
"  the  command  was  so  much  committed  to  battle 
that  it  became  necessary  either  to  advance  or  else 
retreat  under  fire.  Lieutenant  Miley,  representing 
General  Shafter,  authorized  an  advance,  which  was 
ordered."  It  appears  that  to  Lieutenant  Miley — 
whose  promising  military  career  was  cut  short,  a 
year  later,  by  a  fatal  illness  at  Manila — belongs  a 
great  share  of  the  responsibility  for  the  assault  upon 
the  San  Juan  heights,  and  of  the  credit  for  its 
success. 

The  story  of  the  assault,  in  brief,  was  that  the 

right  half  of  Sumner's  division — consisting  chiefly 

of  the  First  Cavalrv,  the  Ninth  Cav- 

Storming  of  the  j  and  th  Rough  Riders,  but  with 
San  Juan  Jt  .  te.  ' 

heights,  July  i.  many  stragglers  from  other  regi 
ments,  charged  up  Kettle  Hill,  the 
Spaniards  fleeing  as  they  came  up  the  slope. 
Reaching  the  top,  they  were  in  time  to  see  the 
American  centre  and  left  move  upon  the  main  Span 
ish  position — an  attack  of  greater  difficulty,  there 
being  a  wider  intervening  space  to  traverse,  and  the 
defenders  being  much  stronger  in  numbers.  The 
charge  was  not  a  swift  rush  of  cheering  regiments, 
sweeping  forward  in  serried  ranks,  as  the  popular 
fancy  has  pictured  it.  It  was  a  climb  up  a  rough, 
steep  slope,  covered  with  tall  grass  and  dotted  with 
trees,  and  the  assailants  were  irregular  masses  of 
men,  now  halting  to  fire,  now  rushing  on,  breaking 
down  the  wire  fences  or  vaulting  over  them.  Of 
the  many  descriptions  given  by  officers  who  took 
part  in  it,  perhaps  the  most  graphic  is  that  of  Cap 
tain  Bigelow,  of  the  Tenth  Cavalry,  who  was  at 


250 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


about  the  centre  of  the  American  line.  He  reports 
that  after  cutting  an  impeding  fence  with  a  sharp 
ened  bayonet : 

I  struck  out  as  fast  as  the  tall  grass  would  permit  me 
toward  the  common  objective  of  the  mass  of  men  which  I 
now  saw  surging  forward  on  my  right  and  left — San  Juan 
Hill.  The  men  kept  up  a  steady  double  time,  and  com 
menced  firing  of  their  own  accord  over  one  another's 
heads  and  the  heads  of  the  officers,  who  were  well  out  in 
front  of  the  men.  I  tried  to  stop  the  firing,  as  I  thought 
it  would  seriously  retard  the  advance,  and  other  officers 
near  me  tried  to  stop  it;  but  a  constant  stream  of  bullets 
went  over  our  heads,  the  men  halting  in  an  erect  position 
to  fire.  The  men  covered,  I  should  say,  about  fifty  yards 
from  front  to  rear.  They  formed  a  swarm  rather  than 
a  line. 

Close  under  the  ridge  there  was  a  considerable 
space  sheltered  from  fire  by  the  steep  slope  above, 
the  Spanish  trenches  having  been  located  too  far 
back  upon  the  crest  of  the  hill.  Here,  at  some 
points,  the  assailants  halted  to  gather  themselves 
together.  Captain  Kerr,  of  the  Sixth  Cavalry,  re 
ports  that  his  squadron  was  half  an  hour  in  this 
"  dead  "  space,  about  sixty  yards  from  the  summit, 
not  being  in  sufficient  force  to  charge  the  trenches, 
and  the  Spaniards  not  daring  to  leave  their  defences 
and  fire  down  upon  him. 

Immediately  under  the  blockhouse  the  charging 
troops  were  stopped  by  the  fire  of  the  American 
artillery  and  machine  guns,  which  just  at  this  time 
began  to  pour  in  upon  the  Spanish  lines.  Lieu 
tenant  Parker,  who  had  been  sent  forward  with  the 
somewhat  vague  order  to  "  make  the  best  use  he 
could  "  of  his  Catlings,  got  three  of  them  into  action 
about  the  centre  of  the  firing  line,  and  poured  a 
destructive  stream  of  bullets  along  the  top  of  the 
hill  as  the  assault  began.  Back  at  El  Pozo,  where 
Captain  Grimes  had  been  firing  intermittently  dur 
ing  the  day,  Best's  and  Parkhurst's  batteries  had 
gone  into  position  beside  him,  and  had  sent  one 
round  of  shells  into  the  Spanish  blockhouse  and 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     251 

trenches.  As  they  saw  these  projectiles  and  the 
Catling  bullets  striking  above  them,  the  leaders  of 
the  charge  stopped,  although  at  that  very  moment 
the  Spaniards  were  running  from  their  defences. 

"  At  this  time,"  reports  Captain  Allen,  of  the 
Sixteenth  Infantry,  "  there  arose  at  the  foot  of  the 
slope  and  in  the  field  behind  us  a  great  cry  of '  Come 
back  !  Come  back  ! '  The  trumpets  there  sounded 
'  Cease  firing,'  '  Report/  and  '  Assembly.'  The  men 
hesitated,  stopped,  and  began  drifting  down  the 
steep  slope." 

"  We  rushed  forward  almost  to  the  trenches," 
says  Captain  Byrne,  of  the  Sixth,  "  when  shells  from 
our  guns  in  rear  commenced  to  fall  a  short  dis 
tance,  probably  thirty  yards,  in  front  of  us,  and  we 
saw  that  those  in  rear  had  stopped  and  would  not 
follow  or  support  us.  In  this  front  party  there  were 
comparatively  very  few  men,  not  enough  to  accom 
plish  anything,  and  we  turned  reluctantly  back." 

Captain  McFarland,  of  the  Sixteenth,  another  of 
the  leading  officers,  was  wounded  at  this  point — it 
was  thought  by  the  fire  from  the  rear.  But  the 
American  batteries  now  ceased  firing ;  and  a  few 
minutes  later — the  time  was  half  past  one  o'clock — 
the  infantrymen  made  a  final  rush,  occupied  the 
trenches,  in  which  only  dead  and  wounded  men  were 
left,  and  poured  a  brisk  fusillade  upon  the  retreating 
Spaniards. 

When  the  cavalrymen  on  Kettle  Hill  saw  the  cen 
tre  and  left  charging,  they  supported  the  movement 
first  by  firing  volleys  into  the  Spanish  lines  and  then 
by  moving  on  to  attack  the  San  Juan  ridge.  Rush 
ing  across  the  intervening  valley  and  through  a 
swampy  pond,  they  climbed  the  heights  north  of  the 
blockhouse.  Here,  too,  the  Spaniards  ran  before 
the  assailants  came  to  close  quarters.  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Viele,  of  the  First  Cavalry,  was  left  to  hold 
Kettle  Hill  with  all  the  men  he  could  gather  for  a 
reserve  force.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hamilton,  of  the 
17 


252  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Ninth  Cavalry,  had  been  shot  dead  on  the  hill,  and 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Carroll,  the  brigade  com 
mander,  was  wounded  there. 

General  Hawkins,  who  had  personally  started 
the  Sixth  and  the  Sixteenth  in  their  charge,  running 
with  them  and  waving  his  hat,  was  the  first  general 
officer  to  ascend  the  ridge,  about  half  an  hour  after 
it  was  taken ;  and  shortly  afterward,  when  General 
Kent  came  up,  the  gallant  brigadier  reported  to  his 
division  commander  that  his  two  regiments  of  regu 
lars  had  captured  the  Spanish  \vorks  at  Fort  San 
Juan.  Kent  later  pronounced  this  a  mistake,  and 
attributed  an  equal  share  in  the  exploit  to  the  three 
regiments  of  Colonel  Ewers's  brigade,  the  Ninth, 
Thirteenth,  and  Twenty-fourth.  The  Spanish  flag 
on  the  blockhouse  was  captured  by  a  private  of  the 
Thirteenth.*  Nevertheless,  it  is  no  more  than  jus 
tice  to  say  that  to  the  Sixth  and  the  Sixteenth  fell 
the  very  hardest  of  the  fighting — the  casualty  lists 
prove  this — and  that  they  took  the  lead  in  the  as 
sault  on  the  key  of  the  enemy's  position. 

It  appears  from  Lieutenant  Miiller's  rather  con 
fused  account  of  the  battle  that  the  Spaniards'  "  fore 
most  echelon,"  posted  on  San  Juan  Hill,  consisted 
of  three  hundred  men  under  Colonel  Jose  Baquero, 
with  two  small  rapid-fire  guns  commanded  by  Colo 
nel  Ordonez.  The  guns  were  placed  behind  the 
crest  of  the  first  hill,  and  were  withdrawn  in  time  to 
escape  capture.  Of  the  two  commanding  officers, 
Colonel  Baquero  was  killed,  Colonel  Ordonez 
wounded.  The  force  in  the  second  line,  that  of  Fort 
San  Juan,  the  lieutenant  does  not  specify,  beyond 
stating  it  at  three  hundred  men  when  the  battle 
opened.  Several  bodies  of  reinforcements  were  sent 
forward  during  the  morning,  among  them  being  a 
detachment  of  marines  under  Captain  Bustamente, 

*  Captain  Noble,  of  the  Sixteenth  (afterward  major  of  the  Twenty- 
fifth),  states  in  a  letter  to  the  author  that  "the  Thirteenth  found  the 
flag  lying  on  the  roof,  after  our  men  had  gone  through  the  blockhouse." 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     253 

Admiral  Cervera's  chief  of  staff,  who  was  mortally 
wounded  early  in  the  afternoon.  About  the  same 
time  Lieutenant-General  Linares,  who  had  come 
up  from  his  headquarters  at  the  junction  of  the  roads 
from  Santiago  to  San  Juan  and  to  Caney,  was  shot 
through  the  arm.  He  was  carried  on  a  stretcher  to 
his  house  in  the  city,  relinquishing  his  command  to 
Major-General  Jose  Toral. 

Colonel  Roosevelt  states  the  Spanish  strength  at 
San  Juan  as  forty-five  hundred,  which  is  merely  an 
estimate,  arrived  at  by  taking  six  thousand  as  the 
total  effective  force  in  Santiago  and  deducting  fif 
teen  hundred  for  the  outpost  at  Caney  and  the  gar 
risons  of  the  harbour  forts.  It  is  not  likely,  how 
ever,  that  General  Linares  was  able  to  put  every 
soldier  he  had,  outside  of  these  detachments,  into 
action  at  any  one  point.  He  had  men  at  Fort  Agua- 
dores,  and  others  on  the  north  and  west  of  the  city.* 
Colonel  Aldea's  regiment  was  not  withdrawn  from 
the  other  side  of  the  bay  until  July  2d. 

Lieutenant  Miley  puts  the  number  defending  the 
San  Juan  intrenchments  at  750,  adding  that  behind 
them,  close  around  the  city,  were  3,500  soldiers, 
sailors,  and  marines.  His  figures,  apparently,  are 
based  on  those  of  Lieutenant  Miiller.  The  Spanish 
court  of  inquiry  which  tried  and  acquitted  Toral  de- 


*  Senator  Lodge,  in  his  brilliant  but  highly  inaccurate  narrative  of 
the  war,  asserts  that  "  the  Spaniards  had  12,000  to  13,000  men  in  San 
tiago  ;  they  had  over  9,000  along  the  line  of  defences  on  the  east  side, 
confronting  the  Americans."  Adding  3,500  for  Escario's  brigade, 
which  arrived  July  3d,  and  deducting  1,000  for  the  naval  landing  par 
ties,  this  would  make  about  15,000  at  the  time  of  the  surrender — a 
great  over-statement.  Tt  must  be  remembered,  too,  that  at  least  1,000 
Spaniards  were  in  the  hospitals.  More  than  2,000  sick  and  wounded 
men— chiefly  the  former— were  found  there  when  Sshafter  occupied 
the  city. 

As  another  instance  of  Senator  Lodge's  misrepresentations,  he 
quotes  Lieutenant  Muller  as  saying  that  there  were  "  only  3,000  men 
defending  Santiago,"  and  denounces  him  for  so  transparent  a  false 
hood.  Lieutenant  Muller  nowhere  states  the  total  Spanish  strength  at 
any  such  figure.  On  the  contrary,  in  one  place  he  catalogues  6,190 
troops  and  mentions  others ;  in  another,  he  estimates  the  entire  force 
as  "  at  most,  8,000  men." 


254  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

clared  in  its  report  that  1,700  men  were  available 
to  meet  the  attack,  but  its  list  of  regiments  does  not 
include  the  naval  detachment.  From  these  per- 
plexingly  different  statements,  and  in  the  absence 
of  exact  and  trustworthy  Spanish  returns,  it  does 
not  seem  probable  that  the  defenders  of  San  Juan 
were  more  than  three  thousand  at  most.  The  at 
tacking  force,  undoubtedly,  greatly  outnumbered 
them ;  but  allowing  for  this,  their  resistance  was  far 
less  tenacious  than  Vara  del  Rey's  at  Caney.  They 
replied  briskly  to  the  American  fire,  but,  as  usual, 
their  marksmanship  was  poor,  the  great  majority 
of  their  bullets  flying  too  high.  Very  little  of  their 
musketry  seemed  to  be  aimed  at  individual  objects ; 
when  the  attacking  force  came  within  short  range 
of  the  trenches  they  put  their  rifles  at  arms'  length 
above  their  heads,  and  pulled  trigger  at  a  guess. 
When  the  Americans  charged  home,  they  fled  with 
out  waiting  for  a  hand-to-hand  fight. 

Lieutenant  Miiller  states  the  Spaniards'  loss  for 
the  day,  including  both  Caney  and  San  Juan,  as 
being  593 — 94  killed,  376  wounded,  123  prisoners 
and  missing.  Elsewhere  he  gives  these  same  figures 
as  the  casualty  list  for  the  three  days,  July  ist  to  3d 
— a  discrepancy  which  does  not  create  added  confi 
dence  in  the  accuracy  of  his  statistics.  Moreover,  he 
says  that  of  520  men  at  Caney  only  80  returned, 
most  of  them  crippled  and  bruised.  Not  reckoning 
any  of  the  "  crippled  and  bruised  "  as  wounded,  this 
leaves  only  153  for  all  casualties  at  San  Juan — an 
incredibly  small  figure.  Probably  he  does  not  in 
clude  the  losses  of  the  naval  brigade ;  very  possibly 
his  returns  are  for  the  Spanish  regulars  only.  Six 
or  seven  hundred  wounded  men  were  found  in  the 
hospitals  when  the  city  surrendered.  It  is  easy  to 
believe,  however,  that  the  defenders'  losses  were 
much  smaller  than  those  of  the  assailants. 

On  the  American  side,  Kent's  division,  with  a 
strength  of  5,206  men,  had  93  killed,  492  wounded, 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     255 

and  58  missing.  Most  of  the  missing  were  in  the 
Seventy-first  New  York,  and  nearly  all  reported 
later.  The  cavalry  division  suffered  slightly  more 
in  proportion  to  its  numbers,  losing  45  killed  and 
313  wounded,  with  10  missing,  of  its  total  of  2,738 
men.  The  following  table  shows  the  losses  by  regi 
ments,  as  reported  by  the  division  commanders :  * 


Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Kent's  Division  : 

14 

87 

6 

Sixth.  Infantry                       .  . 

17 

Seventy-first  New  York  

16 

vv 

4.8 

A  0 

Tenth  Infantry 

26 

Twenty-first  Infantry 

*    * 

Second  Infantry  

i 

20 

"    * 

Ninth  Infantry  

4" 

2^ 

I 

Thirteenth  Infantry 

18 

86 

Twenty-fourth   Infantry 

12 

77 

Cavalry  Division  : 
Third  Cavalry  

•3 

e  T 

Sixth  Cavalry 

C  £ 

Ninth  Cavalry 

-5 

IO 

J 

First  Cavalry        

I  a 

*y 

47 

I 

Tenth  Cavalry  
First  Volunteer  Cavalry  

7 

1C 

69 

72 

5 

The  work  of  Lieutenant  Parker  and  his  Catling 
detachment  at  a  critical  moment  of  the  battle  has 
already  been  mentioned.  After  the  taking  of  the 
heights  he  went  forward  to  the  firing  line ;  so  did 
Lieutenant  Hughes,  with  the  Hotchkiss  guns.  The 
field  artillery  played  no  great  part  in  the  battle. 
General  Shafter  states  that  when  Grimes's  battery 
opened  fire,  early  in  the  morning,  upon  the  San  Juan 
blockhouse,  "  this  fire  was  effective,  and  the  enemy 
could  be  seen  running  away  from  the  vicinity  of  the 
blockhouse."  Evidently,  however,  they  came  back 
again  when  the  bombardment,  which  seems  to  have 

*  The  following;  table  shows  the  whole  American  strength  at  San 
Juan  and  the  losses  during  the  ist,  2d,  and  3d  of  July,  as  given  by  the 


R  A 


256 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


done  no  noticeable  damage,  was  over.  Grimes  fired 
for  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes  and  then  stopped,  prac 
tically  silenced  by  the  Spaniards'  return  fire,  which 
was  fairly  spirited  and  accurate,  causing  several 
casualties  in  the  battery  and  in  regiments  halted 
near  it.  The  Spanish  artillery  had  the  great  advan 
tage  of  using  smokeless  powder,  making  it  a  far  less 
conspicuous  target  than  the  American  guns. 

Grimes  resumed  firing  at  intervals,  but  dis 
charged  only  a  hundred  and  sixty  shots  during  the 
day  —  not  a  large  number  for  guns  calculated  to  fire 
three  shots  a  minute.  When  Best  and  Parkhurst, 
who  had  been  held  in  reserve,  came  into  action, 


Returns  Division  of  the  adjutant-general's  office.     Ther 
crepancies  between  its  figures  and  those  printed  above  : 


eral's  office.     There  are  slight  dis 


Kent's  Division,  staff u 

Hawkins's  Brigade,  staff 6 

Sixteenth  Infantry 679 

Sixth  Infantry. 

Seventy-first  New  York 969 

Pearson's  Brigade,  staff 

Second  Infantry  . 
Tenth  Infantry  . . 

Twenty-first  Infantry 467 

Wikoff 's  Brigade,  staff 5 

Ninth  Infantry 466 

Thirteenth  Infantry 465 

Twenty-fourth  Infantry . . 

Wheeler's  Division,  staff 13 

Sumner's  Brigade,  staff. 

Third  Cavalry 

Sixth  Cavalry 451 

Ninth  Cavalry 219 

Wood's  Brigade,  staff 10 

First  Cavalry 523 

Tenth  Cavalry 480 

First  Volunteer  Cavalry 583 

Artillery,  three  batteries 242 

Second  Cavalry  (estimated) 

Total 8,336 


Strength, 
June  30th. 


Killed, 
July  ist-sd. 


Wounded, 
July  ist-3d. 


"5 
114 
68 

53 
40 

34 

25 
92 

77 


Besides  the  above  casualties,  on  the  2d  and  ,-?d  Lawton's  division 
lost  6  killed  and  33  wounded  ;  Bates's  brigade,  i  killed  and  18  wounded. 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     257 

Major  Dillenback  reports  that  "  after  a  vigorous 
shelling  of  the  enemy's  works  on  the  ridge  by  all 
three  batteries,  the  position  was  occupied  by  our 
infantry."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  "  vigorous  shell 
ing  "  consisted  in  firing  just  eight  shells,  one  by 
each  of  Best's  and  Parkhurst's  guns,  Grimes's  men 
being  engaged,  at  the  time,  in  refilling  their  ammu 
nition  chests.  Captain  Parkhurst,  in  his  interesting 
account  of  The  Artillery  at  Santiago,  claims  that  the 
eight  shots  fell  with  marvellous  accuracy  into  the 
trenches  and  blockhouse,  and  did  more  to  drive  the 
Spaniards  from  their  defences  than  all  the  rest  of  the 
American  fire.  Lieutenant  Parker,  in  his  narra 
tive  of  The  Catlings  at  Santiago,  is  equally  confi 
dent  that  his  machine  guns  were  the  more  effective 
weapon,  and  asserts  that  not  a  shell  hit  the  block 
house  or  exploded  near  it. 

The  hill  taken,  Best's  battery  was  hurried  for 
ward,  escorted  by  a  troop  of  the  Second  Cavalry, 
and  took  station  with  the  firing  line,  two  hundred 
yards  north  of  the  San  Juan  blockhouse.  It  stayed 
there  for  about  ten  minutes,  and  then,  finding  the 
Spanish  fire  too  warm,  fell  back  to  Kettle  Hill, 
where  it  was  of  no  further  service,  the  higher  ridge 
in  front  shutting  it  off  from  the  enemy. 

In  the  demoralized  condition  of  the  Spaniards  as 
they  fled  from  their  defences,  the  Americans  might 
probably  have  marched  straight  forward  into  San 
tiago  ;  but  after  eight  hours'  marching  and  fighting 
under  a  blazing  sun  they  were  too  much  exhausted 
to  do  more  than  hold  what  they  had  won.  A  few 
men  of  the  Tenth  Cavalry,  the  Rough  Riders,  and 
other  regiments  who  had  pushed  on  beyond  the 
main  line,  were  recalled.  There  was  no  available 
reserve,  except  the  Seventy-first  New  York,  some 
of  whose  men  had  already  joined  other  commands 
in  the  assault  of  the  hill,  and  the  rest  of  which  was 
moved  forward  during  the  afternoon.  Lawton's 
nonarrival  left  the  right  of  the  American  line  with- 


258  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

out  support,  and  along  the  thinned  ranks  of  the 
cavalry  division  it  was  fully  expected  that  the  enemy 
would  return  in  force  to  retake  the  captured  posi 
tion.  In  response  to  urgent  messages  from  Sumner 
and  Wood,  Kent  moved  tfre  Thirteenth  Infantry 
over  from  his  centre  to  support  them,  but  he  could 
spare  no  other  troops. 

Viewing  the  battle  from  the  hill  near  his  head 
quarters,  Shafter  had  naturally  felt  anxiety  at  Law- 
ton's  failure  to  finish  his  work  at  Caney  in  the  two 
hours  allowed  him.  As  the  day  wore  on  and  Vara 
del  Rev's  men  still  held  out,  he  sent  one  of  his 
aids  with  instructions  that  Lawton  should  withdraw7 
from  Caney  and  march  down  the  Santiago  road  to 
join  Wheeler's  right.  The  movement  ordered  was 
undoubtedly  a  correct  one.  Lawton's  division  was 
urgently  needed  at  the  front,  while  Caney  was  not 
a  vital  point  in  the  American  campaign,  and  would 
in  any  case  become  untenable  by  the  Spaniards 
when  the  hills  of  San  Juan  were  taken.  But  to 
abandon  an  attack  in  which  so  many  lives  had  been 
sacrificed  would  be  to  admit  a  defeat,  and  the  order 
was  not  obeyed.  General  Shafter,  whose  reports 
were  notably  generous  to  his  subordinate  officers, 
says  that  when  his  messenger  reached  Lawton,  "  the 
troops  were  in  the  act  of  making  the  final  charge ; 
nothing  could  stop  them ;  and  when  that  charge 
was  over,  the  fight  at  El  Caney  was  won.  It  was 
then  near  evening."  Captain  Lee,  the  British  mili 
tary  attache,  in  his  account  of  the  battle,  of  which 
he  was  an  eyewitness,  records  the  arrival  of  Shafter's 
order  at  half  past  one — at  least  an  hour  before  the 
storming  of  the  fort.  In  Lawton's  report  it  is  not 
mentioned  at  all. 

The  first  American  troops  to  leave  Caney  were 
the  two  regiments  of  Bates's  brigade,  the  Third  and 
the  Twentieth.  General  Bates  says  in  his  report  that 
"  after  consultation  with  General  Chaffee  "  he  with 
drew  at  about  half  past  four,  hoping  to  be  in  time  to 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     259 

take  part  in  the  battle  at  San  Juan.  Retracing  their 
steps  toward  El  Pozo,  his  men,  who  had  been 
marching  or  fighting  all  day  and  most  of  the  previ 
ous  night,  were  too  much  exhausted  to  move  fast, 
and  as  darkness  was  coming  on  Bates  halted  them 
at  the  first  stream  they  crossed,  and  rode  to  Shafter's 
headquarters  for  instructions.  The  general  ordered 
him  to  the  left  of  Kent's  line,  and  at  midnight  his 
tired  troops  were  in  position  there. 

It  was  near  sunset  before  Lawton  could  get  his 
men  in  motion,  marching  forward  in  column  along 
the  road  from  Caney  to  Santiago,  which  is  a  good 
macadamized  highway,  the  only  good  road  running 
east  from  Santiago.  He  left  five  companies  of  the 
Seventh  Infantry,  and  one  of  the  Seventeenth,  as  a 
guard  at  Caney.  The  head  of  the  column  had 
passed  the  Ducrot  house — the  abandoned  country 
place  of  a  French  resident  of  Santiago — and  was 
nearing  the  right  of  Wheeler's  position,  when  the 
order  was  given  to  halt  for  supper.  The  soldiers 
were  boiling  their  coffee  when  bullets  began  to  fall 
among  them.  It  was  impossible  to  tell  just  whence 
the  fire  came,  and  Lawton,  not  knowing  what  might 
be  in  front  of  him,  and  not  considering  it  safe  to 
advance  further  in  the  darkness,  sent  back  to  Shafter 
for  orders.  The  messenger  reached  headquarters 
half  an  hour  after  midnight,  and  returned  with  in 
structions  that  Lawton  should  turn  about  face  to 
ward  Caney,  and  make  his  way  to  the  front  along 
the  El  Pozo  trail.  This  long  and  circuitous  march 
took  all  the  rest  of  the  night.  At  half  past  seven  next 
morning  (July  2d)  Chaffee's  brigade  reached  San 
Juan  and  deployed  to  the  right  of  Wheeler's  lines ; 
and  the  whole  division  was  in  position  by  noon. 

To  complete  the  story  of  the  operations  of  July 
Duffieid's  feint  Ist»  ^  only  remains  to  mention  Gen- 
at  Fort  Agua-  eral  Duffieid's  movement  against 
dores,  juiy  i.  Fort  Aguadores.  On  the  previous 
day  Shafter  wrote  to  Sampson : 


26o  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

I  wish  you  would  bombard  the  works  at  Aguadores 
in  support  of  a  regiment  of  infantry  which  I  shall  send 
there  early  to-morrow. 

Accordingly,  at  sunrise  on  the  1st,  the  New  York, 
the  Gloucester,  and  the  Suwanee  were  lying  off  the 
shore,  ready  to  use  their  guns.  Three  hours  later 
the  Thirty-third  Michigan  came  up,  having  been 
brought  from  Siboney  on  the  narrow-gauge  railway, 
and  the  ships  opened  fire  on  the  old  fort  west  of  the 
San  Juan  River,  and  on  a  couple  of  rifle  pits  upon  a 
hill  behind  it.  Not  more  than  twenty  Spanish  sol 
diers  were  to  be  seen,  and  these  disappeared  when 
the  shells  began  to  fly.  When  the  order  to  cease 
firing  was  given  by  the  New  York,  the  Suwanee  sig 
nalled  for  permission  to  knock  down  the  flag  on 
the  fort.  Sampson  replied  that  she  might  have  three . 
shots.  Lieutenant  Blue,  the  hero  of  two  venture 
some  reconnoitring  expeditions,  fired  them  with  a 
four-inch  gun,  at  thirteen  hundred  yards.  The  first 
tore  the  Spanish  ensign,  the  second  struck  near  the 
base  of  the  staff  and  bent  it,  the  third  shot  staff  and 
flag  away. 

The  Michigan  volunteers  now  advanced  as  far 
as  the  bridge  over  the  river,  which  the  enemy  had 
broken  down,  and  for  some  time  a  few  Spaniards 
concealed  among  the  trees  on  the  hill  beyond  the 
stream  exchanged  a  desultory  fire  with  them.  Sev 
eral  requests  were  signalled  to  the  ships  to  drive  the 
enemy  off,  to  which  the  New  York  uniformly  replied 
that  there  was  no  perceptible  enemy  to  drive  off. 
About  noon  the  Spaniards  brought  afield  piece  along 
the  railway  from  Santiago.  It  had  fired  only  four  or 
five  shots  when  the  New  York  turned  her  guns  upon 
it  and  silenced  it;  but  General  Durfield,  who  had 
had  two  men  killed  and  six  wounded,  withdrew  his 
regiment  to  Siboney.  *  The  New  York  remained  off 
Fort  Aguadores  another  hour.  She  was  joined  by 
the  Oregon,  and  both  ships  slowly  fired  eight-inch 
shells  over  the  hills  in  the  direction  of  Santiago. 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN  26l 

General  Duffield  has  been  severely  criticised 
for  his  half-hearted  and  resultless  attack,  but  the 
general,  in  reply,  has  shown  that  he  acted  in 
precise  accordance  with  Shafter's  orders.  At  the 
conference  of  June  3Oth,  at  El  Pozo,  the  corps 
commander  cautioned  him  not  to  drive  the 
Spaniards  out  of  their  position,  as  they  might  come 
upon  the  exposed  left  flank  of  the  American  line. 
On  the  following  day  Shatter  telephoned  to  Si- 
boney : 

I  do  not  wish  you  to  sacrifice  any  of  your  men,  but 
to  worry  the  enemy  at  Aguadores  sufficiently  to  keep 
him  there. 

Shatter  himself  confirms  General  Duffield' s  state 
ment.  In  his  official  report  he  states  that  that  officer 
"  attacked  Aguadores  as  ordered,  but  was  unable  to 
accomplish  more  than  to  detain  the  Spaniards  in  that 
vicinity."  In  his  Century  article,  he  says  that  the 
general  "  was  ordered  to  make  a  feint  at  Aguadores, 
to  detain  the  Spanish  troops  in  the  vicinity.  This 
movement  was  well  executed."  In  his  indorsement 
on  General  Duffield's  report,  dated  September  30, 
1898,  he  is  still  more  explicit,  saying  that  the  object 
of  the  manoeuvre  was  "  accomplished  perfectly," 
and  adding: 

There  was  no  intention  of  attempting  to  capture  the 
place,  as  it  would  naturally  fall  with  Santiago,  and,  be 
sides,  was  very  strong.  I  had  had  the  place  carefully 
examined  by  my  engineer  officers  and  General  Bates, 
besides  personal  observation  of  it  in  passing  it,  and  knew 
it  was  no  place  to  assault,  and  not  on  the  true  line  of 
advances  for  Santiago. 

As  to  the  strategy  of  the  movement,  it  would 
appear,  at  a  time  when  men  were  so  urgently  needed 
where  real  fighting  was  in  progress,  that  it  was  a 
mistake  to  detach  a  whole  regiment,  not  to  men 
tion  three  war  ships,  to  detain  the  few  Spaniards — 
Duffield  states  them  at  five  hundred,  and  his  esti 
mate  is  probably  much  too  high — who  held  Fort 


262  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Aguadores.*  As  much  might  have  been  accom 
plished  by  a  single  company,  or  by  a  boat  load  of 
marines  from  the  fleet. 

On  the  following  day — July  2d — the  demonstra 
tion  was  repeated,  on  a  smaller  scale,  by  a  bat 
talion  of  the  Thirty-third  Michigan  under  Major 
Webb,  who  exchanged  a  few  shots  with  the  Span 
iards,  and  had  one  man  fatally  wounded. 

On  the  evening  of  July  ist  the  "  thin  blue  line  " 

of  Wheeler's  and  Kent's  divisions  was  holding  the 

ridge  from  which  it   had   driven  the 

The  "thin  blue     Spaniards,  and  keeping  up  a  rifle  duel 

line "  before  -.11  i    •       ^1      •  J 

Santiago.  wltn  tne  enemy  posted  in  their  second 

series  of  trenches,  a  few  hundred  yards 
nearer  Santiago.  The  soldiers  had  won  a  very  gal 
lant  victory,  but  the  situation  was  one  of  no  little 
anxiety.  A  thousand  men  had  been  killed  and 
wounded,  and  many  others  detailed  to  find  and  bury 
the  dead  and  to  carry  the  injured  to  the  rear ;  all 
were  exhausted,  and  as  most  of  them,  while  fighting 
in  the  tropical  heat,  had  thrown  away — either  of 
their  own  motion  or  by  order  of  their  officers — 
everything  but  guns  and  ammunition,  there  was 
little  to  eat  except  the  scanty  rations  the  Spaniards 
had  left  in  the  captured  position.  Few  men  had 
coats,  still  fewer  had  blankets.  The  discomfort  of 
the  situation  was  extreme,  but  its  imminent  danger 
was  the  thinness  of  the  American  line  at  such  a  dis 
tance  from  its  support,  and  so  close  in  front  of  a 
considerable  force  of  the  enemy. 

General  Wheeler  records  that  a  number  of 
officers  urged  him  to  abandon  the  San  Juan  heights, 
and  take  up  a  more  defensible  position  farther  back  ; 
but  the  veteran  fighter  stoutly  refused  to  withdraw, 
and  fearing  that  the  same  appeal  would  be  made  to 
the  commanding  general  he  sent  a  message  to  head- 

*A  prisoner  told  General  Wheeler  that  the  garrison  consisted  of 
one  hundred  men,  with  three  guns,  two  of  which  were  useless  (The 
Santiago  Campaign,  p.  303). 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     263 

quarters  that  such  a  movement  "  would  cost  us 
much  prestige."  He  had  already  requested  that 
intrenching  tools  should  be  hurried  forward.  As 
soon  as  it  was  dark  Shafter  sent  all  he  had,  and 
Wheeler  personally  set  his  weary  men  at  work  to 
fortify  their  position,  telling  General  Kent  to  do 
the  same.  As  with  most  of  the  supplies  of  the  corps, 
there  were  not  enough  shovels  to  go  around,  but 
the  deficiency  was  partly  remedied  with  Spanish 
tools  found  along  the  enemy's  trenches. 

Shafter  also  ordered  all  the  field  artillery  to  the 
front,  and  during  the  night  three  batteries  — 
Grimes's,  Best's,  and  Parkhurst's — occupied  the 
position  which  Best  had  attempted  to  hold  the  day 
before,  with  orders  to  open,  at  dawn,  on  the  near 
est  part  of  Santiago,  the  centre  of  the  Spanish  posi 
tion.  "  We  ought  to  knock  that  part  of  the  town 
to  pieces  in  a  short  time,"  Shafter  told  Colonel 
McClernand,  but  this  proved  too  much  to  ex 
pect  of  a  dozen  three-inch  field  pieces.  After  fir 
ing  for  about  an  hour,  greatly  hampered  by  their 
own  smoke,*  and  under  a  heavy  fusillade  from 
the  enemy's  lines,  Major  Dillenback  ordered  them 
to  withdraw,  and  they  fell  back  all  the  way  to  El 
Pozo,  where  Capron,  returning  from  Caney,  joined 
them. 

All  day,  on  the  2d  of  July,  firing  was  kept  up 
between  the  two  armies,  with  considerable  loss  on 
both  sides,  the  American  casualties  being  about  one 
hundred  and  fifty  killed  and  wounded.  Among  the 
wounded  was  General  Hawkins,  who  was  succeeded 
as  brigade  commander  by  Colonel  Theaker,  of  the 
Sixteenth.  Shafter's  line  was  now  extended  by  the 

*  Lieutenant  Aultman,  who  was  left  in  command  of  Captain  Park- 
hurst's  battery  by  the  wounding  of  the  latter  officer,  early  in  the  morn 
ing,  reports  :  "  Our  fire  was  unaimed,  and  the  results  could  neither  be 
observed  nor  ascertained,  as  our  view  was  absolutely  obscured  by  our 
own  smoke " — a  severe  commentary  upon  the  mismanagement  that 
sent  the  artillery  into  the  field  equipped  with  a  powder  discarded  by 
every  military  power. 


264          .    THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

arrival  of  Bates  and  Lawton,  on  the  left  and  on  the 
right  respectively,  but  it  was  as  thinly  held  as  ever, 
and  another  anxious  day  followed.  Lying  on  their 
arms,  at  some  points  only  a  quarter  of  a  mile  from 
the  enemy,  under  a  continual  fire  and  in  constant 
expectation  of  an  attack  in  force,  the  men  felt 
the  strain  of  the  situation  severely.  Without  shel 
ter,  they  were  alternately  drenched  with  rain  and 
scorched  by  the  sun.  The  trail  to  El  Pozo  and 
Siboney  had  become  almost  impassable,  and  so  lit 
tle  food  could  be  brought  up  that  semistarvation  was 
added  to  physical  exhaustion. 

At  the  rear,  the  sufferings  of  the  wounded  were 
nothing  less  than  shocking.  It  was  not  realized  at 
first  how  heavy  the  American  losses  had  been. 
Shafter  telegraphed  to  Washington,*  late  on  July 
ist,  that  his  casualties  were  "  above  four  hundred," 
including  but  few  killed.  When  the  four  hundred 
grew  to  be  thrice  as  many,  the  medical  department 
was  simply  overwhelmed,  devotedly  as  its  personnel 
worked  to  cope  with  so  entirely  unexpected  a  situa 
tion.  For  the  wounded  men  the  journey  from  the 
chief  emergency  station,  at  the  ford  of  the  Agua- 
dores  River,  to  the  field  hospital  near  El  Pozo  and 
the  general  hospital  at  Siboney  was  a  terrible  one. 
There  were  practically  no  ambulances,  and  but  a 
limited  number  of  wagons — springless  vehicles  of 
bare  and  splintered  boards  that  caused  frightful 
agony  to  the  ghastly  freight  they  bore  over  the 
rough  trail.  They  carried  only  those  who  could  not 
possibly  make  "their  way  over  the  six  miles  afoot, 
perhaps  with  a  rude  crutch  cut  from  a  tree.  Most 
of  the  wounded  men  were  half  naked,  many  entirely 
so.  There  were  not  enough  tents  or  cots  or  cover 
ings  for  them  in  the  hospitals,  not  enough  medi- 

*  Shafter  was  in  communication  with  Washington  through  a  coast 
wise  cable  from  Santiago  to  Playa  del  Este,  which  had  been  picked  up 
and  carried  ashore  at  Siboney,  where  it  connected  with  the  field  tele 
phone  to  his  headquarters. 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     265 

cines,*  not  enough  surgeons,  not  nearly  enough 
nurses,  and  no  better  food  than  canned  meat  and 
hardtack.  A  heavy  penalty  was  being  paid  for  the 
failure  to  bring  proper  hospital  equipments  from 
Tampa,  but  it  was  not  being  paid  by  those  respon 
sible  for  the  failure.  And  yet — this  was  one  of  the 
strangest  facts  of  the  campaign — the  mortality 
among  the  wounded  was  phenomenally  small,  being 
only  about  one  per  cent. 

Though  the  Spaniards  maintained  a  constant  fire 
until  fighting  was  suspended  by  Shafter's  flag  of 
truce  about  noon  on  the  3d,  it  does  not  seem  that 
they  made  any  real  sortie  against  the  beleaguering 
lines,  although  there  were  several  alarms  of  an 
attack,  and  once,  at  least,  the  American  troops  be 
lieved  that  they  had  repelled  an  assault  in  force. 
This  was  between  nine  and  ten  o'clock  on  the  night 
of  July  2d,  when  a  wave  of  fierce  firing  swept  around 
the  trenches.  Shafter  speaks  of  it  as  "  the  attack 
called  the  night  sortie,"  and  adds  that  "  it  did  not 
amount  to  much,  though  there  was  wild  firing  in 
the  dark."  This  is  no  doubt  a  more  correct  account 
than  the  earlier  one  he  gave  in  his  official  report: 
"  About  ten  P.  M.  the  enemy  made  a  vigorous 
assault  to  break  through  my  lines,  but  he  was  re 
pulsed  at  all  points."  His  authority  was  probably 
the  statement  in  Kent's  report  that  "  at  nine  p.  M. 
a  vigorous  assault  was  made  all  along  our  lines. 
This  was  completely  repulsed,  the  enemy  again  re 
tiring  to  his  trenches."  Wheeler  makes  no  mention 
of  the  supposed  sortie.  The  division  commanders, 
at  the  time,  were  with  Shafter  at  El  Pozo. 

"  Suddenly  a  burst  of  firing  broke  out,"  says 
Lieutenant  Parker,  who  was  at  the  front  with  the 

*  This  was  admitted  even  by  the  army  staff.  "  During  and  after 
the  battles  at  El  Caney  and  San  Juan  there  was  an  insufficiency  of 
tents,  cots,  bedding,  and  medicines,"  said  Surgeon-General  Sternberg 
in  his  annual  report  for  1898.  Unofficial  observers  with  the  army- 
George  Kennan,  for  instance,  in  Campaigning  in  Cuba —describe  a 
scene  of  pitiable  misery  and  gruesome  horror. 


266  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

cavalry  division,  "  and  it  was  believed  by  many  that 
a  serious  night  attack  had  been  made."  The  lieu 
tenant  tells  how  two  officers  near  his  position  tried 
to  stop  the  waste  of  ammunition  in  the  dark.  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Roosevelt  strode  along  the  trenches 
in  front  of  the  Rough  Riders  and  told  them  that 
"  he  thought  cowboys  were  men  who  shot  only  when 
they  could  see  the  whites  of  the  other  fellow's  eyes." 
Captain  Ayres,  of  the  Tenth  Cavalry,  called  to  his 
negro  troopers  that  they  were  "  no  better  than  the 
Cubans,"  upon  which  the  men  laughed  and  ceased 
their  wild  firing.*  How  wild  it  was  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that  some  American  officers  reported  that  they 
were  fired  upon  from  their  own  lines. 

On  their  side,  at  the  same  time,  the  Spaniards 
believed  that  they  had  sustained  and  repelled  an 
attack.  "  A  little  before  ten  P.  M.,"  f  says  Lieuten 
ant  Miiller,  "  the  enemy,  who  no  doubt  intended  to 
surprise  us,  furiously  attacked  our  lines,  and  was 
repulsed  with  great  loss." 

At  six  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  2d,  General 
Shafter  summoned  his  division  commanders  to  meet 
him  at  El  Pozo.  The  conference  began  about  eight, 
and  each  of  the  officers  he  had  sent  for — Wheeler, 
Lawton,  Kent,  and  Bates — beginning  with  the 
junior,  gave  his  view  of  the  situation.  The  four  men 
were  not  unanimous  upon  the  question  of  a  with 
drawal  ;  but  after  an  hour's  discussion,  Shafter 
stated  his  intention  of  making  no 
First  demand  move  at  present.  Early  the  next 
Ju'y  3™'  ler'  morning  he  took  two  steps  which  may 
at  first  seem  somewhat  contradictory, 
but  which  can  readily  be  reconciled.  He  tele 
graphed  to  the  Secretary  of  War : 

*  Lieutenant  Parker  seems  to  date  this  incident  as  occurring  "on 
the  night  of  the  3d  "  (The  Catlings  at  Santiago,  p.  i6i\  but  the  night 
of  the  2d  must  be  meant,  as  firing  was  suspended  at  noon  on  July  3d 
until  ten  A.  M.  on  the  5th. 

t  This  appears,  in  the  translation  published  by  the  Navy  Depart 
ment,  as  "  ten  A.  M." — an  evident  mistake,  as  it  occurs  at  the  end  of  the 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN     26/ 

We  have  the  town  well  invested  on  the  north  and 
east,  but  with  a  very  thin  line.  Upon  approaching  it 
we  find  it  of  such  a  character  and  the  defences  so  strong 
it  will  be  impossible  to  carry  it  by  storm  with  my  present 
force,  and  I  am  seriously  considering  withdrawing  about 
five  miles  and  taking  up  a  new  position  on  the  high 
ground  between  the  San  Juan  River  and  Siboney,  with 
our  left  at  Sardinero,  so  as  to  get  our  supplies  to  a 
large  extent  by  means  of  the  railroad,  which  we  can  use, 
having  engines  and  cars  at  Siboney. 

At  the  same  time  he  sent  a  flag  of  truce  into  the 
enemy's  lines  with  this  message  to  the  u  command 
ing  general  of  the  Spanish  forces  "  : 

SIR:  I  shall  be  obliged,  unless  you  surrender,  to  shell 
Santiago  de  Cuba.  Please  inform  the  citizens  of  foreign 
countries,  and  all  women  and  children,  that  they  should 
leave  the  city  before  ten  o'clock  to-morrow  morning. 

In  the  fire  of  criticism,  just  and  unjust,  of  which 
General  Shafter  has  been  the  object,  his  despatch  to 
Secretary  Alger  has  been  cited  in  proof  of  his  vacil 
lation  and  mental  and  physical  debility.  In  reality, 
the  fact  that  he  demanded  the  enemy's  surrender 
while  he  was  warning  his  Government  that  he  might 
be  compelled  to  move  backward,  shows  his  correct 
estimate  of  the  situation,  and  his  promptness  and 
resolution  in  availing  himself  of  it.  It  was,  to  a  cer 
tain  extent,  like  Grant  after  the  first  day  of  Shiloh. 
His  position  was  bad,  and  might  become  untenable, 
but  he  had  reason  to  believe  that  that  of  the  enemy 
was  much  worse.  The  Spanish  troops  were  neces 
sarily  quite  as  exhausted  as  his  own  men;  it  was 
known  that  their  food  was  meagre,  and  it  was  easy 
to  guess  that  their  ammunition  was  running  low. 
The  climate  was  but  little  less  trying  to  them  than 
to  the  Americans.  Blockaded  by  sea,  defeated  on 
land,  what  could  Toral  see  before  him  but  destruc 
tion  or  surrender? 


day's  chronicle,  and  a  few  lines  farther  on  the  affair  is  called  "  a  night 
surprise." 

18 


268  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

At  Washington,  where  the  situation  was  very 
imperfectly  understood — Shafter's  despatches  had 
been  few  and  not  specially  luminous — there  was 
some  natural  anxiety.  Secretary  Alger  had  waited 
with  the  President  until  four  o'clock  that  morning 
(July  3d)  for  news  from  the  front,  one  of  the  last 
despatches  they  received  on  the  2d  having  been  a  re 
quest  for  more  surgeons.  It  was  nearly  noon  when 
the  telegram  telling  of  a  possible  retreat  reached 
them.  The  secretary,  a  politician  as  well  as  a  sol 
dier,  replied : 

Of  course  you  can  judge  the  situation  better  than  we 
can  at  this  end  of  the  line.  If,  however,  you  could  hold 
your  present  position,  especially  San  Juan  heights,  the 
effect  upon  the  country  would  be  much  better  than  fall 
ing  back. 

• 

Shafter's  answer,  received  at  Washington  shortly 
after  midnight,  was  brief  and  decided : 

I  shall  hold  my  present  position. 

For  in  the  meantime  the  situation  had  entirely 
changed.  Cervera's  squadron  had  gone  out  of  the 
harbour,  leaving  the  city  to  its  fate. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE    SANTIAGO    SEA    FIGHT 

DURING  the  battle  of  the  ist  of  July  Cervera's 
ships  threw  a  few  shells  in  the  direction  of  the  Amer 
ican  lines,  but  with  little  effect,  as  the  intervening 
hills  prevented  any  accurate  aim.  The  Punta  Gorda 
battery  also  joined  in  the  firing,  but  its  heavier  guns 
turned  seaward,  and  could  not  be  brought  to  bear. 

During  the  day  the  French  consul  at  Santiago 
wrote  to  the  admiral,  inquiring  whether  he  intended 
to  bombard  the  city  if  the  American  troops  occupied 
it,  and  requesting  that  he  should  not  do  so  without 
giving  notice.  Cervera  replied,  next  morning,  that 
if  the  enemy  entered  Santiago  he  would  at  once  turn 
his  guns  on  the  town,  without  further  warning. 
The  French  official  at  once  informed  his  country 
men  and  the  other  consuls,  and  there  was  something 
of  a  panic.  Mr.  Ramsden,  the  British  representa 
tive,  sent  the  civil  governor  of  Santiago  to  see  Cer 
vera,  who  modified  his  truculent  announcement — 
for  there  were  more  than  twenty  thousand  women 
and  children  in  the  city — saying  that  he  would 
bombard  the  place  if  the  Americans  took  it  and  the 
inhabitants  deserted  it.* 

*  A  detailed  account  of  the  incident  appeared  in  the  New  York  Sun, 
December  5,  1898,  in  which  it  was  stated  that  Cervera's  bloodthirsty 
des'gn — quite  foreign  to  the  character  displayed  at  other  times  by  the 
gallant  Spanish  admiral — was  frustrated  only  by  the  interference  of 
the  British  Government.  According  to  the  Sun's  historian,  Ramsden 
telegraphed  information  of  it  to  Sir  Alexander  Gollan,  the  British  con 
sul-general  in  Havana,  at  two  o'clock  A.  M.,  July  2d.  Gollan  went  to 
Blanco,  but  was  rebuffed,  Blanco  telling  him  that  Cervera  was  entirely 
at  liberty  "  to  take  the  measures  which  he  should  deem  best  for  the  suc 
cess  of  the  campaign  " ;  but  a  protest  to  London  caused  a  change  of 

269 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

On  the  morning  of  the  2d  the  harbour  batteries 
were  again  shelled  at  close  range  by  the  blockading 
ships.  This  was  in  answer  to  a  note  from  Shafter, 
requesting  Sampson  to  keep  up  his  fire  upon  Santi 
ago.  The  action  lasted  two  hours,  the  Spaniards 
making  little  attempt  to  reply ;  and  a  shot  from  the 
Texas  accomplished  wrhat  had  not  been  done  in  all 
the  bombardments  of  the  blockade — it  dismounted 
one  of  the  six-inch  guns  in  the  Socapa,  besides  kill 
ing  three  men  and  wounding  six,  among  the  latter 
being  Ensign  Pifia,  the  commander  of  the  battery. 

Throughout  the  day  Cervera  made  preparations 
for  leaving  the  harbour,  Blanco  having  sent  him 
imperative  orders  to  make  a  dash  for 
Havana,  in  spite  of  the  admiral's  pro 
test  of  his  inability  to  cope  with  the 
blockading  fleet.*  The  marines  who  had  gone 
ashore  to  reinforce  Linares  were  taken  aboard,  a 
pilot  was  sent  to  each  ship,  steam  was  made,  and  a 
little  before  half  past  nine  o'clock  on  the  morning 
of  Sunday,  July  3d,  the  six  vessels,  cleared  for 
action,  were  moving  toward  the  sea  gate  of  the  har 
bour  that  had  sheltered  them  for  forty-five  event 
ful  days. 


heart,  and  the  captain-general  ordered  Cervera  to  leave  Santiago  in 
stead  of  bombarding  it. 

This  version  of  the  affair  is  not  borne  out  bv  Mr.  Ramsden's  diary  ; 
indeed,  it  is  contradicted  at  an  essential  point  by  his  statement  that  it 
was  ten  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  July  ad  when  he  saw  Cervera's  note 
to  the  French  consul.  It  must  therefore  be  relegated  to  the  already 
well-filled  realm  of  war  fiction. 

*  On  September  10,  1898,  according  to  a  press  report,  Senor  Aunon, 
the  Spanish  minister  of  marine,  stated  in  the  Cortes  that  Cervera 
"wanted  to  blowup  his  ships  in  the  harbour;  but  I  informed  him 
that  it  would  be  preferable  to  leave  the  port  and  engage  the  enemy. 
General  Blanco  ordered  Admiral  Cervera  to  leave  Santiago,  and  fixed 
the  day  of  his  departure." 

Cervera's  official  report  to  Captain-General  Blanco  was  read  to  rep 
resentatives  of  the  Madrid  press  on  August  22,  180,8,  but  no  copies  of  it 
were  given  out.  According  to  the  version  published  by  the  Heraldo 
(translated  by  the  Navy  Department)  it  begins  :  "  In  obedience  to  your 
orders,  in  the  face  of  that  which  would  have  happened,  and  of  which 
you  were  informed,  I  left  the  bav  of  Santiago  for  sea  on  the  3d  day  of 
July."  Its  account  of  the  battle  is  very  brief. 


THE   SANTIAGO   SEA   FIGHT  271 

Cervera's  choice  of  the  daytime,  rather  than  the 
night,  for  the  moment  of  his  sortie,  was  a  paradox 
that  is  not  explained  in  his  official  report;  but 
officers  of  his  squadron  afterward  gave  what  was  no 
doubt  the  true  reason — that  the  American  ships  lay 
so  close  inshore  from  sunset  to  sunrise,  and  their 
watch  with  searchlights  was  so  perfect,  that  the 
Spanish  admiral  saw  no  possible  hope  of  a  night 
escape.*  Mistaken  as  his  judgment  probably  was, 
it  was  a  remarkable  testimony  to  the  effectiveness 
of  Sampson's  plan  of  blockade. 

The  militant  captain  of  the  Iowa  is  reported  as 
saying,  some  time  after  the  battle,  that  the  Span 
iards  "  were  so  thoroughly  rattled  that  they  just 
started  to  run  out  of  the  way  as  fast  as  they  could." 
To  show  how  unfair  is  such  a  description  of  Cer 
vera's  sortie,  it  is  worth  while  to  quote  the  account 
given  to  Lieutenant  Miiller  by  the  pilot  of  the  Maria 
Teresa : 

I  was  in  the  forward  tower  by  the  side  of  Admiral 
Cervera,  who  was  as  calm  as  though  he  had  been  at 
anchor  in  his  own  cabin,  and  was  observing  the  channel 
and  the  hostile  ships,  and  only  said  these  words: 

"  Pilot,  when  can  we  shift  the  helm?  " 

He  had  reference  to  turning  to  starboard,  which  could 
be  done  only  after  we  had  passed  Diamante  Bank.  After 
a  few  seconds  he  said: 

"  Pilot,  advise  me  when  we  can  shift  the  helm." 

"  I  will  advise  you,  admiral,"  I  answered. 

*  In  The  Story  of  the  Captains  (Century  Magazine,  May,  1899)  Cap 
tain  Taylor  records  his  opinion  that  in  coming  out  by  daylight  Cervera 
"exhibited  a  sound  tactical  sense,"  and  that  if  he  had  made  his  sortie 
at  night  his  ships  would  have  been  sunk  before  passing  the  Morro.  On 
the  other  hand,  Captain  Clark,  in  the  same  symposium,  adduces  some 
strong  reasons  to  the  contrary ;  and  Captain  Taylor's  argument  is 
seriously  weakened  by  the  fact  that  on  the  night  of  July  4th  the  Reina 
Mercedes — an  unarmoured  vessel — came  down  the  channel,  under  a 
heavy  fire  from  the  blockading  fleet,  practically  uninjured.  She  went 
down  near  the  harbour  mouth,  but  she  was  scuttled  by  the  opening  of 
her  valves,  not  sunk  by  the  American  gun-fire. 

As  to  the  courses  open  to  Cervera  when  he  came  out  of  the  harbour 
— to  go  eastward,  to  go  westward,  or  to  scatter  his  ships — while  the 
latter  might  have  saved  one  or  possibly  more  of  his  cruisers,  it  can 
hardly  be  doubted  that  his  decision  to  steam  to  the  west  was  strategi 
cally  correct. 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

A  few  moments  later  I  said:  "Admiral,  the  helm  may 
be  shifted  now." 

In  a  moment  the  admiral,  without  shouting,  without 
becoming  excited,  as  calm  as  usual,  said:  '*  To  starboard," 
and  the  next  minute,  "  Fire!  " 

At  the  same  moment  the  two  guns  of  the  turret  and 
those  of  the  port  battery  fired  on  a  ship  which  seemed 
to  me  to  be  the  Indiana.  By  this  time  there  were  already 
many  dead  and  wounded  in  the  battery,  because  they  had 
been  firing  on  us  for  some  time,  and  I  believe  that  in  spite 
of  the  water  that  was  in  the  ship  she  was  already  on  fire. 
The  admiral  said  to  me: 

"  Good-bye,  pilot;  go  now;  go,  and  be  sure  you  let 
them  pay  you,  because  you  have  earned  it  well." 

The  Spanish  cruisers  came  down  the  channel  in 
column,  Cervera's  flagship,  the  Maria  Teresa,  in  the 
lead,  and  the  Vizcaya,  the  Cristobal  Colon,  and  the 
Almirante  Oquendo  following  in  order,  with  about 
eight  hundred  yards'  distance  between  each  ship 
and  the  next.  Twelve  hundred  yards  behind  the 
Oquendo  came  the  torpedo-boat  destroyers.  As  to 
the  order  in  which  the  destroyers  went  out,  there 
are  discrepancies  in  the  reports  of  the  American 
officers,  and  even  in  Lieutenant  Miiller's  narrative, 
in  which  accuracy  might  have  been  expected.  Ap 
parently  the  explanation  is  that  the  Furor  led  down 
the  channel,  and  when  just  outside  the  Morro  she 
circled  to  port  as  if  to  escape  to  the  eastward,  but 
seeing  the  Gloucester  and  other  vessels  in  her  path, 
she  turned  west  to  follow  the  cruisers — thereby  los 
ing  enough  ground  to  allow  the  Pluton  to  overhaul 
and  pass  her.* 

Cervera's  plan  was  to  turn  westward  as  soon  as 
he  reached  the  sea,  and  run  for  it.  His  one  hope  of 
success  lay  in  outrunning  the  American  battle  ships 
and  beating  off  Sampson's  speediest  vessel,  the 
Brooklyn — not  by  any  means  an  impossible  scheme 
on  paper.  In  the  test  of  action,  his  ships  proved 

*  This  is  based  on  the  detailed  account  given  by  Lieutenant  Muller 
on  the  authority  of  Lieutenants  Bustamente  of  the  Furor  and  Caballero 
of  the  Pluton. 


THE   SANTIAGO   SEA   FIGHT 


273 


much  slower  than  they  should  have  been,  the  Ameri 
cans  faster  than  he  had  expected ;  while  in  fighting 
power  his  four  cruisers  showed  themselves  pitiably 
inferior  to  the  five  powerful  men-of-war — four  bat 
tle  ships  and  a  cruiser — of  whose  guns  they  had  to 
run  the  gantlet. 

These  five — the  Indiana,  the  Oregon,  the  Iowa, 
the  Texas,  and  the  Brooklyn,  recounting  them  in 
order  from  east  to  west — lay  at  or  near  their  regular 
blockading  stations,  in  a  semicircle  about  the  har 
bour  mouth,  and  from  two  and  a  half  to  four  miles 
distant  from  it.  The  Massachusetts  had  gone  early 
that  morning  to  Guantanamo  Bay  for  coal.  The 
New  York  had  signalled,  at  a  quarter  to  nine,  "  Dis 
regard  movements  of  the  commander-in-chief,"  and 
had  started  eastward  for  Siboney,  where  Sampson 
intended  to  land  for  a  conference  with  Shafter.  She 
was  nearly  ten  *  miles  east  of  the  Morro  when  the 
Teresa  came  out,  and  in  company  with  her  were 
the  torpedo  boat  Ericsson  and  the  converted  yacht 
Hist.  Of  the  other  small  vessels,  the  Gloucester  and 
the  Vixen  lay  inside  the  main  blockading  line,  the 
former  to  the  east  of  the  harbour  entrance,  the  latter 
to  the  west.  The  Resolute  was  farther  out,  close  to 
the  Indiana.  On  all  the  ships  the  men  were  at 
"  quarters  for  inspection,"  according  to  the  regular 
routine  of  Sunday  morning. 

Suddenly,  at  almost  exactly  half  past  nine,  the 
Teresa,  with  smoke  pouring  from  her  funnels,  came 
around  Smith  Key  and  turned  down  the  channel  to 
ward  the  sea.  She  was  in  plain  view  of  several 
American  ships,  and  three  or  four  of  them  an 
nounced  "Enemy's  ships  escaping  "  at  almost  the 
same  instant,  the  Iowa  also  firing  a  gun  to  attract 
attention.  The  Brooklyn's  records  show  that  she 
made  the  warning  signal  at  9.35,  having  received 

*  "About  seven,"  Sampson  says  in  his  report;  but  the  distance 
measures  almost  ten  miles  on  the  chart  drawn  up  by  the  board  of  offi 
cers  appointed  to  make  a  map  of  the  battle. 


274  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

it  from  the  Iowa.*  Sampson  had  prescribed  this 
signal  in  a  general  order  dated  June  7th.  Elsewhere 
in  the  carefully  prepared  instructions  with  which  he 
had  sought  to  insure  that  there  should  be  no  un 
readiness  in  any  emergency  that  might  arise,  he  had 
directed  that  whenever  the  enemy  appeared,  "  the 
ships  must  close  and  engage  as  soon  as  possible,  and 
endeavour  to  sink  his  vessels  or  force  them  to  run 
ashore  in  the  channel." 

Even  without  this  order,  there  was  no  doubt  of 
what  was  to  be  done.  The  Spaniards'  simple  tactics 
rendered  manoeuvring  unnecessary,  and  the  re 
markable  combat  that  followed  was  a  gunners'  and 
engineers'  rather  than  a  commanders'  battle.  Com 
modore  Schley  flew  from  the  Brooklyn  the  signals 
"  Clear  for  action  "  and  "  Close  up,"  but  apparently 
they  were  not  noticed  in  the  smoke  and  the  excite 
ment,  as  they  are  not  recorded  in  the  logs  of  the 
other  men-of-war.  Sampson,  when  he  saw  what 
was  happening,  put  the  New  York  about  and  sig 
nalled  "  Close  in  toward  harbour  entrance  and  at 
tack  vessels,"  but  his  orders  could  have  been  visible 
only  to  the  easternmost  of  his  ships. 


*  In  The  Story  of  the  Captains,  Captain  Philip  remarks  that  "  when 
so  many  eyes  must  have  seen  the  approach  of  Cervera  at  once,  it  is  to 
the  credit  of  all  that  none  claims  the  distinction  of  having  been  the  first 
to  discover  the  sally  "  But  Captain  Evans  asserts  that  ' '  the  Iowa  was 
the  first  to  discover  the  Spanish  ships,"  and  accounts  for  it  "because  of 
her  position,  by  which  she  was  enabled  to  see  farther  into  the  harbour 
than  any  other  ship.  All  the  vessels,"  he  adds,  "were  most  vigilant 
and  watchful,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  no  fewer  than  three  claim 
to  have  been  the  first  to  see  the  Spaniards."  For  the  Oregon,  Lieuten 
ant  Eberle  claims  that  "  at  twenty-eight  minutes  after  nine,  our  sharp- 
eyed  chief  quartermaster  sighted  the  masthead  of  a  ship  coming  from 
behind  Smith  Cay."  Captain  Cook's  view  is  that  "it  can  not  be  de 
termined  which  ship  first  discovered  the  enemy.  The  Iowa  was  first 
to  signal  the  fact,  but  the  other  vessels  were  in  the  act  of  hoisting  the 
signal  arranged  by  the  admiral." 

In  his  official  report,  Captain  Philip  states  that  the  Texas  made  the 
signal  a  moment  earlier  than  the  Iowa ;  but  this  must  be  a  mistake. 
Captain  Evans's  quartermaster  had  "bent  on  "  those  particular  flags 
the  evening  before,  when  suspicious  columns  of  smoke  were  seen  rising 
from  the  harbour  ;  and  when  the  Teresa  was  sighted  they  were  hoisted 
instantly. 


THE   SANTIAGO   SEA   FIGHT  275 

It  has  been  stated  that  Cervera's  sortie  caught 
the  blockading  fleet  napping;  that  most  of  the 
American  vessels  were  ready  to  shoot  but  not  to 
pursue;  that — with  two  shining  exceptions — their 
engineers  were  "  unprepared  to  make  a  quick  move 
ment  of  any  kind  in  the  face  of  the  enemy."  * 
While  not  wholly  untrue,  the  criticism  is  decidedly 
unfair.  Of  course,  the  ships  were  not  ready  to  jump 
instantly  to  their  highest  speed.  To  keep  them, 
through  all  the  weeks  of  the  blockade,  in  condition 
to  use  their  full  steaming  power  at  a  moment's  no 
tice,  would  have  been  utterly  impossible.  It  would 
have  involved  an  intolerable  strain  upon  the  crews, 
and  an  expenditure  of  fuel  that  would  have  crippled 
the  fleet's  efficiency  by  necessitating  constant  re- 
coaling.  The  New  York  had  steam  in  four  of  her 
six  boilers ;  the  fifth  was  hot,  the  sixth  was  ready  for 
lighting  fires ;  her  forward  engines  were  discon 
nected,  as  they  can  not  be  used  to  advantage  except 
with  full  boiler  power.  The  Brooklyn,  which  has 
seven  boilers,  had  steam  in  three,  with  three  more 
full  of  hot  water.  If  any  ships  were  caught  nap 
ping  it  was  the  Iowa  and  the  Indiana.  Captain 
Evans  reports  that  the  former  could  make  only  five 
knots  at  first,  quickening  later  to  about  ten ;  and 
the  latter,  whose  machinery  was  not  in  prime  con 
dition,  did  no  better.  Readiest  of  all  the  fleet  was 
that  naval  bulldog,  the  Oregon.  Her  engineers, 
who  had  already  distinguished  themselves  by  speed 
ing  her  from  San  Francisco  to  the  West  Indies,  won 
fresh  laurels  by  their  ship's  fine  performance  on  the 
3d  of  July — a  performance  that  entitles  her  chief 
engineer,  Robert  Milligan,  to  a  place  among  the 
heroes  of  the  war.  The  other  vessel  whose  readi 
ness  for  action  deserves  special  mention  was  the 
Gloucester. 

*  This  criticism  was  made  in  an  article  published  in  the  Engineer 
ing  Magazine,  December,  1898,  which  attracted  some  attention  at  the 
time. 


2^6  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Quickly  as  the  crew  sprang  to  their  stations,  it 
was  some  few  minutes  *  before  the  gunners  were 
rea^y  to  fire,  and  they  were  not  in 

.  time'  nor .near  en9ugh> to  prevent  Cer- 
vera's  ships  coming  out  of  the  chan 
nel.  But  when  they  opened,  with  every  gun  that 
could  be  brought  to  bear,  the  hail  of  shell  that  rained 
upon  the  Spaniards  was  terrific.  There  was  no  swell 
to  render  an  accurate  aim  difficult,  and  the  Ameri 
can  marksmanship  was  deadly.  It  drove  the  Span 
ish  gunners  from  their  pieces,  it  made  slaughter  pens 
of  their  decks,  and,  most  fatal  of  all,  it  set  their 
ships  on  fire.  When  two  of  Cervera's  cruisers — the 
Vizcaya  and  the  Oquendo — lay  beside  the  Maine 
in  Havana  harbour,  Captain  Sigsbee  noticed  the 
"  long  stretch  of  beautiful  woodwork "  in  their 
cabins,  and  foresaw  their  danger  of  fire  in  battle,  f 
His  forecast  was  verified  now.  The  Teresa  and  the 
Oquendo  were  ablaze  after  fifteen  minutes'  fighting. 
The  former  had  her  fire  main  cut  by  one  of  the  first 
shots,  leaving  her  powerless  to  extinguish  the  flames 
that  were  devouring  her. 

The  Spanish  cruisers  came  down  the  channel  at 
a  speed  of  eight  or  ten  knots.  When  they  turned 
westward  they  used  the  full  power  of  their  engines, 
but  only  the  Colon  could  quicken  materially.  Their 
speed  was  enough,  however,  to  carry  them  past  the 
American  ships  before  the  latter  could  get  well 
under  way.  The  five  first-rate  vessels  within  range 
headed  in  directly  toward  the  escaping  foe,  the  only 
exception  being  a  manoeuvre  made  by  the  Brooklyn, 
out  of  which  there  subsequently  grew  one  of  the 
innumerable  controversies  of  the  war. 

The  westward  station  of  Schley's  flagship  placed 


*  "Within  eight  minutes,"  Sampson  says  in  his  report.  "Within 
five  minutes,"  says  Captain  Cook.  "Within  three  minutes,"  says 
Captain  Philip.  "Not  two  minutes,  it  seemed  to  me,"  says  Captain 
Taylor.  Under  the  circumstances,  the  discrepancy  is  not  surprising. 

f  The  Maine,  pp.  56,  57. 


THE   SANTIAGO   SEA   FIGHT  277 

her  nearest  to  Cervera's  ships  when  they  turned  to 
starboard  out  of  the  channel ;  but  their  line  of  flight 
was  close  along  shore,  almost  a  mile  from  her. 
The  Teresa  had  passed,  and  the  Vizcaya  was  fol 
lowing,  when  the  Brooklyn,  which  was  heading  to 
the  northeast,  wore  around  to  seaward.  As  her 
tactical  diameter — that  is,  the  space  in  which  she 
can  go  about — is  eight  hundred  yards,  this  move 
ment  turned  her  in  the  direction  taken  by  the  flee 
ing  Spaniards,  but  set  her  nearly  half  a  mile  farther 
away  from  them. 

His  handling  of  the  Brooklyn  having  been  criti 
cised — or,  perhaps  it  would  be  fairer  to  say,  hav 
ing  been  commented  on  with  much  curiosity  as 
to  its  precise  purpose — Commodore  Schley  subse 
quently  explained  that  he  made  his  seaward  turn, 
at  a  moment  when  the  other  ships  were  follow 
ing  the  order  to  close  with  the  enemy,  in  order  to 
prevent  the  Brooklyn  from  cutting  off  the  fire  of 
the  rest  of  the  fleet.  He  added  that  he  regarded 
it  as  "  the  crucial  and  deciding  feature  of  the  com 
bat,"  and  claimed  the  sinking  of  four  ships  within 
half  an  hour  as  the  result  of  it.*  In  view  of  this 
it  is  certainly  curious  that  in  his  official  report  of 
the  battle  he  makes  no  mention  of  the  manoeuvre. 
His  flag  captain,  Captain  Cook,  merely  records  that 
"  the  enemy  turned  to  the  westward  to  close  in  to 
the  land.  We  then  wore  around  to  starboard,  bring 
ing  the  starboard  battery  into  action.  The  enemy 
hugged  the  shore  to  the  westward."  Before  his 
later  explanation,  Schley's  statement  that  "  the 
Spanish  admiral's  scheme  was  to  concentrate  all  fire 
for  a  while  on  the  Brooklyn,  and  the  Vizcaya  to 
ram  her  "  was  regarded  as  giving  his  reason  for  the 
course  he  took.  The  commodore  attributes  his  in 
formation  to  two  of  Cervera's  captains,  but  no  other 
officer  seems  to  have  noticed  any  threat  of  ramming 

*  Rear-Admiral   Schley's  statement  to  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Naval  Affairs,  February  19,  1899. 


2;8  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR 

on  the  part  of  the  Vizcaya.*  Cervera's  general  plan 
was  simply  to  run ;  and  such  a  bold  offensive  stroke 
would  have  been  most  uncharacteristic  of  Spanish 
seamanship.  Moreover,  had  it  been  attempted,  a 
vessel  can  not  ram  without  risk  of  being  rammed, 
and  the  Brooklyn  was  more  than  two  thousand  tons 
heavier  than  any  of  the  Spanish  ships,  as  well  as 
swifter. 

The  Brooklyn's  seaward  turn  was  made,  too,  at 
very  serious  risk  of  collision  with  the  Texas,  which 
was  coming  up  outside  of  her.  It  appears  that  when 
Commodore  Schley  gave  the  order  to  port  the  helm, 
Lieutenant  Hodgson,  navigating  officer  of  the  flag 
ship,  who  was  beside  him  on  the  platform  around 
the  conning  tower,  pointed  out  the  danger,  but  his 
suggestion  was  disregarded.!  The  officers  of  the 
Texas  had  last  seen  the  Brooklyn  heading  north 
east,  toward  the  Spaniards ;  then  the  smoke  hid  her, 
till  suddenly  she  appeared,  Captain  Philip  states, 
"  bearing  toward  us  and  across  our  bows.  She 
seemed  so  near  that  it  took  our  breath  away.  '  Back 
both  engines  hard ! '  went  down  the  tube  to  the 
astonished  engineers,  and  in  a  twinkling  the  old 
ship  was  racing  against  herself.  The  collision  which 
seemed  imminent,  even  if  it  was  not,  was  averted, 
and  as  the  big  cruiser  glided  past  all  of  us  on  the 
bridge  gave  a  sigh  of  relief.  Had  the  Brooklyn 
struck  us  then,  it  would  probably  have  been  an  end 
of  the  Texas  and  her  half  thousand  men.  Had  the 
Texas  rammed  the  Brooklyn,  it  would  have  been 
equally  disastrous ;  for  the  Texas  was  not  built  for 

*  "  No  Spanish  ship,"  says  Captain  Evans,  "gave  the  slightest  in 
dication  of  using  either  ram  or  torpedo." 

f  An  unpleasant  controversy  afterward  arose  over  this  incident,  it 
being  stated  by  Lieutenant  Heilner,  of  the  Texas,  who  cited  Lieutenant 
Hodgson  as  his  informant,  that  Schley  said  "  Damn  the  Texas  :  let  her 
look  out  for  herself  !  "  The  matter  being  officially  investigated  by  the 
Navy  Department,  Lieutenant  Hodgson  testified  that  the  commodore's 
words  were  "  All  right ;  the  Texas  must  look  out  for  that " — or  to  that 
effect.  Schley  himself  stated  (to  Lieutenant  Hodgson,  in  June,  1899) 
that  he  had  no  recollection  of  any  such  conversation. 


THE    SANTIAGO    SEA   FIGHT 


279 


ramming,  and  she  would  have  doubled  up  like  a 
hoop.  Few  of  our  ship's  company  knew  of  the  in 
cident." 

The  Brooklyn  was  still  nearest  to  the  leading 
Spanish  ships.  The  Iowa,  the  Indiana,  and  the 
Texas,  after  pouring  in  a  tremendous  fire  upon  each 
of  Cervera's  cruisers  as  it  came  out  of  the  harbour 
mouth,  headed  after  the  fugitives  at  the  best  pace 
they  could  make,  their  guns  still  steadily  at  work. 
The  unarmoured  Vixen,  finding  herself  between  the 
two  fleets,  prudently  turned  seaward  and  ran  out 
side  of  the  American  ironclads.  The  Oregon  dashed 
forward  wifh  a  splendid  burst  of  speed,  and  drew 
almost  level  with  the  Brooklyn.  "  It  was  an  inspir 
ing  sight,"  the  captain  of  Schley's  flagship  gener 
ously  says  in  his  report,  "  to  see  this  battle  ship, 
with  a  large  white  wave  before  her,  and  her  smoke 
stacks  belching  forth  continued  puffs  from  her 
forced  draught.  We  were  making  fourteen  knots 
at  the  time,  and  the  Oregon  came  up  off  our  star 
board  quarter  at  about  six  hundred  yards  and  main 
tained  her  position,  though  we  soon  after  increased 
our  speed  to  fifteen  knots,  and  just  before  the  Colon 
surrendered  were  making  sixteen."  f 

In  The  Story  of  the  Captains,  Captain,  Evans 
gives  an  equally  appreciative  description.  "  Clark, 
of  the  Oregon,"  he  says,  "  put  his  helm  to  starboard, 
and  came  through  the  lee  of  the  Iowa  with  the  speed 
of  a  locomotive.  So  sudden  was  his  change  of  posi 
tion  in  the  dense  smoke  that  he  had  great  difficulty, 
as  he  afterward  told  me,  in  preventing  his  men  from 
firing  into  us,  as  they  took  us  for  one  of  the  enemy's 
ships.  As  it  was,  he  did  not  waste  much  time,  and 
as  he  cleared  us  on  our  port  side,  his  thirteen-inch 
guns  fairly  raised  the  scalps  of  those  in  the  conning- 

*  Century  Magazine,  May,  1899,  p.  qi. 

t  Captain  Cook's  estimate  of  his  ship's  speed  was  a  little  too  high. 
The  map  plotted  by  the  official  board  already  mentioned  shows  that 
the  Brooklyn's  average  speed  in  the  long  chase  of  the  Colon  was  a  little 
more  than  thirteen  knots,  the  Oregon's  a  trifle  less. 


280  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

tower  of  the  Iowa.  We  may  all  live  a  hundred  years, 
and  fight  fifty  naval  battles,  but  we  can  never  hope 
again  to  see  such  a  sight  as  the  Oregon  was  on  this 
beautiful  Sunday  morning.  We  could  see  her  for 
a  moment  only  as  she  sped  on  after  the  Colon,  com 
pletely  enveloped  in  the  smoke  of  her  own  guns — 
a  great  white  puffball,  decorated  every  second  with 
vicious  flashes  as  her  guns  spoke  out."  * 

The  Teresa  and  the  Oquendo  soon  dropped  be 
hind  the  other  two  cruisers.  Their  fate  had  been 
sealed  by  the  terrific  fire  that  met  them  as  they  left 
the  channel.  Both  were  ablaze,  and  the  hail  of  shells 
had  wrought  frightful  havoc  on  their  decks.  Cap 
tain  Concas,  of  the  Teresa,  had  been  wounded,  and 
as  the  second  officer  could  not  be  found  Admiral 
Cervera  took  command  in  person.  His  ship  was  a 
mass  of  flame  and  smoke.  It  was  too  late  even  to 
flood  the  magazines,  and  to  save  her  from  sinking 
in  deep  water  the  admiral  ordered  her  beached. 
"  I  thought  to  lower  the  flag,  but  that  was  not  pos 
sible,  on  account  of  the  fire,"  Cervera  says,  but  sev 
eral  American  officers  report  that  a  white  flag  was 
shown  as  she  ran  ashore.  She  went  aground  in  a 
small  cove  at  Nima  Nima,  six  and  a  half  miles  west 
of  the  Morro,  and  lay  there,  burning  fiercely,  about 
a  hundred  yards  from  the  beach. 

This  happened  at  a  quarter  past  ten.  The 
Oquendo  lived  just  five  minutes  longer,  and  got  half 
a  mile  farther  west,  before  she  followed  the  flag 
ship's  example  and  ran  for  the  shore,  hauling  down 
her  colours.  She  was  on  fire  fore  and  aft,  and  her 
fire  pumps  were  disabled ;  her  decks  were  a  sham 
bles,  and  most  of  her  guns  had  been  put  out  of 
action.  Among  the  dead  were  her  commander, 
Captain  Lagaza,  who  was  drowned  in  attempting  to 
reach  the  shore,  and  his  two  chief  officers. 

The  next  victims  of  the  American  gunners  were 

*  The  Century  Magazine,  May,  1899,  pp.  54,  55. 


THE   SANTIAGO   SEA   FIGHT  281 

the  Pluton  and  the  Furor.  The  two  destroyers — 
frail  craft,  yet  dangerous  weapons  if  properly  han 
dled — were  sent  to  sure  destruction  by  Cervera's 
tactics.  In  the  broad  daylight  their  only  chance  of 
escaping,  or  of  getting  within  striking  distance  of 
the  enemy,  lay  in  creeping  close  beside  the  cruisers, 
where  they  would  have  had  at  least  a  partial  shel 
ter.  Coming  out  about  fifteen  minutes  later  than 
the  Teresa,  they  were  doomed.  The  blockading 
ships  had  had  time  to  close  in,  and  were  ready  to 
meet  them  with  a  deadly  fire.  All  four  of  the  battle 
ships,  while  their  heavy  guns  were  hammering  the 
cruisers,  turned  their  secondary  batteries  upon  the 
destroyers. 

The  Gloucester,  too,  steamed  in  to  engage  them 
at  close  quarters.  Her  attack — a  bold  movement 
for  an  unprotected  yacht,  whose  heaviest  guns  were 
six-pounders — was  a  well-planned  stroke,  as  well 
as  a  brave  one,  on  the  part  of  her  captain,  Lieuten 
ant-Commander  Wainwright,  who  was  executive 
officer  of  the  Maine  at  the  time  of  the  fateful  ex 
plosion  of  February  I5th.  As  the  Spanish  cruisers 
came  out  of  the  harbour  he  ordered  his  engines 
slowed,  gaining  steam,  and  waiting  for  the  expected 
appearance  of  the  destroyers.  When  the  Pluton 
and  the  Furor  left  the  channel,  he  dashed  at  them 
at  full  speed.  Captain  Taylor,  of  the  Indiana,  sig 
nalled  "  Enemy's  torpedo  boats  coming  out,"  but  in 
the  smoke  Wainwright  read  it  as  "  Gunboats  will 
advance,"  which  he  interpreted  as  an  assurance  that 
he  would  not  be  fired  on  by  his  own  ships ;  and 
though  he  narrowly  escaped  the  fire  of  both  the 
Indiana  and  the  Iowa,  he  closed  in  upon  the  de 
stroyers,  training  his  forward  guns  upon  the  Pluton, 
his  after  guns  upon  the  Furor,  and  getting  within 
six  hundred  yards'  range. 

Both  were  disabled  within  three  miles  of  the 
Morro.  At  half  past  ten  the  Pluton,  with  fire  and 
smoke  bursting  from  her  decks,  turned  shoreward, 


282  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

and  ran  upon  the  rocks  west  of  the  Cabanas  inlet, 
where  she  blew  up  and  settled  in  the  surf.  The  Furor, 
also  on  fire,  was  circling  about  help- 

less{y> and  as  a  white  flas. was  waved 

from  her  deck  Wainwright  ceased 
firing  and  launched  his  boats,  to  rescue  the  crews, 
and  to  see  if  there  was  any  chance  of  saving  the 
prizes.  The  boats  had  taken  aboard  Lieutenant 
Carlier  and  eighteen  of  his  men,  and  were  picking 
up  the  survivors  of  the  Pluton,  when  there  was  a 
series  of  explosions  on  the  Furor;  her  bow  rose 
into  the  air,  and  she  went  down  stern  first  in  deep 
water. 

The  Gloucester's  boats  saved  twenty-six  men 
from  the  Pluton,  including  her  captain,  Lieutenant 
Vazquez.  Captain  Villamil,  commanding  the  two 
destroyers,  was  on  the  Furor,  and  perished  with 
her.*  A  few  refugees  from  both  vessels,  with  some 
from  the  Teresa  and  the  Oquendo,  escaped  to  the 
shore  and  made  their  way  back  to  Santiago,  swim 
ming  the  Cabanas  inlet. 

Credit  for  the  destruction  of  the  Pluton  and  the 
Furor  has  been  claimed  as  the  sole  possession  of  the 
Gloucester.  Lieutenant  Huse,  executive  officer  of 
the  plucky  yacht,  states  in  his  report  that  after  Cap 
tain  Taylor's  signal  "  it  appeared  that  the  fight  be 
tween  this  ship  and  the  two  apparently  uninjured 
destroyers  was  a  thing  apart  from  the  battle  in  which 
the  larger  ships  were  engaged."  Lieutenant-Com 
mander  Wainwright,  though  he  mentions  the  fact 
that  "  the  Indiana  poured  in  a  hot  fire  from  all  her 
secondary  batteries  upon  the  destroyers,"  asserts 
that  until  the  Gloucester  closed  with  them  "  they 
were  not  seriously  injured." 

On  the  other  hand,  Captain  Taylor's  version  is 
that  when  the  Teresa  and  the  Oquendo  gave  up  the 
fight,  "  we  (the  Indiana)  then  devoted  our  special 

*  Remains  identified  as  those  of  Captain  Villamil  were  found  among 
the  rocks  on  the  beach  in  March,  1899. 


THE  SANTIAGO   SEA  FIGHT 


283 


attention  to  prevent  the  escape  of  the  destroyers, 
which  appeared  more  than  a  match  for  the  Glou 
cester.  They  were  soon  seen  to  blow  up,  apparently 
struck  by  our  six-inch  and  six-pounders."  Captain 
Eaton,  of  the  Resolute,  corroborates  this,  testifying 
that  he  distinctly  saw  the  Furor  "  struck  by  an 
eight-inch  or  thirteen-inch  shell  from  the  Indiana, 
which  was  followed  by  an  explosion  and  flames." 

Furthermore,  Captain  Evans  asserts  that  the  fire 
of  the  Iowa,  "  together  with  that  of  the  Gloucester 
and  another  smaller  vessel,*  proved  so .  destructive 
that  one  of  the  torpedo-boat  destroyers  (Pluton)  was 
sunk,  and  the  Furor  was  so  much  damaged  that  she 
was  run  upon  the  rocks."  Captain  Philip  claims  a 
share  of  the  work  for  the  Texas.  "  Owing  to  our 
secondary  battery,"  he  says,  "  together  with  the 
Iowa  and  Gloucester,  the  two  destroyers  were  forced 
to  beach  and  sink."  And  Captain  Clark,  of  the  Ore 
gon,  adds  that  "  when  it  was  discovered  that  the 
enemy's  torpedo  boats  were  following  their  ships, 
we  used  our  rapid-fire  guns,  as  well  as  the  six-inch, 
upon  them  with  telling  effect."  The  New  York 
also  fired  some  four-inch  shells — the  only  shots  she 
discharged  in  the  battle — at  the  Furor. 

Other  ships,  besides  the  Indiana,  claim  the  shots 
that  exploded  the  two  boats.  "  One  of  our  heavy 
shells,"  says  Captain  Taylor,  "  was  seen  to  strike 
one  of  the  destroyers,  an  explosion  and  flames  fol 
lowing."  In  narrating  the  fate  of  the  Furor,  Captain 
Evans  writes :  "  A  large  projectile,  we  believed  from 
the  Iowa,  seemed  to  cut  her  in  two."  Captain  Philip 
also  describes  her  explosion,  and  adds :  "  The  men 
of  the  Texas  have  always  insisted  that  this  was 
caused  by  a  shell  from  Ensign  W.  K.  Gise's  six-inch 
gun."  Lieutenant  Eberle,  of  the  Oregon,  records 
that  "  the  plucky  little  vessels  fought  their  guns 

*  This  seems  to  be  an  error,  as  the  Gloucester  was  the  only  smaller 
vessel  engaged.  Captain  Evans  also  confuses  the  Pluton  and  the 
Furor. 

19 


284  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

until  a  shell — which,  it  is  claimed,  was  fired  by  our 
after  six-inch  gun — struck  the  Furor  amidships  and 
caused  an  explosion.  The  torpedo  boat  was  literally 
torn  to  pieces." 

No  doubt  none  of  Sampson's  captains  had  the 
least  desire  to  claim  more  than  his  due,  but  it  is 
easy  to  understand  that  all  of  them  were,  as  the 
admiral  said,  "  vitally  interested  and  justly  proud 
of  their  ships."  Sampson's  report  gives  what  is 
probably  a  very  fair  summary  of  the  matter: 

The  destroyers  probably  suffered  much  injury  from 
the  fire  of  the  secondary  batteries  of  the  battle  ships 
Iowa,  Indiana,  and  the  Texas.  Yet  I  think  a  very  consid 
erable  factor  in  their  speedy  destruction  was  the  fire,  at 
close  range,  of  the  Gloucester's  battery. 

From  the  wreck  of  the  Pluton  the  Gloucester's 
boats  went  on  to  the  Teresa  and  the  Oquendo.  The 
Spanish  flagship  had  lowered  a  boat,  which  sank  at 
once,  and  a  steam  launch,  which  also  went  down 
after  making  one  journey  to  the  beach.  The  admiral 
jumped  overboard,  and  his  son,  Lieutenant  Angel 
Cervera,  and  two  sailors  helped  him  ashore,  where 
he  surrendered  to  Lieutenant  Norman  of  the  Glou 
cester.  The  work  of  rescue  was  rendered  perilous 
by  the  explosion  of  guns  and  ammunition  on  board 
the  burning  cruisers.  The  Teresa's  magazines  had 
flooded  as  she  filled  with  water,  but  one  of  the 
Oquendo's  blew  up,  shattering  the  forward  part  of 
the  ship.  Farther  aft  her  torpedoes  added  to  the 
destruction,  and  she  was  left  a  hopeless  wreck,  her 
frame  practically  broken  in  two.  Her  flag,  and 
those  of  the  two  destroyers,  were  captured  by  the 
Gloucester's  boats. 

Meanwhile  the  Colon  and  the  Vizcaya  were  flee 
ing  westward,  hotly  pursued  by  the  Brooklyn  and 
the  Oregon,  with  the  Texas  following, 

drivwMhwe         and  the   Iowa  and  the  Indiana  doing 

their  best  to  keep  up  with  the  chase. 
The  Colon  passed  her  consort  about  half  past  ten, 


THE    SANTIAGO    SEA    FIGHT  285 

and  drew  out  of  range  of  the  American  ships ;  but 
the  Vizcaya  was  still  under  fire  from  all  five, 
and  in  twenty  minutes  more  her  race  was  over. 
Burning,  and  with  a  heavy  list  to  port,  she 
was  headed  for  the  shore,  and  after  veering  about 
as  if  in  indecision  she  was  run  ashore  in  the  small 
bay  of  Aserraderos,  twenty  miles  west  of  the 
Morro. 

The  Vixen,  which  had  followed  the  pursuit,  was 
in  time  to  fire  a  few  shots  at  the  Vizcaya  before 
her  flag  went  down.  The  New  York,  which  had 
turned  westward  at  sight  of  the  escaping  Spaniards, 
and  had  passed  through  the  fire  of  the  Morro  and 
Socapa  batteries  without  deigning  to  return  it,  was 
now  coming  up,  accompanied  by  the  Ericsson  and 
the  Hist.  The  Ericsson  had  her  torpedoes  ready  for 
use,  but  she  was  too  late  to  get  within  striking  dis 
tance. 

As  there  was  now  no  enemy  afloat  but  the  Colon, 
who  was  too  fast  for  him,  and  whom  the  swifter 
ships  were  pretty  sure  to  overtake,  Captain  Evans 
sent  five  of  the  Iowa's  boats  to  take  off  the  crew  of 
the  burning  Vizcaya.  The  rescuers,  who  were  rein 
forced  from  the  Ericsson  and  the  Hist,  kept  up  their 
dangerous  work  in  the  face  of  constant  explosions — 
both  of  the  cruiser's  main  magazines  blew  up — until 
there  were  no  more  living  men  to  save.  Captain 
Eulate  was  taken  aboard  the  Iowa.  He  had  his 
sword,  and  proffered  it,  in  token  of  surrender,  to 
Captain  Evans,  who  chivalrously  declined  to  re 
ceive  it. 

Sampson  had  already  ordered  the  Indiana  to 
return  to  her  blockading  station — a  wise  precaution, 
as  there  were  still  a  couple  of  armed  vessels  in  San 
tiago  harbour,  which  might  have  wrought  havoc 
among  the.  transports  at  Siboney — and  he  now  sent 
back  the  Iowa  and  the  Ericsson,  leaving  the  Hist  to 
stand  by  the  Vizcaya.  Of  Cervera's  ships,  only  the 
Colon  was  left.  At  this  time  she  had  a  lead  of  six 


286  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

miles,  but  it  is  evident  that  Captain  Moreu  had  no 
hope  of  escape.  He  kept  close  along  shore,  follow 
ing  the  bends  of  the  coast,  while  his  pursuers  steered 
straight  forward  to  cut  him  off.  A  little  after  eleven 
o'clock,  when  the  Vizcaya  turned  shoreward,  the 
Brooklyn  was  three  quarters  of  a  mile  ahead  of  the 
Oregon,  both  ships  having  now  worked  up  to  a  speed 
of  quite  or  nearly  fifteen  knots,  and  gaining  steadily 
on  the  Colon.  The  Vixen  was  nearly  abeam  of  the 
Oregon,  but  farther  seaward ;  the  Texas  was  a  mile 
and  a  half  from  the  Oregon,  and  not  quite  holding 
her  own  in  the  race ;  the  New  York  was  six  miles 
behind  the  Texas,  steaming  a  little  faster  than  any 
of  the  other  vessels. 

It  was  an  exciting  race,  but  its  end  was  certain. 
At  twenty  minutes  after  twelve  the  Oregon  was  near 
enough  to  the  quarry  to  open  fire  at 

!ong  ran&e  wit1}  her  great  thirteen- 
inch  rifles.  A  little  later  the  Brook 
lyn  began  to  use  her  eight-inch  guns,  but  her  shots 
fell  short.  A  thirteen-inch  shell  from  the  Oregon, 
however,  fell  just  ahead  of  the  Colon,  and  another 
struck  under  her  stern ;  and  at  a  quarter  past  one 
she  turned  into  the  cove  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rio 
Turquino  ("  Blue  River "),  fifty-four  miles  west 
of  Santiago  harbour,  and  ran  for  the  shore,  haul 
ing  down  her  flag.  Commodore  Schley  sent  Cap 
tain  Cook  on  board  to  receive  her  surrender. 
Captain  Moreu,  Cook  reports,  "  surrendered  un 
conditionally.  He  was  polite,  shook  hands,  and 
said  that  his  case  was  hopeless,  and  that  he  saw 
we  were  too  much  for  him."  Captain  Paredes, 
second  in  command  of  the  Spanish  squadron,  was 
also  on  the  Colon. 

As  Captain  Cook  left  the  Colon  the  New  York 
and  the  Texas  came  up,  and  he  went  aboard  the 
flagship  to  report  to  Sampson.  The  admiral  ordered 
Captain  Chadwick  to  take  over  the  prize.  After 
transferring  the  prisoners — five  hundred  and  eight 


THE   SANTIAGO   SEA  FIGHT  287 

in  number — to  the  Resolute,  which  had  followed  the 
chase,  he  left  Lieutenant-Commander  Cogswell,  of 
the  Oregon,  in  charge,  with  a  crew  from  the  Oregon 
and  the  New  York.  But  the  fine  Spanish  cruiser 
was  not  destined  to  be  of  service  to  her  captors. 
Her  sea  valves  had  been  opened,  and  so  broken  that 
they  could  not  be  closed.  Many  of  her  crew  were 
drunk,  and  Lieutenant  Eberle,  of  the  Oregon,  states 
that  they  deliberately  damaged  the  vessel's  arma 
ment  and  equipment.  It  is  said  that  her  firemen 
had  been  ashore  without  food  for  thirty-six  hours, 
and  on  their  return  to  the  ship  brandy  was  given 
them.  Demoralization  resulted,  and  a  number  of 
men  were  shot  by  the  officers  for  abandoning  their 
places  in  the  fireroom.  The  Colon  had  been  run 
upon  a  steep  beach,  where  the  water  was  seventy 
feet  deep  at  her  stern  and  only  eight  at  her  bow ; 
but  as  she  settled  she  slipped  backward,  and  was 
in  danger  of  going  down  in  deep  water.  Captain 
Chadwick  thereupon  placed  the  New  York's  stem 
against  her,  and  pushed  her  bodily  up  on  the  beach. 
Here  she  gradually  settled,  in  spite  of  all  efforts  to 
stop  her  leaks ;  and  finally,  just  after  the  prize  crew 
abandoned  her,  she  went  over  on  her  starboard 
beam  ends. 

An  hour  before  midnight  Sampson  started  the 
New  York  for  Santiago,  leaving  the  Oregon  and 
the  Texas  to  stay  by  the  Colon.  Except  for  the 
breaking  of  her  valves,  the  captured  cruiser  was 
practically  uninjured  when  she  sank,  and  it  was  fully 
— though,  as  it  proved,  mistakenly — expected  that 
she  could  be  raised.  She  showed  the  marks  of  only 
half  a  dozen  shells,  probably  received  as  she  left 
the  harbour,  and  some  of  them  had  not  penetrated 
her  armour.  Her  handling  during  the  battle  was  not 
creditable  to  the  Spaniards.  Rated  at  twenty  knots 
an  hour,  she  allowed  the  sixteen-knot  Oregon  to 
overhaul  her ;  she  was  surrendered  practically  with 
out  a  fight — though  this  is  to  a  great  extent  excused 


288  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

by  the  fact  that  she  was  without  her  heavy  guns — 
and  most  ingloriously  scuttled. 

The  battle  was  over,  and  one  of  the  greatest  and 
most  complete  of  naval  victories  had  been  won. 
The  Spanish  squadron  was  utterly  de- 
stroyed.  Of  its  complement  of  about 
twenty-three  hundred  men,  some 
three  hundred  and  fifty  were  killed,  burned,  or 
drowned ;  the  rest — except  those  who  escaped  to 
Santiago — were  prisoners.*  The  American  fleet 
was  practically  unscathed.  It  had  lost  one  man 
killed — Chief  Yeoman  Ellis,  of  the  Brooklyn,  who 
was  struck  by  a  shell — and  ten  wounded,  none  fatal 
ly,  most  of  the  cases  being  injuries  to  eardrums  from 
the  concussion  of  the  guns.  The  ships  were  scarcely 
marked  by  the  torrent  of  ill-aimed  fire  that  had 
come  from  the  fleeing  Spaniards. 

The  Brooklyn  showed  most  traces  of  the  fight 
— chiefly  in  her  rigging  and  upper  works,  the  Span 
ish  gunners  having  fired  high,  as  seems  to  be  their 
inveterate  habit.  The  flag  at  her  main  was  shot 
to  pieces,  and  her  signal  halyards  repeatedly  cut. 
In  all  she  was  struck  by  twenty  shells,  besides 
pieces  of  bursting  projectiles  and  small  shot  from 
machine  guns.  Of  the  other  ships,  the  Oregon  was 
hit  three  times,  the  Indiana  twice,  by  fragments  or 
small-calibre  missiles  which  did  no  damage.  A  six- 
inch  shell  struck  the  Texas,  going  through  her  ash 

*  The  prisoners  captured  on  July  3d  were  confined  at  Annapolis 
and  at  Portsmouth,  N.  H.,  the  number  being:  93  at  the  former  place 
and  1,681  at  the  latter,  besides  a  few  sick  and  wounded  men  sent  to  the 
Naval  Hospital  at  Norfolk,  and  8  who,  through  a  regrettable  misunder 
standing,  were  shot  and  killed  by  their  guards  on  board  the  Harvard, 
during  a  false  alarm  of  mutiny.  The  number  of  those  who  escaped  to 
Santiago  is  stated  by  Lieutenant  Mullerat  about  150.  Stories  are  told, 
both  by  Spaniards  and  by  Americans,  of  unarmed  refugees  being  mur 
dered  by  Cubans  ;  but  it  is  fair  to  add  that  Cervera,  who  mentions  that 
the  insurgents  temporarily  held  about  200  prisoners  from  the  Teresa 
and  the  Oquendo,  makes  no  complaint  of  ill  treatment,  and  Lieutenant 
Hazeltine,  of  the  Hist,  reports  that  Cubans  at  Aserraderos  helped  in 
the  rescue  of  the  Vizcaya's  crew,  and  gave  "  first  aid"  to  some  of  the 
wounded  men. 


THE   SANTIAGO   SEA   FIGHT  289 

hoist  and  injuring  her  forced-draught  apparatus. 
The  Iowa  received  two  of  about  the  same  calibre, 
which  pierced  her  hull,  but  did  no  material  harm, 
though  one  started  a  small  fire ;  and  about  seven 
minor  projectiles,  which  left  only  trifling  marks. 
The  Gloucester,  which  went  nearest  to  the  enemy's 
guns,  seemed  to  bear  a  charmed  life,  for  not  a  shot 
touched  her.  At  one  moment  of  the  battle  she  had 
a  narrow  escape.  As  she  closed  with  the  destroyers, 
her  crew  could  hear,  amid  the  roar  of  cannon,  the 
drumming  sound  of  a  machine  gun,  and  could  trace 
its  fire  by  a  line  of  splashes,  about  as  long  as  their 
ship,  and  steadily  drawing  nearer  as  the  Spaniards 
gauged  the  range.  It  was  from  a  one-pounder 
Maxim  on  the  Furor,  and  if  its  stream  of  shot  reached 
the  Gloucester,  even  for  a  few  minutes,  it  meant  ter 
rible  slaughter  on  her  decks ;  but  when  the  splashes 
were  only  a  few  yards  away  they  suddenly  ceased — 
the  gun,  no  doubt,  having  been  put  out  of  action  by 
the  American  fire. 

The  completeness  of  Cervera's  defeat  is  not  ade 
quately  explained  by  his  squadron's  inferiority  to 
the  enemy  it  had  to  meet.    The  Span- 
causes  of  the       ish  acimirai  states  jn  his  report  that 

American  ((     .         .  M       r  ,    r  . 

victory  the  hostile  forces  were  three  times 

as  large  as  ours."  Lieutenant  Miiller 
calculates  that  "  six  ships,  if  the  Pluton  and  Furor 
may  be  called  such,  had  to  fight  against  twenty- 
four  that  were  better  protected  and  armed."  These 
are  utter  misrepresentations.  The  battle  was  fought, 
on  the  American  side,  by  six  ships — the  battle  ships 
Iowa,  Oregon,  Indiana,  and  Texas,  the  cruiser 
Brooklyn,  and  the  converted  yacht  Gloucester.  An 
other  auxiliary,  the  Vixen,  must  be  added  to  the 
list,  as  she  was  present  throughout  the  fight,  though 
her  part  in  it  was  little  more  than  that  of  a  spec 
tator.  The  New  York,  though  she  fired  a  few  shots, 
was  practically  out  of  the  JDattle.  The  Hist,  the 
Ericsson,  the  Harvard,  and  the  Resolute  came  up 


2QO  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

only  in  time  to  receive  the  prisoners.  No  other 
American  ship  was  present  at  all.  Some  of  the 
twenty-four  vessels  listed  by  Lieutenant  Miiller  were 
as  far  away  as  Manila. 

The  comparative  gun  power  of  two  fleets  may 
be  stated  in  various  ways.  The  seven  American 
vessels  engaged  at  Santiago  had  a  total  of  225  guns 
to  Cervera's  146,  and  they  had  14  guns — the  twelve- 
and  thirteen-inch  rifles  of  the  battle  ships — heavier 
than  anything  the  Spaniards  carried.  In  the  me 
dium-sized  weapons,  with  which  most  execution  was 
done,  the  Spanish  ships  were  better  off.  The  Amer 
ican  ships  had  64  guns  of  calibres  from  four  to 
eight  inches,  only  18  of  which  were  rapid-firers; 
Cervera  had  46  rapid-fire  guns  of  calibres  from  four 
and  a  half  to  six  inches.  Not  all  the  guns,  of  course, 
on  either  side,  could  be  used.  A  published  calcula 
tion  by  Lieutenant  Wells,  of  the  Brooklyn,  esti 
mates  that  the  number  actually  engaged  during  the 
battle  was  105  on  the  American  ships  and  91  on 
the  Spanish,  and  that  the  weight  of  metal  they  could 
throw  per  minute  was  respectively  6,720  and  4,827 
pounds.  As  a  summary  of  all  these  figures  it  is 
probably  fair  to  say  that  on  paper  the  American 
gun  fire  was  superior  to  the  enemy's  by  fully  fifty 
per  cent.*  In  this  no  account  is  taken  of  the  shore 
batteries,  which  maintained  a  brisk  but  quite  ineffec 
tive  fire  during  the  early  part  of  the  battle. 

Several  of  the  Spanish  cruisers'  guns,  Lieutenant 
Miiller  states — as  Cervera  also  stated  before  he  left 
the  Cape  Verde  Islands — were  out  of  order,  and 
some  of  their  ammunition  was  defective ;  but  it  was 
not  so  much  the  better  guns  as  the  better  gunnery 
that  won  the  sweeping  victory.  It  was  the  same 
story  that  was  told  in  Manila  Bay  two  months  be- 


*  Captain  Taylor  records  that  Admiral  Cervera,  a  few  hours  after 
the  battle,  said  that  he  had  estimated  Sampson's  force  as  four  times 
stronger  than  his  own.  u  The  odds,"  adds  the  commander  of  the  In 
diana,  "  were  surely  exaggerated  in  the  mind  of  this  gallant  officer." 


THE   SANTIAGO   SEA   FIGHT 


29I 


fore.  Sampson's  men  had  a  special  advantage  in 
the  practice  they  had  had  during  the  blockade. 
Their  fire  killed  the  enemy's  fire,  and  would  have 
done  so  had  the  Spaniards  possessed  twice  the  bat 
teries  they  had.  Another  very  important  factor  in 
the  result  was  the  extensive  use  of  wood  in  the  con 
struction  of  the  Spanish  ships.  With  the  possible 
exception  of  the  Furor,  none  of  Cervera's  vessels 
was  destroyed  by  the  direct  effect  of  shot  and  shell ; 
all  of  them  but  the  Colon  perished  by  fire,  the  flames 
being  started  by  exploding  projectiles,  and  the  dis 
abling  of  pumps  and  hose  leaving  them  to  spread 
unchecked. 

There  is  scarcely  a  chapter  of  history,  however 
stately  or  terrible,  that  has  not  its  footnote  of  com 
edy  ;  and  such  was  the  case  with  the 
Adventures  of      storv  of  t}ie  Santiago  sea  fight,  bril- 

IndthrReso-  liant  with  triumPh  for  America,  and 
lute,  July  i.  tragic  with  ruin  and  death  for  the 
ships  and  sailors  of  Spain.  A  gleam 
of  humour  is  to  be  found  in  the  adventures  of  certain 
minor  members  of  Sampson's  fleet. 

When  Cervera's  ships  came  out  of  the  harbour, 
the  Resolute,  as  has  been  said,  lay  east  of  the  Morro, 
near  the  Indiana.  She  had  on  her  decks  several  tons 
of  guncotton,  which  Sampson  intended  to  use  in  an 
attempt  to  explode  the  channel  mines,  in  order  to 
remove  the  obstructions  most  to  be  dreaded  in  forc 
ing  an  entrance  to  the  harbour.  When  the  shells 
began  to  fly,  Captain  Eaton  regarded  his  position 
as  too  perilous,  and  made  full  speed  for  Siboney. 
Meeting  the  New  York,  he  informed  Sampson  of 
Cervera's  sortie — a  service  which  the  admiral  neg 
lects  to  acknowledge  in  his  report,  possibly  because 
he  could  see  for  himself  what  had  happened — and 
was  ordered  to  "  proceed  to  Guantanamo  and  notify 
the  ships  there  to  join  the  fleet."  Passing  Siboney 
on  this  mission,  vigorously  sounding  his  whistle, 
and  flying  a  signal  which  announced  that  the  Span- 


292  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

iards  "  had  fled,"  he  caused  much  natural  alarm  to 
the  transports  lying  there.  Captain  Cotton,  of  the 
Harvard,  who  was  discharging  stores  in  the  bay, 
hastily  recalled  his  boats,  and  stood  westward  after 
Sampson,  his  ship  cleared  for  action. 

From  Siboney  the  news,  becoming  more  and 
more  alarming  as  it  travelled,  was  cabled  to  Playa 
del  Este,  on  Guantanamo  Bay.  The  Suwanee, 
which  had  been  coaling  in  the  bay,  was  just  putting 
to  sea,  when  Commander  McCalla  of  the  Marble- 
head,  lying  at  Playa,  signalled  her  to  wait  for  him ; 
and  coming  within  hailing  distance,  he  informed  her 
captain,  Lieutenant-Commander  Delehanty,  that 
"  the  Spanish  fleet  had  escaped  from  Santiago  de 
Cuba,  and  was  in  all  probability  on  its  way  to  this 
port  to  destroy  unarmed  vessels."  On  this  appalling 
intelligence,  Delehanty  called  his  line  officers — three 
in  number — about  him,  and  explained  the  situation. 
A  month  ago,  he  told  them,  the  Navy  Department 
had  stated  that  if  Cervera's  squadron  escaped  the 
service  would  be  disgraced.  Apparently  that  mis 
fortune  had  come  to  it;  and  the  four  line  officers  of 
the  Suwanee,  without  a  dissenting  voice,  resolved 
to  do  all  in  their  power  to  redeem  the  reputation  of 
the  American  navy.  All  this  is  modestly  recorded 
in  Lieutenant-Commander  Delehanty's  report, 
which  continues : 

I  thereupon  directed  these  officers  to  draw  the  com 
mon  charges  from  the  guns,  to  load  with  armour-piercing 
shell,  and  to  which  parts  of  the  enemy's  ships  they  should 
direct  their  fire.  We  were  in  a  small  gunboat,  with  a 
maximum  speed  of  ten  knots,  standing  out  to  meet  a 
fleet  of  heavily  armed  armoured  cruisers  with  reputed 
speed  of  double  ours.  Under  other  circumstances  it  would 
have  been  my  duty  to  avoid  so  unequal  a  conflict.  I 
felt  the  full  responsibility  of  making  the  decision,  and  I 
record  with  pride  that  not  a  man  flinched  when  it  was 
made  known. 

Unfortunately  for  history,  the  Suwanee  did  not 
encounter  the  Spanish  fleet,  and  an  hour  or  so 


THE   SANTIAGO   SEA   FIGHT 


293 


later  the  Dupont  brought  news  of  its  destruction. 
Meanwhile  the  Resolute  had  been  spreading  a  sec 
ond  alarm.  Off  Daiquiri,  on  the  way  eastward,  she 
sighted  a  "large, strange  man-of-war,"  whose  colours 
Captain  Eaton  took  to  be  Spanish.  He  promptly 
faced  about,  and  steamed  at  full  speed  to  give  notice 
of  this  new  and  entirely  unexpected  enemy.  After 
warning  the  transports  at  Siboney — this  was  an  ex 
citing  morning  for  nervous  skippers — he  continued 
westward  till  he  met  the  Indiana,  returning  from  the 
wrecks  of  Cervera's  cruisers,  and  informed  her  that 
a  "  Spanish  battle  ship  "  was  approaching.  While 
the  Resolute  passed  on  to  find  Sampson,  Captain 
Taylor  stood  for  the  mysterious  stranger  with  his 
guns  ready  for  use,  and  found  her  to  be  the  Aus 
trian  cruiser  Kaiserin  Maria  Theresa — a  name  curi 
ously  like  that  of  Cervera's  flagship — which  desired 
permission  to  enter  the  blockaded  harbour. 


CHAPTER   XIV 

THE    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO 

ON  the  morning  of  July  3d,  Lieutenant  Allen, 
of  the  Second  Cavalry,  stationed  on  Lawton's  ex 
treme  right,  saw  the  departure  of  Cervera's  fleet, 
and  at  once  sent  word  to  Shafter's  headquarters. 
The  scene  of  the  great  sea  fight  was  screened  from 
the  armies  ashore  by  the  high  hills  along  the  coast, 
and  its  result  was  not  known  till  after  noon,  when 
news  came  from  Siboney  that  all  the  Spanish  ships 
but  one  had  been  destroyed.  That  the  Colon  had 
shared  the  fate  of  her  consorts  was  not  reported 
until  the  following  day. 

To  Santiago,  too,  the  news  came  slowly.  Half 
an  hour  after  noon  a  message  from  the  Morro  told 
of  the  loss  of  the  two  destroyers ;  but  not  until 
evening  did  refugees  from  the  Teresa  and  the 
Oquendo  come  in  with  their  story  of  disaster,  and 
the  fate  of  Cervera's  other  vessels  was  not  known 
until  the  officers  of  the  Kaiserin  Maria  Theresa  re 
ported  it  next  morning.  The  Austrian  cruiser  and 
a  small  British  man-of-war,  the  Alert,  came  to  take 
away  from  the  doomed  city  residents  claiming  the 
protection  of  their  flags.  Neither  ship  entered  the 
harbour ;  they  lay  off  the  Morro,  and  the  refugees 
were  taken  out  to  them  in  boats. 

Toral  had  already  answered  the  demand  for 
capitulation.  "  It  is  mv  duty  to  sav  to  you  that  this 
city  will  not  surrender,"  was  his  reply,  which 
294 


THE    SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO  295 

reached  Shafter  at  half  past  six  on  the  3d.  Firing 
— which  had  ceased  in  the  morning,  when  the  flag 
of  truce  left  the  American  lines — was  not  resumed, 
as  four  of  the  foreign  consuls  in  Santiago  came  out 
with  Colonel  Dorst,  Shafter's  messenger,  and 
begged  for  a  day's  respite.  They  stated  that  fifteen 
or  twenty  thousand  people  desired  to  leave  the  city, 
and  begged  that  the  noncombatants  should  be 
allowed  to  occupy  the  village  of  Caney,  and  be  sup 
plied  with  food.  Shafter  at  once  wrote  to  Toral  that 
he  would  not  bombard  until  noon  of  the  5th,  if  in 
the  meantime  no  move  were  made  against  him,  and 
requested  that  the  consuls  would  come  out  again 
next  morning  for  another  interview. 

That  same  evening  (July  3d)  Colonel  Escario's 
column  from  Manzanillo  marched  into  Santiago 
from  the  west,  by  the  Cobre  road, 
apparently  without  resistance  from 
Garcia,  who  had  undertaken  to  stop 
it.  Although  this  added  thirty-five  hundred  soldiers 
to  the  garrison,  it  made  little  change  in  the  situation. 
When  Shafter  heard  of  it,  on  the  4th  * — Garcia  re 
ported  that  five  thousand  men  had  passed  in — he 
sent  a  message  to  Wheeler  warning  him  to  be  ready 
in  case  of  attack ;  but  with  Cervera's  fleet  destroyed, 
and  with  some  reinforcements  arriving  and  more 
promised,  he  felt  strong  enough  to  hold  his  position 
without  any  difficulty,  except,  perhaps,  in  the  event 
of  a  larger  body  of  Spaniards  coming  up  from  Hol- 
guin.  Escario's  advent  meant  that  Toral  would  have 
more  mouths  to  feed — for  the  newcomers  had  ex 
hausted  their  rations  during  the  march  from  Man 
zanillo — and  more  men  to  surrender. 

*  On  the  evening  of  July  3d,  Shafter  had  telegraphed  to  Washing 
ton  :  "To-night  my  lines  completely  surround  the  town  from  the  bay 
on  the  north  of  the  city  to  a  point  on  the  San  Juan  River  on  the  south. 
General  Pando,  I  find  to-night,  is  some  distance  away,  and  will  not 
get  into  Santiago  " — a  despatch  that  shows  imperfect  information  both 
as  to  the  movements  of  the  enemy  and  even  as  to  the  situation  of  his 
own  troops. 


296 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


Of  Shafter's  reinforcements,  the  Ninth  Massa 
chusetts  had  come  up  from  Siboney  on  the  2d,  and 
other  troops  were  reported  on  their  way  from  Tampa 
and  Newport  News.  On  the  3d  General  Miles  tele 
graphed  from  Washington : 

I  expect  to  be  with  you  within  one  week  with  strong 
reinforcements. 

When  the  consuls  came  out  again  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  4th,  Lieutenant  Miley,  representing 
Shafter,  conferred  with  them  upon  the  question  of 
quartering  and  feeding  the  noncombatants.  It  was 
a  difficult  problem,  because  Caney,  a  village  of  three 
hundred  houses  at  most,*  had  been  shelled  during 
the  battle  of  July  ist,  and  contained  many  wounded 
men  and  some  unburied  dead ;  it  was  fifteen  miles 
from  Shafter's  base  of  supplies,  and  all  that  he  could 
promise  to  furnish  was  the  simplest  food — bread, 
bacon,  sugar,  and  coffee — for  not  more  than  three 
or  four  thousand.  The  consuls  were  advised  to  keep 
the  people  in  the  city  as  long  as  possible,  unless  a 
bombardment  should  be  ordered,  and  to  send  them 
out  gradually  as  their  provisions  became  exhausted  ; 
and  another  conference  was  arranged  for  the  follow 
ing  day,  the  5th. 

The  events  of  the  night,  however,  precipitated 
matters. 

Fearing  lest  the  batteries  and  the  mines  might 

not  avail,  without  the  support  of  Cervera's  fleet,  to 

prevent  Sampson  from  forcing  an  en- 

sinkingofthe      trance  to  the  harbour  and  putting  an 

Mercedes,  ,  ,..  .,   .,.  .  °  . 

juiy  4.  end  to  all  possibility  of  further  resist 

ance,  General  Toral  and  the  com 
mandant  of  the  port  decided  upon  an  attempt  to 
block  the  channel  by  sinking  the  Reina  Mercedes 
at  its  narrowest  point.  It  was  a  repetition  of  the 
Merrimac  manoeuvre,  and  it  proved  equally  unsuc- 

*  Lieutenant  Muller  gives  the  number  as  two  hundred  ;  Mr.  Rams- 
den,  who  was  among  the  refugees,  as  three  hundred. 


^*~~-  r"Y 

THE   SURRENDER   OF   Sj~ 

cessful.  The  dismantled  cruiser — her  guns  had  al 
ready  been  taken  ashore — was  hastily  stripped  dur 
ing  the  4th,  and  an  hour  before  midnight  her  com 
mander,  Ensign  Nardiz,  and  a  few  engineers  and 
sailors  moved  her  down  the  harbour,  intending  to 
drop  her  bow  and  stern  anchors,  swing  her  across 
the  channel,  and  open  her  valves. 

Shafter  had  notified  Sampson  that  fighting  on 
land  was  suspended,  but  the  admiral  did  not  regard 
the  truce  as  applying  to  the  navy,  and  he  still  kept 
up  the  nightly  watch  with  searchlights.  As  soon 
as  the  Mercedes  came  into  view  the  Massachusetts, 
which  was  the  ship  on  guard  duty,  and  the  Texas, 
which  lay  beside  her,  opened  fire,  and  the  shore 
batteries  replied.  A  mortar  shell  from  the  latter 
struck  the  Indiana,  going  through  her  forward 
deck  and  exploding  below,  where  it  did  some 
damage  but  hurt  none  of  her  crew.  This  was  the 
only  hit  the  Spanish  mortars  scored  during  the 
campaign. 

The  Mercedes  went  down  at  the  intended  spot, 
but  not  in  the  intended  position,  a  shell — so  her 
crew  reported — having  cut  her  stern  anchor  loose 
prematurely.  Next  morning  (July  5th)  the  Suwanee 
reconnoitred  close  in,  and  reported  that  the  chan 
nel  was  not  closed  by  the  sunken  ship,  which  lay 
with  her  upper  deck  partly  submerged;  but  it  was 
thought  that  she  would  prove  a  dangerous  obstruc 
tion  to  Sampson's  larger  ships. 

An  immediate  result  of  the  midnight  firing  was 
a  panic  in  Santiago.  Fully  believing  that  the  Amer 
ican  fleet  was  forcing  the  harbour,  the  inhabitants 
poured  out  of  the  city,  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
5th  the  Caney  road  was  thronged  with  women,  chil 
dren,  and  old  men,  who  during  the  remaining  days 
of  the  siege,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  Shafter's  com 
missary  department  and  of  the  Red  Cross  organiza 
tion,  had  to  endure  terrible  sufferings.  Many  fugi 
tives  fled  to  camps  in  the  mountains ;  others  sought 


298  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

refuge  along  the  shores  of  the  bay;  and  Santiago 
was  almost  emptied  of  all  but  soldiers.* 

During  these  days  of  truce,  and  the  week  that 
followed,  the  American  lines  were  gradually  ex- 
sie  -ofsar  tended,  north  of  the  city,  until  Lud- 
tia^o6,  juiya"-i7.  low's  brigade,  on  the  extreme  right  of 
Lawton's  division,  finally  closed  the 
gap  through  which  Escario  had  entered,  command 
ing  the  Cobre  road  and  touching  the  head  of  the 
bay.f  Two  of  the  field  batteries  (Capron's  and 
Parkhurst's,  the  latter  now  commanded  by  Lieuten 
ant  Hinds)  were  brought  up  from  El  Pozo  and  sta 
tioned  with  Lawton ;  the  other  two  (Grimes's  and 
Best's)  were  also  moved  forward  to  a  position  in 
the  rear  of  Bates's  brigade,  on  the  left  of  the  army. 
The  field  mortars  were  sent  up  to  San  Juan,  and 
one  of  the  siege  guns  was  disembarked  at  Siboney, 
but  it  was  found  impossible  to  carry  it  over  the 
muddy  trail  to  the  front. J  Besides  strengthening 
his  own  lines,  Shafter  endeavoured  to  cripple  the 

*  Lieutenant  M  filler  gives  a  striking  picture  of  the  desolation  of  the 
beleaguered  city  : 

"Santiago  presented  the  same  aspect  that  Pompeii  and  Hercula- 
neum  must  have  offered.  Not  a  single  store  was  open,  not  even  the 
drug  stores.  A  few  horses  were  running  through  the  city,  pulling  up 
the  grass  growing  along  the  sidewalks.  Many  dogs  were  staying  at 
the  entrances  of  the  houses,  which  their  masters  had  abandoned.  At 
night  they  barked  incessantly. 

"  At  night  the  city  was  truly  impressive.  The  streets  were  dark  as 
wolves'  dens.  A  few  guerrillas  were  breaking  into  abandoned  stores 
and  houses,  which  they  ransacked." 

To  suppress  such  robberies  General  Toral  issued  a  special  decree 
fixing  death  or  life  imprisonment  as  the  penalty  for  offences  against 
persons  cr  property. 

f  The  Spaniards  ?eem  to  have  been  able  to  use  the  Cobre  road  as 
late  as  the  loth  of  July,  for  Garcia  reported  on  that  day  that  he  had 
driven  in  the  enemy's  outposts  at  Cobre  and  Dos  Caminos.  On  the 
afternoon  of  the  nth  Ludlow's  lines  were  extended  down  t©  the  bay. 

%  Some  of  these  movements  do  not  seem  to  have  been  in  strict  ac 
cordance  with  the  rather  indefinite  truce  between  the  two  armies.  On 
July  1 2th  Toral  called  Shafter's  attention  to  the  advance  of  the  Ameri 
can  troops  north  of  the  city,  "of  which,"  the  Spanish  general  said,  "  I 
suppose  you  are  ignorant,"  and  requested  that  they  should  return  to 
their  former  position.  It  does  not  appear  that  any  withdrawal  resulted, 
but  Shafter  promised  that  there  should  be  no  further  advance,  and  sent 
the  division  commanders  explicit  orders  to  that  effect. 


THE   SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO  299 

enemy  by  cutting  the  pipe  that  brought  water  to 
Santiago  from  the  hills  north  of  the  city.  In  the 
dry  season  this  might  have  been  an  effective  stroke ; 
but  with  heavy  rain  falling  daily,  the  Spaniards  had 
an  ample  supply  in  cisterns  for  their  immediate 
needs.* 

Shafter's  position  grew  stronger  day  by  day — 
he  telegraphed  to  the  War  Department,  on  the  8th, 
that  it  was  "  impregnable  against  any  force  the 
enemy  can  send  "-—but  the  task  of  storming  Toral's 
defences  did  not  promise  to  be  less  difficult  or  less 
costly.  At  one  time,  indeed,  the  idea  of  abandoning 
the  siege  occurred  to  him,  as  is  shown  by  a  despatch 
he  sent  to  Washington  on  the  4th : 

If  we  have  got  to  try  and  reduce  the  town,  now  that 
the  fleet  is  destroyed,  which  was  stated  to  be  the  chief 
object  of  the  expedition,  there  must  be  no  delay  in  getting 
large  bodies  of  troops  here. 

At  Washington,  General  Miles  took  up  the  sug 
gestion  of  withdrawing  from  Santiago,  and  proposed 
that  Shafter's  corps,  with  all  the  reinforcements 
ready  to  leave  the  United  States,  should  be  sent  to 
Porto  Rico,  the  conquest  of  which  he  was  eager  to 
undertake  at  once.  He  was  overruled,  however — 
and  fortunately,  for  the  withdrawal  would  have  re 
vived  the  drooping  hopes  of  Spain,  while  the  city's 
fall  undoubtedly  prompted  her  Government  to  sue 
for  peace. 

With  "  take  Santiago "  the  keynote  of  every 
despatch  from  Washington,  Shafter  contemplated  an 
assault  only  as  a  last  resort.  He  kept  up  negotiations 
for  a  surrender,  and  meanwhile  he  urged  Sampson 
to  force  his  way  into  the  harbour  and  end  the  cam 
paign  with  the  great  guns  of  the  fleet.  His  first 

*  It  seems,  however,  from  Lieutenant  M filler's  narrative,  that  in  the 
last  days  of  the  siege  a  shortage  was  beginning  to  be  felt,  or  at  least 
apprehended ;  and  the  immediate  repair  of  the  broken  pipes  was  one 
of  the  concessions  requested  by  the  Spanish  commissioners  who  nego 
tiated  the  surrender. 

20 


300  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

note  to  Toral,  written  on  July  3d,  was  followed  up 
by  three  letters  on  the  4th.  One  offered  to  parole 
and  return  the  wounded  men  captured  at  Caney. 
Another  proposed  the  exchange  of  a  corresponding 
number  of  Spanish  prisoners  for  Lieutenant  Hobson 
and  his  seven  comrades  of  the  Merrimac,  who  were 
still  held  in  Santiago,  Blanco  having  declined  to 
authorize  their  release.  The  third  announced  the 
destruction  of  Cervera's  squadron  and  the  death  of 
Vara  del  Rey  at  Caney,  and  concluded  : 

In  view  of  the  above,  I  would  suggest  that,  to  save 
needless  effusion  of  blood  and  the  distress  of  many  people, 
you  may  reconsider  your  determination  of  yesterday. 
Your  men  have  certainly  shown  the  gallantry  which  was 
expected  of  them. 

The  return  of  the  wounded  Spaniards,  besides  its 
slight  relief  to  Shafter's  overworked  hospital  serv 
ice,  was  designed  to  disprove  the  idea  that  the  in 
vading  army  was  in  the  habit  of  murdering  its 
prisoners.  The  behaviour  of  the  men  captured  at 
Caney  showed  that  this  preposterous  myth  had 
found  wide  credence  among  the  Spanish  soldiers. 
Many  Americans  thought  that  it  accounted  for  the 
unexpectedly  stubborn  resistance  they  had  offered, 
and  that  it  had  been  deliberately  spread  by  their 
officers. 

Toral  replied  to  all  three  notes  with  a  letter  of 
the  most  formal  politeness,  thanking  Shafter  for  his 
courtesy,  informing  him  that  the  proposition  for 
Hobson's  exchange  had  been  referred  to  the  captain- 
general,  and  again  refusing  to  surrender. 

Next  day  (July  5th)  twenty-eight  wounded  pris 
oners — four  officers,  one  of  whom  was  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Vara  del  Rey,  a  brother  of  the  dead  general, 
and  twenty-four  men — were  delivered  to  the  Span 
iards  ;  and  word  came  from  Toral  that  Blanco  had 
agreed  to  the  exchange  for  Hobson,  which  was  car 
ried  out  on  the  afternoon  of  the  6th.  Besides  the 
four  he  had  paroled,  Shafter  had  three  Spanish  offi- 


THE   SURRENDER    OF   SANTIAGO 


301 


cers  among  his  prisoners.  From  them  Toral  chose 
Lieutenant  Arias,  who  was  sent  into  Santiago  with 
seven  privates ;  and  the  crew  of  the  Merrimac  came 
out  to  the  American  lines,  where  they  received  a 
warm  greeting  on  their  way  to  Siboney  and  the 
fleet.  With  these  pacific  negotiations  in  progress, 
firing  was  not  resumed,  though  the  limit  set  for  the 
truce  had  expired  at  noon  on  the  5th. 

A  conference  between  Shafter  and  Sampson — 
postponed  from  the  3d  of  July,  when  the  admiral, 

on  his  way  to  Siboney,  was  called  back 
Misunderstand-  by  the  events  of  that  memorable 
LnhKaft«Tndn  morning— had  been  arranged  for  the 
Sampson.  6th.  A  serious  misunderstanding  had 

arisen  between  the  two  commanders, 
dating  back  to  their  meeting  on  the  2Oth  of  June,  the 
day  of  the  arrival  of  the  Fifth  Corps  off  Santiago, 
when  the  joint  plan  of  campaign  was  first  outlined. 
Of  this  plan  Sampson  has  stated  his  idea  very  clearly 
and  positively  in  a  report  dated  July  I5th: 

It  was  essential  .  .  .  that  the  positions  occupied  by 
the  eastern  and  western  batteries  should  be  carried,  and 
this  was  the  scheme  of  action  first  proposed  by  General 
Shafter  in  his  discussion  with  my  chief  of  staff,  who  was 
sent  by  me  to  meet  General  Shafter  the  day  of  his  arrival. 
The  chief  of  staff  carried  with  him  a  chart  of  the  harbour 
and  explained  the  situation,  stating  that  it  was  regarded 
by  us  as  a  movement  of  primal  importance  that  these 
points  should  be  carried  before  any  attention  was  paid  to 
the  city.  The  possession  of  these  points  insured  the  de 
struction  of  the  mines  by  us,  the  entrance  of  our  heavy 
ships  in  the  harbour,  and  the  assault  on  Admiral  Cervera's 
squadron  inside.  To  this  General  Shafter  gave  most  cor 
dial  assent,  and  stated  that  he  had  no  intention  of  attack 
ing  the  city  proper,  that  here  [pointing  to  the  entrance] 
was  the  key  to  the  situation,  and  that  when  we  had  this 
we  had  all.  This  was  repeated  in  his  interview  with  Gen 
eral  Garcia  at  Aserraderos. 

I  do  not  know  why  a  change  of  plan  occurred,  unless 
it  was  that  the  troops  on  being  landed  advanced  them 
selves  so  far  on  the  roads  toward  Santiago  before  any 
specific  plan  of  operations  had  been  decided  upon  that  it 
was  found  inconvenient  to  divert  them  to  the  other  points. 


302  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

On  the  other  hand,  Shafter's  memorandum  of 
the  conference  at  Aserraderos — which  he  dictated 
on  the  spot  to  Lieutenant  Miley,  of  his  staff,  and  of 
which  Lieutenant  Staunton,  of  Sampson's  staff,  took 
a  copy — makes  no  mention  of  the  harbour  batteries, 
simply  recording  the  proposal  to  "  land  expedition 
at  Daiquiri  and  march  on  Santiago."  In  his  article 
published  in  the  Century  Magazine  the  general 
adds: 

Soon  after  coming  on  board  the  Seguranga,  some  of 
the  naval  officers  suggested  that,  in  their  opinion,  the 
first  thing  to  do  was  to  drive  the  Spanish  troops  from 
the  Morro  and  Socapa  batteries,  thus  enabling  the  navy 
to  remove  the  mines  in  the  harbour;  but  after  my  inter 
view  with  General  Garcia,  and  having  seen  the  character 
of  the  shore  on  my  way  down  to  Aserraderos,  I  regarded 
this  as  entirely  out  of  the  question.  .  .  .  There  could  have 
been  no  misunderstanding  as  to  my  purpose.* 

*  This  recalls  the  general's  statement  that  his  instructions  for  the 
battle  of  July  ist  were  clearly  understood  by  tfte  officers  who  com 
manded  in  the  field  (see  p.  247). 

In  his  official  report  of  the  campaign,  General  Shafter  says,  after 
describing  the  arrangements  for  landing  at  Daiquiri  : 

"These  movements  committed  me  to  approaching  Santiago  from 
the  east  over  a  narrow  road,  at  first  in  some  places  not  better  than  a 
trail,  running  from  Daiquiri  through  Siboney  and  Sevilla,  and  mak 
ing  attack  from  that  quarter.  This,  in  my  judgment,  was  the  only 
feasible  plan,  and  subsequent  information  and  results  confirmed  my 
judgment." 

The  general  has  also  stated,  as  his  reason  for  not  attacking  the 
Morro,  that  the  country  along  the  coast  was  u  rugged,  devoid  of  water, 
and  densely  covered  with  a  poisonous  undergrowth."  Could  it  have 
been  more  difficult  than  the  jungles  through  which  Wheeler's  and 
Kent's  divisions  made  their  way,  at  such  heavy  cost,  on  July  ist  ? 

On  the  other  hand,  he  would  have  had  the  railroad  to  bring  his  sup 
plies  from  Siboney.  It  will  be  remembered  that  on  July  3d  he  wanted 
its  aid  so  much  that  he  was  "  seriously  considering  withdrawing  about 
five  miles,  and  taking  up  a  new  position  on  the  high  ground  between 
the  San  Juan  river  and  Siboney,  with  our  left  at  Sardinero  " — on  the 
coast  between  Siboney  and  Fort  Aguadores — "so  as  to  get  our  supplies 
to  a  large  extent  by  means  of  the  railroad,  which  we  can  use,  having 
engines  and  cars  at  Siboney."  (See  page  267.)  He  might  also  have 
received  effective  assistance  from  Sampson ;  but  apparently  Shafter 
had  a  low  estimate  of  the  value  of  a  fleet  as  a  factor  in  land  fighting. 
This  is  shown  by  his  confident  assertion  that  it  was  "nonsense"  to 
suppose  that  Cervera's  squadron  could  have  kept  him  out  of  Santiago. 
"We  could  easily  have  protected  ourselves,"  he  says,  "and  taken  po 
sition  to  clear  his  decks  with  musketry  fire."  A  general  who  can  de 
feat  and  silence  heavily  armed  ironclads  with  musketry  fire,  even  when 


THE    SURRENDER   OF    SANTIAGO 


303 


It  is  quite  clear,  nevertheless,  that  there  was  a 
fundamental  misunderstanding,  and  one  sure  to 
cause  friction  in  the  management  of  the  joint  cam 
paign.  Expecting  the  troops  to  strike  at  the  Morro, 
Sampson  was  disappointed,  to  use  no  stronger  word, 
when  their  only  move  in  that  direction — Duffield's 
feeble  demonstration  at  Fort  Aguadores — proved 
utterly  abortive,  in  spite  of  his  own  co-operation. 
On  the  following  day  (July  2d)  he  told  Shatter,  by 
telephone  from  Siboney : 

Impossible  to  force  entrance  until  we  can  clear  chan 
nel  of  mines,  a  work  of  some  time  after  forts  are  taken 
possession  of  by  your  troops.  Nothing  was  accomplished 
yesterday  by  the  advance  on  Aguadores. 


the  ironclads  are  Spanish  and  the  riflemen  are  Americans,  is  not  a  man 
to  argue  with. 

On  June  26th,  Colonel  Pearson,  with  the  Second  Infantry,  recon 
noitred  along  the  coast,  marching  six  miles  westward  from  Siboney, 
along  the  railroad,  without  any  special  difficulty.  He  found  the  bridges 
intact,  and  no  enemy  in  sight. 

In  his  book  on  The  Santiago  Campaign  (pp.  286,  310),  General 
Wheeler  gives  some  despatches  which  are  scarcely  consistent  with 
Shafter's  positive  and  repeated  assertion  that  he  regarded  an  attack  on 
the  harbour  batteries  as  "entirely  out  of  the  question"  from  the  first. 
On  July  2d  the  cavalry  commander  received  this  note  : 

"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  WHEELER  :  What  do  you  think  of  the  idea 
of  sending  a  division  in  rear  of  the  left  division  to  clear  out  the  forts 
along  the  entrance  to  the  bay  so  as  to  let  the  navy  in  and  have  the  busi 
ness  over.  Can  it  be  done  ?  Very  respectfully, 

"WILLIAM  R.  SHAFTER." 

Wheeler's  reply  was  :  "  I  regret  to  say  that  I  do  not  think  infantry 
can  take  the  forts  along  the  entrance  to  the  bay.  I  would  like  to  do  it, 
but  the  effort  would  be  attended  with  terrible  loss." 

Again,  on  July  6th,  Shafter  wrote  :  "  If  it  was  possible  to  get  be 
tween  the  town  and  the  lower  bay  and  try  and  clear  those  batteries  out 
and  let  the  navy  in,  the  capture  of  the  city  would  be  easy  ;  but  I  am  at 
a  loss  how  to  accomplish  it." 

It  would  appear  that  but  for  Wheeler's  contrary  advice,  Shafter 
contemplated  ordering  an  assault  upon  the  Punta  Gorda  or  Morro  bat 
tery,  or  possibly  both,  as  the  next  step  after  the  battle  of  July  ist. 
Wheeler's  belief  that  the  landward  defences  of  the  batteries  were  too 
strong  for  assault  seems  to  have  been  based  upon  observation  with  "  a 
very  powerful  glass "  at  several  miles'  distance  (The  Santiago  Cam 
paign,  p.  87). 

General  Shafter  has  one  triumphant  answer  to  make  to  all  criticisms 
upon  his  management  of  the  campaign  :  he  was  sent  to  take  Santiago, 
and  he  took  it.  In  war  success  covers  a  multitude  of  mistakes,  and 
very  properly  so. 


304 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


Shafter  replied : 

It  is  impossible  for  me  to  say  when  I  can  take  bat 
teries  at  entrance  to  harbour.  If  they  are  as  difficult  to 
take  as  those  which  we  have  been  pitted  against,  it  will 
be  some  time  and  a  great  loss  of  life.  I  am  at  a  loss 
to  see  why  the  navy  can  not  work  under  a  destructive  fire 
as  well  as  the  army. 

And  an  hour  later  he  added : 

I  urge  that  you  make  effort  immediately  to  force  the 
entrance  to  avoid  future  losses  among  my  men,  which  are 
already  very  heavy.  You  can  now  operate  with  less  loss 
of  life  than  I  can. 

Sampson  at  once  wrote  a  letter  in  which  he  reiter 
ated  his  opinion  that  it  was  impracticable  to  enter 
the  harbour  while  the  Spaniards  controlled  the 
mines,  but  promised  to  attempt  to  remove  them  by 
countermining.  On  the  following  morning  (July 
3d)  the  Resolute  brought  a  quantity  of  guncotton 
from  Guantanamo  for  this  purpose,  and  the  admiral, 
as  already  recorded,  started  for  the  army  headquar 
ters,  intending  to  propose  the  storming  of  the  Morro 
and  Socapa  batteries  by  the  marines — there  were 
about  a  thousand  of  them  at  Playa  del  Este  and 
with  the  fleet — and  a  detachment  of  Shafter' s  troops. 
On  the  4th,  after  the  great  sea  fight,  Shafter  re 
peated  his  demand  that  Sampson  should  force  the 
harbour,  and  twice  telegraphed  his  view  of  the  case 
to  Washington,  stating  in  one  despatch : 

I  regard  it  as  necessary  that  the  navy  force  an  entrance 
into  the  harbour  of  Santiago  not  later  than  the  6th  instant, 
and  assist  in  the  capture  of  that  place.  If  they  do,  I  be 
lieve  the  place  will  surrender  without  further  loss  of  life. 

And  in  the  other : 

If  Sampson  will  force  an  entrance  with  all  his  fleet 
to  the  upper  bay  of  Santiago  we  can  take  the  city  within 
a  few  hours.  Under  these  conditions  I  believe  the  town 
will  surrender.  If  the  army  is  to  take  the  place,  I  want 
fifteen  thousand  troops  speedily,  and  it  is  not  certain  that 
they  can  be  landed,  as  it  is  getting  stormy.  Sure  and 
speedy  way  is  through  the  bay.  Am  now  in  position  to 
do  my  part. 


THE   SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO  305 

On  the  5th  the  two  commanders  received  orders 
to  confer  and  arrange  a  joint  attack.  Shafter  was 
unable  to  ride  to  Siboney,  and  Sampson  promised 
to  come  to  his  headquarters ;  but  next  morning  (July 
6th)  the  admiral  was  ill,  and  Captain  Chadwick  went 
ashore  to  represent  him.  At  the  conference  it  was 
agreed  that  another  demand  should  be  made  for 
Toral's  surrender.  If  this  should  be  refused,  at  noon 
on  the  Qth  the  navy  was  to  bombard  Santiago  with 
its  great  guns,  lying  off  Fort  Aguadores.  Should 
the  Spaniards  still  fail  to  come  to  terms,  the  Socapa 
was  to  be  stormed,  and  some  of  Sampson's  smaller 
ships  were  to  attempt  a  dash  into  the  harbour. 

The  demand  for  surrender — which  Captain  Chad- 
wick  states  that  he  wrote,  though  Shafter  signed  it — 
was  similar  in  tenor  to  Shafter's  pre- 
siow  progress  vious  notes  to  Toral,  adding  the  warn- 

toward  sur-  ,  .  , 

render  ing  that  unless  terms  were  arranged 

by  noon  of  the  Qth  the  navy  would 
open  fire — the  three  clays'  respite  giving  time  for 
communication  with  Havana  and  Madrid.  The 
Spanish  commander  replied  with  a  request  that  the 
English  cable  operators,  who  were  among  the  refu 
gees  at  Caney,  should  be  sent  into  Santiago.  This 
was  done,  with  the  result  that  on  the  8th  he  sent 
an  offer  to  evacuate  the  city  and  the  eastern  part 
of  the  province — the  territory  subsequently  sur 
rendered — on  condition  that  he  should  be  allowed 
to  withdraw  unmolested  to  Holguin,  with  his  arms, 
ammunition,  and  baggage. 

Shafter  telegraphed  this  unexpected  offer  to 
Washington,  and  after  a  conference  with  his  division 
commanders  he  sent  a  second  despatch  strongly 
advocating  its  acceptance.  It  would,  he  pointed  out, 
at  once  open  the  harbour,  and  relieve  him  from  de 
pendence  upon  his  base  at  Siboney,  which  the  pos 
sibility  of  stormy  weather  made  more  or  less  pre 
carious  ;  it  would  end  the  terrible  sufferings  of  the 
refugees  who  had  fled  from  the  city;  it  would  save 


306  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

the  property,  mostly  owned  by  Cubans,  which  a 
bombardment  would  destroy ;  and  it  would  leave 
his  corps  ready  for  service  elsewhere,  while  yet 
in  good  health — which  might  not  be  the  case  much 
longer,  for  yellow  fever  had  appeared  at  Siboney. 
All  that  would  be  lost,  he  said,  would  be  some 
prisoners,  who  were  not  wanted,  and  the  arms 
they  carried.  But  the  reply  from  Washington,  de 
spatched  late  in  the  evening  of  the  Qth,  was  : 

Your  message  recommending  that  Spanish  troops  be 
permitted  to  evacuate  and  proceed  without  molestation 
to  Holguin  is  a  great  surprise,  and  is  not  approved.  The 
responsibility  of  destruction  and  distress  to  the  inhabitants 
rests  entirely  with  the  Spanish  commander.  The  Secre 
tary  of  War  orders  that  when  you  are  strong  enough  to 
destroy  the  enemy  and  take  Santiago,  you  do  it. 

Toral  was  at  once  informed  that  his  proposal  was 
declined,  and  that  unless  he  surrendered  the  truce 
would  end  at  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  July 
loth.  He  repeated  his  refusal,  and  at  the  hour 
named  the  Spaniards  opened  fire.  They  were 
promptly  answered  from  the  American  lines,  and 
late  in  the  day — Shafter's  message  requesting  Samp 
son's  co-operation  having  been  delayed  —  the 
Brooklyn  and  the  Indiana  threw  eight-inch  shell 
into  the  city  for  an  hour.  Hostilities  ceased  at 
nightfall,  but  were  renewed  early  on  the  nth,  the 
New  York,  the  Brooklyn,  and  the  Indiana  again 
joining  in  the  bombardment,  which  was  stopped,  in 
the  afternoon,  by  a  flag  of  truce  from  Shafter. 

The  principal  result  of  the  firing  was  the  dis 
abling  of  most  of  Toral's  artillery.  In  men,  the 
Spaniards  lost  seven  killed  and  sixty-five  wounded, 
the  Americans  two  killed  and  thirteen  wounded. 
The  shells  from  the  fleet  destroyed  or  damaged 
fifty-nine  houses,  but  the  city  was  almost  entirely 
deserted,  and  Lieutenant  Muller  states  that  there 
was  no  loss  of  life.  Many  of  the  projectiles  did  not 
explode ;  those  that  did  so  caused  no  serious  fires, 
as  Santiago  is  a  stone-built  town. 


THE   SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO  307 

The  message  from  Shafter  to  Toral,  which  ended 
the  fighting,  gave  a  new  turn  to  the  negotiations. 
It  was  the  result  of  a  telegram  from  Washington : 

Should  the  Spaniards  surrender  unconditionally  and 
wish  to  return  to  Spain,  they  will  be  sent  back  direct  at 
the  expense  of  the  United  States  Government. 

Informed  of  this  offer,  Toral  replied  that  he  "  con 
firmed  his  former  communication,"  but  added :  "  I 
have  communicated  your  proposition  to  the  general- 
in-chief  [Blanco]  "  —an  unmistakable  sign  of 
yielding. 

Meanwhile,  the  reinforcements  for  which  Shafter 
had  asked  had  begun  to  arrive  in  force.  On  the  9th 
the  First  Illinois — a  Chicago  volunteer  regiment — 
and  six  batteries  of  light  artillery,  under  Brigadier- 
General  Randolph,  had  reached  Daiquiri;  on  the 
loth  the  First  District  of  Columbia  and  the  Eighth 
Ohio  had  landed  at  Siboney.  The  District  of 
Columbia  men  and  two  battalions  of  the  Illinois 
regiment  were  at  once  moved  forward,  and  placed 
between  Wheeler  and  Lawton ;  the  artillery  was 
disembarked,  but  the  roads  were  now  in  such  im 
passable  condition  that  only  two  batteries  had 
reached  the  front  on  the  I4th,  when  the  final  negotia 
tions  for  the  surrender  began.  On  the  nth  General 
Miles  arrived  off  the  harbour  on  board 
Miles  reaches  the  Yale,  which,  with  the  Columbia, 
had  brought  the  S.ixth  Massachusetts 
and  part  of  the  Sixth  Illinois,  under 
Brigadier-General  Henry,  from  Charleston. 

General  Miles  had  planned  to  land  troops  west 
of  the  harbour,  and  before  going  ashore  he  ordered 
Henry  to  be  ready  to  disembark  at  Cabanas.  He 
rode  to  headquarters  on  the  morning  of  the  I2th. 
Shafter  at  once  informed  Toral  that  the  command 
ing  general  of  the  American  army  was  present,  and 
suggested  a  personal  interview.  At  noon  on  the 
1 3th  the  three  generals  met,  and  a  conversation  fol 
lowed  of  which  Shafter  reported :  "  I  think  it  made 


308 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


a  strong  impression  on  him  [Toral]."  But  pending 
instructions  from  Havana  nothing  was  finally  set 
tled,  and  another  interview  was  arranged  for  noon 
of  the  1 4th. 

Uncertain  of  the  success  of  these  long-drawn-out 
negotiations,  Shafter  had  again  appealed  to  Wash 
ington  that  Sampson  should  be  ordered  to  force  the 
harbour.  On  the  I3th  Secretary  Alger,  who  appar 
ently  took  Shafter's  view  of  the  matter,  wrote  to 
the  Navy  Department  formally  requesting  that  the 
necessary  instructions  should  be  issued  at  once. 
Secretary  Long,  who  evidently  agreed  with  Samp 
son,  formally  acknowledged  the  receipt  of  the  letter, 
but,  instead  of  issuing  the  requested  order,  tele 
graphed  to  the  admiral : 

The  commanding  general  of  the  army  urges,  and  Secre 
tary  of  War  urgently  requests,  that  navy  force  harbour. 
Confer  with  commander  of  army.  Wishing  to  do  all  that 
is  reasonably  possible  to  insure  the  surrender  of  the  enemy, 
I  leave  the  matter  to  your  discretion,  except  that  the 
United  States  armoured  vessels  must  not  be  risked. 

Adjutant-General  Corbin  sent  Shafter  a  private 
telegram,  confidentially  informing  him : 

The  Secretary  of  War  suggests  that  if  the  navy  will 
not  undertake  to  break  through,  take  a  transport,  cover 
the  pilot  house  and  most  exposed  points  with  baled  hay 
.  .  .  and  call  for  volunteers,  from  the  army — not  a  large 
number — to  run  into  the  harbour,  thus  making  a  way  for 
the  navy. 

But  the  remarkable  idea  of  running  ships  piled 
up  with  inflammable  hay  past  batteries  of  rapid-fire 
guns  was  never  tested.  Three  hours  before  noon  on 
the  i4th  Toral  informed  Shafter  that  he  had  heard 
from  the  captain-general.  Blanco  said  that  he  had 
referred  the  question  to  Madrid;  and  that  mean 
while,  if  the  American  commander  would  continue 
the  truce,  terms  of  capitulation  might  be  agreed 
upon  provisionally.  Here  was  a  distinct  step  in  the 
slow  progress  toward  a  surrender. 


THE   SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO 


309 


That  the  Spaniards  were  perfectly  aware  of  the 
hopelessness  of  their  situation  was  shown  by  a  de 
spatch  which  General  Linares  sent  to  Blanco  on 
the  1 2th,  in  answer  to  an  official  suggestion  that  he 
might  break  through  the  American  lines  by  attack 
ing  in  conjunction  with  the  troops  at  Holguin : 

Although  confined  to  my  bed  by  great  weakness  and 
much  pain,  the  situation  of  the  long-suffering  troops  here 
occupies  my  mind  to  such  an  extent  that  I  deem  it  my 
duty  to  address  your  Excellency  and  the  Minister  of  War 
that  the  state  of  affairs  may  be  explained. 

Enemy's  positions  very  close  to  precinct  of  city,  fa 
voured  by  nature  of  ground;  ours  spread  out  over  four 
teen  kilometres;  large  number  sick;  not  sent  to  hospitals 
because  necessary  to  retain  them  in  trenches.  Horses  and 
mules  without  food  and  shelter;  rain  has  been  pouring  into 
the  trenches  incessantly  for  twenty  hours.  Soldiers  with 
out  permanent  shelter;  rice  the  only  food;  can  not  change 
or  wash  clothes.  Many  casualties;  chiefs  and  •  officers 
killed;  forces  without  proper  command  in  critical  mo 
ments.  Under  these  circumstances  impossible  to  open 
passage,  because  one  third  of  the  men  of  our  contingent 
would  be  unable  to  go  out;  enemy  would  reduce  forces 
still  further;  result  would  be  great  disaster  without  accom 
plishing  the  salvation  of  eleven  much-thinned  battalions, 
as  desired  by  your  Excellency.  In  order  to  go  out  under 
protection  of  Holguin  division  it  would  be  necessary  for 
the  latter  to  break  through  the  enemy's  line,  and  then  with 
combined  forces  to  break  through  another  part  of  the 
same  line.  This  would  mean  an  eight-days'  journey  for 
Holguin  division,  bringing  with  them  a  quantity  of  rations 
which  they  are  unable  to  transport.  The  situation  is  hope 
less;  surrender  inevitable;  we  are  only  prolonging  the 
agony.  .  .  . 

Santiago  de  Cuba  is  not  Gerona.  a  walled  city,  on  the 
soil  of  the  mother  country,  defended  inch  by  inch  by  her 
own  sons,  by  old  men,  women,  and  children,  who  encour 
aged  and  assisted  the  combatants,  and  risked  their  lives, 
impelled  by  the  sacred  idea  of  independence  and  with  the 
hope  of  succour  which  they  received.  Here  is  solitude, 
the  complete  exodus  of  the  population,  insular  as  well  as 
peninsular,  including  the  public  officials,  with  few  excep 
tions.  Only  the  clergy  remain,  and  they  intend  to  leave 
to-day,  headed  by  their  archbishop. 

The  defenders  are  not  just  beginning  a  campaign,  full 
of  enthusiasm  and  energy;  for  three  years  they  have  been 
fighting  against  the  climate,  privations,  and  fatigue;  and 


310  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

now  that  the  most  critical  time  has  arrived  their  courage 
and  bodily  strength  are  exhausted.  .  .  .  There  is  a  limit 
to  the  honour  of  arms,  and  I  appeal  to  the  judgment  of  the 
Government  and  the  whole  nation. 

At  noon  on  the  I4th,  when  Miles,  Shafter,  and 
Toral  met  again,  the  latter  was  told  that  he  must 
surrender  immediately  and  with  no  conditions  be 
yond  the  return  of  his  troops  to  Spain.  After  some 
discussion,  carried  on  through  interpreters,  the  two 
American  officers  understood  that  he  consented  to 
do  so,  and  commissioners  were  appointed  to  draw 
up  terms  —  Generals  Wheeler  and  Lawton  and 
Lieutenant  Miley,  for  the  United  States ;  for  Spain, 
General  Escario,*  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fontan,  and 
Robert  Mason,  the  British  vice-consul. 

Both  Miles  and  Shafter  telegraphed  to  Washing 
ton  that  Santiago  had  surrendered,  and  the  welcome 
news  went  all  over  the  country ;  but  when  the  com 
missioners  met,  at  half  past  two  o'clock  (July  I4th), 
it  was  found  that  there  had  been  a  misunderstand 
ing,  and  that  Toral's  representatives  had  power  to 
act  only  subject  to  approval  from  Madrid.  This 
was  a  serious  disappointment,  but  negotiations  pro 
ceeded,  several  questions  of  detail  being  raised,  and 
the  Spaniards  making  a  hard  fight  for  permission 
to  retain  their  arms,  so  that  they  could  go  back  to 
their  native  land  with  some  at  least  of  the  honours 
of  war.  The  three  American  officers  could  not 
grant  such  a  concession,  but  they  agreed  to  make 
a  strong  recommendation  to  the  Government  at 
Washington  that  the  surrendered  weapons  should 
be  returned  to  the  prisoners. 

The  commissioners  sat  until  after  midnight,  and 
then  adjourned  to  meet  early  on  the  i^th.  In  the 
morning  Shafter  sent  a  telegram  correcting  his  pre 
mature  announcement  of  a  surrender,  and  reporting 

*  Colonel  Escario  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  brigadier-general  by 
cable  from  Madrid,  in  recognition  of  the  skill  and  gallantry  of  his  march 
from  Manzanillo  to  Santiago. 


THE   SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO  311 

the  negotiations  in  progress.  "  It  can  not  be  pos 
sible,"  he  added,  u  that  there  will  be  a  failure  in  com 
pleting  arrangements  " — a  sentence  which  inevitably 
created  an  impression  that  a  failure  was  by  no  means 
impossible.  Secretary  Alger  replied  with  a  despatch 
suggesting  that  Toral  might  be  playing  for  time,  in 
hope  that  reinforcements  would  reach  him ;  and  a 
similar  misgiving  had  naturally  arisen  at  the  front. 
With  this  disturbing  doubt  in  the  background,  the 
presence  of  Mr.  Mason  as  a  member  of  the  joint 
commission  proved  valuable  to  the  Americans  as  an 
assurance  that  the  Spaniards,  as  finally  became  evi 
dent,  were  acting  in  entire  good  faith  throughout 
the  negotiations. 

Few  of  Shafter's  officers  and  men  expected  that 
Toral  would  surrender  until  Santiago  was  stormed. 
The  whole  army  was  prepared  to  attack  at  the  word. 
The  artillery,  reinforced  by  Randolph's  batteries, 
and  pushed  boldly  forward — one  battery,  Captain 
Reilly's,  was  posted  in  front  of  the  firing  line — was 
eager  for  a  chance  to  redeem  its  comparative  failure 
in  the  battles  of  the  ist  of  July.  At  the  point  where 
the  American  lines  were  nearest  to  the  enemy,  on 
the  extreme  right,  two  of  Lawton's  brigades,  Lud- 
low's  and  McKibbin's — Brigadier-General  McKib- 
bin,  who  came  to  Cuba  as  lieutenant-colonel  of  the 
Twenty-first  Infantry,  had  succeeded  Colonel  Evan 
Miles — were  ready  to  charge  the  Spanish  trenches. 

The  attack  would  probably  have  been  a  bloody 
one.  In  front  of  the  trenches  was  a  double  line  of 
barbed-wire  fences,  which  would  have  held  the 
assailants  under  a  murderous  fire.  Farther  back 
there  were  pitfalls  and  barricaded  streets.  "  Upon 
entering  the  city,"  Shafter  said  in  the  despatch  he 
sent  to  Washington  at  the  moment  of  the  hoisting 
of  the  flag,  "  I  discovered  a  perfect  entanglement 
of  defences.  Fighting  as  the  Spaniards  did  the  first 
day,  it  would  have  cost  five  thousand  lives  to  have 
taken  it." 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

At  three  o'clock  on  the  I5th  the  terms  of  capitu 
lation  were  signed.  They  provided  for  the  surrender 
of  the  whole  eastern  district  of  the  province  of  San 
tiago,  with  all  the  troops  and  war  material  it  con 
tained  ;  the  garrison  of  the  city  of  Santiago  to  march 
out  and  deposit  their  arms,  the  officers  retaining 
their  side  arms,  and  both  officers  and  men  keeping 
their  personal  property  ;  all  the  Spanish  troops  to  be 
transported  to  Spain  with  as  little  delay  as  possible, 
any  volunteers  or  guerrillas  who  wished  to  remain 
in  Cuba  being  allowed  to  do  so  on  parole.  This 
agreement  was  only  provisional,  but  all  suspense 
was  ended  next  morning  (July  i6th)  when  a  note 
came  from  Toral  announcing  that  the  Spanish  Gov 
ernment  had  authorized  him  to  capitulate. 

There  now  remained  only  the  signing  of  the  final 
convention  —  identical  in  terms  with  the  preliminary 
agreement  —  which  took  place  at  six 


July  x^  ceremony  of  the  surrender.     Shafter 

and  Toral  met  at  half  past  nine  in  the 
morning  of  the  I7th,  under  a  tall  ceiba  tree  between 
the  lines  —  which  had  been  the  meeting  place  of  the 
commissioners  —  and  when  Toral  had  saluted  and 
said  :  "  I  yield  the  city  and  the  military  division  of 
the  province  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  to  the  authority 
of  the  United  States  of  America,"  the  two  generals, 
with  their  escorts,  rode  into  Santiago,  and  at  the 
stroke  of  noon  the  American  flag  went  up  over 
the  Government  palace  in  the  centre  of  the  ancient 
Spanish  city  —  Spanish  no  longer. 

The  Santiago  campaign  was  over,  and  Shafter, 
after  being  brought  to  the  very  brink  of  disaster  by 
adverse  circumstances  and  by  his  own  mistakes,  had 
won  a  sweeping  and  complete  success.  As  he  after 
wards  said  himself,*  there  had  been  very  little 
strategy  in  his  movements.  He  certainly  had  not 

*  In  his  speech  at  a  dinner  of  the  Sons  of  the  Revolution,  in  New 
York,  November  25,  1898. 


THE   SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO 


313 


proved  himself  a  Napoleon  or  a  Caesar,  but  he  had 
earned  the  right  to  say  veni,  vidi,  vici.  Bluff  and 
untactful  in  personal  intercourse,  he  was  not  a  man 
to  be  widely  popular  among  his  subordinates.  His 
attitude  to  the  press  representatives — gentry  seldom 
beloved  of  commanding  generals — involved  him  in 
some  undignified  controversies,  and  brought  upon 
him,  in  retaliation,  much  unjust  censure.  But  a 
hundred  newspaper  criticisms  are  more  than  offset 
by  one  such  expression  as  those  that  have  come 
from  some  of  the  men  who  were  with  him  at  San 
tiago. 

General  Wheeler,  who  has  an  ill  word  for  no  one, 
calls  him  "  a  man  of  more  than  ordinary  intellect 
and  force  of  character."  General  Breckinridge,  not 
regarded  as  an  especially  friendly  critic,  bears  testi 
mony  in  his  official  report  to  "  the  remarkable 
energy,  decision,  and  self-reliance  which  character 
ized  General  Shafter's  course  during  this  distin 
guished  military  adventure  throughout  its  arduous 
course  to  its  most  honourable  conclusion."  More 
valuable  still  is  the  judgment  of  that  fine  soldier 
General  Chaffee,  given  in  his  reply  to  a  speaker  who 
had  complimented  him  at  Shafter's  expense :  * 

He  worked  night  and  day  at  his  duties,  and  though 
his  physical  disabilities  made  his  strength  unequal  to 
mine,  and  prevented  him  from  doing  some  of  the  things 
I  was  able  to  do,  yet  I  say  there  is  no  more  honest,  faith 
ful,  and  conscientious  man  who  ever  went  out  to  command 
troops.  Let  no  one  decry  him  in  my  presence.  No  man 
ever  possessed  more  iron  courage.  General  Shafter  is  a 
man.  He  has  my  unbounded  respect. 

These  are  strong  words  of  praise,  and  they  are  en 
tirely  true. 

When  the  Fifth  Corps  was  preparing  to  embark 
at  Tampa,  newspaper  prophets  were  spreading 
abroad  detailed  forecasts  of  the  marvellous  ways  in 

*  At  a  dinner  of  the  Commercial  Club  of  Kansas  City,  Mo.,  De 
cember  19,  1898. 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

which  American  engineering  skill  was  to  be  applied 
to  military  uses.  Shafter,  we  were  told,  was  to  in 
vade  Cuba  with  "  fortification  machines  "  that  would 
throw  up  breastworks  at  railroad  speed ;  with  "  road 
builders  "  that  would  construct  macadam  highways 
as  if  by  magic ;  with  powerful  searchlights  to  reveal 
the  enemy's  movements  at  night;  and  with  other 
novel  paraphernalia  destined  to  make  victory  swift 
and  easy.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  if  we  except  the  work 
done  by  the  signal  service  in  establishing  telegraph 
and  telephone  communication,  the  Santiago  cam 
paign  was  fought  out  on  the  most  primitive  lines, 
with  scarcely  an  attempt  at  "  scientific  warfare." 
Shafter's  small  engineer  corps  accomplished  prac 
tically  nothing  ;*  his  weak  force  of  artillery  did  little 
for  him ;  of  cavalry  he  had  almost  none.  His  battles 
were  fought  by  infantry,  and  were  won  by  the  sheer 
pluck  and  dash  of  his  men,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
to  a  certain  extent  they  had  the  disadvantage  of 
inferior  equipment,  f 

Much  has  been  said,  in  the  newspapers  and  else 
where,  upon  the  question  whether  Santiago  was  sur 
rendered  to  General  Miles  or  to  Gen 
eral  Shafter.    Unlike  another  question 
that  has  been  raised  by  sundry  war 
critics  ignorant  of  warfare,  who  have 
debated  whether  Admiral  Sampson  or  Commodore 
Schley  was  in  command  of  the  fleet  that  destroyed 
Cervera,t  this  is  not  entirely  an  idle  query.     It  ap- 

*  The  engineers  built  a  pier  for  the  Cubans  at  Aserraderos,  and 
later  one  at  Siboney,  which  was  not  finished  until  just  before  the  end 
of  the  campaign.  They  also  did  a  little  scouting  and  some  road  re 
pairing,  but  did  not  succeed  in  making  even  a  tolerable  trail  from  Si 
boney  to  the  front.  They  complained— no  doubt  truly— that  they  were 
seriously  handicapped  by  lack  of  proper  equipment,  and  especially  of 
transportation. 

t  There  is  little  to  choose  between  the  Mauser  rifle  and  the  Krag- 
Jorgensen,  but  there  is  no  question  of  the  terrible  disadvantage  under 
which  the  American  volunteers  and  artillery  laboured  by  reason  of  their 
lack  of  smokeless  powder. 

%  The  answer  to  this  question  is  so  self-evident  to  any  one  who  has 
the  slightest  understanding  of  naval  affairs  that  no  space  has  been 


THE   SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO  315 

pears  that  on  July  8th,  the  day  after  Miles  left 
Washington,  Adjutant-General  Corbin  telegraphed 
to  Shafter : 

Secretary  of  War  directs  me  to  inform  you  that  Gen 
eral  Miles  left  here  at  10.40  last  night  for  Santiago,  but 
with  instructions  not  to  in  any  manner  supersede  you  as 
commander  of  the  forces  in  the  field  near  Santiago  so 
long  as  you  are  able  for  duty. 

This  not  unnaturally  led  to  a  certain  amount  of  mis 
understanding.  On  the  day  of  the  surrender,  in 
reply  to  an  order  directing  him  to  move  his  troops 
to  fresh  camps,  Shafter  telegraphed  to  Miles : 

Letters  and  orders  in  reference  to  movement  of  camp 
received  and  will  be  carried  out.  None  is  more  anxious 
than  myself  to  get  away  from  here.  It  seems  from  your 
orders  given  me  that  you  regard  my  force  as  a  part  of 
your  command.  Nothing  will  give  me  greater  pleasure 
than  serving  under  you,  general,  and  I  shall  comply  with 
all  your  requests  and  directions,  but  I  was  told  by  the 
secretary  that  you  were  not  to  supersede  me  in  command 
here. 

To  this  communication,  an  entirely  creditable  and 
soldierly  one,  Miles,  who  had  gone  to  Guantanamo 
Bay  with  the  transports  carrying  Henry's  troops,  re 
plied  (July  1 8th) : 

wasted  on  it  in  the  present  narrative.  It  may  be  said  here  that  the  at 
tempts  which  have  been  made  in  the  press,  and  even  in  Congress,  to 
deprive  Admiral  Sampson  of  the  honour  justly  earned  by  his  splendid 
services  to  his  country  are  disgraceful  to  their  authors.  They  must  rest 
either  upon  a  total  misunderstanding  of  the  facts,  or  upon  some  most 
unworthy  motive  of  jealousy. 

As  a  sample  of  the  methods  employed,  Sampson's  signal,  on  the 
morning  of  July  3d,  to  "disregard  the  movements  of  commander-in- 
chief,"  has  been  distorted  into  "disregard  the  orders  of  commander- 
in-chief,"  and  paraded  as  a  proof  that  he  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
battle  of  that  day. 

The  fact  that  venomous  attacks  upon  Sampson  have  been  coupled 
with  extravagant  praise  of  Schley  must  be  most  embarrassing  to  the 
latter  officer,  who  very  properly  said,  in  an  official  despatch  written  a 
week  after  the  battle  with  Cervera  :  "  Victory  was  secured  by  the  forces 
under  the  command  of  the  commander-in-chief,  North  Atlantic  station, 
and  to  him  the  honour  is  due." 

As  has  been  said  by  Captain  Mahan,  the  foremost  American  au 
thority  on  naval  strategy,  "  the  first  credit  of  the  battle,  as  of  the  cam 
paign,  belongs  to  the  man  whose  dispositions  prevailed  in  both — to 
Admiral  Sampson." 

21 


316  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Have  no  desire  and  have  carefully  avoided  any 
appearance  of  superseding  you.  Your  command  is  a 
part  of  the  United  States  army,  which  I  have  the  honour 
to  command,  having  been  duly  assigned  thereto,  and 
directed  by  the  President  to  go  wherever  I  thought 
my  presence  required  and  give  such  general  directions 
as  I  thought  best  concerning  military  matters,  and  espe 
cially  directed  to  go  to  Santiago  for  a  specific  purpose. 
You  will  also  notice  that  the  orders  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  of  July  I3th  left  the  matter  to  my  discretion. 
I  should  regret  that  any  event  would  cause  either 
yourself  or  any  part  of  your  command  to  cease  to  be 
a  part  of  mine. 

This  was  unanswerable,  and  exactly  defined  the 
position  General  Miles  occupied  during  his  brief  stay 
before  Santiago.  When  he  landed  at  Siboney,  in 
the  afternoon  of  July  n,  he  had  found  the  place 
in  a  very  unsatisfactory  condition.  General  Duffield, 
in  command,  was  ill,  and  apparently  no  one  had 
taken  his  place ;  an  alarming  outbreak  of  yellow 
fever  had  begun — probably  caused,  and  certainly 
hastened,  by  the  use  of  infected  buildings  which 
should  have  been  destroyed ;  the  medical  and  trans 
portation  services  were  frightfully  inadequate.  The 
landing  stage  was  still  unfinished,  and  General  Miles 
went  on  shore  through  the  surf.  He  began  to  issue 
orders  at  once,  signing  them  "  Nelson  A.  Miles, 
major-general  commanding " ;  *  but  he  counter 
manded  no  plan  of  Shafter's,  and  his  part  in  the  con 
clusion  of  the  campaign  was  limited  to  his  share  in 
the  conferences  with  Toral — which,  on  Shafter's  own 
statement,  Miles  allowed  to  continue  when  his  own 
judgment  was  in  favour  of  breaking  them  off — and 

*  One  of  his  first  orders  was  for  the  burning  of  the  buildings  be 
lieved  to  be  infected  with  yellow  fever,  including  the  army  post-office, 
a  house  used  by  the  newspaper  correspondents,  and  others  occupied  by 
the  Thirty-third  Michigan.  General  Shafter  had  that  morning  issued 
instructions  to  the  same  effect,  but  apparently  nothing  had  been  done 
toward  carrying  them  out. 

Warnings  against  the  use  of  buildings  likely  to  be  infected  had  been 
issued  before  the  Fifth  Corps  landed,  and  General  Miles  regarded  the 
neglect  of  proper  precautions  at  Siboney  as  a  distinct  violation  of 
orders. 


THE   SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO  317 

his  preparations,  afterward  abandoned,  to  land 
troops  at  Cabanas. 

It  was  hardly  a  secret  at  the  time,  and  has  since 
become  notorious,  that  an  unfortunate  ill  feeling 
had  arisen  between  General  Miles  and  the  army  staff 
at  Washington ;  but  Secretary  Alger's  despatches 
distinctly  recognize  him  as  in  command,  notably  the 
one  mentioned  in  Miles's  note  of  the  i8th  to  Shafter, 
already  quoted.  This  is  dated  July  I3th,  and  ad 
dressed  to  "  Major-General  Miles,  Camp  near  San 
tiago  " : 

You  may  accept  surrender  by  granting  parole  to 
officers  and  men,  the  officers  retaining  their  side  arms. 
The  officers  and  men  after  parole  to  be  permitted  to 
return  to  Spain,  the  United  States  assisting.  If  not  ac 
cepted,  then  assault,  unless  in  your  judgment  an  assault 
would  fail.  Consult  with  Sampson,  and  pursue  such 
course  as  to  the  assault  as  you  jointly  agree  upon.  Matter 
should  now  be  settled  promptly. 

After  such  an  order,  clothing  him  with  com 
plete  authority,  and  therefore  with  full  responsibility, 
it  was  certainly  both  tactful  and  generous  on  Miles's 
part  to  leave  the  formal  reception  of  Toral's  sur 
render  to  Shafter,  whom  he  would  necessarily  have 
outranked  had  he  been  present.  At  the  same  time, 
it  was  a  very  proper  recognition  of  the  fact  that  to 
the  commander  of  the  Fifth  Corps  belonged  the 
honours  of  a  victorious  campaign,  and  especially 
the  credit  of  having  secured  a  capitulation  without 
further  fighting,  thus  capturing  Santiago  at  a  cost 
which,  after  all,  was  small  in  proportion  to  the  great 
results  gained. 

General  Miles's  report  indicates  his  belief  that 
his  preparations  to  land  a  brigade  at  Cabanas  helped 
to  bring  Toral  to  terms : 

The  Spanish  commander  was  well  aware  of  our  de 
signs,  as  the  position  and  movements  of  the  fleet  had  been 
in  full  view  of  the  officers  commanding  his  troops,  and 
they  had  reported  to  him  having  seen  fifty-seven  vessels, 
some  of  them  loaded  with  troops,  menacing  that  part  of 
his  position. 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

For  the  navy,  too,  a  share  in  the  work  is  claimed 
— apart  from  its  victory  over  Cervera,  which  was  the 
great  decisive  event  of  the  campaign 
and  of  the  war.  A  board  appointed 
by  Sampson  to  inspect  the  captured 
city  reported,  after  a  detailed  account  of  the  damage 
done  by  the  war-ships'  fire : 

We  believe  that  the  bombardment  by  the  ships  had 
much  to  do  with  the  early  surrender  of  the  city. 

This  is  indorsed  by  the  admiral.  "  The  effect  of  our 
shell,"  he  says,  "  was  undoubtedly  one  of  the  prin 
cipal  causes  of  the  surrender  at  this  time." 

And  in  distributing  the  credit  where  it  is  due 
mention  should  be  made  of  the  effective  stroke  of 
military  diplomacy  that  came  from  Washington. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  offer  to  return  Toral's 
forces  to  Spain  did  much  toward  making  the  sur 
render  possible. 

It  was  somewhat  anomalous  that  in  the  cere 
monies  marking  the  successful  ending  of  a  joint 
land  and  sea  campaign  the  American  navy  wTas  not 
represented.  On  July  I3th,  when  Shafter  informed 
Sampson  that  a  surrender  was  expected,  the  admiral 
expressed  his  desire  to  share  in  the  negotiations, 
which  involved  questions  of  importance  to  both 
branches  of  the  service.  The  general  acquiesced, 
and  promised  that  if  possible  he  would  give  due 
notice  of  the  final  arrangement  of  terms,  in  order 
that  Sampson  might  send  a  representative.  Next 
morning  (July  I4th)  Shafter  again  telephoned  to 
Siboney  that  there  was  "  every  prospect  of  capitula 
tion,"  and  Miles  invited  the  admiral  to  send  an 
officer  ashore ;  but  before  this  could  be  done  there 
came  a  message  telling  him  that  Santiago  had 
already  surrendered. 

On  the  1 5th  Sampson  was  informed  of  the  hitch 
in  the  negotiations.  On  the  i6th  Shafter  tele 
phoned  : 


THE   SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO 


319 


Enemy  has  surrendered.  Will  you  send  some  one  to 
represent  navy  in  the  matter? 

Captain  Chadwick,  as  Sampson's  chief  of  staff, 
landed  and  went  to  the  front  as  quickly  as  he  could. 
The  convention  had  already  been  signed;  it  con 
tained  no  reference  to  the  navy,  nor  to  the  Spanish 
ships  at  Santiago.  The  captain  told  Shafter  that 
these  latter — the  gunboat  Alvarado  and  five  mer 
chant  steamers,  one  of  which,  the  Mejico,  was  armed 
—would  be  regarded  by  the  navy  as  its  prizes.  Shaf 
ter  said  that  he  would  refer  the  matter  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War. 

:<  This,"  Sampson  says,  "  could  have  no  bearing 
upon  what  I  considered  my  duty  in  the  matter,  par 
ticularly  in  view  of  our  late  experience  of  Spanish 
perfidy  in  regard  to  injury  of  ships,  which  in  my 
opinion  made  it  necessary  to  look  after  their  safety 
at  once."  But  when  he  sent  in  prize  crews,  they 
found  army  officers  in  charge  of  the  vessels,  and 
General  McKibbin,  who  had  been  designated  as 
military  governor  of  Santiago,  declined  to  give  them 
up  until  Sampson  had  sent  Shafter  an  emphatic 
protest.  In  a  joint  campaign,  the  admiral  pointed 
out,  usage  gives  captured  cities  or  forts  to  the 
army,  floating  property  to  the  navy;  he  had  left  the 
harbour  batteries  to  be  occupied  by  the  troops,  and 
he  expected,  in  return,  similar  consideration  with 
regard  to  the  ships.  "  My  prize  crews  must  remain 
in  charge,"  he  concluded,  "  and  I  have  so  directed." 
His  action  was  approved  at  Washington,  but  the 
merchant  vessels  were  afterward  released,  it  being 
decided  that  shipping  captured  jointly  by  the  army 
and  the  navy  is  not  liable  to  seizure  as  prizes.  The 
Alvarado,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Blue,  for 
merly  of  the  Suwanee,  was  added  to  Sampson's  fleet. 

On  the  day  before  the  surrender  (July  :6th) 
Shafter  personally  invited  Garcia  and  his  staff  to 
witness  the  ceremony.  The  Cuban  chief  asked  if 
it  was  intended  to  continue  the  Spanish  civil 


320  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

officials  in  power,  and  on  being  answered  in  the 

affirmative  he  dramatically  declared  that  he  could 

not  go  where  Spain  ruled.   No  Cuban 

Garcia  leaves       troops  were  allowed  to  enter  the  city 

Santiago,  L.  .      J. 

juiyie.  — a   very    proper   precaution    against 

disorder,  but  one  that  was  bitterly  re 
sented  by  the  excluded  patriots.  Garcia  was  so  deep 
ly  offended  that  he  marched  his  men  northward  into 
the  interior,  and  sent  Shatter  a  letter  *  reproaching 
the  American  commander  for  his  ingratitude.  On 
July  3Oth  he  appeared  at  Gibara,  on  the  north  coast, 
which  had  been  evacuated  by  the  Spaniards  a  few 
days  before ;  and  meeting  Commander  Maynard,  of 
the  Nashville,  he  announced  his  intention  of  mov 
ing  upon  Holguin,  where  the  garrison,  commanded 
by  General  Luque,  was  in  great  straits  for  food,  but 
apparently  no  serious  fighting  followed. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  I7th  the  Spanish 
troops  began  to  deposit  their  rifles  at  the  arsenal 
in  Santiago,  where  they  were  re- 
surrender  *  ceived  and  inventoried  by  Lieutenant 
Brooke,  Shafter's  ordnance  officer,  the 
disarmed  men  being  marched  out  to  a  camp  near 
San  Juan.  Of  the  Spanish  Mauser,  the  weapon  of 
the  regular  troops,  the  number  surrendered  was 
7,902  rifles  and  833  carbines,  besides  about  7,000 
guns  of  other  makes,  chiefly  the  Remington,  which 
was  used  by  the  volunteers.  There  were  only  1,500,- 
ooo  rounds  of  Mauser  ammunition — less  than  200 
cartridges  for  each  gun.  The  store  of  food  was 
larger  than  might  have  been  expected,  amounting 
— on  the  authority  of  General  Wood — to  1,200,000 
rations,  but  including  little  except  rice. 

Of  the  men,  it  seems  that  no  precise  count  was 
taken — a  rather  curious  omission,  f     In  his  official 


*  Or  at  least  Shatter  received  a  letter  purporting  to  come  from  Gar 
cia.  Its  authenticity  does  not  seem  to  be  certain. 

t  No  report  was  made  to  Washington  of  the  number  of  men  form 
ing  the  garrison  of  Santiago.  The  only  figures  received  by  the  War 


THE   SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO 


321 


report  Shafter  estimates  their  number  as  about 
12,000.  In  his  Century  Magazine  article  he  gives  it 
as  11,500,  which  is  still  probably  an  overstatement. 
Lieutenant  Miley,  who  was  in  a  position  to  have 
exact  information,  puts  it  at  10,500,*  and  other  esti 
mates  are  lower.  Of  these  more  than  2,000  were 
sick  and  wounded  men  in  the  four  hospitals,  f 

Toral's  division  included  nine  garrisons  outside 
of  Santiago,  numbering  13,000  men,  and  stationed  at 
Guantanamo,  Baracoa,  Sagua  de  Tanamo,  El  Cristo, 
El  Songo,  Dos  Caminos,  Moron,  San  Luis,  and 
Palma  Soriano.  The  surrender  of  such  considerable 
forces  without  a  shot  fired  against  them  came  as  a 
surprise  when  the  Spanish  general  offered  it ;  yet  it 
is  easily  accounted  for.  General  Pareja's  men  at 
Guantanamo,  as  was  already  known,  were  on  the 
brink  of  starvation ;  J  and  the  other  detachments 
were  little  better  off.  Toral  told  Miles  that  all  of 
them  were  hard  pressed  by  insurgents.  With  San 
tiago  taken  and  the  coast  blockaded  their  position 
became  hopeless,  and  if  not  surrendered  to  Shafter 
they  would  be  left  to  the  tender  mercies  of  the 
Cubans. 

Shafter  commissioned  Lieutenant  Miley,  of  his 
staff,  to  receive  the  surrender  of  the  inland  garrisons. 
With  two  mounted  troops  of  the  Second  Cavalry, 
under  Captain  Lewis,  and  accompanied  by  Captain 
Ramus,  an  aid  of  Toral's,  the  lieutenant  started  on 
July  igth,  making  his  way  over  the  mountains, 

Department  were  those  of  the  whole  number  of  soldiers  transported  to 
Spain,  22,137,  of  whom  14,995,  representing  the  garrisons  of  the  city 
and  of  six  inland  stations,  sailed  from  Santiago. 

*  In  Cuba  with  Shafter,  p.  214. 

t  "At  the  hospitals,"  says  Lieutenant  Muller,  "only  the  seriously 
wounded  and  sick  were  admitted  ;  those  who  could  stand  on  their  feet 
were  refused  and  sent  back  to  the  trenches.  If  this  had  not  been  the 
case,  there  would  not  have  been  beds  enough  in  which  to  put  them  nor 
physicians  to  attend  them." 

%  The  condition  of  the  Spanish  troops  at  Guantanamo  may  be 
judged  from  the  fact  that  from  April  to  September  T2th  nine  hundred 
and  eighteen  men— nearly  one-seventh  of  Pareja's  force — died  in 
hospital. 


322  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

through  a  country  from  which  almost  all  traces  of 
civilization  had  disappeared,  to  El  Cristo.  The 
small  Spanish  detachments  here  and  at  Moron  and 
Dos  Caminos  *  surrendered  readily,  but  the  coman- 
dante  of  the  larger  force  at  San  Luis  refused  to 
accept  the  statements  of  Miley  and  Ramus  until  he 
had  sent  a  messenger  of  his  own  to  Santiago.  At 
Palma  Soriano,  on  the  22d,  eight  hundred  men 
capitulated  without  resistance,  though  Miley  had 
been  warned  at  San  Luis  that  he  would  probably  be 
fired  upon.  The  prisoners  from  all  these  places,  and 
from  El  Songo,  which  yielded  without  a  visit,  were 
marched  down  to  Santiago  as  rapidly  as  possible, 
and  the  First  Infantry,  a  regiment  which  had 
scarcely  suffered  in  the  fighting,  was  sent  up  to  gar 
rison  the  towns. 

The  Spanish  troops  at  Guantanamo  surrendered 
to  Colonel  (now  Brigadier-General)  Ewers ;  but  it 
was  not  until  August  I3th — the  last  day  of  the  war 
— that  Lieutenant  Miley,  with  another  Spanish  staff 
officer,  Major  Irles,  set  out  for  Baracoa  and  Sagua 
de  Tanamo,  on  the  northern  coast.  At  neither  place 
was  there  any  attempt  at  resistance,  though  no  news 
of  the  fall  of  Santiago  had  reached  these  isolated 
towns.  Shafter's  transports  had  passed  within  sight 
of  Baracoa,  and  the  comandante  had  told  his  men 

*  This  is  a  station  on  the  railroad  from  Santiago  to  San  Luis,  and 
must  not  be  confounded  with  the  village  of  the  same  name  just  outside 
of  Santiago,  on  the  road  to  Cobre,  mentioned  on  page  298.  "  Dos 
Caminos,"  meaning  Two  Roads,  or  Crossroads,  is  a  common  Spanish 
name. 

Lieutenant  Miley  fin  Cuba  with  Shafter,  p.  193)  thus  describes  the 
condition  of  these  outlying  Spanish  posts  : 

"Surrounding  each  of  the  towns  there  was  a  little  cultivated  zone 
Avith  a  radius  of  half  a  mile  or  a  mile,  depending  on  the  size  of  the 
place,  planted  mainly  to  corn  and  sweet  potatoes.  The  mango  trees 
were  to  be  found  everywhere  loaded  with  fruit.  The  natives  in  the 
towns  consisted  of  old  men,  women,  and  children,  while  the  able- 
bodied  men  were  all  soldiers  in  the  insurgent  army.  I  found  all  these 
towns  surrounded  by  bands  of  insurgents,  and  the  Spanish  garrisons 
could  not  lay  down  their  arms  in  safety  unless  I  had  American  troops 
to  leave  as  guard.  For  that  reason  the  garrisons  at  El  Cristo,  Moron, 
and  Dos  Caminos  were  not  disarmed  until  I  came  back  on  my  return 
to  Santiago." 


THE   SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO  323 

that  they  were  Spanish  ships,  loaded  with  troops 
on  their  way  to  conquer  the  Americans.  At  Sagua, 
which  Miley  reached  on  the  I5th,  a  bulletin  was 
posted  announcing  a  great  victory  won  by  Montojo 
at  Manila. 

At  Santiago,  on  July   i6th,  the  refugees  from 

Caney,  a  miserable  procession  of  sick  and  starving 

people,    who    had    endured    horrors 

shafter's  army        orse  than  a  bombardment,  began  to 

fever  stricken.  ,      .       ,  r\        <i 

return  to  their  homes.  On  the  two 
following  days  the  electric  mines  in  the  harbour 
mouth  were  exploded,  and  the  contact  torpedoes 
taken  up,  two  that  could  not  be  moved  being  marked 
with  buoys ;  and  on  the  afternoon  of  the  i8th  the 
transports,  headed  by  the  Red  Cross  ship  State  of 
Texas,  were  able  to  come  into  the  bay. 

This  ended  all  fear  of  a  shortage  of  supplies ;  but 
the  victorious  army  was  in  a  sorry  and  shocking 
condition  of  sickness  and  debility.  More  than  half 
the  soldiers  were  either  down  with  malarial  fever,  or 
slowly  recovering  from  it ;  dysentery  was  prevalent, 
typhoid  had  appeared,  and  there  were  cases  of  yel 
low  fever  in  every  regiment.  Attempts  were  made 
to  fight  this  last,  the  most  dreaded  of  diseases,  by 
moving  to  fresh  camping  grounds,  but  it  was  soon 
found  that  the  soldiers  had  not  strength  enough  to 
move  their  tents  and  impedimenta.  Any  exertion 
in  the  hot  sun  only  increased  the  sickness.  The  hos 
pital  service  was  still  utterly  inadequate ;  there  was 
a  lack  of  needed  medicines,  and  a  total  absence  of 
suitable  food. 

The  wounded  and  part  of  the  sick  were  sent 
back  to  the  United  States  on  returning  transports. 
On  some  ships — notably  the  Seneca  and  the  Concho, 
which  reached  Fort  Monroe  on  the  i8th  and  28th 
of  July  respectively,  and,  hoisting  the  yellow  flag, 
were  ordered  on  to  New  York — there  was  great 
suffering  through  their  utter  lack  of  proper  accom 
modation  and  attendance.  The  Seneca  had  four 


324  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

deaths  during  the  voyage,  the  Concho  six ;  and  the 
arrival  of  these  vessels  with  their  wretched  cargo — in 
such  pitiable  contrast  to  the  strong  and  eager  host 
that  sailed  from  Tampa  a  few  weeks  before — was  the 
first  revelation  to  the  people  of  the  United  States 
of  the  sinister  results  that  a  defective  army  organi 
zation  had  inevitably  caused.*  But  still,  both  in 
Washington  and  in  the  country  generally,  there  was 
no  realization  of  the  desperate  plight  of  the  soldiers 
in  Cuba. 

On  July  1 4th  Secretary  Alger  had  telegraphed 
to  General  Miles : 

As  soon  as  Santiago  falls,  the  troops  must  all  he  put 
in  camp  as  comfortable  as  they  can  be  made,  and  remain, 
I  suppose,  until  the  fever  has  had  its  run. 

Miles  gave  similar  directions  to  Shafter  several 
times,  and  on  the  2ist  he  cabled  to  Washington  from 
Guantanamo,  where  he  was  preparing  to  sail  for 
Porto  Rico : 

There  is  not  a  single  regiment  of  regulars  or  volun 
teers  with  General  Shafter's  command  that  is  not  infected 
with  yellow  fever,  from  one  case  in  the  Eighth  Ohio  to 
thirty-six  in  the  Thirty-third  Michigan. 

*  "  Algerism"  is  a  word  that  was  coined  by  certain  newspapers  to 
denote  the  cause  of  all  the  armv's  sufferings.  The  term  was  an  unfair 
attack  upon  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  betrayed  either  political  spite  or 
ignorance  of  the  true  facts  of  the  case. 

Secretary  Alger  did  not  accomplish  such  wonders  as  those  that 
Stanton  achieved  when  he  brought  order  and  efficiency  out  of  the  chaos 
of  President  Lincoln's  war  office.  The  task  of  equipping  an  army  to 
fight  Spain  was  well  nigh  an  impossible  one,  and  the  badly  organized 
system  of  which  General  Alger  was  the  official  head  was  incompetent 
to  grapple  with  it.  Much  creditable  work  was  done,  but  it  was  inev 
itable  that  there  should  be  failure  at  many  points,  and  that  loss  and 
suffering  should  result.  But  in  attempting  to  fasten  blame  upon  the 
personnel  of  the  department  it  is  impossible  to  find  more  than  the  un 
avoidable  percentage  of  human  error.  Though  he  did  not  prove  to  be 
the  rare  and  brilliant  organizer  who  alone  could  have  cut  the  obstruc 
tive  red  tape  and  met  the  overwhelming  needs  of  the  service,  the  secre 
tary  himself  laboured  with  the  most  devoted  energv. 

The  main  cause  of  the  armv's  troubles  is  to  be  found  in  the  illiberal 
and  unintelligent  policy  that  has  been  traditional  with  Congress  in  its 
control  of  the  military  establishment.  The  responsibility  rests  upon 
the  national  legislature,  and  indirectly  upon  the  nation  that  it  rep 
resents. 


THE   SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO  325 

After  consulting  with  best  medical  authorities,  it  is  my 
opinion  that  the  best  mode  of  ridding  the  troops  of  the 
fever  will  be  as  I  have  directed — namely,  the  troops  to 
go  up  as  high  into  the  mountains  as  possible,  selecting 
fresh  camps  every  day.  If  this  does  not  check  the  spread 
of  the  disease,  the  only  way  of  saving  a  large  portion  of 
the  command  will  be  to  put  them  on  transports  and  ship 
them  to  the  New  England  coast,  to  some  point  to  be  desig 
nated  by  the  surgeon-general. 

The  plan  of  changing  camps,  as  has  been  said, 
proved  worse  than  useless,  yet  on  August  3d  Shafter 
was  again  instructed  to  move  his  command  along 
the  San  Luis  railroad  to  the  high  ground  north  of 
Santiago.  It  was  quite  impossible  to  carry  out  such 
an  order.  Shafter  assembled  his  general  officers, 
read  the  instructions  he  had  received,  and  asked 
their  opinion.  One  of  them  *  was  for  seizing  every 
ship  in  the  harbour  and  starting  northward  at  once, 
orders  or  no  orders;  all  agreed  that  to  leave  Cuba 
was  an  imperative  necessity.  At  the  suggestion  of 
General  Bates,  they  drew  up  a  "  round  robin  "  letter 
to  the  corps  commander,  stating  that 

the  army  was  utterly  disabled  by  ma 
larial  feVer ;  that  it  was  in  a  condition 
to  be  destroyed  by  an  epidemic,  already  threatened, 
of  yellow  fever;  that  it  must  be  moved  at  once  or 
perish  as  an  army ;  and  that  those  responsible  for 
preventing  such  a  move  would  be  responsible  for 
the  unnecessary  loss  of  thousands  of  lives. 

This  strong  letter  was  signed  by  all  the  officers 
present — Major-Generals  Wheeler,  Kent,  Lawton, 
Bates,  and  Chaffee,  Brigadier-Generals  Sumner, 
Ludlow,  McKibbin,  Ames,  and  Wood,  and  Colonel 
Roosevelt,  f  There  was,  as  Shafter  says,  no  secrecy 

*  General  Shafter  records  this  incident  without  mentioning  names, 
but  the  outspoken  officer  was  probablv  General  Ames,  who  expressed  a 
similar  opinion  to  a  correspondent,  and  who  sent  a  private  telegram  to 
Mr.  Allen,  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy  :  "  This  army  is  incapa 
ble,  because  of  sickness,  of  marching:  anywhere  except  to  the  transports. 
If  it  is  ever  to  return  to  the  United  States,  it  must  do  so  at  once." 

t  Brigadier-Generals  Kent,  Lawton,  Bates,  and  Chaffee  had  just  re 
ceived  their  major-generalships.  General  Ames — a  distinguished  gen- 


326 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


about  it,  and  the  newspaper  correspondents  cabled 
its  contents  to  the  United  States,  where  it  came  as 
a  revelation.  This  was  no  utterance  of  a  sensational 
reporter ;  it  was  the  voice  of  an  army  that  had  been 
sent  out  to  fight  the  nation's  battles,  and  that  now 
found  itself  left  to  parish  on  the  soil  it  had  won. 

At  Washington — Shafter  telegraphed  it  to  the 
War  Department  with  an  expression  of  his  own 
opinion,  saying  that  if  the  troops  were  not  to  be 
moved  till  the  fever  had  passed  there  would  be  very 
few  to  move — its  effect  was  immediate.  Next  day 
(August  4th)  the  general  was  ordered  to  transport 
his  men  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  Montauk  Point, 
where  General  S.  B.  M.  Young,  himself  a  fever  con 
valescent,  was  commissioned  to  prepare  a  camp  for 
them. 

The  embarkation  began  on  August  7th,  and  was 
continued  as  rapidly  as  transports  could  be  secured. 
On  the  25th  General  Shafter  sailed  with  almost  the 
last  men  of  his  corps,  leaving  General  Lawton  in 
command  of  the  province,  with  General  Wood  in 
charge  of  the  city.  Some  of  the  "  immune  "  regi 
ments  were  sent  from  the  United  States  to  do  gar 
rison  duty,  it  being  expected — too  sanguinely,  as  it 
proved — that  they  would  not  suffer  from  the  climatic 
fevers  that  had  been  so  disastrous  to  the  Fifth  Corps. 

The  shipment  of  Toral's  troops  \  began  on 
August  9th,  and  on  September  I7th  all  the  pris 
oners  had  left  Santiago  except  a  small  number  who 

eral  of  the  civil  war,  hailing  from  Massachusetts,  though  formerly  gov 
ernor  of  Mississippi — was  in  command  of  Kent's  third  brigade,  formerly 
Colonel  Wikoff's.  Wood,  promoted  brigadier- general,  had  on  July 
2oth  succeeded  McKibbin  as  military  governor  of  Santiagp.  Being  a 
physician  by  profession,  he  was  peculiarly  fitted  for  a  post  whose  most 
immediate  and  important  problem  was  that  of  sanitation.  Colonel 
Roosevelt,  who  had  also  gained  a  step  in  rank,  was  present  as  com 
mander  of  the  second  cavalry  brigade. 

*  Just  before  he  sailed,  Toral  is  said  to  have  sent  Shafter  a  letter 
commenting  bitterly  on  the  fact  that  the  surrendered  arms  had  not 
been  returned,  as  recommended— or  promised,  as  the  Spaniards  seem 
to  have  understood— by  the  American  commissioners  who  negotiated 
the  capitulation. 


THE    SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO 


327 


elected  to  remain  in  Cuba,  and  a  few  yellow-fever 
patients  at  Baracoa  and  Guantanamo.  The  work 
was  done  by  the  Compania  Transatlantica  Espafiola, 
which  made  the  lowest  tender  when  bids  were  in 
vited  by  the  quartermaster-general's  department. 
It  seemed,  at  first  sight,  anomalous  that  the  United 
States  Government  should  employ  a  Spanish  com 
pany,  some  of  whose  ships  were  actually  serving  as 
auxiliaries  in  the  enemy's  navy  ;  and  representatives 
of  other  ocean  lines — willing  to  accept  the  contract 
at  a  much  higher  price — were  greatly  concerned  at 
so  extraordinary  an  arrangement.  Undoubtedly, 
however,  the  War  Department's  action  was  busi 
nesslike  and  judicious.  It  was  very  satisfactory  that 
the  Spanish  soldiers  should  be  intrusted  to  their 
own  people,  so  that  no  charge  of  ill  treatment  could 
be  laid  at  any  American  door.  For  these  hapless 
men  were  suffering  terribly  during  the  unhealthy 
months  of  August  and  September.  Several  hundred 
died  before  they  could  be  taken  on  board  the  ships, 
and  several  hundred  more  during  the  voyage.  On 
one  vessel,  the  Pedro  de  Satrustegui,  there  were 
seventy-six  deaths. 

The  total  number  of  people  carried  to  Spain  was 
22,864.  This  included  22,137  soldiers — 1,163 
officers  and  20,974  men ;  the  rest  were  officers' 
wives  and  children,  priests,  and  sisters  of  mercy. 
Of  the  soldiers,  5,820  sailed  from  Guantanamo, 
1,322  from  Baracoa  and  Sagua  de  Tanamo,  and  the 
remainder  from  Santiago.  The  cost  to  the  United 
States  Government  was  a  little  more  than  half  a 
million  dollars. 

At  Camp  Wikoff — as  the  Montauk  encampment 
was  named,  in  honour  of  the  ranking  American 
officer  killed  in  the  war — there  was  at  first  much 
confusion,  and  some  actual  suffering,  owing  to  the 
difficulty  of  preparing  for  so  large  a  body  of  men 
at  such  short  notice ;  but  the  outburst  of  newspaper 
criticism  that  ensued  was  quite  unwarranted.  After 


328  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

the  first  weeks  the  comfort  of  the  soldiers  was  well 
provided  for,  and  private  beneficence  fairly  show 
ered  them  with  attentions,  which  in  many  cases 
took  the  form  of  delicacies  actually  injurious  to  men 
recovering  from  fever.  There  were  257  deaths  in  the 
camp  during  August  and  September,  but  quite  or 
nearly  all  of  them  were  due  to  disease  contracted 
before  arriving  there.  The  total  number  of  men  it 
received  was  21,870,  of  whom  17,577  were  from 
Santiago,  the  remainder  from  Tampa  and  else 
where. 

The  sanitary  condition  of  some  of  the  other 
camps,  at  this  time,  had  become  very  unsatisfactory. 
The  army's  death  rate  in  May  and  June  — 0.46  and 
0.70  per  thousand  respectively — was  not  above 
normal.  In  July  it  rose  to  2.15 — "  somewhat  higher 
than  that  of  most  well-cared-for  cities,"  Surgeon- 
General  Sternberg  said  in  his  report  for  the  year; 
but  his  comparison  is  palpably  a  most  unfair  one. 
An  army  consists  only  of  picked  men  in  the  prime  of 
life,  and  its  mortality,  apart  from  loss  in  battle, 
should  be  but  a  fraction  of  that  of  a  community  in 
cluding  all  ages  and  conditions.  In  August  the  rate 
was  4.08  per  thousand,  which  even  Sternberg  char 
acterizes  as  "  excessive."  In  September,  when  the 
most  unhealthy  camps  had  been  abandoned,  it  fell 
to  2.45.  The  total  number  of  deaths  for  the  four 
months  was  2,910.  Secretary  Alger  may  be  cor 
rect  in  his  assertion  that  this  was  "  the  smallest 
death  rate  recorded  of  any  army  of  history,"  but  it 
does  not  follow,  in  view  of  the  recent  advance  of 
sanitary  science,  and  of  the  fact  that  not  a  quarter 
of  the  troops  saw  any  active  service,  that  the  mor 
tality  was  as  low  as  it  should  have  been. 

More  discreditable  than  the  actual  number  of 
deaths  was  the  fact  that  there  were  about  fifteen 
thousand  cases  of  typhoid  fever,  that  scourge  of  ill- 
kept  camps.  Of  these  Camp  Thomas  is  charged 
with  3,426;  the  camp  of  the  Seventh  Corps,  at 


THE   SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO 


329 


Jacksonville,  which  proved  particularly  unhealthy, 
had  about  4,600.*  Some  of  the  smaller  encamp 
ments  made  a  still  worse  showing,  notably  those  of 
the  Fifteenth  Minnesota  Volunteers,  at  St.  Paul  and 
Fort  Snelling,  where,  in  August,  out  of  1,323  sol 
diers,  260  contracted  the  disease. 

There  were  many  causes  that  contributed  to 
bring  about  this  unsatisfactory  state  of  affairs.  One 
was  that  mainspring  of  the  American  army's 
troubles — the  inadequacy  of  the  staff  departments 
to  the  huge  task  suddenly  thrust  upon  them.  Some 
of  the  camp  sites  were  badly  chosen ;  none  was 
properly  prepared  for  the  occupancy  of  large  bodies 
of  troops.  There  was  very  little  official  inspection, 
half  of  the  inspector-general's  small  corps  of  assist 
ants  having  taken  line  commissions  in  the  volunteer 
army ;  the  supplies  of  tentage,  transportation,  medi 
cines,  disinfectants,  and  camp  requisites  of  all  sorts 
were  sometimes  far  from  complete ;  and  the  inex 
perience  of  volunteer  officers  frequently  caused 
avoidable  discomfort  to  the  men  under  their  charge. 
Many  regimental  camps  were  not  properly  laid  out ; 
many  were  very  inadequately  policed. 

But  most  of  the  blame  must  rest  upon  the  sol 
diers  themselves.  Of  the  regulars,  perhaps,  it  was 
true,  as  a  foreign  officer  observed,  that  "  every  man 
looked  fit  to  command,"  and,  as  the  adjutant-general 
asserted,  that  the  force  put  into  the  field  was,  for  its 
size,  "  the  finest  army  the  world  had  ever  known  "  ; 
but  it  would  be  idle  to  deny  that  in  a  hasty  levy  of 
more  than  two  hundred  thousand  volunteers,  with 
the  age  limit  as  low  as  eighteen  years,  an  undesir 
able  element  was  present.  Even  a  casual  inspection 
of  some  of  the  camps — Camp  Black,  for  instance, 
the  chief  rendezvous  of  the  New  York  volunteers — 
was  enough  to  show  that  "  toughness "  was  too 
commonly  mistaken  for  soldierliness.  Surgeon- 

*  The  surgeon-general's  figures  are  4,760,  including  a  few  cases 
from  Tampa. 


330 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


General  Sternberg  points  out,  in  his  report,  that 
drunkenness  and  immorality  were  prominent  causes 
of  the  early  increase  of  sickness.  For  further  testi 
mony  on  this  unpleasant  subject  there  may  be  cited 
the  evidence  given  before  the  War  Investigation 
Commission  as  to  the  shockingly  unsanitary  habits 
of  the  troops  at  Camp  Thomas,  and  a  report  by 
Lieutenant  Miner,  of  the  navy,  on  the  condition 
of  some  of  the  transports  that  carried  volunteers 
from  San  Francisco  to  Manila.* 

*  On  one  vessel,  the  Valencia,  "the  army  officers  were  advised  to 
take  the  necessary  steps  to  preserve  cleanliness,  which  some  of  them 
attempted  to  do,  but  were  unable  to  carry  out.  The  bedding  soon  be 
came  unfit  for  use,  and  had  to  be  thrown  overboard.  The  troops  were 
not  clean  in  their  persons,  because  no  wise  bathing  regulations  were 
adopted,  and  the  regular  '  scrub  and  wash  clothes  '  was  unknown.  Lice 
and  other  vermin  were  rampant.  The  men  spit  on  the  deck,  threw 
waste  food  on  deck,  and  defecated  there  without  regard  to  the  expos 
tulations  of  the  officers  of  the  transport." 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE   PORTO    RICO    CAMPAIGN 

THE  Spanish  colony  of  Porto  Rico  had  figured 
in  the  early  war  plans.  General  Miles  had  sug 
gested  an  attack  upon  it  in  a  letter  dated  May  27th, 
and  on  June  6th  Secretary  Alger  telegraphed  to  him, 
at  Tampa : 

The  President  wants  to  know  the  earliest  moment  you 
can  have  an  expeditionary  force  ready  to  go  to  Porto  Rico 
large  enough  to  take  and  hold  island  without  the  force 
under  General  Shafter. 

Miles  replied  that  he  could  be  ready  in  ten  days 
— an  estimate  that  seems  decidedly  sanguine,  in 
view  of  the  experience  of  Shafter's  corps,  and  of  the 
lack  of  transports.  On  June  Qth  he  was  again  in 
formed  that  "  expedition  No.  2  must  be  organized 
as  rapidly  as  possible";  but  on  the  I5th  his 
preparations  were  interrupted  by  an  urgent  sum- 
.mons  to  Washington.  On  the  26th  a  new  plan  was 
formulated  :  General  Brooke  was  to  organize  a  corps 
from  Chickamauga  and  Camp  Alger,  for  ''operation 
against  the  enemy  in  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico " ; 
Shafter's  troops,  or  any  that  he  could  spare,  were  to 
join  it,  and  Miles  was  to  be  commander-in-chief. 
But  instead  of  detaching  part  of  his  force,  Shafter 
began  to  plead  for  reinforcements,  and  Miles  went 
to  Santiago,  where  his  share  in  the  last  days  of  the 
campaign  has  already  been  narrated. 

For  some  time  after  Sampson's  resultless  bom 
bardment  of  San  Juan  on  May  I2th,  Porto  Rico 
22  331 


332  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

scarcely  appeared  in  the  war  news.  On  June 
to  prevent  the  armed  ships  *  at  San  Juan  from 
attempting  to  molest  the  transports 
passing  between  the  United  States 
and  Santiago,  Admiral  Sampson  or 
dered  the  St.  Paul  and  the  Yosemite  to  blockade 
the  port.  Captain  Sigsbee  reached  his  station  first, 
on  the  morning  of  the  22d,  and  he  had  been  there 
only  a  few  hours  when  he  was  attacked  by  the 
Isabel  II  and  the  Terror. 

The  Spanish  vessels  had  been  ordered  to  drive 
the  St.  Paul  off,  and  the  bluff  above  the  harbour 
mouth  was  crowded  with  people  who  came  out  to 
see  the  fight.  The  Isabel  opened  an  entirely  ineffec 
tive  fire  at  long  range,  keeping  close  under  the  shore 
batteries.  The  Terror — whose  only  weapons  were 
her  torpedoes  and  two  small  guns,  her  twelve-pound 
rapid-firers  having  been  put  aboard  the  Maria 
Teresa  for  the  voyage  across  the  Atlantic,  and  left 
there  when  she  parted  company  with  Cervera — 
moved  eastward  along  shore,  to  get  out  of  the  Isa 
bel's  line  of  fire,  and  then  steamed  straight  at  the 
big  liner.  Such  an  attack  showed  more  pluck  than 
judgment.  At  night  it  might  have  succeeded ;  in 
the  daylight  the  St.  Paul's  five-inch  guns  were  not 
likely  to  let  her  come  within  striking  distance.  The 
two  ships  were  three  quarters  of  a  mile  apart  f  when 
a  shell  shattered  the  Terror's  steering  gear.  She 
veered  around,  practically  disabled,  and  another 
shot  went  clear  through  her,  killing  three  men, 


*  At  San  Juan  were  the  small  Spanish  cruiser  Isabel  II  (1,130  tons, 
a  sister  ship  to  the  Antonio  de  Ulloa  and  the  Juan  de  Austria,  de 
stroyed  by  Dewey  in  Manila  Bay),  the  torpedo-boat  destroyer  Terror, 
and  three  gunboats.  This  was  no  doubt  known  to  the  Navy  Depart 
ment,  which  had  an  agent— Ensign  H.  H.  Ward,  of  the  Bureau  of 
Navigation — in  the  city  during  June.  Ensign  Ward,  who  passed  as  an 
English  traveller,  was  arrested  on  suspicion  by  the  Spanish  authorities, 
but  was  released  on  the  demand  of  the  British  consul. 

f  According  to  the  account  of  the  engagement  given  by  her  captain, 
Lieutenant  de  la  Rocha,  to  Commander  Jacobsen,  of  the  German 
cruiser  Geier,  and  published  by  the  latter  in  the  Marine  Rundschau. 


THE   PORTO   RICO   CAMPAIGN 


333 


damaging  her  engines,  and  making  a  dangerous 
hole  in  her  side  just  below  the  water  line.  She 
was  barely  able  to  turn  and  get  back  into  the 
harbour,  where  she  was  run  aground  to  prevent 
her  sinking,  and  was  subsequently  under  repair  for 
a  month. 

During  the  same  afternoon  (June  22d)  the  Isabel 
appeared  again,  accompanied  by  a  gunboat,  appar 
ently  attempting  to  draw  the  St.  Paul  under  the 
shore  batteries — a  challenge  which  Captain  Sigsbee 
wisely  declined,  his  great  ship,  with  her  high  free 
board,  being  a  mark  that  even  Spanish  gunners 
might  have  found  an  easy  one. 

The  Yosemite  arrived  on  June  25th.  On  the  26th 
the  St.  Paul  started  for  New  York,  to  coal ;  and  on 
his  way  north  Captain  Sigsbee  called  at  Cape  Hai- 
tien  and  cabled  to  Washington  that  in  order  to 
blockade  San  Juan  effectively  a  "  considerable  force 
of  vessels  "  was  needed.  No  other  ships  could  be 
spared,  and  the  Yosemite,  manned  by  men  of  the 
Michigan  Naval  Reserve,  was  left  to  maintain  the 
blockade  alone.  On  June  28th  she  had  a  sharp  en 
gagement.  At  dawn  that  day  she  caught  the  Span 
ish  transport  Antonio  Lopez  attempting  to  steal  up 
to  the  harbour  entrance  from  the  west,  and  drove 
her  ashore.  The  Isabel  II  and  two  gunboats — prob 
ably  informed  of  the  Lopez's  approach  by  a  signal 
sent  along  the  coast — came  out  to  rescue  the  block 
ade  runner,  and  the  shore  batteries  also  opened  fire. 
The  odds  were  heavily  against  the  Yosemite,  but 
the  Spanish  gunners  could  not  hit  her,  and  a  long- 
range  artillery  duel  was  kept  up  for  four  hours,  end 
ing,  as  Commander  Emory  reported,  in  the  repulse 
of  the  enemy's  vessels,  without  any  injury  to  his 
ship. 

The  Yosemite  was  alone  off  San  Juan  for  three 
weeks ;  in  July  the  New  Orleans  was  sent  to  the 
station,  and  later  the  Amphitrite,  the  Cincinnati,  and 
some  other  men-of-war. 


334  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

On   July   2 1st,'  as   he   had   thirty-five   hundred 
troops  at  Guantanamo,  and  reinforcements  were  on 
their  way  from  Tampa  and  Charles- 
Miles  moves  on    t        General  Miles  decided  to  move 

Porto  Rico,  -r-.  -.^.  .  ,.„, 

juiy  21.  upon    Porto    Rico.      The    regiments 

with  him  were  the  Sixth  Massachu 
setts  and  the  Sixth  Illinois,  with  two  hundred  and 
seventy-five  recruits  ordered  to  join  Shafter's  corps, 
but  not  needed  at  Santiago;  Batteries  C  and  F  of 
the  Third  Artillery,  B  and  F  of  the  Fourth,  and  B 
of  the  Fifth;  and  detachments  of  engineers,  of  the 
signal  corps,  and  of  the  hospital  corps.  He  had 
requested  permission  to  take  the  marines  from  Playa 
del  Este,  but  the  Secretary  of  War  refused  it,  say 
ing  "  we  have  enough  army  for  our  work."  His 
troops  were  on  the  Columbia,  the  Yale,  and  seven 
transports,  and  as  a  convoy  Sampson  assigned  the 
Massachusetts,  the  Gloucester,  and  the  Dixie,  with 
Captain  Higginson  of  the  Massachusetts  as  senior 
naval  officer.  The  Cincinnati  was  also  ordered  from 
the  Havana  station  to  Porto  Rico.  The  admiral's 
hands  were  very  full  at  this  time,  with  almost  the 
whole  Cuban  coast  to  patrol,  and  with  some  of  his 
strongest  men-of-war  detached  for  service  in  Com 
modore  Watson's  Eastern  Squadron ;  and  he  had 
considered  that  with  Cervera's  fleet  destroyed  and 
San  Juan  blockaded,  the  Cincinnati  alone,  in  addi 
tion  to  the  guns  of  the  Columbia  and  the  Yale, 
would  be  a  sufficient  protection ;  but  at  Miles's  re 
quest,  and  finally  upon  the  President's  positive  order 
that  a  battle  ship  should  be  sent,  he  added  the  three 
vessels  mentioned. 

The  garrison  of  Porto  Rico  consisted,  according 
to  General  Miles's  report,  of  8,223  Spanish  regulars 
and  9,107  volunteers.  These  figures,  presumably, 
were  obtained  officially  after  the  surrender,  and  are 
accurate,  though  Commander  Jacobsen  gives  the 
Spanish  army  roll  of  January  I,  1898 — since  which 
time  it  seems  that  no  reinforcements  were  sent — 


THE   PORTO   RICO   CAMPAIGN 


335 


as  showing  7,002  regulars.  It  was  believed — quite 
correctly,  as  it  proved — that  the  volunteers  were  dis 
affected,  and  would  refuse  to  fight.  The  chief  mill- 


336  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

tary  stations,  besides  San  Juan,  were  Mayaguez,  in 
the  west ;  Ponce,  the  largest  city  in  the  island,  in  the 
south;  and  Guayama,  in  the  southeast;  but  since 
the  outbreak  of  war  the  Spanish  forces  had  been 
concentrated  in  San  Juan,  only  small  detachments 
remaining  elsewhere. 

The  port  of  Fajardo,  near  Cape  San  Juan,  at  the 
northeast  corner  of  the  island,  was  the  point  selected 
for  the  landing  of  the  expedition ;  but  on  the  way 
eastward  from  Guantanamo,  General  Miles  went  on 
board  of  the  Massachusetts  (July  23d)  and  told 
Captain  Higginson  that  he  preferred  to  make  for 
Guanica,  at  the  other  end  of  Porto  Rico,  in  the 
extreme  southwest.*  His  reasons  were  that  the 
enemy  was  likely  to  have  information  of  his  plans, 
and  to  be  prepared  to  resist  a  landing  at  Fajardo ; 
that  there  were  reported  to  be  no  defences  either  at 
Guanica  or  at  the  neighbouring  city  of  Ponce,  from 
which  a  fine  military  road  led  across  the  island  to 
San  Juan ;  and  that  he  would  find  there  plenty  of 
sugar  lighters,  which  he  could  use  in  taking  men 
and  material  ashore,  the  tugs  and  launches  promised 
him  from  Washington  having  failed  to  arrive,  f 
Captain  Higginson  at  first  demurred  on  the  ground 


*  It  has  been  stated  that  a  landing  at  Guanica  or  Ponce  was  really 
planned  from  the  first,  Fajardo  being  mentioned  merely  as  a  ruse  ;  but 
such  does  not  seem  to  have  been  the  case.  On  July  i8th  Miles  tele 
graphed  to  Washington  that  Sampson  and  himself  had  agreed  upon 
Cape  San  Juan  (presumably  meaning  Fajardo).  On  the  same  day  he 
received  a  despatch — the  result  of  a  conference  between  the  President 
and  Secretaries  Alger  and  Long— authorizing  him  to  use  his  own  dis 
cretion  in  the  matter.  On  July  26th,  just  before  his  report  of  the  cap 
ture  of  Guanica  reached  Washington,  the  Secretary  of  War  sent  him  a 
telegram  that  shows  surprise,  if  not  disapproval : 

"  Conflicting  reports  here  as  to  your  place  of  landing.  Why  did 
you  change  ?  Doraco  TDorado],  fifteen  miles  west  of  San  Juan,  is  re 
ported  an  excellent  place  to  land.  Did  you  leave  ships  to  direct  Schwan 
and  Wilson,  now  en  route,  where  to  find  you  ? " 

Miles  replied  with  a  despatch  stating  at  length  his  reasons  for  pre 
ferring  Guanica  to  Fajardo. 

t  General  Miles  received  valuable  information  about  Porto  Rico 
from  Lieutenant  H.  H.  Whitney,  of  the  Fourth  Artillery,  who  during 
May  spent  two  weeks  in  the  southern  part  of  the  island,  travelling  in 
disguise,  and  who  now  returned  there  on  Miles's  staff. 


THE   PORTO   RICO  CAMPAIGN  337 

that  the  harbour  at  Guanica  was  too  shallow  for  the 
heavier  ships,  and  that  the  southern  coast  was  less 
convenient  for  coaling,  and  less  sheltered  from  the 
prevailing  winds;  but  he  finally  waived  his  objec 
tions,  and  after  passing  Haiti  the  fleet  turned  south 
ward  by  the  Mona  Passage,  detaching  the  Dixie  to 
summon  any  ships  that  might  go  to  the  abandoned 
rendezvous  near  Cape  San  Juan. 

Guanica  was  reached  at  sunrise  on  July  25th, 

and  Lieutenant-Commander  Wainwright  took  the 

Gloucester   into   the   harbour,   scorn- 

nicadju*  *a°U> '  ing  th.e  P°ssible  dangers  of  unknown 
batteries  or  torpedoes.  A  landing 
party  of  thirty  men,  under  Lieutenant  Huse,  execu 
tive  officer  of  the  Gloucester,  went  ashore  and 
hoisted  the  Stars  and  Stripes.  At  this  a  few  shots 
came  from  the  outskirts  of  the  village,  and  a  country 
man — the  only  male  inhabitant  who  had  not  fled 
at  sight  of  the  American  ships — told  the  lieutenant 
that  the  garrison  of  Guanica,  thirty  Spanish  regulars, 
had  sought  shelter  in  the  bushes,  after  telegraphing 
to  Yauco  for  reinforcements.  Huse  barricaded  the 
road  leading  inland,  and  a  little  later,  when  a  small 
body  of  mounted  troops  appeared,  a  few  shots  from 
the  Gloucester's  three-pounders  drove  them  off. 

By  this  time  the  transports  had  followed  the 
Gloucester  into  the  bay,  and  the  soldiers  were  land 
ing  in  boats  from  the  ships  and  in  some  lighters 
found  in  the  harbour  and  promptly  seized.  The  vil 
lage  was  occupied  without  further  resistance,  and  at 
daylight  next  morning  (July  26th)  General  Garret- 
son,  with  six  companies  of  the  Sixth  Massachusetts 
and  one  of  the  Sixth  Illinois,  moved  upon  Yauco, 
about  four  miles  inland.  At  the  hacienda  of  Santa 
Desidera  they  encountered  a  Spanish  force,  which 
opened  a  brisk  fusillade,  and  there  was  a  moment  of 
confusion  among  three  companies  of  the  Massa 
chusetts  men  whom  Garretson  had  posted,  as  a  re 
serve,  in  a  hollow  that  proved  to  be  unsheltered  from 


338  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

the  enemy's  fire.  They  were  soon  rallied,  however, 
the  advance  was  continued,  and  the  Spaniards  re 
treated,  leaving  the  road  to  Ponce  open.  The 
American  loss  in  the  skirmish  was  four  men 
wounded,  all  in  the  Massachusetts  regiment ;  their 
antagonists  had  two  killed  and  eighteen  wounded. 

On  the  morning  of  the  27th  the  Wasp  and  the 
Annapolis  joined  Captain  Higginson's  squadron, 
and  Major-General  Wilson  and  Brigadier-General 
Ernst  arrived  from  Charleston  with  the  latter's  bri 
gade,  which  included  the  Second  Wisconsin,  the 
Third  Wisconsin,  and  the  Sixteenth  Pennsylvania. 
The  troops  were  not  landed  at  Guanica,  as  Miles  was 
now  ready  to  take  and  hold  Ponce,  a  point  of  im 
portance  in  itself,  and  a  better  base  for  his  move 
ment  upon  San  Juan. 

It  fell  to  Commander  Davis,  of  the  Dixie,  to  re 
ceive  the  surrender  of  Ponce  and  of  its  port,  La 
Playa.  With  the  Annapolis  and  the 

WaSP>  the  DLxie  anch°red  in  the  har" 

bour  before  sunset  that  same  day  (July 
27th).  Lieutenant  Merriam,  who  was  sent  ashore, 
found  that  the  garrison  of  La  Playa  had  fled,  leaving 
no  one  with  whom  he  could  deal ;  but  the  British  and 
German  consuls  came  down  from  Ponce,  with  some 
representatives  of  mercantile  interests,  and  through 
their  mediation  the  comandante,  Colonel  San  Martin, 
surrendered  the  city  to  Commander  Davis,  on  con 
dition  that  he  should  be  allowed  to  retreat  unmo 
lested  with  his  soldiers — who  numbered  about  three 
hundred,  besides  forty  or  fifty  sick  men  who  were 
left  behind.  He  could  have  done  nothing  else ;  the 
Dixie  alone,  with  her  guns  trained  on  his  defence 
less  city,  was  a  sufficient  argument  for  capitulation, 
without  considering  the  overwhelming  force  close 
behind  her ;  yet  it  was  the  luckless  colonel's  fate  to 
be  a  scapegoat  for  Spain's  resentment  of  her  mis 
fortunes.  On  reaching  San  Juan  he  was  arrested 
and  court-martialed  by  Captain-General  Macias,  and 


THE   PORTO   RICO   CAMPAIGN 


339 


sentenced  to  death  for  giving  up  Ponce  without 
resistance.  Upon  the  intercession  of  General 
Brooke  and  other  American  officers,  his  punish 
ment  was  subsequently  commuted  to  life  imprison 
ment,  and  it  is  understood  that  he  was  sent  to  the 
Spanish  convict  station  at  Ceuta,  in  Morocco. 

The  transports  came  into  the  harbour  of  Ponce 
early  on  the  28th,  and  the  army  took  possession  of 
the  city.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  they  were  received 
with  a  general  display  of  friendliness  by  the  natives. 
General  Miles  issued  a  proclamation,  setting  forth 
in  somewhat  flowery  periods  that  the  American 
forces  were  in  Porto  Rico  "  in  the  cause  of  liberty, 
justice,  and  humanity,"  and  "  bearing  the  flag  of 
freedom ; "  that  they  represented  "  the  fostering 
arm  of  a  nation  of  free  people,  whose  greatest  power 
is  in  its  justice  and  humanity  to  all  those  living 
within  its  fold.  Hence,"  the  general  added,  "  the 
first  effect  of  this  occupation  will  be  the  immediate 
release  from  your  former  political  relations,  and,  it  is 
hoped,  a  cheerful  acceptance  of  the  Government  of 
the  United  States."  General  Wilson  was  appointed 
military  governor  of  Ponce,  and  Captain  Chester, 
of  the  Cincinnati,  captain  of  the  port. 

General  Miles  had  declined  to  consider  himself 
bound  by  Commander  Davis's  agreement  that  there 
should  be  no  pursuit  of  the  withdrawing  Spaniards 
for  forty-eight  hours,  but  he  made  no  immediate 
movement.  With  this  firm  foothold  in  the  south 
west  of  the  island,  he  waited  for  the 
troops  he  needed  to  advance  in  force. 
Ihey  came  on  the  3ist,  when  Briga 
dier-General  Schwan  arrived  from  Tampa  with  the 
Eleventh  and  the  Nineteenth  Infantry,  a  troop  of 
the  Second  Cavalry,  and  two  batteries  of  the  Sev 
enth  Artillery;  and  Major-General  Brooke  and 
Brigadier-General  Hains  brought  nearly  six  thou 
sand  men  from  Newport  News,  including  the  Third 
Illinois,  the  Fourth  Ohio,  the  Fourth  Pennsylvania, 


340 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


a  company  of  the  Eighth  Infantry,  a  troop  of  the 
Sixth  Cavalry,  the  Philadelphia  City  Troop,  Troops 
A  and  C,  New  York  Cavalry,  and  Rodney's  bat 
talion  of  artillery.  One  of  Schwan's  transports  had 
an  adventure  en  route.  .She  was  chased  by  the 
Eagle  off  the  Cuban  coast,  and  as  her  captain 
ignored  Lieutenant  Southerland's  signals  and 
warning  shots  she  narrowly  escaped  being  fired  on. 

Miles's  plan  of  campaign  now  began  to  disclose 
itself.  At  Ponce  he  had  before  him  a  fine  highway 
running  through  Coamo  and  across  the  centre  of 
the  island  for  seventy  miles  to  San  Juan.  General 
Brooke's  division  was  carried  eastward  on  its  trans 
ports  to  Arroyo,  which  surrendered  to  Captain 
Goodrich,  on  the  Gloucester,  on  August  1st.  Land 
ing  there,  Brooke  was  to  rnarch  by  Guayama  to 
reach  the  San  Juan  road  at  Cayey.  Schwan,  mean 
while,  was  ordered  to  go  ashore  at  Guanica  and 
move  around  the  western  end  of  Porto  Rieo,  by 
way  of  San  German  and  Mayaguez.  Henry  and 
Garretson — with  General  Stone,  famous  as  a  road 
builder,  to  make  a  practicable  highway  out  of  a  neg 
lected  trail  across  the  hills — headed  straight  across 
the  centre  of  the  island,  by  Ad  juntas  and  Utuado, 
to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  any  Spanish  forces  dis 
lodged  by  Schwan.  All  four  columns  were  to 
converge  upon  San  Juan,  where  the  Spaniards 
were  likely  to  make  their  last  stand,  and  where 
the  final  blow  could  be  struck  by  army  and  navy 
together. 

The  story  of  the  Porto  Rico  campaign  recalls 
the  proverb  which  says  that  the  happiest  nation  is 
the  one  that  has  the  least  history.  Its  brief  annals 
are  not  lengthened  by  any  record  of  sufferings  and 
difficulties  like  those  that  made  the  story  of  San 
tiago.  General  Miles's  well-laid  plans  were  car 
ried  out  with  almost  clocklike  precision,  and  in  the 
nineteen  days  between  the  landing  at  Guanica  and 
the  end  of  the  war  his  four  advancing  columns  occu- 


THE   PORTO   RICO   CAMPAIGN 


341 


pied  about  one  third  of  the  island,  with  the  insig 
nificant  loss  of  three  men  killed  and  forty  wounded. 

General  Schwan,  with  the  westernmost  column 
— consisting  of  the  Eleventh  Infantry  (Colonel  De 
Russy),  Troop  A  of  the  Fifth  Cavalry,  a  battery  of 
Catling  guns,  and  two  of  field  artillery,  a  total  of 
1,447  men,  with  a  few  native  guides — left  Yauco  on 
August  Qth.  At  San  German,  which  was  reached 
next  morning,  he  heard  that  the  garrison  of  Maya- 
guez — eleven  hundred  Spanish  regulars  of  the 
Alfonso  XIII  regiment,  commanded  by  Colonel 
Soto,  and  a  few  volunteers — was  coming  out  to 
meet  him. 

Moving  on  down  the  valley  of  the  Rio  Grande, 

the    American    advance    guard    encountered    the 

enemy    at    Hormiguero,    about    four 

The  fight  at         miles    from    Mayaguez.       Here    the 

Hormiguero,  c  •       j  j  1  -11    -J 

Aug.  10.  bpamards  were  posted  on  a  hillside 

commanding  the  valley,  and  their  fire 
caused  a  few  casualties  while  Schwan's  men  were 
discovering  their  position  and  deploying  for  an 
attack.  Turning  into  the  fields  on  both  sides  of 
the  road — planted  with  sugar  cane,  and  intersected 
by  creeks  and  wire  fences — the  American  soldiers 
pushed  steadily  forward;  the  Catling  guns,  under 
Lieutenant  Maginnis  of  the  Eleventh,  moved  with 
the  firing  line,  and  the  artillery  was  brought  to  bear 
from  the  foothills.  The  Spaniards,  who  had  the 
advantage  of  position,  but  were  outnumbered  and 
had  no  guns,  made  a  feeble  resistance  and  a  pre 
cipitate  retreat.  Schwan's  losses  in  the  skirmish 
were  one  man  killed  and  sixteen  wounded;  the 
enemy's  he  estimated  at  fifty  killed  and  wounded. 
Early  next  day  (August  nth)  the  American 
troops  entered  Mayaguez,  a  city  of  22,000  people, 
and  the  chief  seaport  on  the  west  coast  of  Porto 
Rico.  The  inhabitants  received  them  with  every 
demonstration  of  satisfaction.  The  garrison  had 
retreated  by  a  road  running  inland  toward  Lares, 


342 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


and  Schwairs  first  intention  was  to  hurry  on  in 
pursuit;  but  the  settlement  of  affairs  in  Mayaguez 
demanded  attention ;  his  men  were  tired,  the  roads 
were  poor,  and  drenching  rains  helped  to  make 
operations  difficult.  He  decided  to  send  out  a  fly 
ing  column,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Burke,  of 
the  Eleventh,  to  follow  the  enemy. 

With  seven  hundred  men — six  companies  of  his 
regiment,  a  platoon  of  cavalry,  and  another  of 
artillery — Burke  set  out  on  the  morning  of  the  I2th. 
That  night,  after  pushing  all  day  along  a  road 
that  climbed  into  the  mountains,  he  had  bivouacked 
in  the  trail,  when  news  reached  him  that  the  Span 
iards  had  assembled  from  one  to  two  thousand  men 
at  Las  Marias,  and  were  preparing  to  make  a  stand. 
He  sent  a  courier  back  to  General  Schwan  with  this 
information,  adding  that  he  proposed  to  move  for 
ward  at  daybreak  and  attack  the  enemy. 

Fearing  that  Burke's  force  might  be  inadequate, 
Schwan  promptly  hurried  after  him  with  the  cavalry 
troop,  ordering  Colonel  De  Russy  to  follow  as 
rapidly  as  possible  with  the  rest  of  the  brigade.  He 
found  the  advance  guard  drawn  up  on  the  crest  of 
a  ridge,  firing  upon  the  Spaniards,  who  held  the 
opposite  hill  and  were  scattered  in  the  valley  be 
tween.  Through  the  valley  ran  a  swift  and  deep 
mountain  torrent,  the  Rio  Prieto,  which  most  of 
Colonel  Soto's  men  had  crossed,  but  some  had  been 
unable  to  cross.  After  a  brisk  exchange  of  shots, 
the  main  body  continued  its  retreat,  leaving  the 
rear  guard,  utterly  disorganized,  to  hide  in  the 
woods,  where  forty  prisoners  were  rounded  up  by 
the  American  cavalry.  Colonel  Soto  was  found  in 
a  peasant's  cottage,  disabled  by  an  injury ;  his  sec 
ond  in  command  was  also  among  the  prisoners. 

Schwan  was  ready  to  move  on  early  the  next 
morning  (Sunday,  August  I4th)  to  attack  Lares — 
which  would  no  doubt  have  proved  easy  prey — 
when  he  received  word  that  the  peace  protocol  had 


THE   PORTO   RICO  CAMPAIGN 


343 


been  signed  the  day  before,  and  he  had  to  recall 
his  orders  for  an  advance.  "  No  troops,"  he  says, 
"  ever  suspended  with  a  worse  grace." 

No  fighting  at  all  fell  to  Garretson's  brigade, 
which,  with  General  Henry  as  division  commander, 
left  Ponce  on  August  8th.  Its  move- 
£denry"c°oiumn.  ments  were  slower  than  Henry  had  an 
ticipated.  He  had  nothing  but  ox  carts 
to  carry  his  supplies  through  a  hilly  country  where 
pack  trains  would  have  given  better  service.  Be 
sides  a  battalion  of  the  Nineteenth  Infantry  and  a 
small  mounted  detachment — Troop  A,  of  the  Sec 
ond  Cavalry — his  force  consisted  of  two  unseasoned 
volunteer  regiments,  the  Sixth  Illinois  and  the  Sixth 
Massachusetts.  The  discipline  of  the  latter  had 
been  unsatisfactory  both  in  the  skirmish  of  July  26th 
before  Yauco  and  during  the  march  to  Ponce.  At 
Ponce  several  of  the  officers,  who  had  been  ordered 
before  a  board  of  inquiry,  resigned  their  commis 
sions,  and  since  then  its  morale  had  improved ;  but 
on  the  first  day's  march  northward  Henry  reports 
that  there  was  much  straggling  in  the  brigade, 
"  new  shoes  being  the  alleged  cause."  Only  nine 
miles  were  covered  on  the  8th,  and  the  troops  did 
not  reach  Adjuntas  until  August  loth.  On  the  I3th, 
when  the  order  to  discontinue  hostilities  came, 
Henry  was  at  Utuado  with  his  regulars  and  two 
battalions  of  the  Massachusetts  men,  preparing  to 
advance  upon  Arecibo,  where  there  was  a  small 
body  of  Spaniards ;  Garretson,  with  the  rest  of  the 
brigade,  was  still  at  Adjuntas. 

Meanwhile,  after  some  delay  in  the  landing  of 
the  necessary  supplies  and  material  at  Ponce, 
Ernst's  brigade — the  Sixteenth  Pennsylvania  (Colo 
nel  Hulings),  the  Second  Wisconsin  (Colonel 
Born),  and  the  Third  Wisconsin  (Colonel  Moore), 
with  two  batteries,  Potts's  and  Anderson's,  both 
commanded  by  Major  Lancaster — had  advanced 
along  the  main  highway  across  the  island,  running 


344  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

eastward  and  northward  to  San  Juan.  Before  leav 
ing  Ponce  the  volunteers  exchanged  their  Spring 
field  rifles  for  Krag-Jorgensens.  The  Pennsyl 
vania  regiment  led  the  advance,  and  its  reconnoi 
tring  parties  came  into  conflict  with  the  outposts  of 
the  Spaniards,  who  were  falling  back  slowly.  On 
August  8th  General  Ernst,  with  the  rest  of  the  bri 
gade,  passed  the  Pennsylvanians,  and  camped 
within  four  miles  of  Coamo. 

General  Wilson,  the  division  commander,  came 
out  from  Ponce  on  the  previous  afternoon  (August 
7th).  From  deserters  and  friendly  natives  he  had 
full  information  of  the  Spaniards'  movements.  They 
were  preparing  to  meet  him  near  Aibonito,  at  the 
highest  point  on  the  road,  where  it  crosses  the 
mountain  ridge  that  parallels  the  south  coast  of  the 
island.  Here  they  had  some  two  thousand  troops 
in  a  strong  natural  position,  which  they  were  further 
strengthening  with  batteries  and  intrenchments. 
At  Coamo,  where  the  road  first  reaches  the  hills, 
was  an  outpost  held  by  about  three  hundred  men. 
This,  too,  was  a  strong  position,  not  to  be  taken  by 
direct  assault  without  risk  of  serious  loss,  and  Gen 
eral  Wilson  planned  a  turning  movement. 

On   the   evening  of  the   8th  the   Pennsylvania 

regiment  moved  out  from  the  rear  and  struck  into 

a  hill  trail  north  of  the  road,  which 

The  action  at  i       j      i  •          1     1  T  • 

Coamo,  July  9.  had  been  reconnoitred  by  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  Biddle  and  other  staff 
officers.  After  bivouacking  in  the  hills,  the  march 
— a  rough  and  difficult  journey  of  about  a  dozen 
miles — was  resumed  before  daybreak,  and  at  eight 
o'clock  next  morning  Colonel  Hulings's  men 
reached  a  point  commanding  the  San  Juan  road  in 
the  rear  of  Coamo.  The  Spaniards  were  already 
retreating,  Major  Lancaster's  guns  having  opened 
upon  them  in  front.  A  few  escaped  toward  Aibo 
nito,  but  their  commander,  Major  Martinez,  who  ex 
posed  himself  with  reckless  gallantry,  was  shot  down, 


THE   PORTO   RICO   CAMPAIGN  345 

and  after  returning  the  Pennsylvanians'  fire  till  their 
position  was  evidently  hopeless,  the  main  body  gave 
up  the  fight,  waving  hats  and  handkerchiefs  in 
token  of  surrender.  The  Pennsylvanians,  who  had 
had  the  fight  practically  to  themselves,  marched 
back  into  Coamo  with  two  hundred  and  one  pris 
oners.  Their  loss  was  only  six  wounded ;  the  Span 
iards  had  seven  killed  and  sixtynine  wounded.* 

A  bridge  over  a  deep  ravine  before  Coamo  had 
been  destroyed,  but  General  Wilson  saved  several 
others  on  the  road  to  Aibonito  by  sending  out  a 
mounted  detachment — Troop  C  of  the  New  York 
cavalry,  under  Captain  Clayton — in  prompt  pursuit 
of  the  fleeing  enemy.  Five  and  a  half  miles  beyond 
Coamo  the  troopers  came  under  fire  from  the  Span 
ish  batteries  on  the  hill  of  Asomanta,  commanding 
the  highway  where  it  winds  up  to  the  summit  of  the 
divide,  over  which  it  passes  to  the  village  of  Aibo 
nito;  and  here  the  American  cavalrymen  were 
ordered  to  remain  as  an  outpost. 

During  the  loth  and  nth  General  Wilson  was 

bringing    up    his    forces    and    reconnoitring.      He 

found    a    serious    task    before    him. 

The  span-  The  Spaniards'  position  gave  them  a 

lards' stand  at  •  r  i  ,1  ,  1 

Aibonito.  plunging   fire    down   the    steep   road, 

and  the  American  artillery  could  not 
be  brought  to  bear  except  with  the  disadvantage  of 
firing  from  points  several  hundred  feet  lower  than 
the  enemy's  guns.  On  both  sides  of  the  road  the 
ground  was  broken  by  deep  and  precipitous  ravines. 
Nevertheless  General  Wilson  decided  that  another 
flanking  movement  was  practicable,  and  ordered 
Ernst  to  be  ready,  on  the  morning  of  the  I3th,  to 
take  a  mountain  trail  branching  to  the  left  and  run- 


*  In  his  official  report  of  the  action,  dated  Coamo,  August  10,  1898, 
Colonel  (now  Brigadier-General)  Hulings  stated  the  Spanish  loss  as  6 
killed,  40  wounded,  and  167  prisoners.  In  a  personal  statement  to  the 
writer  he  substitutes  the  figures  given  above,  saying  that  men  were 
found  later  among  the  houses  in  the  village. 


346 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


ning  westward  and  northward  over  the  divide  to 
Barranquito,  whence  Aibonito  could  be  taken  in 
the  rear. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  I2th,  to  engage  the  Span 
iards'  attention  and  develop  their  strength,  Major 
Lancaster  took  a  field  battery  to  a  hilltop  on  the 
left  of  the  road  and  opened  fire  upon  the  works  on 
the  hill  of  Asomanta.  At  first  the  Spanish  guns 
replied  feebly,  and  Major  Lancaster  thought  he 
had  silenced  them ;  but  after  an  hour's  firing,  when 
his  ammunition  was  running  low,  the  enemy  ap 
parently  received  reinforcements,  and  he  found  his 
battery  the  target  of  a  hail  of  shells  and  bullets,  his 
smoke  powder  helping  the  Spaniards  to  get  his 
range.  His  position  was  evidently  untenable,  and 
the  guns  were  withdrawn,  Lieutenant  Hains,  who 
commanded  one  of  them,  being  shot  through  the 
body,  and  the  battery's  whole  loss  being  one  man 
killed  and  six  wounded,  one  mortally. 

Knowing  that  he  might  at  any  moment  receive 
news  of  an  armistice,  General  Wilson  delayed 
Ernst's  flanking  movement  and  sent  a  flag  of  truce 
to  the  Spanish  lines  with  a  demand  for  surrender. 
The  message  was  forwarded  to  San  Juan,  to  the 
captain-general,  whose  reply,  received  early  the 
next  morning  (August  I3th)  was  a  curt  refusal ;  and 
Ernst  was  on  the  point  of  starting  when  General 
Miles  telegraphed  from  Ponce  the  order  to  suspend 
operations. 

General  Brooke's  advance,  too,  was  halted  at  the 

very  moment  when  a  sharp  fight  was  imminent. 

His    disembarkation    at   Arroyo   was 

Brooke's  ad-         slow,  there  being  no  wharf  and  few 

vance  from  available  boats,  and  two  of  his  trans- 
Arroyo. 

ports     being     delayed     by     running 

aground  at  Ponce.  On  August  5th  the  infantry  was 
ready  to  move,  and  that  morning  General  Hains 
marched  upon  Guayama  with  the  Fourth  Ohio 
(Colonel  Coit)  and  the  Third  Illinois  (Colonel  Ben- 


THE   PORTO   RICO   CAMPAIGN 


347 


nitt),  the  former  leading  the  way.  About  a  mile 
from  the  town  the  Ohioans  encountered  a  small 
number  of  Spaniards,  who  fired  a  few  shots  and 
retreated  through  Guayama,  of  which  the  Ameri 
cans  took  possession.  Just  beyond  the  town,  on  the 
road  to  Cayey,  there  was  another  skirmish,  the 
enemy  being  dispersed  again  by  the  Ohio  regi 
ment's  dynamite  guns. 

No  further  advance  was  made  till  the  8th,  when 
General  Hains  ordered  a  company  of  the  Fourth 
Ohio  to  reconnoitre  toward  Cayey.  Colonel  Coit 
took  two  companies,  and  three  miles  out  they  came 
under  a  sharp  fire  from  Spaniards  posted  on  a  hill 
commanding  the  road,  near  the  village  of  Pablo 
Vasquez.  The  enemy  had  the  range  accurately, 
and  the  reconnoitring  party  could  do  nothing  but 
seek  shelter  and  then  fall  back,  which  they  did  with 
five  men  wounded.  They  met  the  rest  of  the  regi 
ment,  with  the  dynamite  guns,  hurrying  out  to  sup 
port  them,  an  alarming  report  of  disaster  having 
reached  Guayama. 

Again  General  Brooke  was  forced  to  wait,  in 
order  to  get  his  cavalry  and  artillery  ashore  and  to 
the  front.  On  the  I2th  he  issued  orders  for  an 
attack,  his  plan  being  to  threaten  the  Spanish  posi 
tion  with  the  Third  Illinois,  a  battalion  of  the  Fourth 
Pennsylvania,  and  a  couple  of  batteries,  while  Gen 
eral  Hains,  with  the  Fourth  Ohio,  marched  north 
ward  into  the  hills  to  take  it  in  the  rear.  Hains 
set  out  early  next  morning,  and  was  close  upon  the 
enemy — who  would  seemingly  have  been  taken  by 
surprise,  and  could  scarcely  have  escaped  capture, 
Brooke's  guns  being  ready  to  open  fire  upon  them 
in  front — when  a  staff  officer  overtook  him  with 
news  of  the  signing  of  the  protocol. 

The  navy,  which  had  opened  the  way  for  Miles's 
troops  at  Guanica,  at  Ponce,  and  at  Arroyo,  con 
ducted  practically  no  offensive  operations  during 
the  last  days  of  the  campaign.  It  made  a  small 
23 


348  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

diversion  by  sending  ashore  thirty-five  sailors  and 
marines  from  the  Amphitrite  at  Cape  San  Juan, 
on  August  6th.  The  landing  party,  commanded  by 
Lieutenant  Atwater,  occupied  the  Cape  San  Juan 
lighthouse,  and  defended  it  against  a  night  attack 
by  some  one  hundred  and  twenty  Spanish  mounted 
infantry ;  but  on  the  Qth,  as  the  advantage  of  hold 
ing  the  place  seemed  slight,  Captain  Barclay  with 
drew  his  men.  They  had  suffered  no  casualties, 
except  the  fatal  wounding  of  Naval  Cadet  Board- 
man  by  the  accidental  discharge  of  a  revolver. 

A  reason  for  the  comparative  inaction  of  the 
navy  may  possibly  be  found  in  certain  despatches 
which  General  Miles  sent  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 
One  was  dated  from  Ponce,  August  9th : 

I  am  informed  the  naval  vessels  at  this  place  have  been 
ordered  round  to  San  Juan.  In  order  that  there  may  be 
no  conflict  of  authority  I  request  that  no  aggressive  action 
be  taken  against  that  place,  that  no  landings  be  made,  or 
communication  held  with  the  Spanish  officials  or  forces 
on  this  island  by  the  navy. 

And  on  the  following  day  the  general  telegraphed 
to  Secretary  Alger :  * 

I  am  fully  convinced  that  Sampson  has  sent  orders  to 
the  commander  of  this  fleet,  as  soon  as  army  leaves  south 
coast,  to  take  his  fleet,  go  round  to  San  Juan,  and  demand 
the  surrender  of  the  capital  or  bombard  the  city,  and  not 
to  waste  ammunition  on  any  of  the  batteries.  First,  to 
bombard  a  city  containing  innocent  women  and  children 
would  be  a  violation  of  the  first  order  of  the  President. 
Second,  it  is  an  interference  with  the  work  given  the 
army  by  the  President.  I  ask  that  any  such  action  be 
suspended.  After  we  have  raised  the  flag  over  all  the  prin 
cipal  cities  and  arrived  at  San  Juan,  any  aid  by  the  navy 
against  land  batteries,  intrenchments,  or  fortifications 
would  be  advisable,  but  not  against  a  city  of  non-combat 
ants.  The  control  of  all  military  affairs  on  the  land  of  this 
island  can  safely  be  left  to  the  army. 

*  This  despatch  is  not  among;  those  published  by  the  War  Depart 
ment,  but  it  appeared  in  the  New  York  Sun,  July  3,  1899,  and  is  pre 
sumably  authentic. 


THE   PORTO   RICO   CAMPAIGN 


349 


It  is  only  natural  that  General  Miles  should 
have  been  anxious  to  finish  his  well-planned  cam 
paign  with  his  own  forces,  but  these  letters  cer 
tainly  show  professional  jealousy  carried  to  an  ex 
treme. 

Commander  Davis,  of  the  Dixie,  submitted  to 
Sampson,  on  August  2d,  a  plan  for  taking  San 
Juan  by  a  bombardment  from  the  ocean  front  and 
by  landing  marines  and  light  guns  at  the  eastern 
end  of  the  island  on  which  the  city  lies ;  and  it  can 
hardly  be  doubted  that  Sampson  would  have  been 
willing  to  sanction  the  attack,  which  would  have 
been  tolerably  sure  of  success. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE    MANILA    CAMPAIGN 

LIKE  the  invasion  of  Porto  Rico,  the  campaign 
which  completed  Dewey's  triumph  in  Manila  Bay 
by  forcing  the  surrender  of  the  Philippine  capital 
involved  little  actual  righting ;  but  it  was  interesting 
in  a  military  sense,  from  the  novelty  and  the  dif 
ficulty  of  the  work  it  set  before  the  American  army, 
and  its  political  importance  was  still  more  momen 
tous.  It  marked,  indeed,  a  new  era  of  history  for 
the  United  States,  setting  its  flag  over  a  great  em 
pire  in  the  eastern  hemisphere,  and  making  it  no 
longer  an  American  power  merely,  but  a  world 
power. 

Very  few  Americans,  even  among  those  in  au 
thority  at  Washington,  realized  this  in  the  early 
days  of  May,  1898,  when  hurried  preparations  to 
follow  up  Dewey's  victory  were  afoot.  The  irre 
sistible  logic  of  events — destiny,  if  the  term  be  pre 
ferred — was  swiftly  making  obsolete  the  policy  that 
had  guided  American  statesmanship  for  more  than 
a  century ;  yet  it  is  hard  to  single  out  any  precise 
point  as  that  of  the  new  departure,  or,  indeed,  any 
point  at  which  it  was  feasible  to  halt  or  turn  back. 
Dewey's  instructions  (cabled  from  Washington  on 
April  24th)  were  to  "  commence  operations,  particu 
larly  against  the  Spanish  fleet."  A  previous  tele 
gram  (February  25th)  warned  him  that  in  case  of 
war  his  duty  would  be  "  offensive  operations  in 
35o 


THE    MANILA   CAMPAIGN  35! 

Philippine  Islands."  No  despatch,  or  at  least  no 
published  despatch,  gave  any  more  explicit  order 
for  an  attack  upon  Manila,  and  the  conquest  of  the 
islands  can  hardly  have  been  a  long-preconceived 
plan  of  the  Administration  that  stood  committed  to 
a  declaration  that  by  the  American  code  of  morality 
the  annexation  of  another  power's  territory  would 
be  "  criminal  aggression."  *  Yet  to  destroy  Spain's 
fleet  and  leave  her  land  forces  at  the  mercy  of  the 
insurgents,  to  shatter  her  power  without  replacing 
it  with  any  other  constituted  authority,  would  have 
been  a  disaster  to  civilization. 

That  a  land  campaign  in  the  Philippines  had  not 
been  reckoned  among  the  probable  developments  of 
the  war  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  during  April  the 
whole  military  resources  of  the  United  States  had 
been  concentrated  in  the  East  and  South,  the  Pa 
cific  coast  being  practically  stripped  of  men  and 
material.  General  Shafter,  commanding  the  De 
partment  of  California,  had  gone  to  Tampa  with  his 
whole  staff  and  most  of  the  troops  of  his  com 
mand,  leaving  only  the  Fourteenth  Infantry  (Colo 
nel  Thomas  M.  Anderson,  then  stationed  in  Alaska) 
and  part  of  the  Third  Artillery  (Colonel  Marcus  P. 
Miller),  the  latter  a  force  quite  insufficient  to  man 
the  defences  of  San  Francisco. 

On  May  7th,  with  Dewey's  first  announcement 
of  his  victory,  there  came  another  despatch  saying : 

I  control  bay  completely  and  can  take  city  at  any  time, 
but  I  have  not  sufficient  men  to  hold.  .  .  .  Will  ammuni 
tion  be  sent? 

Secretary  Long  immediately  replied : 

The  Charleston  will  leave  at  once  with  what  ammuni 
tion  she  can  carry.  Pacific  Mail  Steamship  Company's 
steamer  Peking  will  follow  with  ammunition  and  supplies. 
Will  take  troops  unless  you  telegraph  otherwise.  How 
many  will  you  require? 

*  President  McKinley's  message  to  Congress,  December  6,  1897. 


352  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Dewey's  answer  went  from  Cavite  on  May  I3th, 
and  from  Hong-Kong  two  days  later : 

I  believe  the  Spanish  governor-general  will  be  obliged 
to  surrender  soon.  I  can  take  Manila  at  any  moment.  To 
retain  possession  and  thus  control  Philippine  Islands 
would  require,  in  my  best  judgment,  well-equipped  force 
of  five  thousand  men.  .  .  .  Spanish  force  is  estimated  ten 
thousand  men.  The  rebels  are  reported  thirty  thousand. 

With  such  an  estimate  of  the  situation — by  no 
means  an  accurate  one — coming  from  the  admiral, 
it  is  not  strange  that  in  the  United  States  there 
should  have  been  divergent  opinions  as  to  the  task 
an  army  expedition  would  have  to  face  and  the  force 
it  would  require.  General  Miles  seems  to  have  been 
the  first  to  formulate  a  plan  of  operation.  On  May 
3d,  when  Dewey's  victory  was  known,  though  not 
officially  reported,  he  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War : 

I  have  the  honour  to  recommend  that  General  Thomas 
M.  Anderson  be  sent  to  occupy  the  Philippine  Islands,  in 
command  of  the  following  troops:  two  battalions  Four 
teenth  Infantry,  two  troops  Fourth  Cavalry,  one  regiment 
of  infantry,  California  volunteers;  two  batteries  heavy 
artillery,  California  volunteers;  one  regiment  of  infantry, 
Washington  volunteers;  the  troops  to  go  with  all  the 
necessary  appliances,  supplies,  and  equipment. 

Miles  has  been  criticised  for  so  greatly  under 
estimating  the  force  needed  at  Manila,  just  as 
Sampson  received  censure  for  his  statement  that 
ten  thousand  soldiers  could  take  Santiago  in  forty- 
eight  hours;  but  he  might  reply  that  his  figures 
agree  closely  with  Dewey's. 

On  May  nth  Major-General  Wesley  Merritt, 
then  commanding  the  Department  of  the  East,  was 
summoned   to   Washington,    and   on 

thC  I2th  ^  WaS  ann°Unced  that  he  had 

been  appointed  to  command  an  army 
corps — the  Eighth  Corps — to  be  or 
ganized  immediately  for  service  in  the  Philippines. 
General  Merritt  was  fortunately  unwilling  to  under 
take  an  almost  unknown  task  with  a  mere  handful 


THE    MANILA   CAMPAIGN  353 

of  men,  and  requested  (May  I3th)  a  total  force  of 
fourteen  thousand  four  hundred,  including  four 
regiments  of  regulars.  Two  days  later,  after  some 
further  study  of  the  situation,  he  wrote  to  the  Presi 
dent  that  still  more  men  might  be  needed,  adding, 
with  remarkable  foresight: 

It  seems  more  than  probable  that  we  will  have  the  so- 
called  insurgents  to  fight  as  well  as  the  Spaniards. 

General  Miles — who  had  not  seen  Merritt's  esti 
mate — submitted  a  different  list  of  troops,  includ 
ing  only  two  regular  regiments — the  Fourteenth 
and  Fifteenth — with  two  squadrons  of  cavalry,  three 
batteries  of  artillery,  thirteen  thousand  volunteers 
from  the  Western  States,  and  some  heavy  guns, 
which  were  to  be  mounted  for  the  defence  of  Manila 
as  soon  as  the  city  should  be  captured.  "  When 
this  is  accomplished,"  he  suggested,  "  the  fleet  can 
be  released  for  more  important  service." 

To  this  Merritt  replied,  on  May  I7th: 

Two  regiments  of  regular  infantry,  two  thirds  of  a 
regiment  of  regular  cavalry,  and  two  light  batteries  is  a 
very  small  proportion  of  the  forty-two  regular  regiments 
in  the  army  when  the  work  to  be  done  consists  of  con 
quering  a  territory  seven  thousand  miles  from  our  base, 
defended  by  a  regularly  trained  and  acclimated  army  of 
from  ten  thousand  to  twenty-five  thousand  men,  and  in 
habited  by  fourteen  million  of  people,  the  majority  of 
whom  will  regard  us  with  the  intense  hatred  born  of  race 
and  religion. 

My  letters  of  May  I3th  and  I5th  give  the  composition 
and  minimum  strength  of  the  regular  force  I  deem  neces 
sary. 

Merritt's  view  prevailed  at  Washington,  and 
orders  were  finally  issued  that  twenty  thousand 
men  should  be  assembled  and  equipped  at  San 
Francisco,  and  sent  across  the  Pacific  as  fast  as 
transports  could  be  secured.  Organizing  work  was 
at  once  begun — or  rather  had  already  been  begun — 
under  Colonel  Anderson,  now  appointed  a  briga 
dier-general  of  volunteers,  and  General  Merriam, 


354  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

who  had  succeeded  Shafter  in  San  Francisco;  and 
on  May  25th  the  advance  guard  of  the  expedition 
— the  first  soldiers  the  young  republic  of  the  west 
had  ever  sent  into  the  ancient  lands  of  the  east — 
sailed  from  the  Golden  Gate.  It  consisted  of  the 
First  California  (Colonel  Smith),  the  Second 
Oregon  (Colonel  Summers),  and  six  companies  of 
the  Fourteenth  Infantry,  in  all  2,491  men,  under 
General  Anderson,  in  three  transports,  the  City  of 
Sydney,  the  Australia,  and  the  City  of  Peking. 

At  Honolulu,  where  the  transports  put  in  for 

coal,  they  found  the  cruiser  Charleston,  which  left 

San  Francisco  a  few  days  before  them, 

Guam' June  *>.       waiting  to  Serve  as  their  eSCOrt'      They 

carried  an  order  from  Secretary  Long 
to  Captain  Glass  of  the  Charleston — there  being  no 
cable  to  Hawaii — instructing  him  to  seize  the  island 
of  Guam,  in  the  Ladrones,  on  his  way  to  Manila.* 
The  expedition  left  Honolulu  on  June  4th,  and 
reached  Guam  on  the  morning  of  the  2oth.  Captain 
Glass  first  visited  Agana,  the  capital,  whose  port  he 
found  entirely  empty ;  then — in  search  of  a  Spanish 
gunboat  of  which  he  had  heard  rumours  at  Honolulu 
—he  took  the  Charleston  into  the  picturesque  har 
bour  of  San  Luis  d'Apra,  a  reef-fringed  bay  com 
manded  by  rocky  cliffs.  The  chart  showed  fortifica 
tions — Fort  Santiago  and  Fort  Santa  Cruz — but 
these  proved  to  be  nothing  more  than  abandoned 
ruins ;  and  the  only  vessel  in  the  harbour  was  a 
small  Japanese  trader.  No  Spanish  man-of-war 
had  called  at  the  island  for  eighteen  months;  no 
news  had  come  from  the  outer  world  since  April 
1 4th,  and  the  exiles  who  formed  Spain's  garrison 

*  The  Ladrone  or  Marianne  Islands  had  belonged  to  Spain  ever 
since  their  discovery  by  Magellan  in  1521.  They  consist  of  fifteen  islets 
scattered  in  a  broken  line  from  north  to  south,  with  a  total  area  of  420 
square  miles  and  a  population  of  about  10,000.  Guam,  the  most  im 
portant  island,  which  was  the  seat  of  the  Spanish  colonial  government, 
lies  at  the  southern  end  of  the  chain,  900  miles  north  of  the  equator 
and  1,300  miles  east  of  the  nearest  of  the  Philippines. 


THE    MANILA   CAMPAIGN  355 

in  this  remote  speck  of  land  knew  nothing  of  the 
war  with  the  United  States.  They  had  no  defences ; 
the  only  cannon  in  Guam  were  four  little  cast-iron 
antiquities  once  used  for  saluting,  but  condemned 
as  unsafe  even  for  that  peaceful  purpose. 

Captain  Glass  fired  a  shot  or  two  at  the  fortifica 
tions  before  he  discovered  that  they  were  deserted, 
and  the  sound  of  his  guns  brought  out  two  officers 
in  a  boat,  who  were  mightily  surprised  to  find 
themselves  prisoners.  They  were  paroled  and  sent 
ashore  to  summon  the  governor,  Lieutenant-Colo 
nel  Marina,  from  Agana.  That  official  replied  that 
the  Spanish  law  forbade  him  to  board  a  foreign 
vessel,  but  he  would  be  pleased  to  confer  with 
Captain  Glass  on  shore.  The  captain's  answer  was 
a  note  sent  ashore  on  the  following  morning,  with 
a  landing  party  under  Lieutenant  Braunersreuther, 
giving  Marina  half  an  hour  to  surrender  uncondi 
tionally.  No  resistance  was  possible;  the  garrison 
— sixty  Spaniards  and  a  few  native  soldiers — was 
disarmed,  the  Spaniards  were  taken  on  board  the 
Sydney,  and  on  the  22d  the  four  ships  resumed 
their  voyage,  entering  Manila  Bay  on  June  3Oth. 

Here  the  situation  had  changed  little  since  the 

destruction  of  Montojo's  fleet  two  months  before. 

Rear-Admiral    Dewey    (promoted    to 

Anderson  that  rank  M      ^h)  had  been  waiting 

reaches  Manila,     -,11  •  •  r  it.      r*       •*.  ' 

June  30  m  the  bay,  in  possession  ot  the  Lavite 

arsenal  and  of  the  fortifications  on 
the  island  of  Corregidor,  and  with  Manila  itself, 
rigidly  blockaded,  lying  at  the  mercy  of  his  guns. 
He  had  lost  one  of  his  officers,  Captain  Gridley,  of 
the  Olympia,  through  illness,*  the  vacant  place 
being  taken  by  Captain  Lamberton,  who  had  been 
serving  on  the  flagship  as  the  admiral's  chief  of  staff. 

*  Captain  Gridley  was  "condemned  by  a  medical  survey" — to  use 
the  cynical-sounding  phrase  that  ends  the  career  of  many  a  brave 
sailor  who  has  served  his  country  well  — in  May,  and  was  ordered 
home.  He  died  on  the  way,  at  Kobe,  Japan,  June  4th. 


TTNTVF,3.8IT 


356 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


Commander  Wood,  of  the  Petrel,  had  been  put  in 
charge  of  the  station  at  Cavite,  which  was  well 
equipped  with  storehouses  and  barracks,  and  with 
machine  shops  that  proved  very  useful  for  small  re 
pairs  to  the  squadron.  On  May  I2th  another  prize 
had  been  captured — the  Spanish  gunboat  Callao, 
which  steamed  into  the  bay  in  ignorance  of  Dewey's 
presence  there. 

The  position  of  the  Manila  garrison  was  a  des 
perate  one.  In  the  harbour  were  Dewey's  ships ; 
on  the  landward  side  they  were  hemmed  in  by  the 
insurgents,  who  had  pushed  their  lines  close  up  to 
the  city,  and  who  mustered  about  fourteen  thou 
sand  men,  commanded  by  General  Emilio  Agui- 
naldo.  This  remarkable  young  Fili- 
Dewey's  pino  leader,  who  has  since  been  the 

relations  with         x        ,  -  ,        ...  ,   . 

Aguinaido.  author  of  such  disasters  to  his  coun 
trymen  and  so  much  suffering  and 
loss  to  the  American  troops,  landed  at  Cavite  on 
May  iQth,  having  been  brought  from  Hong-Kong 
on  the  McCulloch,  sent  for  despatches.  Negotia 
tions  with  him  had  been  begun  in  April,  at  Singa 
pore,  by  United  States  Consul  Pratt,  who,  with 
Dewey's  permission,  sent  him  to  Hong-Kong  for 
a  conference.  Arriving  there  a  few  days  after  the 
admiral's  departure,  he  was  received  by  Rounsevelle 
Wildman,  the  American  consul  at  Hong-Kong. 
Aguinaido  afterward  asserted  that  both  Mr.  Pratt 
and  Mr.  Wildman  promised  that  their  Government 
would  assist  him  to  establish  the  independent  repub 
lic  for  which  he  had  long  been  righting;  but  his 
allegations  can  not  be  credited  in  the  face  of  their 
emphatic  denials,  and  of  Dewey's  repeated  and  ex 
plicit  assertion  that  no  pledges  of  any  sort  were 
given.  With  or  without  pledges,  however,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  it  was  a  mistake  to  accept  his  co 
operation  on  any  basis.  He  proved  to  be  an  effect 
ive  weapon  against  the  Spaniards,  but  in  thoroughly 
scrupulous  fighting  such  a  weapon  should  not  have 


THE   MANILA   CAMPAIGN 


357 


been  employed.  If  the  Filipinos  were  to  have  no 
political  recognition,  they  should  have  had  no  mili 
tary  recognition.  If  they  were  to  be  regarded — no 
doubt  correctly — as  incapable  of  civilized  self-gov 
ernment,  they  should  not  have  been  used  as  allies 
in  war,  aided  with  gifts  of  arms,  and  intrusted  with 
the  care  of  Spanish  prisoners. 

The  admiral  thus  described  his  relations  with 
the  insurgents  on  June  27th,  in  answer  to  an  inquiry 
from  Washington : 

Aguinaldo,  insurgent  leader,  with  thirteen  of  his  staff, 
arrived  May  ipth,  by  permission,  on  Nanshan.*  Estab 
lished  self  Cavite,  outside  arsenal,  under  the  protection  of 
our  guns,  and  organized  his  army.  I  have  had  several 
conferences  with  him,  generally  of  a  personal  nature. 
Consistently  I  have  refrained  from  assisting  him  in  any 
way  with  the  force  under  my  command,  and  on  several 
occasions  I  have  declined  requests  that  I  should  do  so, 
telling  him  the  squadron  could  not  act  until  the  arrival  of 
the  United  States  troops.  At  the  same  time  I  have  given 
him  to  understand  that  I  consider  insurgents  as  friends, 
being  opposed  to  a  common  enemy.  Aguinaldo  has  acted 
independently  of  the  squadron,  but  has  kept  me  advised 
of  his  progress,  which  has  been  wonderful.  I  have  allowed 
to  pass  by  water  recruits,  arms,  and  ammunition,  and  to 
take  such  Spanish  arms  and  ammunition  from  the  arsenal 
as  he  needed.  Have  advised  frequently  to  conduct  the 
war  humanely,  which  he  has  done  invariably.  My  rela 
tions  with  him  are  cordial,  but  I  am  not  in  his  confidence. 
The  United  States  has  not  been  bound  in  any  way  to 
assist  insurgents  by  any  act  or  promises,  and  he  is  not, 
to  my  knowledge,  committed  to  assist  us.  I  believe  he 
expects  to  capture  Manila  without  my  assistance,  but  doubt 
ability,  they  not  yet  having  many  guns.  In  my  opinion, 
these  people  are  far  superior  in  their  intelligence  and  more 
capable  oi  self-government  than  the  natives  of  Cuba,  and 
I  am  familiar  with  both  races. 

On  the  other  side,  Aguinaldo's  attitude  was  stated 
in  a  proclamation  he  issued  at  Cavite,  May  24th : 

Now  that  the  great  and  powerful  North  American 
nation  have  come  to  offer  disinterested  protection  for  the 

*  Apparently  a  mistake,  as  other  accounts  agree  that  Aguinaldo 
went  to  Manila  on  the  McCulloch. 


358  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

effort  to  secure  the  liberation  of  this  country,  I  return  to 
assume  command  of  all  the  forces  for  the  attainment  of 
our  lofty  aspirations,  establishing  a  dictatorial  government 
which  will  set  forth  decrees  under  my  sole  responsibility, 
assisted  by  the  advice  of  eminent  persons,  until  these  islands 
are  completely  conquered  and  able  to  form  a  constitutional 
convention  and  to  elect  a  president  and  a  cabinet,  in  whose 
favour  I  will  duly  resign  the  authority. 

During  June,  as  the  insurgents  gained  in 
strength,  Aguinaldo  issued  several  decrees  consti 
tuting  a  civil  government  in  the  territory  they  con 
trolled,  and  on  July  ist  he  proclaimed  himself  presi 
dent  of  the  Filipino  republic — a  step  of  which,  por 
tentous  as  it  was  of  coming  trouble,  no  official 
notice  was  taken. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  of  May  ist,  and  be 
fore  the  naval  weakness  of  the  Spaniards  was  fully 
understood,  there  were  rumours  that  they  would 
make  an  effort  to  retrieve  their  first  great  disaster. 
When  Cervera  left  the  Cape  Verde  Islands,  one  of 
the  many  conflicting  reports,  or  conjectures,  as  to 
his  destination  was  that  he  was  bound  for  the  east, 
to  attack  the  American  fleet  with  what  would  in 
deed  have  been  an  overwhelming  force.  On  May 
1 2th  Secretary  Long  cabled  to  Dewey  that  the 
whereabouts  of  the  powerful  Spanish  squadron 
was  still  unknown ;  but  that  day  its  arrival  at  Mar 
tinique  was  reported  by  Captain  Cotton,  of  the 
Harvard. 

Although  it  had  sent  the  flower  of  its  navy  to 
sure  destruction  in  the  West  Indies,  instead  of 
probable  success  in  the  Philippines,  the  Madrid 
Government,  it  soon  appeared,  still  entertained  the 
idea  that  it  could  save  Manila.  Its  attempt  proved 
an  utterly  feeble  one,  and  effected  nothing  save  to 
expose  its  lack  of  resources  and  the  almost  ludicrous 
incompetence  of  the  directors  of  its  military  policy. 
In  the  whole  story  of  Spanish  weakness  and  failure, 
the  adventures  of  Camara's  squadron  form  the  most 
pitiable  chapter. 


THE   MANILA   CAMPAIGN 


359 


During  May  and  June  there  were  active  prepara 
tions  at  the  Cadiz  navy  yard — watched,  during  part 
of  the  time,  by  two  young  American 
officers,  Ensigns  W.  H.  Buck  and  H. 
H.  Ward,  of  the  Bureau  of  Naviga 
tion,  who  had  volunteered  for  secret  service  duty 
— to  equip  for  foreign  service  all  the  war  ships  that 
could  be  sent  to  sea.  The  available  vessels  included 
two  battle  ships — the  old  9,9OO-ton  Pelayo  and  the 
Emperador  Carlos  V,  a  fine  new  ship  of  9,235  tons, 
whose  armament  was  still  incomplete ;  the  two 
armed  auxiliaries  Rapido  and  Patriota,  formerly  the 
Hamburg-American  liners  Normannia  and  Colum 
bia ;  and  several  torpedo  boats  and  destroyers,  of 
the  class  whose  inefficiency,  in  Spanish  hands,  was 
demonstrated  at  Santiago.  On  June  I7th  it  was 
reported  that  a  squadron  under  Admiral  Camara 
had  left  Cadiz,  sailing  eastward;  on  the  I9th  it  had 
reached  Cartagena.  As  far  back  as  May  2oth  Sec 
retary  Long  had  warned  Dewey  that  there  were 
rumours  of  such  a  movement,  but  on  May  29th  he 
had  cabled : 

There  is  no  Spanish  force  en  route  to  Philippine 
Islands. 

Even  when  Camara's  sailing  was  reported,  it  was 
not  believed  at  Washington  that  he  would  actually 
leave  the  Spanish  coast.  On  June  22d  Secretary 
Long  telegraphed  to  Dewey :  * 

Our  special  agents  report  Camara's  fleet  at  Cartagena, 
Spain.  It  is  thought  reliable  information.  His  future 
destination  not  ascertained  yet. 

*  Correspondence  between  Dewey  and  Washington  went  through 
the  American  consulate  at  Hong-Kong,  requiring  from  two  to  five 
days  to  pass  between  Hong-Kong  and  Manila.  The  McCulloch  and 
Dewey's  supply  ships  made  frequent  voyages  to  and  fro  with  de 
spatches. 

It  appears  that  on  cutting  the  Manila  cable  the  admiral  took  the 
wire  on  board  the  Olympia  and  attempted  to  use  it,  but  the  Spanish 
Government  prevented  this  by  sealing  the  line  at  Hong-Kong— a  right 
reserved  by  its  contract  with  the  cable  company. 


360  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

That  there  was  no  alarm  at  Washington  is  shown 
by  the  secretary's  despatch  of  the  same  date  to 
Sampson  at  Santiago : 

Spanish  fleet  at  Cartagena,  Spain;  movement  probably 
made  to  satisfy  people.  This  information  probably  re 
liable. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Camara  passed  Cape  Bon,  in 
Tunis,  on  the  22d,  and  on  the  26th  he  appeared  off 
Port  Said,  at  the  northern  end  of  the  Suez  Canal. 
Sagasta,  the  Spanish  premier,  announced  in  the 
Cortes,  on  the  23d — the  legislature  was  dissolved  OR 
the  following  day — that  Manila  was  the  objective 
point  of  the  expedition.  On  the  25th,  and  again  on 
the  27th,  Secretary  Long  cabled  the  news  to  Dewey. 
Admiral  Dewey  is  established  in  the  popular  re 
gard  as  so  invincible  a  hero  that  many  Americans, 
no  doubt,  vaguely  assume  that  if 
Camara  had  reached  Manila  he  would 
have  been  destroyed  as  speedily  as 
was  Montojo's  feeble  fleet.  They  may  be  surprised 
to  learn  that  the  admiral  himself  was  very  far  from 
possessing  such  an  easy  confidence.  On  the  con 
trary,  it  is  recorded  by  General  Greene,*  who  was 
personally  in  conference  with  him,  that  he  fully  de 
cided,  in  case  the  Spanish  squadron  continued  its 
voyage,  to  abandon  Manila  Bay  and  retreat  before 
it.  He  was  not  prepared  to  pit  his  unarmoured 
cruisers  against  a  pair  of  heavy  battle  ships.  He 
resolved,  the  general  relates,  to  take  his  men-of-war 
and  the  transports  out  into  the  Pacific,  and  cruise 
eastward  to  meet  the  monitors  Monterey  and 
Monadnock,  which  were  on  their  way  to  him  from 
California.  With  this  important  addition  to  his 
fighting  strength,  he  would  return  and  give  battle 
to  Camara.  The  army,  meanwhile — its  senior 
officer,  General  Anderson,  having  readily  accepted 

*  The  Capture  of  Manila,  published  in  the  Century  Magazine  for 
March  and  April,  1899. 


THE    MANILA   CAMPAIGN  361 

Dewey's  plan — would  march  inland  from  Cavite,  in 
trench  itself  in  the  interior  of  Luzon,  and  await  the 
fleet's  return.  The  result,  as  General  Greene  ob 
serves,  would  have  been  a  very  interesting  cam 
paign  ;  but  on  July  22d,  just  as  the  admiral  was  on 
the  point  of  taking  steps  to  put  his  design  into 
action,  the  news  came  that  Camara  had  turned  back. 
To  Dewey  himself,  apparently,  belongs  the  first 
suggestion  of  the  effective  counter  stroke  that  re 
moved  the  danger.  In  the  first  despatch  he  sent  to 
Secretary  Long  after  hearing  of  Camara's  start 
from  Cadiz  he  said: 

In  my  judgment,  if  the  coast  of  Spain  was  threatened, 
the  squadron  of  the  enemy  would  have  to  return. 

This  reached  Washington  on  June  27th,  and  that 
very    day    an    official    bulletin    of    the    Navy    De 
partment  announced   that  "  Commo- 
watson's  East-    dore    \Vatson    sails    to-day    in    the 

ern  Squadron,  .  -» T  ,  •    •     "*      A  j      •      1 

June  27.  cruiser     Newark     to     join     Admiral 

Sampson  at  Santiago,  where  he  will 
take  under  his  command  an  armoured  squadron, 
with  cruisers,  and  proceed  at  once  to  the  Spanish 
coast."  The  new  move  was  not  kept  a  secret,  and 
news  of  it  immediately  went  all  over  the  world,  and 
to  Madrid  in  particular.  Further  information  was 
given  out  the  same  day.  Watson's  fleet — the  com 
mand,  it  may  be  presumed,  would  have  been 
Schley's  had  he  made  a  better  record  with  the 
Flying  Squadron — was  to  be  called  the  Eastern 
Squadron,  and  was  to  consist  of  the  Newark  as 
flagship,  the  battle  ships  Iowa  and  Oregon,  the 
armed  auxiliaries  Yosemite,  Dixie,  and  Yankee, 
and  three  colliers.  When  the  squadron  was  actually 
commissioned  (July  7th)  these  arrangements  had 
been  modified,  the  Massachusetts  taking  the  place 
of  the  Iowa ;  and  as  it  never  sailed  for  Spain,  all  the 
vessels  named  remained  under  Sampson's  orders. 
Here  we  may  note  another  testimony  to  the 


362  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

supreme  importance  of  the  destruction  of  Cervera's 
fleet  as  the  great  decisive  event  of  the  war.  While 
his  squadron  remained  intact  it  would  have  been 
exceedingly  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  hold  the 
American  position  at  Santiago,  to  maintain  the 
blockade  of  Cuba,  and  at  the  same  time  to  detach 
a  powerful  force  for  offensive  operations  beyond  the 
Atlantic.  The  triumphant  ending  of  Sampson's 
naval  campaign  made  this  last  undertaking  entirely 
feasible,  and  ended  Dewey's  chief  apprehension. 

Camara  reached  Port  Said  short  of  coal,  after 
the  fatal  habit  of  Spanish  admirals ;  and  according 
to  instructions  from  Washington,  Mr.  Watts,  the 
deputy  consul-general,  who  was  in  charge  of  the 
American  consulate  at  Cairo,  promptly  lodged  a 
protest  against  his  being  allowed  to  take  on  fuel  in 
any  Egyptian  port.  The  fact  that  the  protest  was 
successful  is  ascribed  to  the  good  offices  of  Lord 
Cromer,  the  British  agent.  Nevertheless,  the  Span 
iards  passed  through  the  canal — except  the  three 
torpedo-boat  destroyers,  Audaz,  Osada,  and  Pro 
serpina,  which  were  ordered  back  to  Spain  from  Port 
Said ;  but  they  still  lay  at  Suez  on  July  6th,  the  war 
ships  having  taken  some  coal  from  the  auxiliaries, 
when  an  order  came  recalling  them  to  the  threat 
ened  coast  of  the  peninsula.  The  fiasco  of  the  Ca- 
rnara  expedition  was  over,  and  Manila  was  left  to 
its  fate. 

Though  the  position  of  the  Spanish  garrison  was 
now  hopeless,  that  of  Admiral  Dewey  was  not  en 
tirely  easy  or  comfortable.     He  was 
Diedrichs'  seven  thousand  miles  from  an  avail 

able  base;  his  stock  of  ammunition 
was  small,  and  his  supply  of  provisions — most  of 
which  came  from  Australia — more  or  less  precari 
ous,  though  he  never  was  actually  short  of  food  or 
fuel.*  He  had  to  face  a  peculiar  embarrassment, 

*  On  June  i3th  Dewey  sent  to  Washirf^ton  a  request  for  six  months' 
supplies  in  all  departments,  stating  that  it  was  "practically  impossible 


THE    MANILA   CAMPAIGN  363 

moreover,  in  the  behaviour  of  some  of  the  foreign 
war  ships  which  lay,  ostensibly  to  watch  the  inter 
ests  of  their  respective  flags,  in  the  blockaded  har 
bour.  Germany,  in  particular,  was  represented  by 
a  squadron  that  seemed  disproportionate  to  her 
share  in  the  commerce  of  Manila.  Admiral  Died- 
richs,  commanding  the  German  fleet  on  the  East 
Asiatic  station,  came  into  the  harbour  on  June  I2th, 
and  at  the  end  of  the  month  he  had  with  him  five 
vessels  whose  rated  strength  was  superior  to 
Dewey's  small  fighting  force. 

Amid  the  excitement  of  war,  and  under  the 
strain  of  a  trying  situation,  it  is  probable  that  anx 
iety  and  resentment  were  created  by  incidents  which 
under  other  conditions  would  have  passed  unno 
ticed.  It  is  entirely  clear,  now,  that  the  German 
Government  cherished  no  insidious  designs  against 
the  United  States,  and  had  no  idea  of  provoking  a 
conflict  with  its  forces  in  Asiatic  waters.  It  is 
equally  clear  that  the  American  officers  at  Manila, 
from  the  admiral  down,  believed  the  situation  to 
be  one  of  real  danger,  and  that  there  was  a  bitter 
ill  feeling  between  the  two  fleets.  It  appears  that 
Diedrichs  failed  to  display  a  proper  respect  for 
Dewey's  position  as  a  blockader  of  the  port,  and 
that  Dewey,  at  least  on  one  occasion,  was  peremp 
tory  in  enforcing  his  rule  that  every  vessel  entering 
or  leaving  the  harbour  should  be  examined  by  his 
guard  ship  of  the  day. 

The  situation  was  not  improved  by  an  incident 
which  occurred  early  in  July,  when  Aguinaldo  sent 
word  that  his  troops  had  captured  the  shore  de 
fences  of  Subig  Bay,  and  had  endeavoured  to  attack 

to  obtain  further  supplies  within  the  limits  of  the  station  during  the 
war."  On  July  zcth,  however,  he  said  that  he  had  six  months'  pro 
visions  on  hand.  On  August  gth  he  reported  "provisions  for  three 
months,  fresh  ;  also  plenty  of  coal."  A  British  ship,  the  Ellen  A. 
Reed,  brought  him  a  cargo  of  coal  from  Cape  Town  in  July  ;  he  also 
took  a  supply  from  another  British  vessel,  the  Honolulu,  laid  up  at 
Manila  by  the  blockade. 
24 


364  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

the  main  Spanish  position  on  an  island  in  the  har 
bour  (Isla  Grande),  but  had  been  prevented  from 
doing  so  by  the  German  cruiser  Irene,  which  had 
threatened  to  fire  on  their  boats,  on  the  ground 
that  they  flew  no  recognised  flag.  Dewey  met  the 
difficulty  by  sending  the  Raleigh  and  the  Concord 
to  Subig  (July  7th),  where  the  Spaniards,  numbering 
about  thirteen  hundred,  surrendered  without  resist 
ance,  the  Irene — whose  interference  with  the  insur 
gents,  though  perhaps  officious,  was  technically 
quite  correct — of  course  interposing  no  objection. 
The  prisoners  were  turned  over  to  the  insurgents — 
a  transaction  which  came  dangerously  near  to  being 
a  recognition  of  them  as  a  belligerent  power. 

The  first  American  troops,  as  has  been  said, 
arrived  on  June  3Oth,  and  next  morning  General 
Anderson  began  to  disembark  his 
men  an^  material  at  Cavite.  During 
the  day  he  had  an  interview  with 
Aguinaldo,  whom  he  found  to  be  in  control  of 
everything  between  the  navy-yard  gates  and  the 
Spanish  lines.  The  Filipino  leader,  the  general  re 
ports,  "  did  not  seem  pleased  at  the  incoming  of 
our  land  forces."  No  further  move  was  made, 
though  Anderson  did  some  reconnoitring  mean 
while,  till  July  1 5th.  Then,  in  order  to  secure  space 
for  the  landing  of  Greene's  brigade,  whose  arrival 
was  expected,  a  battalion  of  the  California  regi 
ment  was  sent  across  from  Cavite  to  the  eastern 
shore  of  the  bay,  and  encamped  near  the  hamlet  of 
Tambo,  some  three  miles  from  Malate,  the  south 
ernmost  suburb  held  by  the  Spaniards.  To  the  new 
camp — christened  Camp  Dewey — the  rest  of  the 
Calif ornians  went  on  the  I7th,  on  which  day  the 
second  army .  expedition  came  into  the  harbour. 
This  consisted  of  a  battalion  of  the  Eighteenth  In 
fantry  and  another  of  the  Twenty-third ;  three  regi 
ments  of  volunteer  infantry,  the  First  Colorado 
(Colonel  Hale),  the  First  Nebraska  (Colonel  Bratt), 


THE    MANILA   CAMPAIGN  365 

and  the  Tenth  Pennsylvania  (Colonel  Hawkins)  ; 
and  two  batteries  of  volunteer  artillery  from  Utah 
—in  all  3,586  men,  commanded  by  General  Francis 
V.  Greene,  a  former  officer  in  the  regular  army,  and 
late  colonel  of  the  Seventy-first  New  York. 

Greene's  brigade  left  San  Francisco  on  June 
1 5th,  on  the  four  transports  China,  Colon,  Zealandia, 
and  Senator.  After  calling  at  Honolulu  (June 
23d  to  25th),  and  passing  Wake  Island  (July  4th) 
and  Guam  (July  Qth),  off  Cape  Engano,  at  the 
northern  end  of  Luzon,  the  Boston  was  found  wait 
ing  to  escort  the  transports  to  Manila.  On  the 
1 7th  they  were  in  the  harbour,  and  next  day  the 
men  began  to  go  ashore  at  Camp  Dewey,  where 
General  Greene  took  command,  General  Anderson, 
who  until  Merritt's  arrival  was  senior  officer,  re 
maining  at  Cavite.  Aguinaldo  had  moved  his  head 
quarters  from  Cavite  to  Bakoor,  across  the  small  bay 
of  that  name,  to  make  room  for  the  Americans,  but 
his  attitude  was  by  no  means  cordial,  and  he  gave 
them  no  aid  in  securing  what  they  most  needed — 
vehicles  and  draught  animals.  The  insurgents  still 
occupied  a  thin  line  of  intrenchments  between 
Camp  Dewey  and  the  Spanish  works. 

On  July  25th  the  transport  Newport,  with 
Major-General  Merritt  and  his  staff,  reached  Ca 
vite,  and  on  the  3oth  five  other  ves- 
sels  brought  in  Brigadier-General 
MacArthur  and  his  brigade.  This 
pretty  nearly  doubled  the  force  in  the  field,  the 
new  arrivals  numbering  4,847,  including  four  vol 
unteer  regiments — the  Thirteenth  Minnesota,  First 
North  Dakota,  First  Idaho,  and  First  Wyoming ; 
another  battalion  each  of  the  Eighteenth  and 
Twenty-third  Infantry ;  and  the  Astor  Battery,  a 
volunteer  field  battery  organized  as  a  gift  to  the 
Government  by  Colonel  John  Jacob  Astor,  of  New 
York. 

With   almost   eleven   thousand   men   under   his 


366  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

command,  besides  nearly  five  thousand  more 
already  on  their  way  from  San  Francisco,*  General 
Merritt  was  eager  to  end  a  situation  that  was  full 
of  perplexities  by  an  immediate  attack  on  Manila. 
After  reviewing  the  ground  he  decided,  as  Ander 
son  and  Greene  had  already  agreed,  that  the  best 
approach  to  the  city  was  by  the  road  from  the 
south,  the  Calle  Real  ("  Royal  Road  "),  which  ran 
parallel  to  the  shore  from  Camp  Dewey  to  the 
Spanish  lines  at  Malate,  within  easy  range  of  the 
guns  of  the  fleet.  To  clear  the  ground  for  an  ad 
vance  it  was  necessary  to  get  the  insurgents  out  of 
the  way ;  and  Greene  was  commissioned  to  arrange 
this  with  Aguinaldo — unofficially,  as  Merritt  pre 
ferred  to  have  no  dealings  with  the  Filipino  leader. 
Aguinaldo  consented  to  withdraw  his  soldiers  four 
hundred  yards  from  the  beach,  on  condition  that 
the  request  should  be  made  of  him  in  writing;  and 
on  July  29th  this  arrangement  was  carried  out,  the 
abandoned  line  being  occupied  by  some  of  Greene's 
men,  who  were  promptly  set  to  work  to  strengthen 
the  trenches. 

The  growth  of  the  defences,  in  plain  view  of 
their  lines,  and  but  a  thousand  yards  distant,  seem 
ingly    apprised    the    Spaniards    that 
°f  American  troops  had  taken  the  place 

of  the  Filipinos,  and  on  the  night  of 
July  3  ist,  just  before  midnight,  they  opened  a  heavy 
fire  of  musketry  and  artillery.  The  trenches  were 
held,  at  the  time,  by  the  Tenth  Pennsylvania,  with 
four  guns  of  the  Utah  artillery.  The  Spaniards 

*  Five  additional  transports  were  on  their  way  across  the  Pacific 
when  the  war  ended  :  the  Peru  and  the  City  of  Puebla  with  1,682  men, 
under  Major-General  Elwell  S.  Otis,  who  left  San  Francisco  July  i5th 
and  arrived  at  Manila  August  2ist ;  the  Pennsylvania,  with  1,348  men, 
left  San  Francisco  July  igth  ;  and  the  City  of  Rio  de  Janeiro  (July  23d) 
and  the  St.  Paul  (July  29th),  with  1,735  men,  under  Brigadier-General 
Harrison  Grey  Otis. 

The  monitor  Monadnock  started  from  San  Francisco  on  June  25th, 
in  company  with  the  collier  Nero,  but  did  not  reach  Manila  until 
August  i6th. 


Sketch  map  of  the  scene  of  General  Merritt's  campaign 
in  July  and  August,  1898. 


368  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR 

kept  up  a  hot  fusillade  for  about  two  hours,  but  did 
not  advance  from  their  works,  though  an  attack 
in  force  was  momentarily  expected,  and  the  whole 
American  camp  was  under  arms.  A  company  of 
the  Third  Artillery,  serving  as  infantry,  hurried  to 
support  the  Pennsylvanians,  and  the  California  regi 
ment  was  also  moved  up. 

It  was  a  dark,  stormy  night,  with  high  wind  and 
tropical  rain,  and  it  was  difficult  to  ascertain  what 
was  happening.  Major  Cuthbertson,  commanding 
a  battalion  of  the  Pennsylvanians,  reported  that  the 
enemy  had  sallied  out  and  attempted  to  turn  the 
right  flank  of  the  American  line,  but  he  was  un 
doubtedly  mistaken.  General  Greene,  who  was  at 
the  front,  had  been  ordered  to  remain  on  the  de 
fensive,  and  therefore  sent  no  more  men  forward 
than  were  necessary  to  hold  the  trenches.  For  the 
same  reason  he  did  not  signal  to  the  Boston,  which 
lay  off  the  shore,  ready  to  use  her  guns  if  called 
upon.  The  skirmish — the  expedition's  baptism  of 
fire — ended  without  result,  though  not  without 
casualties,  Greene's  loss  being  ten  killed  and  forty- 
three  wounded. 

After  the  night  encounter  of  July  3ist,  General 
Greene  kept  his  men  at  work  extending  their  in- 
trenchments,  to  secure  the  American  right  against 
the  possibility  of  an  attack  in  flank.  Before  the 
final  advance  upon  Manila,  a  strong  line  of  works 
had  been  completed,  about  twelve  hundred  yards  in 
length,  its  left  coming  down  to  the  bay,  while  its 
right  extended  across  the  Calle  Real  and  rested 
upon  a  practically  impassable  rice  swamp  just  be 
yond  a  parallel  road  farther  inland,  running  into 
the  city  from  the  village  of  Pasay.  To  construct 
and  hold  this  line  was  a  task  of  no  small  difficulty 
and  hardship.  Any  exposure  drew  the  enemy's  fire. 
Tropical  rains  were  incessant,  and  shelter  from 
them  impossible.  The  soil  was  so  wet  that  it  could 
be  held  in  place  only  by  bagging  it,  and  the  mud 


THE   MANILA   CAMPAIGN  369 

so  deep  that  shoes  were  ruined  and  many  men  per 
force  went  barefoot.  One  storm  left  two  feet  of 
water  in  part  of  the  trenches. 

Almost  every  night  the  Spaniards  fired  upon  the 
American  works,  generally  with  both  artillery  and 
musketry.  Greene's  instructions  were  to  make  no 
reply  unless  they  actually  came  out  to  attack  him; 
but  with  raw  troops  posted  close  to  the  enemy's 
lines,  and  under  fire  for  the  first  time  in  the  dark 
ness  and  rain,  it  proved  impossible  to  enforce  such 
an  order  strictly,  and  in  four  of  these  resultless 
nocturnal  skirmishes  a  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
rounds  of  ammunition  were  expended.  Almost 
every  night,  too,  a  few  men  were  killed  and 
wounded.  It  began  to  appear  that  though  Greene's 
forward  move  was  in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of 
his  orders,  it  was  unfortunate  that  he  had  taken 
up  so  advanced  a  position  so  long  before  the  be 
sieging  forces  were  prepared  to  strike  a  decisive 
blow. 

For  though  General  Merritt  was  anxious  to  end 
the  army's  discomfort  by  an  immediate  attack,  Ad 
miral  Dewey  now  declared  himself  not  quite  ready 
for  the  final,  move.  It  may  be  remembered  that  in 
May  and  June  the  admiral  had  repeatedly  reported 
that  he  could  take  Manila  at  any  moment.*  Since 
then  he  had  been  strengthened  by  the  arrival  of  the 
Charleston,  while  the  Spaniards  had  been  weakened 
in  numbers  and  morale  by  the  long  siege,  by  their 
losing  fight  with  Aguinaldo,  and  by  the  growing 
hopelessness  of  their  position  between  the  American 
fleet  and  army  and  the  insurgent  forces.  It  is  pos 
sible  that  the  prolonged  strain  of  an  anxious  situa 
tion  had  lessened  Dewey's  confidence  and  increased 
his  caution ;  it  is  possible  that  he  dreaded  political 

*  "  I  control  bay  completely,  and  can  take  city  at  any  time,"  he 
said  in  his  despatch  of  May  4th.  Again,  on  May  i3th  :  "I  can  take 
Manila  at  any  moment"  ;  and  on  July  3d  :  "This  squadron  can  re 
duce  the  defences  of  Manila  at  any  moment." 


370 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


complications.  To  put  into  words  what  the  admiral 
probably  refrained  from  putting  into  words,  if  he 
should  summon  the  Spaniards  to  surrender  or  stand 
his  fire,  and  if  one  or  more  of  the  foreign  squadrons 
should  protest  against  a  bombardment,  he  would 
find  himself  in  a  situation  of  great  embarrassment, 
perhaps  of  humiliation.  He  had  five  cruisers,  none 
of  them  armoured  or  very  heavily  armed ;  two  moni 
tors — the  Monterey  and  the  Monadnock — were  on 
their  way  across  the  Pacific.  The  ten-  and  twelve- 
inch  guns  of  these  formidable  fighting  machines  * 
would  give  him  a  trump  card  in  any  game  he  might 
be  called  upon  to  play ;  and  he  wished  to  wait  for 
them,  or  at  any  rate  for  one  of  them,  before  taking 
action. 

On  August  4th  the  Monterey  came  into  the  bay 
fifty-four  days  from  San  Diego — a  remarkable  voy 
age  for  a  coast-defence  ship,  even  though  she  was 
towed  most  of  the  way  by  the  collier  Brutus.  On 
the  5th  General  Greene  went  to  General  Merritt,who 
had  remained  on  his  transport,  the  Newport,  and 
reported  the  situation  at  the  front.  Merritt  sent 
him  on  to  Dewey,  who  explained  his  wish  for  a  little 
further  delay.  To  silence  the  Spaniards'  heavy  guns 
without  risk  of  loss,  he  needed  the  Monterey  to 
engage  the  city  batteries ;  but  she  required  time  for 
slight  repairs  after  her  long  journey.  If  the  troops 
could  not  be  withdrawn  from  the  first  line  of 
trenches — which  Greene  naturally  regarded  as  im 
possible — he  would  stand  ready  to  aid  them,  if 
they  were  hard  pressed,  whenever  they  signalled  to 
him  from  the  beach ;  but  he  would  prefer  not  to 
use  his  guns,  except  in  case  of  necessity,  as  he  did 
not  desire  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement.  Be 
sides — although  this  is  not  mentioned  in  General 

*  Sampson  reported  the  monitors  inefficient  for  such  service  as  the 
San  Juan  expedition,  because  they  lacked  speed  and  were  poor  gun 
platforms  in  a  swell.  They  were  well  suited  for  fighting  in  the  smooth 
water  of  Manila  Bay. 


THE    MANILA   CAMPAIGN 


371 


Greene's  narrative — he  was  negotiating  through  the 
Belgian  consul,  M.  Andre,  for  the  peaceful  sur 
render  of  the  city. 

Next  day  (August  6th)  Dewey  and  Merritt  had 

a  further  conference,  and  on  the  morning  of  the 

7th  one  of  the  navy  launches  took  into 

surrenderor        Manila    the    following    joint    note    to 

Manila  de-  ,t  ,     .  i     -r?          •       T        j 

manded,  Aug.  6.    the  captain-general,  Fermm  Jaudenes, 
who  had  superseded  General  Augustin 
on  the  4th  :  * 

SIR:  We  have  the  honour  to  notify  your  excellency 
that  operations  of  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States  against  the  defences  of  Manila  may  begin  at  any 
time  after  the  expiration  of  forty-eight  hours  from  the 
hour  of  receipt  by  you  of  this  communication,  or  sooner 
if  made  necessary  by  an  attack  on  your  part. 

This  notice  is  given  in  order  to  afford  you  an  oppor 
tunity  to  remove  all  noncombatants  from  the  city. 

General  Jaudenes  replied  promptly,  thanking  the 
American  commanders  for  their  "  humane  senti 
ments,"  and  saying  that  as  he  was  surrounded  by 
the  insurgents  he  was  "  without  places  of  refuge  for 
the  increased  number  of  wounded,  sick,  women,  and 
children  now  lodged  within  the  walls." 

As  a  result  of  the  notice  thus  served  upon  the 
Spanish  captain-general,  there  was  no  further  firing, 
either  by  night  or  by  day,  upon  the  American 
trenches.  Not  another  shot  was  exchanged  between 
the  opposing  forces,  until  the  last  day  of  the  cam 
paign  and  the  war. 

At  noon  on  the  gth  the  forty-eight  hours  had 
expired,  and  Manila  expected  an  immediate  bom 
bardment.  Red-cross  flags  were  hoisted  on  build 
ings  containing  sick  or  wounded  men.  Boats  came 
out  of  the  Pasig  carrying  foreign  residents,  and  the 
neutral  squadrons  steamed  out  of  range.  It  was 

*  The  change  is  said  to  have  been  made  under  orders  from  Madrid, 
for  the  reason  that  Augustin  had  requested  permission  to  surrender 
without  further  resistance.  The  orders  must  presumably  have  been 
sent  through  one  of  the  foreign  squadrons  at  Manila. 


372 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


noted  as  a  significant  fact — though  perhaps  its 
meaning  was  exaggerated — that  the  British  and  the 
Japanese  vessels  took  up  a  position  beside  Dewey's, 
off  Cavite,  while  the  fleets  of  Germany  and  France 
moved  away  northward  into  the  bay.  But  there  was 
no  bombardment.  Instead,  another  joint  note  was 
sent  to  Jaudenes,  formally  demanding  a  surrender : 

SIR:  The  inevitable  suffering  in  store  for  the  wounded, 
sick,  women,  and  children,  in  the  event  that  it  becomes  our 
duty  to  reduce  the  defences  of  the  walled  town  in  which 
they  are  gathered,  will,  we  feel  assured,  appeal  successfully 
to  the  sympathies  of  a  general  capable  of  making  the  de 
termined  and  prolonged  resistance  which  your  excellency 
has  exhibited  after  the  loss  of  your  naval  forces,  and  with 
out  hope  of  succour. 

We  therefore  submit,  without  prejudice  to  the  high 
sentiments  of  honour  and  duty  which  your  excellency  en 
tertains,  that  surrounded  on  every  side  as'  you  are  by  a 
constantly  increasing  force,  with  a  powerful  fleet  in  your 
front,  and  deprived  of  all  prospect  of  reinforcement  and 
assistance,  a  most  useless  sacrifice  of  life  would  result  in 
the  event  of  an  attack,  and  therefore  every  consideration 
of  humanity  makes  it  imperative  that  you  should  not  sub 
ject  your  city  to  the  horrors  of  a  bombardment.  Accord 
ingly,  we  demand  the  surrender  of  the  city  of  Manila,  and 
the  Spanish  forces  under  your  command. 

The  captain-general  replied  with  a  refusal  to  sur 
render,  but  offered  to  refer  the  question  to  Madrid 
if  time  were  granted  him  to  send  and  receive  a  mes 
sage  by  way  of  Hong-Kong.  As  this  would  involve 
a  delay  of  several  days,  Dewey  and  Merritt  declined 
the  proposal,  and  made  final  arrangements  for  an 
attack.  At  the  same  time,  almost  up  to  the  last 
moment,  they  continued  their  negotiations  through 
the  Belgian  consul.  M.  Andre's  mediation  would 
no  doubt  have  been  entirely  successful  had  not  the 
Spanish  officers  feared  the  disapproval  of  the  home 
Government  in  case  they  laid  down  their  arms  with 
out  a  fight.  As  it  was,  though  no  such  agree 
ment  was  officially  made  or  recorded,  it  was  tacitly 
understood  that  nothing  more  than  a  show  of  re 
sistance  would  be  offered.  Manila,  with  its  two 


THE    MANILA   CAMPAIGN  373 

hundred  and  fifty  thousand  people,  lay  at  the  mercy 
of  Dewey's  guns ;  the  insurgents  had  cut  off  its 
water  supply,  leaving  it  dependent  upon  the  rains, 
and  upon  such  food  as  was  stored  in  the  city;  its 
garrison  must  have  surrendered,  before  long,  either 
to  the  Americans  or  to  the  still  more  hated  and 
dreaded  Aguinaldo. 

The  reports  of  the  army  officers  who  com 
manded  in  the  action  of  August  i3th  scarcely  give  a 

historical  account  of  the  events  of  the 
Aug0"3°f  memorable  day  that  saw  the  American 

flag  hoisted  over  the  capital  of  the 
Philippines.  They  relate  the  advance  of  their  troops, 
the  capture  of  the  Spanish  lines,  the  entry  into 
the  city,  and  its  surrender,  as  if  that  told  the  whole 
story.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  though  there  was  some 
real  fighting,  and  though  it  was  not  the  fault  of  the 
American  troops  that  there  was  not  more,  the  land 
"  battle  "  of  Manila  was  a  curious  and  Pickwickian 
sort  of  combat.  The  Philippine  capital  was  prac 
tically  taken  when  Dewey  destroyed  Montojo's 
squadron  on  the  morning  of  May  ist.  The  affair 
of  August  1 3th  was  little  more  than  a  formality. 
The  Spaniards  had  seventy  pieces  of  modern  artil 
lery,  of  calibres  up  to  nine  inches,  but  they  did  not 
use  them,  with  the  exception  of  two  small  guns 
in  the  trenches,  Dewey  having  promised  M.  Andre 
that  if  their  batteries  remained  silent  he  would 
throw  no  shells  into  the  city.  Of  Jaudenes'  thirteen 
thousand  men  only  a  very  small  part  contested  the 
American  advance,  though  he  might  have  massed 
nearly  his  whole  force  to  meet  it.  Five  thousand 
were  held  behind  the  fortifications  of  the  old  city, 
where  they  stood,  without  firing  a  shot,  to  watch 
Greene's  men  march  under  the  walls. 

Had  Dewey's  fleet  held  aloof,  had  there  been 
no  besieging  army  of  insurgents,  and  had  the 
Spaniards  resisted  with  all  their  power,  Merritt's 
men  would  very  probably  have  taken  Manila; 


374 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


but  the  battle  would  have  been  an  entirely  differ 
ent  one. 

The  plan  of  attack  was  that  Dewey  should  open 
fire  upon  Fort  San  Antonio,  at  Malate,  seconded 
by  Greene's  artillery — seven  of  the  Utah  guns,  and 
three  lent  by  the  navy  and  manned  by  men  of  the 
Third  Artillery.  When  the  bombardment  seemed 
to  have  been  effective,  Greene's  brigade,  on  the 
American  left,  near  the  beach,  was  to  advance  upon 
the  Spanish  works.  MacArthur,*  who  had  the 
Astor  Battery  and  one  of  the  Utah  guns,  was  to 
follow  a  similar  programme  on  the  right,  where  the 
centre  of  the  Spanish  position  was  a  blockhouse 
marked  as  "  No.  14  "  on  the  plan  of  the  Manila  de 
fences.  The  admiral  was  then  to  signal  a  demand 
for  the  city's  surrender,  and  it  was  understood  that 
this  would  be  yielded,  although  it  was  not  known 
just  how  much  resistance  would  satisfy  the  Span 
iards.  The  Oregon  regiment  was  to  come  up  from 
Cavite  on  a  transport,  in  readiness  to  go  ashore  and 
take  possession.  The  division  commander,  General 
Anderson,  went  over  from  Cavite  to  direct  opera 
tions  at  the  front ;  General  Merritt  did  not  go 
ashore,  making  his  headquarters  on  the  Zafiro. 

At  half  past  nine"  the  Olympia  fired  the  first 
shot.  The  artillery  on  shore  promptly  followed  suit, 
and  the  bombardment  was  kept  up  for  three  quar 
ters  of  an  hour,  the  Spaniards  making  no  reply 

*  By  an  order  dated  August  ist,  Major-General  Merritt  organized 
his  forces  into  a  division  (the  second  division  of  the  Eighth  Corps), 
under  Brigadier-General  Anderson,  whose  headquarters  were  at  Ca 
vite.  The  division  consisted  of  two  brigades  : 

First  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  MacArthur) — Fourteenth  and 
Twenty-third  Infantry,  Thirteenth  Minnesota,  First  North  Dakota, 
First  Idaho,  First  Wyoming,  and  Astor  Battery. 

becond  Brigade  (Brigadier-General  Greene) — Eighteenth  Infantry, 
First  California,  First  Nebraska,  First  Colorado,  Tenth  Pennsylvania, 
Third  Artillery,  Utah  Artillery,  and  Company  A,  United  States  En 
gineers. 

The  Second  Oregon,  the  California  Heavy  Artillery,  and  a  signal- 
corps  detachment  were  stationed  at  Cavite,  under  the  immediate  or 
ders  of  General  Anderson,  who  remained  at  that  point  until  August 
I3th.  General  Merritt  did  not  go  ashore  until  Manila  surrendered. 


THE    MANILA   CAMPAIGN 


375 


whatever.  Then,  Fort  San  Antonio  having  been 
heavily  buffeted,  and  its  magazine  exploded,  Greene 
sent  the  First  Colorado  forward  along  the  beach, 
and  signalled  the  navy  to  cease  firing.  As  the  Colo 
rado  men  advanced,  a  few  shots  came  from  behind 
the  Spanish  lines.  They  volleyed  in  reply,  forded 
the  shallow  channel  in  front  of  the  fort,  and  entered 
its  battered  walls  without  opposition.  The  garri 
son  had  deserted  it,  carrying  off  the  breech-blocks 
of  the  guns,  and  leaving  behind  a  wounded  man 
and  two  dead. 

MacArthur's  artillery,  on  the  right,  opened  o'n 
the  enemy's  lines  while  Dewey  was  bombarding 
Fort  San  Antonio,  the  Utah  gun  firing  upon  Block 
house  Fourteen,  from  which  no  response  came,  and 
the  Astor  Battery,  on  the  extreme  right,  engaging 
in  a  brief  duel  with  a  couple  of  field  guns  in  the 
Spanish  lines.  These  latter  having  ceased  firing,  a 
squad  of  the  Twenty-third  Infantry  scouted  forward 
and  found  that  the  enemy's  trenches  were  aban 
doned.  The  brigade  then  advanced,  and  the  Thir 
teenth  Minnesota  occupied  the  blockhouse,  where 
the  American  flag  was  hoisted  about  twenty  min 
utes  past  eleven.  Still  pushing  forward,  no  resist 
ance  was  encountered  till  the  Minnesota  regiment, 
leading  the  way,  entered  the  streets  of  the  suburban 
village  of  Cingalon. 

Here,  of  course,  the  ground  had  not  been  recon 
noitred.  There  was  a  blockhouse  in  the  village, 
with  emplacements — fortunately  empty — for  six 
guns.  It  was  held  by  the  rear  guard  of  the  retreat 
ing  Spaniards,  who  fired  into  the  Minnesota  men 
at  short  range,  causing  them  to  fall  back  in  some 
disorder.  The  position  was  a  strong  one,  and  it 
was  obstinately  held,  though  MacArthur  brought 
up  his  force  as  rapidly  as  he  could  over  the  difficult 
ground.  He  was  hampered  by  the  necessity  of 
moving  along  a  single  road,  with  thick  timber  and 
rice  swamps  on  either  hand.  Only  a  small  part  of 


376  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

his  brigade  could  be  put  on  the  firing  line ;  and  the 
check  was  so  serious  that  General  Anderson,  who 
was  now  in  Malate,  sent  over  the  field  telegraph  a 
message  instructing  him  to  retreat  from  Cingalon 
and  make  his  way  over  to  the  left  to  follow  Greene's 
advance.  This  was  at  twenty-five  minutes  past  one 
o'clock,  but  when  MacArthur  received  the  order — 
which  is  not  mentioned  in  his  report — the  Spanish 
fire  was  dying  out,  and  a  little  later  the  blockhouse 
was  abandoned,  leaving  the  way  to  Paco  and 
Manila  open. 

Meanwhile  Greene's  brigade,  entering  Malate, 
had  a  brief  exchange  of  fire  with  the  Spanish  posi 
tions  farther  inland ;  but  no  serious  resistance  was 
offered,  and  after  clearing  the  enemy's  line  of 
trenches  the  American  troops  marched  steadily 
forward  through  Malate  and  Ermita,  keeping  close 
to  the  bay.  The  Callao,  the  captured  Spanish  gun 
boat,  now  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Tappan, 
moved  beside  them  along  the  shore.  Occasional 
shots  still  came  from  street  corners  and  from  houses, 
though  when  they  reached  the  open  space  of  the 
Luneta — the  water-side  parade  ground  of  Manila — 
and  were  in  full  view  of  the  old  walled  city,  a  white 
flag  was  seen  flying  above  its  ancient  fortifications. 
The  white  ensign  of  surrender  had  been  hoisted 
shortly  after  eleven  o'clock,  in  answer  to  Dewey's 
signalled  demand,  and  Lieutenant 
B™.m!)y  and  Lieutenant -Colonel 
Whittier,  representing  the  admiral 
and  General  Merritt,  had  already  gone  ashore  to 
negotiate  terms  with  General  Jaudenes.  The  sur 
render  was  of  course  complete,  but  Spanish  honour 
was  salved  by  the  proviso  that  the  garrison  should 
"  capitulate  with  all  the  honours  of  war."  This 
enabled  them  to  claim  the  privilege  for  which  Toral 
pleaded  so  hard  at  Santiago — that  of  carrying  their 
arms  back  to  Spain.  Merritt  yielded  the  point — 
which  would  no  doubt  have  been  disallowed  by  his 


THE    MANILA   CAMPAIGN  377 

official  superiors  had  he  been  in  communication 
with  Washington,  as  Shafter  was.  For  the  rest,  the 
articles — finally  signed  on  Sunday,  August  I4th,  by 
a  commission  consisting  of  General  Greene,  Lieu 
tenant-Colonels  Whittier  and  Crowder,  of  Merritt's 
staff,  and  Captain  Lamberton,  chief  of  staff  to 
Dewey,  and  by  General  de  la  Pena  and  Colonels 
Reyes  and  Felifi  for  the  Spaniards — provided  that 
the  city,  its  defences,  and  all  public  property,  should 
be  turned  over  to  the  victorious  army;  that  Jau- 
denes's  troops  should  be  prisoners  of  war  pending 
the  conclusion  of  a  peace  treaty,  the  officers  retain 
ing  their  side  arms,  horses,  and  personal  property ; 
and  that  the  question  of  their  return  to  Spain  should 
be  left  to  the  United  States  Government. 

The  casualties  in  Greene's  brigade,  on  August 
1 3th,  were  one  man  killed  and  six -wounded;  in 
MacArthur's  brigade,  four  killed  and  thirty-nine 
wounded.  In  the  firing  between  the  trenches, 
earlier  in  the  month,  Greene  had  fifteen  killed  and 
sixty  wounded,  making  the  entire  American  loss  in 
action  during  the  Manila  campaign  twenty  killed 
and  one  hundred  and  five  wounded. 

It  appears  that  most  of  the  fighting  on  the  I3th, 
and  most  if  not  all  of  the  few  casualties  to  Merritt's 
men,  took  place  after  the  white  flag  had  gone  up 
over  the  Manila  walls.  The  order  to  cease  firing 
may  have  been  delayed  in  transmission  to  some 
parts  of  the  Spanish  lines,  or  may  not  have  been 
promptly  obeyed  when  received.  Each  army,  it 
seems,  blamed  the  other  for  the  desultory  exchange 
of  shots  that  accompanied  Greene's  march  into  the 
city.  At  one  point  a  body  of  insurgents,  on  the  road 
from  Paco,  had  fired  upon  the  Spaniards,  and  the 
latter  replied  with  a  volley  that  killed  one  man  and 
wounded  two  of  the  First  California,  the  only  loss 
the  regiment  suffered  during  the  day. 

Merritt  had  hoped,  by  closely  following  up  the 
retreating  Spaniards,  and  by  holding  the  bridges 


378  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

on  the  roads  entering  Manila  from  the  south  and 
east,  to  keep  Aguinaldo's  men  out  of  the  city,  where 
their  presence  could  only  be  a  serious  embarrass 
ment  and  a  menace  to  law  and  order.  Moreover, 
their  exclusion  appears  to  have  been  part  of  the 
understanding  with  the  captain-general.  Unfortu 
nately,  during  the  blocking  of  MacArthur's  advance 
at  Cingalon,  some  two  or  three  thousand  of  them 
made  their  way  in  from  Paco  and  established  them 
selves  at  several  points  in  the  suburbs.  They  are 
said  to  have  looted  some  houses,  among  them  the 
residence  of  a  Spanish  official  in  Ermita,  where  they 
broke  open  the  safe  and  appropriated  the  funds  it 
contained.  Though  they  were  held  in  check  by  the 
American  troops,  and  though  they  afterward  with 
drew  from  the  city,  the  friction  thus  caused  helped 
to  precipitate  the  disastrous  rupture  that  ultimately 
resulted. 

By  the  evening  of  the  I3th,  except  for  the  posi 
tions  held  by  the  insurgents,  Manila  was  effectively 
occupied  by  the  American  troops.  The  Oregon  regi 
ment  had  come  up  the  Pasig  in  boats  and  taken 
possession  of  the  walled  city,  where  Merritt  made 
his  headquarters  in  the  ayuntamiento,  or  city  hall. 
MacArthur's  brigade  was  distributed  through  Ma- 
late,  Ermita,  and  the  southern  suburbs,  while 
Greene  held  Binondo,  Tondo,  and  the  northern  dis 
tricts.  MacArthur  himself  was  appointed  governor 
of  the  city. 

And  so,  almost  without  a  blow,  the  seat  of  Span 
ish  power  in  the  east  was  captured,  with  thirteen 
thousand  prisoners  of  war,  twenty-two  thousand 
small  arms,  seventy  modern  and  several  hundred 
obsolete  pieces  of  artillery,  and  a  public  fund  of 
nine  hundred  thousand  dollars. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE    LATTER    DAYS    OF    THE    CUBAN    BLOCKADE 

AFTER  outlining  the  campaigns  of  Santiago, 
Porto  Rico,  and  Manila,  it  only  remains,  in  order 
to  complete  the  military  and  naval  record  of  the  war, 
to  chronicle  several  minor  engagements  that  took 
place  on  the  Cuban  coast  during  the  last  two 
months  of  hostilities.  The  story  of  the  blockade 
has  already  been  briefly  given  up  to  the  point  at 
which  the  advent  of  Cervera  changed  the  course  of 
events.  When  the  struggle  centred  about  Santi 
ago,  and  the  main  strength  of  the  American  navy 
was  concentrated  there  under  Admiral  Sampson, 
Commodore  Watson  was  left  in  command  off  Ha 
vana.  At  this  time,  it  may  be  recalled,  the  blockade 
covered  only  a  hundred  miles  of  the  island's  north 
ern  coast,  from  Bahia  Honda  to  Cardenas,  and  the 
port  of  Cienfuegos  on  the  south ;  but  it  was  pro 
posed  to  extend  it  as  soon  as  possible.  To  reinforce 
Watson's  scanty  fleet — composed  of  small  armed 
auxiliaries — vessels  were  drawn  from  Commodore 
Howell's  squadron,  patrolling  the  North  Atlantic 
coast ;  and  on  June  I9th  Sampson  sent  word  to 
Washington : 

The  President  may  declare  immediately  the  blockade 
of  whole  southern  coast. 

Three  days  later  Secretary  Long  telegraphed  to  the 
admiral : 

It  is  proposed  to  proclaim  the  blockade  on  the  east  * 
side  of  Cape  Cruz,  Cuba,  to  Cape  Frances,  Cuba.  When 
will  you  be  ready? 

*  This  word  should  probably  read  "  south." 
25  379 


380  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

And  again  on  June  24th : 

Reports  constantly  received  of  provisions  reaching 
Spanish  forces  via  southern  port  of  Cuba,  and  of  prepara 
tion  at  Mexico,  Jamaica,  to  forward  further  supplies; 
therefore  the  department  desires  greatly  to  keep  all  block 
ade  effective,  to  establish  blockade  from  Cape  Cruz,  Cuba, 
to  Cape  Frances,  Cuba.  When  shall  you  be  ready  for  the 
latter  to  be  proclaimed? 

On  the  28th  the  proclamation  was  issued,  the  port 
of  San  Juan,  in  Porto  Rico,  being  included.  This 
set  the  navy  a  difficult  task.  Sampson  had  tele 
graphed,  on  June  23d,  that  the  detachment  of  men- 
of-war  for  convoy  duty  with  transports  would  "  so 
reduce  the  available  ships  for  blockade  as  to  make 
it  quite  impossible  to  maintain  strict  blockade  on 
the  whole  of  Cuba.  Vessels  running  blockade,"  he 
added,  "  are  smaller  in  size  but  greatly  increased  in 
number." 

Watson  had  now  been  ordered  to  Guantanamo, 
to  organize  a  squadron  for  a  strategic  move  against 
the  coast  of  Spain ;  and  to  take  his  place,  on  June 
25th,  Commodore  Howell  was  instructed  to  bring 
his  remaining  ships  south.  On  July  ist,  when  he 
reached  Key  West,  Howell  was  put  in  charge  of 
the  blockade,  his  new  command  being  designated 
as  the  "  first  North  Atlantic  squadron,"  and  being 
still  subject  to  Sampson's  authority  as  commander- 
in-chief.  At  this  date  the  admiral  had  a  total  of 
ninety-eight  vessels  under  his  orders. 

During  June,  the  tedious  routine  of  the  blockade 

was  enlivened  by  but  little  fighting.     On  the  I3th 

the   Yankee — ordered   to   Cienfuegos 

ciheenfYuengkoes'at  after  ^T  brief  service  with  Sampson 
June  13.  at  Santiago,  and  specially  commis 

sioned  to  watch  for  the  blockade  run 
ner  Purissima  Concepcion,  which  was  afterward 
destroyed  at  Manzanillo — had  a  brush  with  two 
Spanish  vessels,  the  Gallicia  and  a  smaller  gunboat; 
and  though  the  enemy  had  the  aid  of  shore  bat- 


LAST   DAYS   OF   THE   CUBAN    BLOCKADE     381 

teries,  her  amateur  gunners — the  New  York  naval 
reserve  men — drove  their  antagonists  into  the  har 
bour.  Cubans  with  whom  Commander  Brownson 
communicated  a  few  days  later  told  him  that  the 
Gallicia  was  so  badly  damaged  when  she  retreated 
that  she  was  beached  to  prevent  her  from  sinking. 
The  Yankee  was  not  hit,  though  she  had  one  man 
wounded  by  fragments  of  a  shell  that  burst  just 
outside  a  gun  port. 

A  week  later  (June  2oth)  she  exchanged  shots 
with  another  gunboat  at  Casilda,  the  port  of  Trini 
dad,  forty  miles  east  of  Cienfuegos — as  did  also  the 
Dixie  on  the  22d.  On  the  29th  the  Dixie,  the 
Eagle,  and  the  Yankton  practised  upon  a  body  of 
Spanish  cavalry  at  Rio  Hondo,  between  Casilda  and 
Cienfuegos. 

The   chief   Spanish    strongholds    on   the    south 

coast,  west  of  Santiago,  were  Cienfuegos  and  Man- 

zanillo.     The  first   reconnaissance   of 

First  attack  on       the   jatter  made   Qn  j  th     i 

Manzanillo,  ...  .      ,     J  ,,         °        .       ?, 

june  30.  three  auxiliaries  of  the      mosquito 

class — the  Hist,  the  Hornet,  and  the 
Wompatuck.  This  adventurous  little  squadron,  two 
yachts  and  a  tug,  with  Lieutenant  Young,  of  the 
Hist,  as  its  senior  officer,  steamed  boldly  into  the 
bay — a  wide,  shallow  sheet  of  water  behind  a  line 
of  keys.  In  the  entrance  it  encountered  a  Spanish 
gunboat,  which  was  speedily  disabled  and  blown  up. 
Nearing  Manzanillo,  quite  a  formidable  array  of  de 
fences  was  found.  Five  gunboats  and  some  armed 
pontoons  were  drawn  up  across  the  inner  harbour ;  * 

*  Lieutenant  Young  reports  seeing  a  large  torpedo  boat,  four  gun 
boats,  and  four  large  pontoons.  Lieutenant  Helm,  of  the  Hornet,  ob 
served  "five  to  six  armed  vessels."  Lieutenant  Jungen,  of  the  Wom 
patuck,  saw  a  torpedo  boat,  three  small  gun  vessels,  an  old  steam 
cruiser,  and  a  sailing  vessel.  Captain  Barreda,  the  Spanish  commander 
of  the  port,  states  that  his  force  consisted  of  five  gunboats— the  Guan- 
tanamo,  the  Estrella,  the  Delgado  Pareja.  the  Guardian,  and  the  Cuba 
Esoanola,  the  last  two  being  disabled— and  the  pontoon  Maria,  supported 
by  the  "  few  guns  "  that  the  city  had.  He  reports  his  loss  as  two  killed 
and  seven  wounded  on  the  ships,  and  a  few  wounded  on  shore.  On 


382  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

behind  them  were  several  small  batteries  on  the 
water  front,  and  another  in  a  fort  above  the  town, 
while  for  two  miles  the  shore  was  lined  with  sol 
diers. 

Though  the  odds  were  heavily  against  them,  the 
three  little  American  ships  steamed  up  within  a  mile 
of  the  enemy,  and  for  an  hour  and  a  half  a  brisk 
fire  was  exchanged.  The  attacking  vessels  were  re 
peatedly  hit,  but  received  no  material  injury  till  a 
shot  cut  the  Hornet's  steam  pipe,  temporarily  dis 
abling  her,  and  scalding  three  of  her  crew.  She 
was  towed  out  of  range  by  the  Wompatuck,  and 
the  squadron  withdrew.  The  Spaniards  had  suf 
fered  far  more  severely.  One  of  their  gunboats  and 
a  sloop  loaded  with  soldiers  were  sunk,  and  a  pon 
toon  burned ;  but  it  was  clear,  as  Lieutenant  Young 
reported  to  Sampson,  that  a  much  stronger  force 
than  his  was  needed  to  capture  the  place. 

The  Scorpion  (Lieutenant-Commander  Marix) 
and  the  Osceola  (Lieutenant  Purcell)  were  to  have 
joined  in  the  attack  on  Manzanillo,  but  they  did  not 
receive  their  orders  in  time.  Arriving  on  the  fol 
lowing  day  (July  ist),  and  missing  the  Hist  and 
her  consorts,  they  made  an  independent  reconnais 
sance,  steaming  into  the  bay  and  opening  fire  on 
the  Spanish  gunboats.  The  return  fire  was  so 
heavy  and  accurate  that  after  a  twenty  minutes'  en 
gagement  Marix  decided  to  withdraw.  The  two 
ships  remained  outside,  watching  the  port,  and  cap 
turing  some  small  prizes.  The  skipper  of  a  British 
schooner,  the  Edmund  Blunt,  which  came  out  car 
rying  refugees  to  Jamaica,  told  them  that  the  town 
was  in  great  straits  for  food. 

On  that  same  day  (July  ist)  Commodore  Howell 
arrived  at  Key  West  from  the  north,  and  took  per 
sonal  charge  of  the  north  coast  blockade.  As  to  the 

the  other  hand,  the  captain  of  the  British  ship  Edmund  Blunt  told  an 
officer  of  the  Scorpion  that  an  American  shell  killed  thirteen  men  on 
the  Maria. 


LAST    DAYS   OF    THE    CUBAN   BLOCKADE     383 

extent  of  this,  there  was  some  doubt  and  misunder 
standing.     For  once,  the  clocklike  workings  of  the 
Navy     Department     seem     to     have 
Howeiiin  slipped  a  cog.     Howell  found  no  or- 

charge  of  the  ,  •*.•!_•  ^    ^^          ixr  i 

blockade  July i  ders  awaiting  him  at  Key  West,  and 
to  his  request  for  instructions  the  only 
answer  was  a  despatch  saying  that  his  duty  was  to 
be  "  that  formerly  performed  by  Commodore  Wat 
son  as  inspector  of  blockade."  Taking  his  flagship, 
the  cruiser  San  Francisco,  to  Havana,  he  found 
there  only  Watson's  directions  to  the  vessels  on  that 
one  station.  He  therefore  confined  himself  to  pa 
trolling  the  coast  from  Bahia  Honda  to  Cardenas, 
the  limits  fixed  by  the  President's  proclamation  of 
April  2 1  st. 

On  July  Qth,  however,  Sampson  sent  him  in 
structions  to  blockade  the  whole  north  coast  of 
Cuba,  as  far  as  his  force  permitted,  and  especially 
the  part  of  it  between  Nipe  and  Nuevitas,  to  pre 
vent  communication  between  Havana  and  the  Span 
ish  troops  in  Santiago  province.  Howell  carried 
out  the  order  as  well  as  he  could,  though  he  re 
ported  that  he  needed  fifty  vessels — more  than 
twice  as  many  as  he  could  muster* — to  do  the  work 
effectively.  He  also  applied  to  the  Navy  Depart 
ment  for  more  precise  information  as  to  the  status 
of  the  blockade ;  but  the  misunderstanding  seems 
to  have  continued,  for  on  August  8th  he  received 
the  following  despatch  from  Secretary  Long : 

By  what  authority  are  you  blockading  Sagua  La 
Grande?  It  is  not  included  in  the  President's  proclama 
tion.  Sampson  has  not  informed  department  that  he  has 
blockaded  it,  and  therefore  no  proclamation  has  been 

*  On  August  3d  Howell  reported  only  fourteen  vessels  at  their  sta 
tions  on  the  north-coast  blockade  -  nine  off  Havana,  two  off  Matanzas, 
two  off  Sagua  la  Grande,  one  off  Cardenas,  none  off  such  ports  as 
Mariel  and  Bahia  Honda— and  added  :  "  I  desire  to  call  your  attention 
to  the  small  number  of  ships  with  which  I  am  supposed  to  keep  up  an 
efficient  blockade  of  over  four  hundred  miles  of  coast,  and  also  to  the 
fact  that  most  of  these  ships  are  of  low  speed,  light  gun  fire,  and  would 
be  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  a  hurricane." 


384  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

issued.  Courts  are  releasing  vessels  captured.  Claims  for 
damages  will  be  heavy.  Protests  from  three  governments 
already  received  at  State  Department. 

In  reply,  Howell  informed  the  secretary  of  the 
directions  received  from  Sampson,  and  stated  that 
he  had  allowed  the  •  Nuevitas  to  Nipe  blockade  to 
lapse  after  the  surrender  of  Santiago,  but  was 
patrolling  the  coast  farther  west,  between  Cardenas 
and  Nuevitas,  in  order  to  prevent  the  landing  of 
supplies  for  Havana,  which,  he  had  learned,  was 
being  done  on  a  large  scale.  Secretary  Long  an 
swered  by  instructing  him  to  restrict  the  blockade 
to  its  original  limits,  not  molesting  vessels  trading 
with  other  ports,  unless  they  were  Spanish  or  car 
ried  contraband  cargoes ;  and  in  compliance  with 
this  he  withdrew  his  ships  from  the  coast  east  of 
Cardenas. 

Though  Howell's  force  was  so  small,  it  made 
two  captures  in  July  that  seriously  discouraged  the 
business  of  blockade  running.  The  victims  were 
two  Spanish  Atlantic  liners,  vessels  of  five  thousand 
tons  each — the  Alfonso  XII,  which,  after  showing 
her  heels  to  the  Eagle  off  the  Isle  of  Pines,  was  run 
ashore  at  Mariel  by  the  Hawk,  and  set  on  fire  by 
shells  from  the  Castine ;  and  the  Santo  Domingo, 
which,  pursued  by  the  Eagle,  met  a  like  fate  near 
Cape  Frances,  on  the  south  coast.  The  latter  vessel 
was  armed  with  two  five-inch  guns — which  she  did 
not  attempt  to  use — and  carried  in  her  hold  two 
twelve-inch  rifles  and  a  full  cargo  of  provisions,  in 
tended  for  Havana. 

The  capture  of  Nipe  Bay,  on  the  2ist  of  July, 
was  of  importance  because  it  secured  another  har 
bour  of  refuge  for  the  blockading 
iy™iPe  squadron  and  a  half-way  station  on 
the  direct  route  to  Porto  Rico.  It 
was  executed  by  the  Annapolis  (Commander 
Hunker),  the  Wasp  (Lieutenant  Ward),  the  Topeka 
(Lieutenant-Commander  Cowles),  and  the  Leyden 


LAST   DAYS   OF   THE   CUBAN   BLOCKADE     385 

(Ensign  Crosley),  under  direct  orders  from  Samp 
son.  Cuban  insurgents  had  informed  Cowles  that 
the  place  was  held  by  eight  hundred  Spanish  troops, 
the  nine-hundred-ton  gunboat  Jorge  Juan,  and  a 
smaller  vessel,  with  mines  and  a  battery  to  defend 
the  entrance.  Approaching  the  mouth  of  the  bay, 
Commander  Hunker,  senior  officer  of  the  attacking 
squadron,  ordered  the  Wasp  and  the  Leyden  to 
steam  ahead  and  develop  the  enemy's  strength.  The 
young  officers  commanding  the  two  small  vessels 
were  so  eager  for  the  fray  that  they  raced  forward 
at  full  speed,*  the  Wasp  overhauling  her  consort 
and  reaching  the  entrance  first.  The  shore  battery 
proved  to  be  dismantled ;  the  mines  were  there,  as 
was  afterward  found,  but  the  daring  little  craft 
passed  them  without  injury — probably  for  the  same 
reason  that  made  the  torpedoes  in  Guantanamo  Bay 
so  harmless  to  the  Texas  and  the  Marblehead.f  In 
the  bay,  quite  unprepared  for  action — no  doubt 
through  misplaced  confidence  in  the  protection  of 
the  mines — lay  the  Jorge  Juan,  at  anchor,  with  her 
awnings  spread,  her  boats  lowered  alongside,  and 
her  firemen  hurriedly  attempting  to  get  up  steam. 
The  Wasp  and  the  Leyden  promptly  opened  fire, 
which  she  returned  with  such  of  her  guns — her  main 
battery  consisted  of  three  six-inch  rifles — as  she 
could  bring  to  bear,  being  of  course  unable  to 
manoeuvre.  The  Annapolis  and  the  Topeka  were 
within  range  a  few  minutes  later,  and  in  half  an 
hour  the  Jorge  Juan  was  sinking.  A  boat  from 
the  Leyden  captured  her  colours  just  before  she 
went  down,  and  the  Annapolis  took  off  one  of 
her  small  guns.  Her  crew,  or  most  of  it,  escaped 
ashore. 


*  Lieutenant  Ward  was  so  anxious  to  establish  the  fact  that  he  was 
instructed  to  go  in  first  that  he  submitted  a  special  report  citing  the 
names  of  thirty-five  witnesses— members  of  his  crew — who,  he  said, 
could  testify  that  Commander  Hunker  authorized  him  to  take  the  lead. 

t  Page  202. 


386  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

The  other  vessel  reported  to  be  in  the  bay  was 
not  to  be  found.  Insurgents  afterward  told  Com 
mander  Hunker  that  the  Spaniards  had  taken  her 
up  a  creek  and  sunk  her,  and  had  then  abandoned 
the  place,  retreating  to  Holguin. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  south  coast,  Lieutenant-Com 
mander  Marix  was  still  blockading  Manzanillo,  but 
had  deferred  another  attack  until  an 
Attacks  on  Man-  a(jequate  force  COuld  be  mustered. 

zanillo,  July  18        TT  «  0  /L  , 

and  Aug.  12.  He  sent  word  to  Sampson  (by  the 
Hist,  on  July  nth)  that  he  was 
willing  and  anxious  to  assault,  but  that  he  consid 
ered  it  his  duty — though  it  would  probably  place 
another  officer  in  command — to  recommend  that  a 
protected  man-of-war  should  be  assigned  to  the 
work.  As  a  result  the  Wilmington  (Commander 
Todd)  and  the  Helena  (Commander  Swinburne) 
were  detached  to  join  Marix's  squadron,  and  on  the 
1 7th  these  two  gunboats  rendezvoused  with  the 
Scorpion,  the  Hist,  the  Hornet,  the  Wompatuck, 
and  the  Osceola  at  Guayabal,  twenty  miles  west  of 
Manzanillo,  Commander  Todd  being  senior  officer. 
Early  next  morning  they  were  in  the  bay,  where 
they  lay  for  three  hours  deliberately  firing  upon  the 
Spanish  ships,  opening  at  long  range  and  gradually 
closing  in,  until  nothing  was  to  be  seen  afloat  in  the 
harbour.  All  the  enemy's  gunboats  were  burned 
or  sunk,  as  was  also  the  blockade-runner  Purissima 
Concepcion.  The  American  ships,  which  were  en 
tirely  uninjured,  then  withdrew,  Sampson  having 
ordered  them  not  to  engage  the  forts. 

One  of  the  navy's  marvellously  few  casualties 
during  the  war  occurred  on  August  2d,  when 
the  Bancroft,  which  had  been  patrolling  about 
the  Isle  of  Pines,*  sent  a  launch  into  Cortes  Bay 
in  pursuit  of  a  schooner,  and  one  of  the  boat's 

*  It  had  been  believed  that  provisions  were  being:  sent  to  Havana 
from  the  Isle  of  Pines,  but  Commander  Clover  reported  that  this  was 
probably  untrue,  as  food  was  very  scarce  on  the  island. 


LAST   DAYS   OF   THE   CUBAN    BLOCKADE     387 

crew  was  killed  by  rifle  fire  from  an  ambuscade  on 
shore. 

The  last  action  on  the  southern  coast  of  Cuba 
was  the  fourth  and  final  attack  on  Manzanillo,  on 
August  1 2th.  On  the  o,th  the  Newark — now  com 
manded  by  Captain  Goodrich,  formerly  of  the  St. 
Louis,  Captain  Barker  having  been  transferred  to 
the  Oregon — and  the  Resolute,  carrying  Colonel 
Huntington's  marine  battalion,  left  Guantanamo  for 
the  Isle  of  Pines ;  but  as  some  smaller  vessels,  which 
were  to  have  accompanied  them,  were  not  ready, 
Captain  Goodrich  decided,  at  the  suggestion  of 
Lieutenant  Young,  of  the  Hist,  to  strike  at  Man 
zanillo  while  waiting.  With  a  flotilla  consisting  of 
the  Newark,  the  Resolute,  the  Suwanee,  the  Hist, 
the  Osceola,  and  the  Alvarado — the  last  being  the 
gunboat  captured  at  Santiago,  now  commanded  by 
Lieutenant  Blue — he  entered  the  bay  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  1 2th,  and  sent  in  a  demand  for  the  sur 
render  of  the  town  and  garrison,  which  was  refused. 
Goodrich  then  began  to  use  his  guns.  After  half 
an  hour's  firing  he  saw,  or  thought  he  saw,  a  white 
flag,  and  ordered  the  Alvarado,  also  flying  the  signal 
of  truce,  to  go  in  and  communicate  with  the  Span 
iards.  The  latter,  however,  continued  their  fire,  and 
the  bombardment  was  resumed,  and  kept  up  until 
sunset,  the  Newark  firing  an  occasional  shell  dur 
ing  the  night. 

At  daybreak  white  flags  were  seen  in  the  town, 
and  a  boat  came  out  with  the  news  that  the  peace 
protocol  had  been  signed.  The  armistice  robbed 
the  navy  of  another  victory,  for  it  appears  that  the 
Spanish  comandante  had  drawn  up  a  formal  docu 
ment  of  surrender  on  the  previous  evening,  and 
was  intending  to  send  it  to  Captain  Goodrich  in 
the  morning. 

The  last  shots  of  the  Havana  blockade  were 
heard  at  dawn  on  the  I2th,  when  the  San  Fran 
cisco  went  within  range  of  the  batteries,  which  fired 


388  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

on  her,  and  a  twelve-inch  shell  from  the  Morro 
went  through  her  stern,  doing  but  little  damage. 
The  last  shots  of  the  war  were  exchanged  between 
the  Mangrove  and  two  Spanish  gunboats  off  Cai- 
barien,  in  Santa  Clara  province,  on  the  morning  of 
August  1 4th. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

THE    CONCLUSION    OF    PEACE 

IN  the  early  days  of  July,  when  Cervera's  fleet 
had  been  destroyed;  when  the  fall  of  Santiago  was 
imminent,  and  the  American  troops  were  already 
preparing  to  move  upon  Porto  Rico ;  when  the  last 
hope  of  relieving  Manila  was  abandoned,  and  Spain 
itself  was  threatened  with  attack,  the  hopelessness 
of  prolonging  the  struggle  began  to  be  evident 
even  at  Madrid.  The  air  was  full  of  rumours  of 
negotiations  for  peace.  Rumours  became  certainty 
on  the  26th  of  the  month,  when  Jules  Cambon,  the 
French  ambassador  at  Washington,  called  at  the 
White  House  and  presented  an  informal  but  definite 
inquiry,  on  behalf  of  Sagasta's  Government,  as  to 
the  terms  upon  which  the  United  States  would  be 
willing  to  end  the  war. 

He  got  his  answer  on  the  3Oth,  in  a  long  inter 
view  with  the  President.  The  conditions  offered 
were  that  Spain  should  renounce  all  claim  to  sover 
eignty  in  Cuba,  and  evacuate  the  island  at  once ; 
that  Porto  Rico,  with  its  dependent  islets,  and  one 
of  the  Ladrones,  should  be  ceded  to  the  United 
States ;  and  that  the  American  forces  should  occupy 
the  city  and  bay  of  Manila  pending  the  conclusion 
of  a  treaty  of  peace,  by  which  the  "  control,  disposi 
tion,  and  government "  of  the  Philippines  should 
be  finally  decided. 

Sagasta's  cabinet  met  on  Monday,  August  ist,  to 
consider  these  terms.  It  took  several  days  for  Span- 

389 


390  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

ish  pride  to  swallow  so  severe  a  dose  of  humiliation  ; 
and  it  was  not  until  the  7th  that  the  minister  of 
state,  the  Duke  of  Almodovar  del  Rio,  replied. 
His  note  accepted  the  first  two  propositions ;  to  the 
third  it  also  gave  a  seeming  acceptance,  though  in 
somewhat  ambiguous  terms.  To  remove  all  doubt, 
Secretary  Day  drew  up  a  protocol 
Protocol"  stating  clearly,  and  without  the  slight 

est  modification,  the  terms  already 
offered  to  Spain ;  and  this  document  he  sent  to  M. 
Cambon  for  signature.  Its  precise  contents  were: 

ARTICLE  I.  Spain  will  relinquish  all  claim  of  sover 
eignty  over  and  title  to  Cuba. 

ART.  II.  Spain  will  cede  to  the  United  States  the  island 
of  Porto  Rico  and  other  islands  now  under  Spanish  sov 
ereignty  in  the  West  Indies,  and  also  an  island  in  the 
Ladrones,  to  be  selected  by  the  United  States. 

ART.  III.  The  United  States  will  occupy  and  hold  the 
city,  bay,  and  harbour  of  Manila  pending  the  conclusion 
of  a  treaty  of  peace,  which  shall  determine  the  control,  dis 
position,  and  government  of  the  Philippines. 

ART.  IV.  Spain  will  immediately  evacuate  Cuba, 
Porto  Rico,  and  other  islands  now  under  Spanish  sover 
eignty  in  the  West  Indies;  and  to  this  end  each  Govern 
ment  will,  within  ten  days  after  the  signing  of  this  protocol, 
appoint  commissioners,  and  the  commissioners  so  ap 
pointed  shall,  within  thirty  days  after  the  signing  of  this 
protocol,  meet  at  Havana  for  the  purpose  of  arranging 
and  carrying  out  the  details  of  the  aforesaid  evacuation  of 
Cuba  and  the  adjacent  Spanish  islands;  and  each  Govern 
ment  will,  within  ten  days  after  the  signing  of  this  proto 
col,  also  appoint  other  commissioners,  who  shall,  within 
thirty  days  after  the  signing  of  this  protocol,  meet  at  San 
Juan,  in  Porto  Rico,  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  and 
carrying  out  the  details  of  the  aforesaid  evacuation  of 
Porto  Rico  and  other  islands  now  under  Spanish  sover 
eignty  in  the  West  Indies. 

ART.  V.  The  United  States  and  Spain  will  each  ap 
point  not  more  than  five  commissioners  to  treat  of  peace, 
and  the  commissioners  so  appointed  shall  meet  at  Paris 
not  later  than  October  i,  1898,  and  proceed  to  the  negotia 
tion  and  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace,  which  treaty  shall 
be  subject  to  ratification  according  to  the  respective  con 
stitutional  forms  of  the  two  countries. 

ART.  VI.  Upon  the  conclusion  and  signing  of  this 
protocol  hostilities  between  the  two  countries  shall  be  sus- 


THE   CONCLUSION   OF   PEACE  391 

pended,  and  notice  to  that  effect  shall  be  given  as  soon 
as  possible  by  each  Government  to  the  commanders  of  its 
military  and  naval  forces. 

Once  more,  of  course,  a  reference  to  Madrid  was 
necessary ;  but  acceptance  was  the  only  possible 
course,  and  M.  Cambon  was  authorized  -to  sign 
the  protocol  with  Secretary  Day.  The  formal  act 
that  ended  hostilities  took  place  in  the  cabinet  room 
of  the  White  House,  at  twenty-three  minutes  past 
four  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  August  I2th.  It 
has  already  been  told  how  the  news  reached  Miles's 
army  in  Porto  Rico  just  in  time  to  stop  a  battle  at 
Aibonito  and  another  near  Cayey ;  how  it  prevented 
the  surrender  of  Manzanillo,  but  was  too  late  to 
save  Manila. 

On  August  26th  the  President  named  the  Amer 
ican  peace  commissioners — William  R.  Day,  Sec 
retary  of  State,  chairman;  Senator  Davis,  of  Min 
nesota,  chairman  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee ;  Senator  Frye,  of  Maine;  Justice  White, 
of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court ;  and  Whitelaw 
Reid,  formerly  minister  to  France.  One  of  these, 
Justice  White,  declined  to  serve,  and  his  place  was 
taken  by  Senator  Gray,  of  Delaware,  a  leading 
Democratic  member  of  the  Senate.  Spain's  com 
missioners  were  Eugenio  Montero  Rios,  president 
of  the  Spanish  senate,  chairman ;  Senor  de  Abar- 
zuza,  a  member  of  the  same  body,  and  formerly  his 
country's  ambassador  at  Paris ;  Senor  de  Garnica, 
a  justice  of  the  supreme  court;  General  Rafael 
Cerero;  and  Senor  de  Villa  Urrutia,  Spanish  min 
ister  to  Belgium. 

The  commission  met  in  Paris,  on  October  1st, 

the  French  Government  providing  quarters  for  it 

in    the    foreign    office    on    the    Quai 

^Pari^*"116*    d'°rsai-      Its   conferences   lasted   ten 

Ocf  TD'CC  10.      weeks,  the  Spaniards  fighting  hard  for 

concessions  that  would  at  least  enable 

their  Government  to  put  the  best  possible  face  on 


392 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


the  disasters  it  had  brought  upon  itself.  Cuba  be 
ing  dealt  with  first,  they  sought  to  free  Spain  from 
the  huge  debt  that  she  had  contracted  in  her  mal 
administration  of  the  island's  affairs,  urging  that 
international  law  requires  that  the  liabilities  of  a 
territory  should  pass  with  its  sovereignty.  The 
American  commissioners  declined  to  admit  the  prin 
ciple  in  this  particular  case,  for  the  reason — a  rea 
son  of  indisputable  equity — that  the  so-called  Cuban 
debt  was  not  contracted  in  any  sense  for  the  benefit 
of  Cuba,  but  was  incurred  by  Spain  in  her  ineffec 
tual  and  costly  efforts  to  subjugate  the  island. 

The  Americans  also  declined  a  proposition  that 
Cuba  should  be  ceded  direct  to  the  United  States, 
the  Spanish  contention  being  that  if  Spain  withdrew 
her  authority,  and  the  United  States  asserted  none, 
the  island  would  be  left  in  a  state  of  anarchy.  This 
was  a  mere  technical  objection,  perhaps  a  deliberate 
attempt  at  embarrassment,  the  Washington  Govern 
ment  having  pledged  itself  before  the  world  to  leave 
Cuba  to  her  own  people. 

A  much  more  serious  difference  arose  when  the 
question  of  the  Philippines  was  taken  up,  and  the 
Spaniards  were  first  informed  (October  3ist)  that 
entire  possession  of  the  great  eastern  archipelago 
was  required  for  the  United  States.  The  demand 
was  referred  to  Madrid,  where  it  was  answered  by 
a  flat  refusal ;  and  it  actually  appeared,  for  a  time, 
that  the  negotiations  might  be  broken  off.  It  seems 
clear  that  the  Spanish  Government  regarded  the 
protocol  as  leaving  its  sovereignty  in  the  Philip 
pines  intact,  and  not  open  to  subsequent  challenge. 
In  a  despatch  sent  on  August  7th  the  Duke  of 
Almodovar  del  Rio  declared  that  in  assenting  to  the 
clause  about  Manila,  his  country  did  not  renounce 
her  title  to  the  islands,  but  left  it  to  the  peace  com 
mission  "  to  agree  upon  such  reforms  as  the  condi 
tion  of  these  dependencies  and  the  civilization  of 
their  natives  may  render  desirable."  But  it  is  equally 


THE   CONCLUSION   OF   PEACE 


393 


clear  that  the  terms  of  the  document  have  an  en 
tirely  different  meaning.  They  express  precisely 
what  Secretary  Day  meant  them  to  express — that 
the  United  States  Government  had  not  decided 
whether  it  desired  to  annex  the  Philippines,  and 
that  their  ownership  was  left  for  later  settlement. 
"  Possession  "  was  the  word  in  the  original  draft  of 
the  protocol ;  "  disposition  "  was  substituted  at  M. 
Cambon's  suggestion,  as  a  word  less  offensive  to 
Spanish  sensibilities. 

The  Spaniards  suggested  arbitration  as  to  the 
/^-^rneaning  of  the  protocol,  which  was  of  course  re 
fused,  and  no  progress  was  made  until  November 
2 1st,  when  the  American  commissioners  made  a 
final  proposition — practically  an  ultimatum,  allow 
ing  a  week  for  a  definite  reply.  The  demand  for 
the  archipelago  was  not  modified,  but  it  was  prom 
ised  that  for  ten  years  Spanish  ships  and  merchan 
dise  should  enter  Philippine  ports  on  equal  terms 
with  American  traders,  and  that  the  United 
States  should  pay  to  Spain  the  sum  of  twenty 
million  dollars.  An  impression  went  abroad  that 
the  money  was  offered  as  a  repayment  of  such 
part  of  the  Spanish  Government's  past  expenditures 
in  the  islands  as  represented  actual  betterments. 
Spain's  commissioners  may  have  accepted  it  as  such 
— perhaps  to  veil  the  commercial  character  of  the 
transaction ;  but  it  appears  that  the  offer  was  in 
tended  by  the  American  commissioners — at  any  rate 
by  most  of  them — as  practically  a  proposition  of 
sale  and  purchase,  or  at  least  a  douceur  to  facilitate 
the  desired  agreement.*  Neither  in  the  wording  of 
the  proposal  as  submitted  on  November  2ist,  nor  in 
the  treaty  as  finally  drawn,  is  any  reason  or  con 
sideration  for  the  payment  specified. 

*  That  this  view  was  taken  by  the  American  commissioners  has  been 
explicitly  stated  by  at  lea^t  two  of  them.  At  the  dinner  of  the  Ohio 
Society  in  New  York,  February  25,  1899,  Senator  Gray  spoke  of  the 
choice  that  presented  itself  of  taking  the  islands  either  "  by  the  ruthless 


394  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

On  the  28th,  the  day  by  which  an  answer  was 
required,  the  Spaniards  signified  their  acceptance, 
coupling  it  with  a  formal  and  of  course  ineffectual 
protest.  Recognising  the  impossibility  of  resisting 
their  powerful  antagonist,  they  declared,  and  to 
avoid  still  greater  loss  and  suffering  to  their  coun 
try,  they  could  do  nothing  but  yield  to  the  victor's 
terms,  however  harsh.  And  so,  on  the  evening  of 
December  loth,  the  commissioners  met  for  the  last 
time  to  sign  the  treaty  that  freed  Cuba  from  Spain, 
and  transferred  a  colonial  empire  from  an  ancient 
monarchy  of  Europe  to  the  young  and  mighty  re 
public  of  the  west. 

hand  of  conquest,  or  by  some  concessions  that  comported  with  the 
greatness  and  character  of  this  country.  And  therefore,"  he  went  on, 
u  we  believed  that  it  was  better  ...  to  take  them  by  voluntary  cession 
and  by  purchase,  so  to  speak." 

Secretary  Day,  in  a  letter  published  in  the  daily  press  on  October 
12,  1899,  quotes  and  approves  Senator  Gray's  statement,  and  adds : 
"  It  was  not  claimed  that  the  United  States  had  a  right  to  the  Philip 
pine  Islands  as  a  matter  of  conquest.  By  the  cession  for  a  considera 
tion  we  obtained  an  indisputable  title." 

On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Whitelaw  Reid  (Later  Aspects  of  Our  New 
Duties,  page  9)  says  that  when  the  American  commissioners  first  de 
manded  the  cession  of  the  islands,  they  "accompanied  this  demand  for 
a  transfer  of  sovereignty  with  a  stipulation  for  assuming  any  existing 
indebtedness  of  Spain,  incurred  for  public  works  and  improvements  of 
a  pacific  character  in  the  Philippines.  The  United  States  thus  asserted 
its  right  to  the  archipelago  for  indemnity,  and  at  the  same  time  com 
mitted  itself  to  the  principle  of  payment  on  account  of  the  Philippine 
debt "  ;  and  that  though  the  ultimatum  gave  no  reason  for  the  twenty- 
million-dollar  payment,  "it  was  really  nothing  but  the  old  proposition, 
with  the  mention  for  the  first  time  of  a  specific  sum  for  the  payment, 
and  without  any  question  of  'pacific  improvements.'  That  sum  just 
balanced  the  Philippine  debt— forty  million  Mexican,  or,  say,  twenty 
million  American  dollars." 

The  difference  of  opinion  between  Mr.  Reid  and  his  colleagues  is 
curious. 


INDEX 


Abarzuza,   Senor  de,   Spanish  peace  commissioner,  391. 

Acosta,  Commander,  of  the  Reina  Mercedes,  196. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  on  Cuba,  18. 

Adjuntas,  Porto  Rico,  340,  343. 

Adria,  American  steamer,  155. 

Agafia,  capital  of  Guam,  354,  355. 

Aguadores,  Fort,  230,  235;  Duffield's  movement  against,  259;  bom 
barded  by  Sampson,  260;  second  movement  against,  262. 

Aguadores  River,  240,  242,  249;  emergency  hospital  at,  264. 

Aguila  Negra,  Cuban  revolutionary  society,  21. 

Aguilera,  governor  of  Madrid,  94. 

Aguinaldo,  Emilio,  Filipino  insurgent,  130;  relations  with  American 
forces,  356,  357;  president  Filipino  republic,  358;  reports  German 
interference  at  Subig,  363;  meets  Anderson,  364;  at  Bakoor,  365; 
withdraws  from  before  Malate,  366;  followers  enter  Manila,  378. 

Aibonito,  Porto  Rico,  344;  Spanish  position  at,  345. 

Alabama,  American  battle  ship,  101. 

Albany,  American  cruiser,  103. 

Albemarle,  Lord,  at  Havana,  8. 

Alcaniz,  Major,  at  Las  Guasimas,  226. 

Aldea,  Colonel,  230,  253. 

Aleman,  Jose  B.,  Cuban  insurgent,  52. 

Alert,  British  sloop  of  war,  294. 

Alfonso  XII,  Spanish  cruiser,  68,  77;  at  Havana,  122. 

Alfonso  XII,  Spanish  steamer,  384. 

Alger,  R.  A.,  Secretary  of  War,  145;  restricts  information  to  press, 
149;  advises  Shafter  against  retreat,  268;  requests  co-operation  of 
Sampson,  308;  work  during  the  war,  324. 

Allen,  Captain  L.  C.,  Sixteenth  Infantry,  251. 

Allen,  Colonel  James,  Signal  Corps,  173. 

Allen,  Lieutenant  H.  T.,  Second  Cavalry,  294. 

Almirante  Oquendo,  Spanish  cruiser,  100;  at  Havana,  71;  at  St.  Vin 
cent,  118,  157;  crosses  Atlantic,  168;  leaves  Santiago,  272;  in  battle 
of  Santiago,  276;  driven  ashore,  280,  284. 

Almodovar  del  Rio,  Spanish  Minister  of  State,  390,  392. 

Alvarado,  Spanish  gunboat,  captured  at  Santiago,  319;  at  Manza- 
nillo,  387. 

Ambulances,  lack  of,  at  Santiago,  212,  264. 

Ames,   Brigadier-General  A.,  325. 

Amphitrite,  American  monitor,  103,  108,  116;  goes  to  San  Juan,  159, 
161;  with  Sampson  in  Nicholas  Channel,  178;  off  San  Juan,  333; 
at  Cape  San  Juan.  348. 

Anderson,   Captain   H.   R.,   Fourth   Artillery,   343. 

Anderson,  Colonel  Thomas  M.,  Fourteenth  Infantry,  351;  brigadier- 
general  of  volunteers,  352;  goes  to  Manila,  360,  364;  at  Cavite,  365, 
374;  in  attack  on  Manila.  376. 

Andre,  Belgian  consul  at  Manila,  131;  negotiates  for  surrender,  371- 

Annapolis,  American  gunboat,  104,  215,  338;  at  Nipe  Bay,  384,  385. 
26  395 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Annapolis,  Spanish  prisoners  at,  288. 

Anthony,  William,  marine,  of  the  Maine,  77. 

Antonio  Lopez,  Spanish  gunboat,  154. 

Antonio  Lopez,  Spanish  transport,  333. 

Arango,  Francisco,  Cuban  statesman,  9. 

Aranguren,  Nestor,  Cuban  insurgent,  64. 

Argonauta,  captured  by  Marblehead,  151. 

Arias,  Lieutenant,  exchanged  for  Hobson,  301. 

Ariete,  Spanish  torpedo  boat,  119. 

Army,  American,  104,  204;  health  of,  during  war,  328. 

Army,  Spanish,  97. 

Arroyo,  Porto  Rico,  340;  Brooke  lands  at,  346. 

Artillery,  American,  in  battle  of  Caney,  237;  in  battle  of  San  Juan, 
255;  before  Santiago,  263. 

Aserraderos,  197,  217;  conference  at,  218,  301,  302;  Cubans  taken  to 
Siboney  from,  232. 

Asomanta,  hill  of,  Porto  Rico,  345,  346. 

Astor,  Colonel  John  Jacob,  on  Shatter's  staff,  365. 

Astor  Battery,  365,  374,  375. 

Atlanta,  American  cruiser,  103,   108. 

Atwater,  Lieutenant  C.  N.,  of  the  Amphitrite,  348. 

Audaz,  Spanish  torpedo-boat  destroyer,  362. 

Augustin,  captain-general  of  the  Philippines,  129;  issues  proclama 
tion,  130;  refuses  Dewey's  terms,  143;  superseded  by  Jaudenes,  371. 

Australia,  American  transport,  354. 

Auxiliaries,  bought  by  United  States  Government,  112. 

Ayres,  Captain  C.  G.,  Tenth  Cavalry,  266. 

Azcarraga,  premier  of  Spain,  62. 

Azor,  Spanish  torpedo  boat,  119. 

Bagley,  Ensign  Worth,  killed  at  Cardenas,  153. 

Bahia  Honda,  Lopez  lands  at,  25;  Virginius  surrendered  at,  35;  limit 
of  blockade,  122,  383. 

Bainbridge,  Lieutenant-Colonel  A.  H.,  Fourth  Infantry,  213. 

Bakoor,  near  Manila,   143,  365. 

Balloon  detachment  at  Santiago,  215;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  242. 

Balmaceda,  captain-general  of  Cuba,  31. 

Baltimore,  American  cruiser,  73,  103,  108:  joins  Dewey  at  Hong- Kong, 
109,  131;  leaves  Mirs  Bay,  132;  at  Subig  Bay,  132;  enters  Manila 
Bay,  133;  injuries  in  battle,  139;  captures  Corregidor,  144. 

Bancroft,  American  training  ship,  used  as  gunboat,  108,  149,  216, 
218,  386. 

Banes,  Cuban  expedition  lands  at,  149. 

Baquero,  Colonel  J.,  killed  at  San  Juan,  252. 

Baracoa,  founded  by  Velasquez,  3;  surrender  of,  321,  322;  Spaniards 
sail  from,  327. 

Barbadoes,  Oregon  at,   in. 

Barcelona,  attack  on  American  consulate  in,  58. 

Barclay,  Captain  C.  J.,  of  the  Amphitrite,  116,  348. 

Barker,  Captain  A.  S.,  member  of  Naval  War  Board,  121;  command 
ing  the  Newark,  and  later  the  Oregon,  387. 

Barker,  W.  B.,  American  consul  at  Sagua  la  Grande,  52. 

Barreda,  Captain,  commander  of  port  at  Manzanillo,  381. 

Barton,  Miss  Clara,  president  of  American  Red  Cross  Society,  60. 

Bates,  Brigadier-General  J.  C.,  215:  in  battle  of  Caney,  234,  238; 
marches  to  San  Juan,  259;  at  conference  of  July  2,  266;  suggests 
the  "  round  robin,"  325. 

Bayamo,  Garcia  and  Rowan  meet  at,  147. 

Bell,  Colonel,  quartermaster-general's  department,  212. 

Benham,  Colonel  D.  W.,  Seventh  Infantry,  214. 

Bennington,  American   gunboat,   104. 

Bennitt,  Colonel  F.,  Third  Illinois,  346. 

Beranger,  Admiral,  Secretary  of  Spanish  Navy,  78. 

Bernadou,  Lieutenant  J.  B.,  of  the  Winslow,  116;  wounded  at  Car 
denas,  152. 


INDEX 


397 


Berry,  Commander  R.  M.,  of  the  Castine,  116. 

Best,  Captain  C.  L.,  First  Artillery,  214;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  250, 
257;  retires  to  El  Pozo,  263;  moves  forward,  298. 

Biddle,  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.,  on  General  Wilson's  staff,  344. 

Bigelow,  Captain  J.,  Tenth  Cavalry,  249. 

Binondo,  suburb  of  Manila,  378. 

Bisbee,  Lieutenant-Colonel  W.  H.,  First  Infantry,  213. 

Black  Warrior,  seized  at  Havana,  27. 

Blanco,  captain-general  of  Cuba,  55,  62;  admits  supplies  for  destitute 
Cubans,  60;  abolishes  reconcentration,  79;  captain-general  of  the 
Philippines,  129;  measures  for  defence  of  Santiago,  229;  orders 
Cervera  to  leave  Santiago,  270;  consents  to  exchange  Hobson, 
300;  refers  Shatter's  demands  to  Madrid,  308. 

Blandin,  Lieutenant  J.  J.,  of  the  Maine,  68. 

Blockade  of  Cuba,  proclamation  of,  122;  difficulty  of,  150;  extended 
to  south  coast,  380;  misunderstanding  as  to  extent  of,  383. 

Blockade  of  Santiago,  191. 

Blockhouse  Fourteen,  Manila,  374,  375. 

Blue,  Lieutenant  Victor,  of  the  Suwanee,  197,  211,  260;  commanding 
the  Alvarado,  319,  387. 

Boardman,  Cadet  W.  H.,  of  the  Amphitrite,  348. 

Bolivar,  Soles  de,  Cuban  revolutionary  society,  15. 

Born,   Colonel,   Second   Wisconsin,   343. 

Borrowe,  Sergeant  H.  A.,  First  Volunteer  Cayalry,  228. 

Boston,  American  cruiser,  103,  108;  leaves  Mirs  Bay,  132;  at  Subig 
Bay,  132;  enters  Manila  Bay,  133;  meets  Greene's" expedition,  365; 
off  Manila,  368. 

Boutelle,  Congressman,  opposes  intervention  in  Cuba,  90. 

Bratt,  Colonel  J.  P.,  First  Nebraska,  364. 

Braunersreuther,  Lieutenant  W.,  of  the  Charleston,  355. 

Breckinridge,  Major-General  J.  C.,  145;  with  Fifth  Corps,  215;  opin 
ion  of  Shatter,  313. 

Brice,  American  consul  at  Matanzas,  53. 

British  squadron  at  Manila,  372. 

Brooke,  Lieutenant  W.,   Fourth  Infantry,  320. 

Brooke,  Major-General  J.  R.,  145,  146,  331,  339,  346,  347. 

Brooklyn,  American  cruiser,  101,  102,  108,  116;  goes  to  Cienfuegos, 
172;  to  Santiago,  176;  on  Santiago  blocka-de,  191;  in  battle  of  San 
tiago,  273,  277,  286,  288:  bombards  Santiago,  306. 

Brownson,  Commander  W.  H.,  purchasing  agent  in  Europe,  74;  com 
manding  the  Yankee,  117,  381. 

Brumby,  Lieutenant  T.  M.,  of  the  Olympia,  376. 

Brutus,  American  collier,  370. 

Buchanan,   President,  and  Cuba,  28. 

Buck,  Ensign  W.  H.,  Bureau  of  Navigation,  359. 

Buena  Ventura,  captured  by  Nashville,  123. 

Buffalo,  American  cruiser,  purchaser!   from   Brazil,   TIO. 

Burke,   Lieutenant-Colonel    D.   W.,    Eleventh   Infantry,   342. 

Burr,   Captain  E.,   Engineer  Corps,  215. 

Burriel,  General  Juan,  commander  at  Santiago,  34. 

Bustamente,  Captain,  chief  of  staff  to  Cervera,  195;  mortally  wounded 
at  San  Juan,  253. 

Byrne,  Captain  B,  A.,  Sixth  Infantry,  251. 

Cabanas,  harbour  of,  near  Santiago,  197,  216,  219,  307,  317. 

Cables  cut  on  Cuban  coast,  134,  155. 

Cabras  Island,  San  Juan  harbour,   161. 

Cadarso,   Captain,  of  the  Reina  Cristina,   141. 

Cadiz,  Cervera  starts  from,  118;  Camara  starts  from,  359. 

Caibarien,   Cuba,  388. 

Caimanera,  199,  202;  Spanish  forces  at,  203. 

California  Heavy  Artillery,  374. 

Calkins,  Lieutenant  C.  G.,  of  the  Olympia,  135. 

Callao,  Spanish  gunboat,  captured,  356;  in  attack  on  Manila,  376. 

Calleja,  Emilio,  captain-general  of  Cuba,  43. 


398 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


Calle  Real,  near  Manila,  366,  368. 

Camara,  Admiral,  358;  leaves  Cadiz,  359;  at  Port  Said,  360,  362;  re 
called  to  Spain,  362. 

Cambon,  Jules,  French  ambassador  at  Washington,  93;  asks  for  terms 
of  peace,  389;  signs  protocol,  391. 

Cameron,  Senator,  proposes  recognition  of  Cuban  independence,  59. 

Camp  Alger,  Falls  Church,  Va.,  106,  232. 

Camp  Black,  near  New  York,  329. 

Camp  Dewey,  near  Manila,  364,  365. 

Camp  McCalla,  Playa  del  Este,  200. 

Campos,  Martinez,  captain-general  of  Cuba,  37;  premier  of  Spain,  40; 
returns  to  Cuba,  44;  resigns,  46;  raises  fund  for  destitute,  55. 


Camp  Thomas,  Chickamauga,  Ga.,  106,  145,  146;  unsanitary  condition 
>f>  L  " 

Wikoff,  Montauk  Point,  3;. 
Canalejas,  Jose,  editor  of  the  Madrid  Heraldo,  66. 


Caney,  230;  plan  of  attack  on,  234;  battle  of,  236;  troops  left  at,  259; 
Santiago  refugees  at,  295-297,  305,  323. 

Cannon,  Congressman,  74. 

Canovas  del  Castillo,  Spanish  premier,  39;  assassinated,  62. 

Canuelo,  Fort,  San  Juan  harbour,   161. 

Cape  Engano,  Luzon,  365. 

Cape  Haitien,  telegraph  station  at,  159,  333. 

Cape  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico,  336,  348. 

Capron,  Captain  A.,  First  Artillery,  214,  227;  in  battle  of  Caney,  236, 
238;  at  El  Pozo,  263;  before  Santiago,  298. 

Capron,  Captain  A.  K.,  First  Volunteer  Cavalry,  killed  at  Las 
Guasimas,  224*,  226. 

Cardenas,  Lopez  lands  at,  24;  action  of  May  nth  at,  152;  limit  of 
blockade,  122,  383,  384. 

Cardinal  Cisneros,  Spanish  cruiser,  100. 

Carlier,  Lieutenant  D.,  of  the  Furor,  157,  282. 

Carlist  war,  in  Spain,  30,  36. 

Carroll,  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.,  Sixth  Cavalry,  214;  in  battle  of  San 
Juan,  241,  252. 

Cartagena,   Camara  at,  359. 

Castilla,  Spanish  cruiser,  136;  destroyed  in  battle  of  Manila  Bay,  141. 

Castillo,  General,  Cuban  insurgent,  218,  223,  227,  228. 

Castine,  American  gunboat,  104,  116;  off  Cienfuegos,  173,  175;  at 
Mariel,  384. 

Cataluna,  Spanish  cruiser,   100. 

Cavite,  arsenal  at,  135,  136;  surrenders  to  Dewey,  142;  Dewey's  squad 
ron  at,  143;  Commander  Wood  in  charge  of,  356;  Anderson  lands 
at,  364. 

Cayey,  Porto  Rico,  347. 

Cerero,  General  Rafael,  Spanish  peace  commissioner,  391. 

Cervera,  Admiral,  at  St.  Vincent,  118;  sails  for  West  Indies,  157,  167; 
reaches  Santiago,  169;  receives  Hobson's  surrender,  189;  threatens 
to  bombard  Santiago,  269;  leaves  Santiago,  271;  in  battle  of  San 
tiago,  280;  surrenders,  284;  rumoured  to  be  bound  for  Manila,  358. 

Cervera,  Lieutenant  Angel,  284. 

Cespedes,  Carlos,  Cuban  insurgent,  29,  36. 

Chadwick,  Captain  F.  E.,  serves  on  Maine  commission,  70;  captain 
of  the  New  York,  116,  120;  in  charge  of  the  Colon,  286,  287;  con 
ference  with  Shafter,  305;  goes  to  represent  navy  at  surrender  of 
Santiago,  310. 

Chaffee,  Brigadier-General  A.  R.,  214,  228,  234,  235;  in  battle  of  Caney, 
236,  237;  reaches  San  Juan,  259;  opinion  of  Shafter,  313;  signs 
"  round  robin."  325. 

Charette,  G.,  of  the  Merrimac  crew,  187. 

Charleston,  American  cruiser,  103,  109,  351;  captures  Guam,  354; 
reaches  Manila,  355,  369. 

Chester,  Captain  C.  M.,  of  the  Cincinnati,  116;  at  Ponce,  339. 

Chicago,  American  cruiser,  103,  108. 

Chickamauga.     See  Camp  Thomas. 


INDEX 


399 


China,  American  transport,  365. 

Cienfuegos,  blockade  01,  proclaimed,  122;  action  of  April  2Qth  off,  151; 
cables  cut  off,  154;  blockaded  by  Schley,  172;  Yankee  off,  380. 

Cincinnati,  American  cruiser,  103;  fire  in  coal  bunkers,  69;  ordered 
to  North  Atlantic  station,  108,  116;  bombards  Matanzas  batteries, 
126;  with  Sampson  in  Nicholas  Channel,  178;  goes  to  Porto  Rico, 

Cingalon,  suburb  of  Manila,  375,  376. 

Cisneros,  Salvador  Cisneros  Betancourt,  Cuban  insurgent,  37. 

City  of  Peking,  American  transport,  351,  354. 

City  of  Puebla,  American  transport,  366. 

City  of  Rio  de  Janeiro,  American  transport,  366. 

City  of  Sydney,  American  transport,  354,  355. 

City  of  Washington,  Ward  line  steamer,  68;  used  as  transport,  216. 

Ciudad  Cadiz,  Spanish  transport,  118. 

Clark,  Captain  Charles  E.,  of  the  Oregon,  109;  opinion  on  Cervera's 

strategy,  271;  in  battle  of  Santiago,  279,  283. 
Clark,  Colonel  E.  P.,  Second  Massachusetts,  213. 
Clausen,  R.,  of  the  Merrimac  crew,  188. 
Clay,  Henry,  on  Cuba,  18. 

Clayton,  Captain  B.  T.,  New  York  Cavalry,  345. 
Cleveland,   President,   on   Cuba,   58;    proclamation   against  filibuster 

ing,  62. 

Clover,  Commander  Richardson,  of  the  Bancroft,  149,  218. 
Coamo,  Porto  Rico,  340;  action  at,  344. 
Coast  defences  of  United  States,  106. 
Coghlan,  Captain  J.  B.,  of  the  Raleigh,  132. 
Cogswell,  Lieutenant-Commander  J.  K.,  of  the  Oregon,  287. 
Coit,  Colonel  A.   B.,  Fourth   Ohio,  346,  347. 
Colon,  American  transport,  365. 
Colonel  Lloyd  Aspinwall,  seizure  of,  33. 
Columbia,  American  cruiser,  102,  116;  carries  troops  to  Santiago,  307; 

to  Porto  Rico,  334. 

Columbia,  German  liner,  purchased  by  Spain,  359. 
Columbus,  Christopher,  discovers  Cuba,  2. 
Comba,  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.,  Twelfth  Infantry,  214. 
Compania  Transatlantica  Espanola,  125,  327. 
Competitor,  filibustering  schooner,  61  ;  prisoners  released,  62. 
Concas,  Captain  Victor,  of  the  Maria  Teresa,  157;  wounded  in  battle 

of  Santiago,  280. 

Concho,  American  transport,  323. 
Concord,  American  gunboat,  73,  104;  leaves  Mirs  Bay,  132:  at  Subig 

Bay,  132;  enters  Manila  Bay,  133;  captures  Spaniards  at  Subig,  364. 
Conde  de  Venadito,   Spanish  cruiser,   122. 
Conrad,  Major  C.  H.,  Eighth  Infantry,  213. 
Converse,    Commander    G.    A.,    of    the    Montgomery,    116;    suggests 

Merrimac  manoeuvre,   185. 
Cook,    Captain   F.    A.,   of  the   Brooklyn,   116;    in  battle  of  Santiago, 

274,  277,  279;  receives  surrender  of  Colon,  286. 
Coppinger,  Major-General  .T.  J.,  145,  146. 
Corbin,  Adjutant-General  H.  C.,  146,  308,  315. 
Cornish,  Admiral,  at  Manila,  128. 

Corregidor  Island,  Manila  Bay,  133;  captured  by  Dewey,  144,  355. 
Cotton,  Captain  C.  S.,  of  the  Harvard,  170,  292,  358. 
Cowles,  Lieutenant-Commander  W.  S.,  of  the  Topeka,  384. 
Crank,  R.  K.,  assistant  engineer  of  the  Merrimac,   188. 
Crescent  City,  American  ship,  debarred  from  Havana,  26. 
Cristobal  Colon,  Spanish  cruiser,  100;  at  St.  Vincent,  118,  157;  crosses 

Atlantic,  168;  at  Santiago,  182-184;  leaves  Santiago,  272;  in  battle 

of  Santiago,  276,  284;  surrenders,  286;  sinks,  287. 
Crittenden,  Colonel,  comrade  of  Lopez,  25. 
Crofton,  Lieutenant  W.  M.,  First  Infantry,  148. 
Cromer,  Lord,  British  agent  in  Egvpt,  362. 


Crosley,  Ensign  W.  S.,  of  the  Levden,  385. 
Crowder,  Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  H.,  of  Me 


erritt's  staff,  377. 


400  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Crowninshield,  Captain  A.  S.,  member  of  Naval  War  Board,  121. 

Cuba  Espanola,   Spanish  gunboat,  381. 

Cuban    soldiers    at    Aserraderos,    197,    217;    transported    to    Siboney, 

232;  in  battle  of  Caney,  239. 
Cubitas,  insurgent  capital  at,  48. 
Culebra  Island,   160. 

Cummins,   Captain  A.   S.,  Fourth  Artillery,  214. 
Curagao,  Cervera  at,   169,   172. 
Cuthbertson,  Major  H.   C.,  Tenth   Pennsylvania,  368. 

Daggett,  Lieutenant-Colonel  A.  S.,  Twenty-fifth  Infantry,  213,  238. 

Daiquiri,  Fifth  Corps  lands  at,  219;  artillery  lands  at,  232;  reinforce 
ments  land  at,  307. 

Davis,  Commander  C.  H.,  of  the  Dixie,   117,  338,  349. 

Davis,  Senator,  chairman  of  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs, 
86,  90;  American  peace  commissioner,  391. 

Day,  William  R.,  Secretary  of  State,  65,  74,  390;  chairman  of  Ameri 
can  peace  commission,  391,  394. 

Dayton,  Commander  J.  H.,  of  the  Detroit,  116. 

Declaration  of  war  by  Spain,  124;  by  the  United  States,  125. 

Deignan,  O.  W.,  of  the  Merrimac,  187. 

Delehanty,  Commander  D.,  of  the  Suwanee,   197,  292. 

Delgado  Pareja,  Spanish  gunboat,  381. 

Derby,  Lieutenant-Colonel  G.  McC.,  Engineer  Corps,  234,  242,  244. 

De  Russy,  Colonel  I.  D.,  Eleventh  Infantry,  341,  342. 

Detroit,  American  cruiser,  103,  108,  116;  goes  to  San  Juan,  159,  161; 
with  Sampson  in  Nicholas  Channel,  178. 

Dewey,  Commodore  George,  commanding  Asiatic  station,  108,  115; 
at  Hong-Kong,  130;  starts  for  Manila,  131;  at  Subig  Bay,  132; 
enters  Manila  Bay,  135;  battle  of  Manila  Bay,  138;  cuts  Manila 
cable,  144;  despatches  to  Washington,  351,  352;  promoted  to  rear- 
admiral,  355;  plan  of  retreat  before  Camara,  360;  suggests  attack 
on  Spanish  coast,  361;  friction  with  German  squadron  at  Manila, 
363;  conferences  with  Greene  and  Merritt,  370,  371. 

Diana  Key,  Cardenas  harbour,  152,  154. 

Diedrichs,  Admiral,  commanding  German  squadron  at  Manila,  363. 

Dillenback,  Major  J.  W.,  Second  Artillery,  214,  257,  263. 

Dingley,  Congressman,  74. 

Dixie,  American  auxiliary  cruiser,  117,  334,  337;  at  Ponce,  338;  in 
Eastern  Squadron,  361;  on  southern  blockade,  381. 

Dolphin,  American   despatch   boat,    116. 

Don  Antonio  de  Ulloa,  Spanish  gunboat,  136. 

Don  Juan  de  Austria,  Spanish  gunboat,  136. 

Dorado,  Porto  Rico,  336. 

Dorst.  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  H.,  assistant  adjutant-general,  148,  295. 

Dos  Caminos,   surrender  of,  321,  322. 

Dotterel,  British  cruiser,  destruction  of,  69. 

Downs,  Colonel  W.  A.,  Seventy-first  New  York,  213. 

Draper,  Sir  William,  at  Manila,  128.  _ 

Du  Bosc,  secretary  of  Spanish  legation  at  Washington,  93. 

Ducrot  house,  near  Santiago.  235,  259. 

Duffield,  Brigadier-General  H.  M.,  232,  233;  movement  against  Fort 
Aguadores,  259;  at  Siboney,  316. 

Dulce,  captain-general  of  Cuba,  31,  33. 

Dupont,  American  torpedo  boat,  116,  151;  off  Cienfuegos,  173;  goes 
to  Key  West,  175;  at  Guantanamo,  293. 

Dupuy  de  Lome,  Spanish  minister  at  Washington,  66;  resigns,  67. 

Dyer,  Captain  N.  M.,  of  the  Baltimore,  132. 

Eagan,  Commissary-General  C.  P.,  146. 

Eagle,  American   converted   yacht,    151,    155:   with   Flying   Squadron, 

174,    176;   reports   Spanish   fleet   in   Nicholas   Channel,   209;   chases 

transport,  340;  on  southern  blockade,  381,  384. 
Eastern  Squadron,  334,  361. 
Eaton,  Captain  J.  G.,  of  the  Resolute,  283,  291,  293. 


INDEX 


4OI 


Eberle,  Lieutenant  E.  W.,  of  the  Oregon,  274,  283. 

Edmund   Blunt,   British   ship,   382. 

Egbert,  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.   C.,  Sixth  Infantry,  213;   in  battle  of 

San  Juan,  246. 

Egmont  Key,  transports  rendezvous  at,  215. 
Eighteenth   Infantry,   364,  365,  374. 
Eighth   Corps,   146,  352. 

Eighth  Infantry,  213;  in  battle  of  Caney,  238,  239;  m  Porto  Rico,  340. 
Eighth  Ohio  Volunteers,  307,  324. 
El   Cristo,   surrender  of,  321,   322. 
Eleventh  Infantry,  339. 

El  Fraile,  Manila  Bay,  Spanish  battery  on,   133,  135. 
Ellen  A.  Reed,  British  collier,  363. 
Elliott,  Captain  G.  F.,  Marine  Corps,  201. 
Ellis,  Chief  Yeoman,  of  the  Brooklyn,  288. 
El  Pozo,  near  Santiago,  232;  American  artillery  at,  242,  250,  263;  field 

telegraph  at,  243,  248;  field  hospital  near,  264;   conference  of  July 

2d  at,  266. 

El  Songo,  surrender  of,  321,  322. 

Emory,  Commander  W.  H.,  of  the  Yosemite,  117,  333. 
Emperador  Carlos  V,  Spanish  battle  ship,  99,  160,  359. 
Endicott  Board  plans  coast  defences,   106. 
Ennis,  Captain  W.,  Fourth  Artillery,  214. 

Ericsson,  American  torpedo  boat,  151;  in  battle  of  Santiago,  273,  285. 
Ermita,   suburb   of   Manila,   376,   378. 
Ernst,  Brigadier-General  O.  H.,  338,  346. 
Escario,    Colonel    Frederico,    229;    reaches    Santiago,    295;    promoted 

to  brigadier-general,  310;  commissioner  on  surrender,  310. 
Esquirre,  Cuban  insurgent,  41. 
Estrella,   Spanish  gunboat,  381. 
Estrella  Point,   Santiago,   193. 

Eulate,  Captain  Antonio,  of  the  Vizcaya,  157,  285. 
Evans,  Captain  R.   D.,  of  the  Iowa,  116,   120;  off  Santiago,   183,   184; 

in  the  battle  of  Santiago,  274,  283,  285. 
Evarts,  William  M.,  Secretary  of  State,  41. 
Ewers,   Lieutenant-Colonel   E.    P.,    Ninth   Infantry,   213;   in   battle   of 

San  Juan,  245,  252;  receives  surrender  of  Guantanamo,  322. 

Fajardo,  Porto  Rico,  336. 

Falcon,  American  ship,  fired  on,  26. 

Fanita,  American  transport,   149. 

Farragut,   Ensign  Guillermo,  78. 

Felifi,  Colonel  J.  M.  de  O.,  377. 

Fernandina,  troops  encamped  at,  106,  205. 

Fifteenth  Infantry,  353. 

Fifteenth  Minnesota  Volunteers,  329. 

Fifth  Artillery,  334. 

Fifth  Cavalry,  341. 

Fifth  Corps,  146;  at  Tampa,  205;  embarkation  of,  211;  regiments  and 

officers  of,  213;   landing  at   Daiquiri,   219;   at   Siboney,  220;   losses 

while  in  Cuba,  233;   sails  for  Montauk,  326. 
Filibustering   in    Cuba,    24;    the   Virginius,    34;    the    Competitor,    61; 

efforts  to  suppress,  62,  84;  legalized,  during  war,  147. 
Fillmore,  President,  on  Cuba,  26. 
First  Artillery,  214. 

First  California  Volunteers,  354,  364,  368,  374,  377. 
First  Cavalry,  214;  at  Las  Guasimas,  223;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  246, 

249,  255. 

First   Colorado  Volunteers,  364,  374,   375. 
First  Corps,   146. 

First  District  of  Columbia  Volunteers,  307. 
First  Idaho  Volunteers,  365,  374. 
First   Illinois   Volunteers,   307. 

First  Infantrv,  1^8,  213;  in  battle  of  Caney,  235,  239. 
First  Nebraska  Volunteers,  364,  374. 


402  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

First  North  Dakota  Volunteers,  365,  374. 

First  Volunteer  Cavalry  (Rough  Riders),  204,  212,  214,  216;  at  Las 
Guasimas,  223,  224,  226;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  246,  249,  255,  257. 

First  Wyoming  Volunteers,  365,  374. 

Fish,  Hamilton,  Secretary  of  State,  36. 

Fish,  Sergeant  Hamilton,  First  Volunteer  Cavalry,  killed  at  Las 
Guasimas,  224. 

Fiske,  Lieutenant  B.  A.,  of  the  Petrel,  133,  142. 

Flagler,  Brigadier-General   D.  W.,  146. 

Florida,  American  transport,  149,  218;  disabled  at  Tampa,  208. 

Flying  Squadron,  116,  158;  moves  to  Key  West,  171;  to  Cienfuegos, 
172;  to  Santiago,  175;  made  part  of  Sampson's  command,  179. 

Fontan,   Lieutenant-Colonel   V.,  310. 

Foote,  American  torpedo  boat,  116,  152. 

Forsyth,  John,  on  Cuba,  23. 

Fort  San  Antonio,  Malate,  374,  375. 

Fourteenth  Infantry,  351,  352,  354,  374. 

Fourth  Artillery,   214,  334. 

Fourth   Cavalry,   352. 

Fourth   Corps,    146. 

Fourth  Infantry,  213;  in  battle  of  Caney,  235,  239. 

Fourth  Ohio  Volunteers,  339,  346,  347. 

Fourth   Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  339. 

Fremont,  Lieutenant  J.   C.,  of  the  Porter,   116. 

French  squadron  at  Manila,  372. 

Fry,  Captain  Joseph,  of  the  Virginius,  34. 

Frye,  Senator,  American  peace  commissioner,  391. 

Furor,  Spanish  torpedo-boat  destroyer,  157;  at  Martinique,  168; 
reaches  Santiago,  169,  173;  leaves  Santiago,  272;  sunk  off  San 
tiago,  282. 

Gallicia,  Spanish  torped9  boat,  at  Cienfuegos,  151,  380. 

Garcia,  Calixto,  Cuban  insurgent  general,  147;  meets  Sampson,  217; 
meets  Sampson  and  Shafter,  218;  taken  to  Siboney,  232;  fails  to 
stop  Escario,  295;  leaves  Santiago,  320. 

Garcia,  Vicejite,  Cuban  insurgent,  38. 

Garnica,  Senor  de,  Spanish  peace  commissioner,  391. 

Garretson,  Brigadier-General  G.  A.,  337,  343. 

Catling  detachment  at  Santiago,  214,  250,  255. 

General  Lezo,  Spanish  gunboat,   136. 

German  squadron  at  Manila,  363,  372. 

Gibara,  Garcia  at,  320. 

Gibbs.  Surgeon  J.  B.,  killed  at  Playa  del  Este,  202. 

Gise,  Ensign  W.  K.,  of  the  Oregon,  283. 

Glass,  Captain  Henry,  of  the  Charleston,  354,  355. 

Gloucester,  American  converted  yncht,  218,  260;  in  battle  of  San 
tiago,  273,  275,  281,  289;  goes  to"  Porto  Rico,  334;  at  Guanica,  337; 
at  Arroyo,  340. 

Gollan,  Sir  Alexander,  British  consul-general  at  Havana,  269. 

Gomez,  Juan,  Cuban  insurgent,  41. 

Gomez,  Maximo,  Cuban  general,  38,  44,  50;  letter  to  McKinley,  51; 
orders  plantations  destroyed,  51;  joined  by  expedition  from  United 
States,  150. 

Goodrich,  Captain  C.  F.,  of  the  St.  Louis,  155,  199;  in  charge  of  land 
ing  of  Fifth  Corps,  219,  220;  at  Arroyo,  340;  commanding  the 
Newark  at  Manzanillo.  387. 

Graham.  Major-General  W.  M.,  145,  146. 

Grant,  President,  on  Cuba,  32,  36,  83. 

Gray,  Senator,  American  peace  commissioner,  391,  393. 

Greely,  Brigadier-General  A.  W.,  145;  reports  on  press  censorship, 
148;  reports  Cervera  at  Santiago,  173;  on  use  of  balloon  at  San 
tiago,  242. 

Greene,  Brigadier-General  F.  V.,  360:  goes  to  Manila,  365;  com 
manding  at  the  front,  366.  368,  370,  374;  in  attack  on  Manila,  376-378. 

Gridley,  Captain  C.  V.,  of  the  Olympia,  132,  135;  death  of,  355. 


INDEX 


403 


Grimes,  Captain  G.  S.,  Second  Artillery,  214;  at  El   Pozo,  235,  242, 

255,  263,  298. 
Guam,  Ladrone  Islands,  capture  of,  354;  Greene's  expedition  passes, 

365. 

Guanica,   Porto  Rico,  landing  at,  337. 
Guantanamo,   Campos  lands  at,  44;   cable  cutting  attempted  at,   155, 

199;  seizure  of  bay  by  Sampson,  198;  Spanish  forces  at,  203;  vessels 

coaling   in   bay,   273,   292;    surrender   of,   321,   322;    Spaniards    sail 

from,   327. 

Guantanamo,  Spanish  gunboat,  381. 
Guardian,   Spanish   gunboat,   381. 

Guayama,  Porto  Rico,  336;  occupied  by  Hains,  347. 
Gussie,  American  transport,  148. 

Hains,  Brigadier-General  P.  C.,  in  Porto  Rico,  339,  346,  347. 

Hains,   Lieutenant  J.   P.,  Third  Artillery,  346. 

Hale,  Colonel  I.,  First  Colorado,  364. 

Hale,  Senator,  74. 

Hall,  Colonel  R.  H.,  Fourth  Infantry,  148. 

Hamilton,  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  M.,  Ninth  Cavalry,  214;  killed  at 
San  Juan,  251. 

Harrington,  Captain  P.  F.,  of  the  Puritan,  116;  bombards  Matanzas 
batteries,  125. 

Harvard,  American  auxiliary  cruiser,  112,  158;  reports  Cervera's 
squadron  at  Martinique,  i^o;  ordered  to  Mona  Passage,  171;  to 
Santiago,  174;  overtakes  Schley,  177;  alarm  of  mutiny  on,  288; 
at  Siboney,  292. 

Haskell,  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  T.,  Seventeenth  Infantry,  214; 
wounded  at  Caney,  237. 

Hatuey,  Cuban  chief,  4. 

Havana,  early  history  of,  5;  captured  by  British,  7;  prosperity  in 
eighteenth  century,  9;  under  Tacon,  21;  Campos  enters,  45;  Weyler 
lands  at,  46;  Blanco  sent  to,  62;  mob  attacks  autonomist  news 
papers,  64;  Maine  ordered  to,  65:  Montgomery,  Vizcaya,  and  Al- 
mirante  Oquendo  arrive  at,  71;  mines  in  harbour,  78;  Sampson's 
plan  for  attacking,  119. 

Hawaii,  Philadelphia  ordered  to,  108. 

Hawk,  American  converted  yacht,  175;  drives  Alfonso  XII  ashore, 
384.. 

Hawkins,  Brigadier-General  H.  S.,  213;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  241, 
245,  248,  252;  wounded,  263. 

Hawkins,  Colonel  A.  L.,  Tenth  Pennsylvania,  365. 

Hawley  bill,  74,   105. 

Hazeltine,   Lieutenant  C.  W.,  of  the  Hist,  288. 

Hearst,  William  R.,  of  New  York,  112. 

Helena,  American  gunboat,  104,  108,  116;  at  Manzanillo,  386. 

Helm,  Lieutenant  J.  M.,  of  the  Hornet,  381. 

Hengelmuller,   Baron,  Austrian  minister  at  Washington,  93. 

Henry,  Brigadier-General  G.  V.,  307,  343. 

Hepburn,  Congressman,  opposes  Hull  bill,  75. 

Hercules,   Spanish   tug,    143. 

Hernandez,  Colonel,  Cuban  insurgent  officer,  217. 

Higginson,  Captain  F.  J.,  of  the  Massachusetts,  116;  off  Santiago, 
184;  goes  to  Porto  Rico,  334,  336. 

Hinds,  Lieutenant  E.,  Second  Artillery,  298. 

Hist,  American  converted  yacht,  273,  285,  288;  at  Manzanillo,  381, 
386,  387. 

Hobson,  Lieutenant  (naval  constructor),  185;  sinks  the  Merrimac, 
189;  released,  300. 

Holguin,  Spanish  forces  at,  217,  230,  309,  320,  386. 

Hong-Kong,  Dewey  at,  130;  Dewey  leaves,  131. 

Honolulu,  British  steamer,  363. 

Honolulu,  Hawaiian   Islands,   354,  365. 

Hood,  Lieutenant  J..  of  the  Hawk,  175. 

Hormiguero,  Porto  Rico,  action  at,  341. 


404  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Hornet,  American  converted  yacht,  151;  at  Manzanillo,  381,  382,  386. 

Hotchkiss  detachment  at  Santiago,  214,  223;  in  battle  of  San  Juan, 
246,  255. 

House  of  Representatives,  votes  for  recognition  of  Cuban  insurgents, 
57;  votes  $50,000,000  for  national  defence,  74;  Hawley  bill,  74;  defeat 
of  Hull  bill,  75;  votes  for  intervention  in  Cuba,  90. 

Howell,  Commodore,  commanding  Northern  Patrol  Squadron,  117, 
379;  ordered  to  Key  West,  380;  in  charge  of  north  coast  blockade, 
382-384. 

Hudson,  American  revenue  cutter,  152. 

Hughes,  Lieutenant  E.  M.,  of  the  Petrel,  142. 

Hughes,  Lieutenant  J.  B.,  Tenth  Cavalry,  215,  255. 

Hugh  McCulloch,  American  revenue  cutter,  113;  leaves  Mirs  Bay, 
132;  enters  Manila  Bay,  135;  reports  battle,  144;  brings  Aguinaldo 
to  Manila,  356. 

Hulings,  Colonel  W.  J.,  Sixteenth  Pennsylvania,  343,  345. 

Hull  bill,  defeat  of,  75;  second  bill  passed,  105. 

Humphrey,  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  F.,  chief  quartermaster  of  San 
tiago  expedition,  215. 

Hunker,  Commander  J.  J.,  of  the  Annapolis,  215,  384-386. 

Huntingdon,  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  W.,  Marine  Corps,  199,  387. 

Huse,  Lieutenant  H.,  of  the  Gloucester,  282,  337. 

Hyatt,  American  consul  at  Santiago,  53,  64,  88. 

Illinois,  American  battle  ship,  101. 

Indiana,  American  battle  ship,  101,  108,  116;  goes  to  San  Juan,  159, 
161 ;  with  Sampson  in  Nicholas  Channel,  178;  at  Key  West  for 
convoy  duty,  205;  convoys  Fifth  Corps,  215;  in  battle  of  Santiago, 
273»  283,  288;  meets  the  Kaiserin  Maria  Theresa,  293;  struck  by 
shell,  297;  bombards  Santiago,  306. 

Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  Spanish  cruiser,  100;  at  St.  Vincent,  118,  157; 
crosses  Atlantic,  168;  reaches  Santiago,  169;  leaves  Santiago,  272; 
driven  ashore,  280,  284. 

Iowa,  American  battle  ship,  101,  108,  116;  goes  to  San  Juan,  159,  161 ; 
to  Cienfuegos,  173;  off  Santiago,  184,  191;  in  battle  of  Santiago, 
273>  279>  285,  289;  assigned  to  Eastern  Squadron,  361. 

Irene,  German  cruiser,  364. 

Irles,  Major,  aid  of  General  Toral,  322. 

Irwin,  Ensign,  of  the  Baltimore,  139. 

Isabel  II,  Spanish  gunboat,  332. 

Isabel  la  Catolica,  Spanish  cruiser,   100. 

Isla  de  Cuba,  Spanish  gunboat,  136. 

Isla  de   Luzon,   Spanish   gunboat,   136. 

Isla  de  Mindanao,  Spanish  transport,  136. 

Isla  Grande,  Subig  Bay,  364. 

Isle  of  Pines,  384,  386,  387. 

acksonville,  troops  encamped  at,   106,  329. 
acobs,  Colonel,  chief  quartermaster,  Fifth  Corps,  212. 
acobsen,  Commander,  German  navy,  332,  334. 
apanese  squadron  at  Manila,  372. 

audenes,    Fermin,   captain-general    of   the    Philippines,   371;    surren 
ders,  376. 

efferson,    Thomas,   on    Cuba,    18. 
enkins,  Jonathan  S..   Memoirs  of,  21. 
enkins,  Lieutenant  F.  W.,  of  the  Maine,  68. 
ewell,  Captain  T.  F.,  of  the  Minneapolis,  116. 
ohnson,   P.,   of  the  Vixen,    190. 

orge  Juan,  Spanish  gunboat,  123;  sunk  in  Nipe  Bay,  385. 
ovellar,  captain-general  of  Cuba,  37. 
ungen,  Lieutenant  C.  W.,  of  the  Wompatuck,  155,  381. 
upiter  Inlet,  Oregon  arrives  at,  in. 
uragua,  iron  mines  at,  225. 

Kaiserin  Maria  Theresa,  Austrian  cruiser,  293. 
Kearsarge,  American  battle  ship,  101. 


INDEX  405 

"Kellogg,  Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  R.,  Tenth  Infantry,  213. 

Kellogg,  Lieutenant  F.  W.,  of  the  Baltimore,   139. 

Kelly,  F.,  of  the  Merrimac,  187. 

Kent,  Brigadier-General  J.  F.,  213;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  241,  244, 
248,  252,  258;  reports  supposed  Spanish  sortie,  265;  at  conference 
of  July  2d,  266;  signs  "  round  robin,"  325. 

Kentucky,  American  battle  ship,   101. 

Kerr,   Captain  J.   B.,  Sixth  Cavalry,  250. 

Kettle  Hill,  near  Santiago,  247,  249,  251,  257. 

Key  West,  North  Atlantic  Squadron  at,  108;  supply  depot  and  hos 
pital  at,  114;  troops  to  be  concentrated  at,  146;  VVinslow  towed  to, 
153;  Remey  in  command  at,  159;  Flying  Squadron  at,  171,  172; 
marine  battalion  at,  199;  convoy  ships  at,  207,  210;  Howell  at,  382. 

Laborde,  Alfredo,  imprisonment  of,  61. 

Lachambre,  Spanish  general,  129. 

Ladrone  Islands,  354,  390. 

Lagaza,  Captain  Juan  B.,  of  the  Oquendo,  157;  drowned  off  San 
tiago,  280. 

Lamberton,  Commander,  chief  of  staff  to  Dewey,  132;  captain  of  the 
Olympia,  355;  commissioner  on  surrender  of  Manila,  377. 

Lancaster,  Major  J.  M.,  Fourth  Artillery,  343,  344,  346. 

Lares,  Porto  Rico,  341,  342. 

Las  Casas,  Bartolome  de,  Spanish  priest,  4,  12. 

Las  Casas,  Luis  de,  captain-general  of  Cuba,  9. 

Las  Guasimas,  action  at,  223. 

Las  Marias,  Porto  Rico,  342. 

Lawton,  Brigadier-General  H.  W.,  213,  228,  234;  in  battle  of  Caney, 
235,  238;  ordered  to  withdraw,  258;  moves  to  San  Juan,  259;  at 
conference  of  July  2d,  266;  before  Santiago,  298;  commissioner  on 
surrender,  310;  signs  "  round  robin,"  325;  in  command  of  Santiago 
province,  326. 

Leary,  Captain  R.  P.,  of  the  San  Francisco,  ^117. 

Lee,  Captain  A.   H.,  British  military  attache,  258. 

Lee,  Major-General  Fitzhugh,  American  consul-general  at  Havana, 
54;  reports  destitution  in  Cuba,  60;  telegraphs  for  American  ships, 
65;  commands  Seventh  Corps,  146. 

Legazpi,   colonizes  the   Philippines,   127. 

Lemus,  Jose,  Cuban  revolutionist,  16. 

Lersundi,  captain-general  of  Cuba,  29. 

Lewis,  Captain  T.  J.,  Second  Cavalry,  321. 

Lewis,  Congressman,  criticises  the  United  States  army,  75. 

Leyden,  American  auxiliary,  384,   385. 

Lieber,  Judge-Advocate-General  G.  N.,  146. 

Linares,  Lieutenant-General  Arsenio,  225,  229;  wounded  at  San  Juan, 
253;  letter  to  Blanco,  309. 

Liscum,  Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  H.,  Twenty-fourth  Infantry,  213; 
wounded  at  San  Juan,  245. 

Lizzie  Major.  American  ship,  seized  at  sea,  33. 

Long,  John  D.,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  74,  145.  *73;  declines  to  order 
Sampson  to  force  Santiago  harbour,  308. 

Lopez,  Narciso,  and  his  filibustering  expeditions,  24. 

Loraine,   Sir  Lambton,   of  the  Niobe,  35. 

Lorenzo,  General,  governor  of  Santiago,  22. 

Ludington,  Ouartermaster-General  M.  I.,  146. 

Ludlow.  Brigadier-General  W.,  215;  in  battle  of  Caney,  235,  237;  be 
fore  Santiago,  208,  311;  signs  "  round  robin,  '  325. 

Ludlow,  Captain  Nicoll,  of  the  Terror,  116,  165. 

Luneta,  Manila,  376. 

Luque,  General,  at  Holguin,  320. 

Lyman,  General,  at  Havana,  8. 

Lyon,  Commander  H.  W.,  of  the  Dolphin,  116. 

MacArthur,  Brigadier-General  A.,  365,  3745  in  attack  on  Manila,  375. 
377;  military  governor  of  Manila,  378. 


406 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR 


McCalla,  Commander  B.  H.,  of  the  Marblehead,  116,  151;  off  Cien- 
fuegos,  175;  in  Guantanamo  Bay,  203,  292. 

McCaskey,  Major  W.   S.,  Twentieth  Infantry,  215. 

McClernand,  Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  J.,  adjutant-general  of  Fifth 
Corps,  241,  243,  248. 

McCulloch.     See  Hugh  McCulloch. 

Maceo,  Antonio,  Cuban  insurgent,  44;  killed,  50;  orders  property 
destroyed,  52. 

Maceo,  Jose,  Cuban  insurgent,  44:  killed,  50. 

McFarland,  Captain  W.  C.,  Sixteenth  Infantry,  251. 

Machias,  American  gunboat,   104,  116;  off  Cardenas,   152,   154. 

Macias,  captain-general  of  Porto  Rico,  166,  338. 

Mackenzie,  Commander  M.  R.  S.,  of  the  Mayflower,  116. 

McKibbin,  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.,  Twenty-first  Infantry,  213;  briga 
dier-general,  311;  military  governor  of  Santiago,  319;  signs  "  round 
robin,"  325;  succeeded  by  Wood,  326. 

McKinley,  President,  views  on  Cuba,  59;  message  of  December,  1897, 
63;  criticised  by  Dupuy  de  Lome,  66;  answers  European  repre 
sentatives,  80;  message  calling  for  intervention  in  Cuba,  81 ;  signs 
resolution  for  intervention,  91;  proclaims  blockade  of  Cuba,  122. 

Magellan,  discoverer  of  the  Philippines,  127. 

Maginnis,  Lieutenant  T.  F.,  Eleventh  Infantry,  341. 

Mahan,  Captain  A.  T.,  member  of  Naval  War  Board,  121,  315. 

Mahoney,   G.,  of  the  Vixen,   190. 

Maine,  American  battle  ship,  goes  to  Havana,  ^65;  destruction  of,  67; 
commission  of  inquiry,  70;  commission's  report,  76;  Spanish  com 
mission,  71,  77. 

Malate,  suburb  of  Manila,  364,  366,  374,  376,  378. 

Mangrove,  American  lighthouse  tender,  70,  388. 

Manila,  early  history  of,  127;  Dewey's  squadron  off,  143;  situation 
of  garrison,  356,  369,  372;  surrender  of,  376;  occupied  by  American 
troops,  378;  cession  to  United  States,  390,  392. 

Manila,  Spanish  survey  ship,  136;  captured  by  Dewey,  143. 

Manila  Bay,  topography  of,  133;  Dewey  enters,  135;  battle  of,  138. 

Manning,  American  revenue  cutter,  148. 

Mante,  Chaplain,  at  Havana,  8. 

Manzanillo,  Escario  marches  from,  229;  attacked  by  American  ships, 


381,  382,  386,  387. 

irblehead,  American  cruiser,  104,  108,  116;  ott  L-ientuegos,  151,  154; 

returns  from  Key  West  to  Cienfuegos,  174,  176;  off  Santiago,  178, 


192;  in  Guantanamo  Bay,  199,  202,  292. 

Maria,  Spanish  pontoon,  381,  382. 

Maria  Cristina,  Queen  Regent  of  Spain,  93. 

Mariel,  proposed  expedition  to,  146;  blockade  of,  383;  Alfonso  XII 
driven  ashore  at,  384. 

Marietta,  American  gunboat,  104,  109;  reaches  Key  West,  no. 

Marina,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  governor  of  Guam,  355. 

Marine  battalion,  organized  in  New  York,  199;  at  Playa  del  Este, 
200,  304;  leaves  for  Isle  of  Pines,  387. 

Marix,  Lieutenant-Commander,  serves  on  Maine  commission,  70; 
commanding  the  Scorpion,  382,  386. 

Marques  del   Duero,   Spanish  gunboat,   136. 

Marti,  Jose,  Cuban  insurgent,  44;  killed,  45. 

Martinez,   Major,  killed  at  Coamo,  344. 

Martinique,  Furor  at,  168;  Terror  returns  to,  169;  Harvard  at,  170. 

Mason,  John  Y.,  signs  Ostend  manifesto,  28. 

Mason,  Robert,  British  vice-consul  at  Santiago,  310,  311. 

Massachusetts,  American  battle  ship,  101,  108,  116;  goes  to  Cien 
fuegos,  172;  off  Santiago,  184,  192;  absent  from  battle  of  Santiago, 
273;  fires  on  Reina  Mercedes,  297;  convoys  Miles  to  Porto  Rico, 
334;  in  Eastern  Squadron,  361. 

Masso,  Bartolome,  Cuban  insurgent,  43. 

Masso,  Juan,  Cuban  insurgent,  64. 

Matanzas,  plan  for  attacking,  122;  harbour  batteries  bombarded,  125, 
151;  blockade  of,  383. 


INDEX 

Mauser  rifle,  98;  effect  of  bullets,  203;  number  surrendered  at  San 
tiago,  320. 

Maxfield,   Major  J.  E.,  Signal  Corps,  242. 

Maxim,  Hiram  S.,  on  modern  warfare,  97. 

Mayaguez,  Porto  Rico,  336;  Schwan's  column  enters,  341. 

Mayflower,  American  converted  yacht,  116;  goes  to  Santiago,  180; 
on  Santiago  blockade,  191. 

Maynard,  Commander  Washburn,  of  the  Nashville,  116;  at  Gibara,  320. 

Mejico,  captured  at  Santiago,  319. 

Melville,  G.  W.,  engineer-in-chief,   153. 

Merriam,   Brigadier-General   H.    C.,    145,   353. 

Merriam,  Lieutenant  G.  A.,  of  the  Dixie,  338. 

Merrimac,  American  collier,  116;  with  Flying  Squadron,  173,  177; 
Hobson  plans  sinking  of,  185;  sinking  of,  189. 

Merritt,  Engineer,  of  the  Alaine,  68. 

Merritt,  Major-General  Wesley,  145,  146;  appointed  to  Eighth  Corps, 
352;  reaches  Manila,  365. 

Merry,  Commander  J.  F.,  of  the  Machias,  116;  off  Cardenas,  152. 

Miantonomoh,  American  monitor,  103,  108;  with  Sampson  in  Nicholas 
Channel,  178. 

Michigan  Naval   Reserve,  333. 

Miles,  Colonel  Evan,  First  Infantry,  213,  228;  in  battle  of  Caney,  235, 
238;  succeeded  by  McKibbin,  311. 

Miles,  Major-General  N.  A.,  145;  views  on  increase  of  army,  205; 
at  Tampa,  208;  letter  to  Garcia,  217;  promises  Shafter  reinforce 
ments,  296;  proposes  withdrawal  from  Santiago,  299;  reaches  San 
tiago,  307;  conference  with  Tpral,  310;  relations  with  Shafter,  314; 
at  Guantanamo,  316,  324;  sails  for  Porto  Rico,  334;  landing  at 
Guanica,  337;  at  Ponce,  339;  plan  of  campaign  in  Porto  Rico,  340; 
jealousy  of  navy,  348;  views  on  expedition  to  Manila,  352,  353. 

Miley,  Lieutenant  J.  D.,  Second  Artillery,  212;  in  battle  of  San 
Juan,  247,  249;  confers  with  consuls,  296;  commissioner  on  sur 
render  of  Santiago,  310;  receives  surrender  of  Spanish  garrisons, 
321,  322. 

Miller,  Colonel  Marcus  P.,  Third  Artillery,  351. 

Miller,  Commander  J.  M.,  of  the  Merrimac,  116,  185. 

Milligan,  Chief-Engineer,  of  the  Oregon,  275. 

Mills,  Senator,  favours  seizure  of  Cuba,  57. 

Miner,   Lieutenant   R.   H.,   330. 

Minneapolis,  American  cruiser,   102,   116,   171,   174;   off  Santiago,   176. 

Mirs  Bay,  Dewey  at,  131. 

Mobile,  troops  encamped  at,  205;  Bates's  brigade  embarks  at,  215. 

Monadnock,  American  monitor,  103,  109,  360,  366,  370. 

Mongada,  Guillermo,  Cuban  insurgent,  43. 

Monitors,  103;  reported  inefficient  by  Sampson,  121;  slow  speed  of, 
159;  needed  by  Dewey,  370. 

Monocacy,  American  corvette,  130. 

Monroe   Doctrine,    17. 

Montague,  D.,  of  the  Merrimac  crew,  187. 

Montauk  Point,  Fifth  Corps  ordered  to,  326. 

Monterey,  American  monitor,  103,  109,  360;  reaches  Manila,  370. 

Montgomery,  American  cruiser,  104,  108;  at  Havana,  71;  on  North 
Atlantic  station,  116;  goes  to  San  Juan,  159,  161 ;  with  Sampson  in 
Nicholas  Channel,  178. 

Montojo,  Admiral,  at  Manila,  132,  135;  wounded  in  battle  of  Manila 
Bay,  140. 

Moore,   Colonel,  Third  Wisconsin,  343. 

Moreu,  Captain  E.  Diaz,  of  the  Colon,  157,  286. 

Moron,  surrender  of,  321,  322. 

Morrill,  American  revenue  cutter,  151. 

Morro,  of  Havana,  built  by  Philip  II,  6;  stormed  by  British,  8;  San 
Francisco  hit  by  shell  from,  388. 

Morro,  of  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico,  161. 

Morro,  of  Santiago,   193,  230;  proposal  to  storm,  304. 

Morton,  J,  P.,  assistant  engineer  of  the  Vixen,  190,  191. 


408 


THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


Mullen,  boatswain  of  the  Merrimac,  187. 
Murphy,  J.  E.,  of  the  Merrimac  crew,  188. 

Nanshan,  American  supply  ship,   130. 

Nardiz,  Ensign  V.,  of  the  Reina  Mercedes,  297. 

Nashville,  American  gunboat,  104,  116;  captures  the  Buena  Ventura, 
123;  off  Cienfuegos,  151,  154. 

Naval  militia,  American,   104. 

Navy,  of  Spain,  99;  of  the  United  States,  101. 

Nero,  American   collier,  366. 

Newark,  American  cruiser,  103,  108;  flagship  of  Eastern  Squadron, 
361 ;  at  Manzamllo,  387. 

New  Orleans,  American  cruiser,  purchased  in  England,  103;  reaches 
New  York,  108;  goes  to  Santiago,  180,  184;  on  Santiago  blockade, 
191,  194;  off  San  Juan,  333. 

Newport,  American  gunboat,   104,   116. 

Newport,  American  transport,  365,  370. 

Newport  News,  Flying  Squadron  at,  116. 

New  York,  American  cruiser,  102,  108,  116;  captures  the  Pedro,  123; 
bombards  Matanzas  batteries,  126;  goes  to  San  Juan,  159,  161 ;  in 
Nicholas  Channel,  178;  goes  to  Santiago,  180;  on  Santiago  block 
ade,  191;  bombards  Fort  Aguadores,  260;  in  battle  of  Santiago,  273, 
283,  285,  287;  bombards  Santiago,  306. 

New  York  Naval  Reserve,  381. 

Niagara,  American  collier,   159,   164. 

Nima   Nima,   near   Santiago,   280. 

Nineteenth  Infantry,  339,  343. 

Ninth  Cavalry,  214,  228;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  246,  249,  255. 

Ninth  Infantry,  213;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  245,  252,  255. 

Ninth  Massachusetts   Volunteers,  235,  296. 

Nipe,  Cuba,  383;   capture  of  bay,  384,  385. 

Noble,  Captain  C.  H.,  Sixteenth  Infantry,  252. 

Norman,  Lieutenant  G.  H.,  of  the  Gloucester,  284. 

Normannia,  German  liner,  purchased  by  Spain,  359. 

Norvell,  Major  S.  T.,  Tenth  Cavalry,  214. 

Nuevitas,  Cuba,  383,  384. 

Numancia,    Spanish   cruiser,    99. 

Ocampo,   Spanish  admiral,  5. 

Olivette  outrage,  49. 

Olney,  Richard,  Secretary  of  State,  51;  message  to  Spain  on  Cuban 
question,  58;  opposes  recognition  of  Cuban  independence,  59. 

Olympia,  American  cruiser,  103,  108;  leaves  Mirs  Bay,  132;  enters 
Manila  Bay,  133;  in  battle  of  Manila  Bay,  138,  139;  in  attack  on 
Manila,  374. 

Ordonez,  Colonel  S.  D.,  wounded  at  San  Juan,  252. 

Oregon,  American  battle  ship,  101;  voyage  from  Puget  Sound  to 
West  Indies,  109;  goes  to  Santiago,  180;  on  Santiago  blockade, 
191,  260;  in  battle  of  Santiago,  273,  275,  279,  286,  288;  in  Eastern 
Squadron,  361 ;  commanded  by  Captain  Barker,  387. 

Osada,  Spanish  torpedo-boat  destroyer,  362. 

Osceola,  American  auxiliary  cruiser,  382,  386,  387. 

Ostend   manifesto,   27. 

Otis,  Brigadier-General  E.   S.,  145;  major-general  of  volunteers,  366. 

Otis,  Brigadier-General  H.  G.,  366. 

Pablo  Vasquez,  Porto  Rico,  Spanish  position  at,  347. 
Paco,  suburb  of  Manila,  376-378. 
Page,  Colonel  J.  H.,  Third  Infantry,  215. 
Palma  Soriano,  321,  322. 
Pando,  General,  45,  233. 
Panther,  American  transport,  199,  200. 

Paredes,  Captain  Jose   de,  second  in   command  of  Cervera's   squad 
ron,  286. 
Pareja,  Brigadier-General  Felix,  203,  230. 


INDEX  409 

Paris,  meeting  of  peace  commission  at,  391. 

Parker,  Lieutenant  J.  H.,  Thirteenth  Intantry,  214;   in  battle  of  San 

Juan,  250,  255,  257;  reports  supposed  Spanish  sortie,  265. 
Parkhurst,   Captain    C.    D.,    Second   Artillery,   214;   in  battle   of   San 

Juan,  250,  257;  before  Santiago,  263,  298. 
Pasay,   near  Manila,  368. 
Patriota,  Spanish  auxiliary  cruiser,  359. 

Patterson,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  Twenty-second  Infantry,  213. 
Pauncefote,   Sir  Julian,   British  ambassador  at   Washington,  80. 
Pearson,   Colonel  E.   P.,  Tenth  Infantry,  213;   in  battle  of  San  Juan, 

241,  246,  248;  reconnoitres  the  Juragua  Railroad,  303. 
Pedro,  captured  by  New  York,   123. 
Pelayo,  Spanish  battle  ship,  99,  160;  reported  at  Santiago,   173;  with 

Camara's   squadron,   359. 
Pena,  General  Nicolas  de  la,  377. 

Peninsulares,  Spanish  party  in  Cuba,  29,  40,  46;  oppose  autonomy,  64. 
Pennsylvania,   American  transport,  366. 
Peoria,  American  auxiliary  cruiser,   149. 
Peru,  American  transport,  366. 
Petrel,  American  gunboat,  104;  leaves  Mirs  Bay,  132;  enters  Manila 

Bay,   133. 

Philadelphia,  American  cruiser,   103,   108. 
Philadelphia  City  Troop,  340. 

Philip,  Captain  J.  W.,  of  the  Texas,  116;  in  battle  of  Santiago,  274,  278. 
Philippines,   early   history   of,    127;    insurrections   in,    129;    cession   to 

United   States,   392,   393.      See    Manila. 
Phillips,  G.  F.,  of  the  Merrimac,  187. 
Pina,   Ensign,  270. 

Pio  Gullon,  Spanish  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  93. 
Playa  del  Este,  cable  station  at,   196,   199,  292. 
Pluton,  Spanish  torpedo-boat  destroyer,  157,  189,  217;  leaves  Santiago, 

272;   driven   ashore,  281. 
Pocock,  Sir  George,  at  Havana,  8. 
Polaria,  German  steamer,  229. 

Polavieja,  captain-general  of  Cuba,  41;  of  the  Philippines,  129. 
Polk,  President,  proposes  to  purchase  Cuba,  24. 

Polo,    Luis,    Spanish   minister   at   Washington,   67;    leaves    Washing 
ton,   92. 

Ponce,  Porto  Rico,  336;  capture  of,  338;  transports  aground  at,  346. 
Porter,  American   torpedo   boat,   116,   159;   at  San  Juan,   161;   goes  to 

Santiago,   180;  off  Santiago,   187,   189,   191. 
Porto   Rico,   plans  of  attack  on,  331;    Spanish  forces  in,  334;   sketch 

map    of,   335;    American   troops   land    in,    337;    cession    to    United 

States,  390. 

Portsmouth,   Spanish  prisoners   at,  288. 

Potter,  Lieutenant-Commander  W.   P.,  of  the  New  York,  70. 
Potts,  Captain  R.  D.,  Third  Artillery,  343. 
Powell,  Cadet  J.  W.,  of  the  New  York,  188,  195. 
Prairie,  American  auxiliary  cruiser,  117. 
Pratt,  American  consul  at  Singapore,  130,  356. 
Primo  de  Rivera,  captain-general  of  the  Philippines,  129. 
Princesa  de  Asturias,  Spanish  cruiser,  100. 
Princeton,    American    gunboat,    104. 

Prizes  taken  by  American  ships,   123;   at  Santiago,  319. 
Proserpina,  Spanish  torpedo-boat  destroyer,  362. 
Protocol,  drawn  up  by  Secretary  Day,  390;  signed,  391. 
Puerto   Cabanas,   Gussie  expedition  repulsed  at,   148;   fired  upon  by 

New  York,  151. 

Puerto  Plata,   Santo  Domingo,   167. 
Punta  Gorda  battery,  Santiago,  193,  197,  230,  269. 
Purcell,  Lieutenant  J.  L.,  of  the  Osceola,  382. 
Purissima  Concepcion,  Spanish  steamer,  380,  386. 

Puritan,   American   monitor,    103,    108,    116;   bombards   Matanzas  bat 
teries,  126;  with  Sampson  in  Nicholas  Channel,  178. 
Putnam,  Israel,  at  Havana,  8. 


410  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Rabi,  General  Jesus,  Cuban  insurgent,  43,  197,  218. 

Rafferty,  Major  W.  A.,  Second  Cavalry,  215. 

Raleigh,    American    cruiser,    103,    108;    leaves    Mirs    Bay,    132;    enters 

Manila  Bay,  133;  captures  Corregidor,  144;  captures  Spaniards  at 

Subig,  364. 

Ramsden,  F.  W.,  British  consul  at  Santiago,  35,  269. 
Ramus,  Captain,  aid  of  General  Toral,  321. 
Randall,  Chief-Engineer,  of  the  McCulloch,  135. 
Randolph,  Brigadier-General  W.  F.,  307. 
Rapido,  Spanish  auxiliary  cruiser,  359. 
Rapido,  Spanish  tug,   142. 
Rayo,   Spanish   torpedo   boat,    119. 
Rea,  George  Bronson,  American  journalist,  48. 
Reconcentration,   ordered   by   Weyler,   50,  51;    abolished   by   Blanco, 

62,  79. 

Red  Cross  Society,  relieves  distress  in  Cuba,  60. 
Reed,  Speaker,  opposes  recognition  of  Cuban  insurgents,  61,  91. 
Reid,  Whitelaw,  American  peace  commissioner,  391,  394. 
Reilly,  Captain  H.  J.,   Fifth  Artillery,  311. 
Reina  Cristina,   Spanish  cruiser,   136;  destroyed   in  battle  of  Manila 

Bay,   140. 
Reina  Mercedes,   Spanish  cruiser,   123;  fires  torpedoes  at  Merrimac, 

189;  Hobson  a  prisoner  on,  190;  guns  of,  193,  229;  injured  in  bom 
bardment,   196;   sinking  of,  296,  297. 
Reina  Regente,  Spanish  cruiser,  loss  of,  100. 
Relief,  American  hospital  ship,  114. 

Remey,  Commodore  G.  C.,  commanding  at  Key  West,  159,  167,  209. 
Resolute,  American  auxiliary  cruiser,  210,  273,  287,  291,  293,  304,  387. 
Restormel,  collier,  captured  by  St.  Paul,  168,  176,  182. 
Reyes,  Colonel  Carlos,  377. 
Ricafort,  captain-general  of  Cuba,  21. 
Rio  de  Janeiro,  Oregon  and  Marietta  at,  no. 
Rio  de  la  Plata,  Spanish  cruiser,  100. 
Rio  Hondo,  Cuba,  381. 
Rio  Prieto,  Porto  Rico,  action  at,  342. 

Rios,  Eugenio  Montero,  chairman  of  Spanish  peace  commission,  391. 
Rio  Turquino,  Colon  goes  ashore  at,  286. 
Rivera,  Rius,  Cuban  insurgent,  50. 
Rivers,  Lieutenant  T.  R.,  Third  Cavalry,  223. 
Rocha,  Lieutenant  F.  de  la,  of  the  Terror,  157,  332. 
Rodgers,  Captain  Frederick,  112. 
Rodgers,  General  John  I.,  106. 
Rodgers,  Lieutenant  W.  L.,  of  the  Foote,  116. 
Roncali,  captain-general  of  Cuba,  24. 
Roosevelt,  Theodore,  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  United  States  Navy, 

121 ;    lieutenant-colonel    First    Volunteer    Cavalry,    212,    266;    signs 

"  round  robin,"  325. 

Rough  Riders.     See  First  Volunteer  Cavalry. 
"  Round  robin,"  signed  by  Shatter's  officers,  325. 
Rowan,  Lieutenant  A.  S.,  mission  to  Garcia,  147,  148;  its  results,  217. 
Rubin,  Brigadier-General,  220;  attacked  at  Las  Guasimas,  223,  225. 
Ruiz,  Colonel  Joaquin,  murder  of,  64. 
Ruiz,  Ricardo,  death  of,  61. 

Sagasta,  premier  of  Spain,  62;  attempts  conciliation,  79;  speech  on 
outbreak  of  war.  93;  appeals  to  Spanish  patriotism,  144;  announces 
Camara's  expedition  to  Manila,  360;  authorizes  Cambon  to  medi 
ate  for  peace,  389. 

Sagua  de  Tanamo,  surrender  of,  321,  322;  Spaniards  sail  from,  327. 

Sagua  la  Grande,  Cuba,  383. 

St.  Louis,  American  auxiliary  cruiser,  112,  155,  158,  171,  181,  219. 

St.  Paul,  American  auxiliary  cruiser,  112,  171;  off  Santiago,  176;  meets 
Sampson,  180;  engages  the  Terror  off  San  Juan,  332. 

St.  Paul,  American  transport,  366. 

St.  Thomas,  American  liners  ordered  to,  160;  Yale  at,  166. 


INDEX  411 

St.  Vincent,  Cape  Verde  Islands,  Spanish  fleet  at,  116,  118,  157. 

Salmeron,  Spanish  republican  politician,  144. 

Sampson,  Rear-Admiral,  serves  on  Maine  commission,  70;  com 
mands  North  Atlantic  Squadron,  115;  plans  attack  upon  Havana, 
119;  ordered  to  blockade  Cuba,  122;  bombards  Matanzas  batteries, 
126;  prepares  to  fight  Cervera,  158;  bombards  San  Juan,  161 ;  re 
turns  to  Key  West,  167,  172;  correspondence  with  Schley  at  Cien- 
fuegos,  174;  cruises  in  Nicholas  Channel,  179;  goes  to  Santiago, 
180,  184;  arranges  blockade,  191,  192;  bombards  Spanish  batteries, 
195;  seizes  Guantanamo  Bay,  198;  estimate  of  Spanish  forces  at 
Santiago,  206;  meets  Garcia,  217,  218;  bombards  Fort  Aguadores, 
260;  in  battle  of  Santiago,  274,  285,  287;  misunderstanding  with 
Shafter,  301;  share  in  capitulat.on  of  Santiago,  318,  319. 

Sandoval,  Spanish  gunboat,   199,  202. 

Sands,  Captain  J.  H.,  of  the  Columbia,  116. 

San  Francisco,  American  cruiser,  103,  108,  117,  383,  387. 

San  Francisco,  Spanish  transport,  118. 

San  German,  Porto  Rico,  341. 

Sanguilly,  Julio,  release  of,  61. 

San  Juan,  near  Santiago,  topography  of,  240;  battle  of,  241;  Spanish 
position  at,  247;  storming  of  heights,  249;  Spanish  strength  and 
losses,  252;  American  strength  and  losses,  254. 

San  Juan,  Porto  Rico,  plan  for  attacking,  121;  topography  of,  160; 
bombarded  by  Sampson,  162;  blockade  of,  332,  380. 

San  Luis,  surrender  of,  321,  322. 

San  Luis  d'Apra,  Guam,  354. 

San  Martin,  Colonel,  surrenders  Ponce,  338. 

Santa  Desidera,  Porto  Rico,  skirmish  at,  337. 

Santiago  de  Cuba,  founded  by  Velasquez,  3;  attacked  by  British,  6; 
Virginius  prisoners  at,  34;  distress  at,  during  Cuban  rebellion, 
53,  88;  cable  cut  off,  155;  Cervera  arrives  at,  169;  incidents  in 
history  of,  181 ;  Spanish  troops  at,  230;  Cervera  leaves,  271;  naval 
battle  of,  276;  fugitives  escape  to,  288,  294;  siege  of,  298;  bombarded 
by  fleet,  306;  surrender  of,  312. 

Santo  Domingo,  filibustering  attack  on,   149. 

Santo  Domingo,  Spanish  steamer,  384. 

Saranac,   captured  at   Iloilo,    125. 

Sartorius  brothers,  Cuban  insurgents,  41. 

Schermerhorn,  Augustus,  of  New  York,  112. 

Schley,  Commodore,  commanding  Flying  Squadron,  116,  158;  ordered 
to  Kev  West,  171;  to  Cienfuegos,  172;  to  Santiago,  174;  withdraws 
from  Santiago  and  returns,  176,  178;  sights  Spanish  ships,  183;  on 
Santiago  blockade,  191;  in  battle  of  Santiago,  274,  277,  286;  praised 
at  expense  of  Sampson,  315. 

Schools  in  Cuba,  n. 

Schwan,  Brigadier-General  T.,  in  Porto  Rico,  339,  341,  342. 

Scorpion,  American  converted  yacht,  172,  174;  fires  on  Yankee,  210; 
at  Manzanillo,  382,  386. 

Second  Artillery,  214. 

Second  Cavalry,  215,  235,  239,  257,  339,  343. 

Second  Corps,   146. 

Second  Infantry,  213;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  246,  255. 

Second  Massachusetts  Volunteers,  213;  in  battle  of  Caney,  238,  239. 

Second  Oregon  Volunteers,  354,  374,  378. 

Second  Wisconsin  Volunteers,  343. 

Seguranc.a,  American  transport,  218. 

Senate,  United  States,  votes  for  recognition  of  Cuban  insurgents, 
57;  Cameron  resolution,  59;  again  votes  for  recognition,  60;  warlike 
agitation  in,  72;  votes  $50,000,000  for  national  defence,  74;  Hawley 
bill,  74;  Foreign  Affairs  Committee's  report  on  Cuba,  86;  votes 
for  intervention  in  Cuba,  91. 

Senator,  American  transport,  365. 

Seneca,  American  transport,  323. 

Seventeenth  Infantry,  106,  214;  in  battle  of  Caney,  237,  239;  one 
company  left  at  Caney,  259. 

27 


412 


THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


Seventh  Artillery,  339. 

Seventh  Corps,  146,  328. 

Seventh  Infantry,  214;  in  battle  of  Caney,  236,  237,  239;  five  com 
panies  left  at  Caney,  259. 

Seventy-first  New  York  Volunteers,  213,  365;  in  battle  of  San  Juan, 
244,  255,  257. 

Sevilla,  near  Santiago,  222,  232. 

Shafter,  Major-General  W.  R.,  at  Tampa,  145,  146,  205;  sails  from 
Tampa,  215;  meets  Garcia,  218;  on  Seguranca,  228;  at  El  Pozo,  233; 
plans  to  attack  Santiago,  234;  instructions  for  battle  of  San  Juan, 
247;  orders  Lawton  to  withdraw  from  Caney,  258;  considers  with 
drawal  from  San  Juan,  267;  demands  surrender  of  Santiago,  267; 
hears  of  Escario's  arrival,  295;  proposes  withdrawal  from  San 
tiago,  299;  misunderstanding  with  Sampson,  301;  conferences  with 
Miles  and  Toral,  307,  310;  receives  surrender  of  Santiago,  312;  rela 
tions  with  Miles,  314;  controversy  as  to  captured  ships,  319;  sails 
for  Mqntauk  Point,  326. 

Sharp,  Lieutenant  A.,  of  the  Vixen,  191. 

Sharpshooters,    Spanish,   in    Santiago    campaign,   242. 

Siboney,  landing  at,  220,  232;  hospital  at,  264;  cable  landed  at,  264; 
transports  at,  291;  reinforcements  land  at,  307;  yellow  fever  at,  316. 

Sicard,  Rear-Admiral,  commanding  North  Atlantic  Squadron,  108; 
succeeded  by  Sampson,  115;  serves  on  Naval  War  Board,  121,  145. 

Sigsbee,  Captain  C.  D.,  of  the  Maine,  67;  of  the  St.  Paul,  176;  on 
construction  of  Spanish  ships,  276;  off  San  Juan,  332. 

Singapore,   Aguinaldo  in,    130. 

Sixteenth  Infantry,  213;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  244,  245,  252,  255. 

Sixteenth  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  343-345. 

Sixth  Cavalry,  214;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  246,  255;  in  Porto  Rico,  340. 

Sixth  Illinois  Volunteers,  307,  334.  337,  343. 

Sixth  Infantry,  213;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  241,  245,  252,  255. 

Sixth  Massachusetts  Volunteers,  307,  334,  337,  343. 

Sixty-fourth  Regiment,  Spanish  army,  201. 

Slavery  in  Cuba,  12;  abolition  of,  15. 

Smith,  Colonel  J.  S.,  First  California,  354. 

Smith  Key,  Santiago  harbour,  196. 

Snyder,  Brigadier-General  S.,  215. 

Socapa  battery,  Santiago,  193,  195,  197,  216,  230;  proposal  to  storm,  304. 

Solace,  American  hospital  ship,  114. 

Somers,  American  torpedo  boat,  purchased  in  Germany,  113. 

Soto,  Colonel,  of  Alfonso  XIII  regiment,  341,  342. 

Soto,  Hernando  de,  governor  of  Cuba,  5. 

Soule,  Pierre,  signs  Ostend  manifesto,  28. 

Southerland,  Lieutenant  W.  H.  H.,  of  the  Eagle,  209,  340. 

Spain,  military  resources  of,  97. 

Springer,  American  vice-consul   at  Havana,  98. 

Stanton,   Paymaster-General   T.   H.,    146. 

State  of  Texas,  Red  Cross  ship,  323. 

Staunton,  Lieutenant  S.  A.,  of  the  New  York,  302. 

Sterling,  American  collier,   181,   185. 

Sternberg,   Surgeon-General  G.   M.,   146,  212,  265,  330. 

Stone,  Brigadier-General  Roy,  in  Porto  Rico,  343. 

Subig  Bay,  Dewey  at,  132;  surrender  of  Spanish  garrison,  364. 

Suez,   Camara's  squadron  at,  362. 

Summers,  Colonel  O.,  Second  Oregon,  354. 

Sumner,  Brigadier-General  S.  S.,  214;  at  council  of  June  3oth,  235; 
in  battle  of  San  Juan,  241,  248,  258;  signs  "  round  robin,"  325. 

Suwanee,  American  auxiliary  cruiser,  197,  202,  260,  292,  297;  at  Man- 
zanillo,  387. 

Swinburne,  Commander  W.  T.,  of  the  Helena,  116,  386. 

Tacon,  Miguel,  captain-general  of  Cuba,  21. 
Tambo,  near  Manila,  361. 

Tampa,  troops  encamped  at,  106,  145,  146,  206;  confusion  in  camp  at, 
207;  Fifth  Corps  sails  from,  215. 


INDEX 


413 


Tappan,  Lieutenant  B.,  of  the  Callao,  376. 

Taylor,  Captain  H.  C.,  of  the  Indiana,  116,  120;  commanding  convoy, 
215;  opinion  of  Cervera's  strategy,  271;  in  battle  of  Santiago,  281, 
283. 

Tejada,  Juan  de,  captain-general  of  Cuba,  6. 

Temerario,  Spanish  torpedo  cruiser,  no. 

Tenth  Cavalry,  149,  214;  at  Las  Guasimas,  223;  in  battle  of  San  Juan, 
246,  255;  257. 

Tenth  Infantry,  213;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  246,  255. 

Tenth   Pennsylvania   Volunteers,   365,   366. 

Ten  Years'  War,  the,  29;  ending  of,  38. 

Terror,  American  monitor,   103,   108,  116;  goes  to  San  Juan,   159,  161. 

Terror,  Spanish  torpedo-boat  destroyer,  157;  at  Martinique,  169;  en 
gages  the  St.  Paul,  332. 

Texas,  American  battle  ship,  102,  108,  116;  goes  to  Cienfuegos,  172; 
to  Santiago,  176;  on  Santiago  blockade,  192;  in  Guantanamo  Bay, 
202;  struck  by  shell,  219;  in  battle  of  Santiago,  273,  278,  283,  287, 
288;  fires  on  Reina  Mercedes,  297. 

Theaker,  Colonel  H.  A.,  Sixteenth  Infantry,  213;  succeeds  Hawkins 
as  brigade  commander,  263. 

Third  Artillery,  334,  351,  368. 

Third  Cavalry,  214;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  246,  255. 

Third  Corps,  146. 

Third  Illinois  Volunteers,  339,  346,  347- 

Third  Infantry,  215;  in  battle  of  Caney,  238,  239;  marches  from  Caney 
to  San  Juan,  258. 

Third  Wisconsin  Volunteers,  343. 

Thirteenth  Infantry,  213;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  245,  246,  252,  255,  258. 

Thirteenth  Minnesota  Volunteers,  365,  374,  375. 

Thirty-fourth  Michigan  Volunteers,  232,  235. 

Thirty-third  Michigan  Volunteers,  232,  235;  at  Fort  Aguadores,  260, 
262;  at  Siboney,  316;  yellow  fever  in,  324. 

Tilley,  Commander  B.  F.,  of  the  Newport,  116. 

Todd,  Commander  C.  C.,  of  the  Wilmington,  116;  at  Cardenas,  152; 
at  Manzanillo,  386. 

Tondo,  suburb  of  Manila,  378. 

Topeka,  American  cruiser,  purchased  in  England,  112,  113;  at  Nipe 
Bay,  384,  385. 

Toral,  Major-General  Jose,  253;  refuses  to  surrender,  294,  300;  com 
plains  of  breach  of  truce,  298;  first  offers  to  surrender  Santiago, 
305;  confers  with  Miles  and  Shatter,  307,  310;  surrenders  Santiago, 
312;  sails  for  Spain,  326. 

Torp  Key,  Guantanamo  Bay,   199,  202. 

Train,  Commander  C.  J.,  of  the  Prairie,   117. 

Transports,  American,  113,  216,  219;  sanitary  condition  of,  330. 

Trocha,  from  Moron  to  Jucaro,  29,  45;  from  Mariel  to  Majana,  50. 

Troop  A,  New  York  Cavalry,  340. 

Troop  C,   New  York  Cavalry,  340,  345. 

Twelfth  Infantry,  214;  in  battle  of  Caney,  236,  238,  239. 

Twentieth  Infantry,  215;  in  battle  of  Caney,  238,  239;  marches  from 
Caney  to  San  Juan,  258. 

Twenty-fifth  Infantry,  213;  in  battle  of  Caney,  235,  238,  239. 

Twenty-first  Infantry,  213;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  246,  255. 

Twenty-fourth  Infantry,  213;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  245,  252,  255. 

Twenty-second  Infantry,  213;  in  battle  of  Caney,  238,  239. 

Twenty-third  Infantry,  364,  365,  374.  375. 

Twickenham,  collier,  captured  by  St.  Louis,  168. 

Ultimatum,  presented  to  Spain,  92. 
Utah  Artillery,  365,  366,  374,  375. 
Utuado,  Porto  Rico,  340,  343. 


Valencia,   American   transport,   330. 
Valladolid,  insult  to  American  minister  in,  94. 
Van  Buren,  Martin,  on  Cuba,  19. 


414  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Van  Horn,  Colonel  J.  J.,  Eighth  Infantry,  213;  fatally  injured,  218. 

Vara  del  Rey,  Brigadier-General,  230;  in  battle  of  Caney,  236,  239. 

Vara  del  Rey,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  300. 

Vazquez,  Lieutenant  P.,  of  the  Pluton,   157,  282. 

Velasco,  Spanish  gunboat,  136. 

Velasquez,  Diego,  founds  settlements  in  Cuba,  3. 

Vesuvius,  American  dynamite  cruiser,  104;  ordered  to  Santiago,  170- 
at  Santiago,  216. 

Vicksburg,  American  gunboat,   104,   151. 

Viele,  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  D.,  First  Cavalry,  214,  251. 

Villamil,  Captain  Fernando,  commanding  Spanish  torpedo  flotilla, 
118;  telegram  to  Sagasta,  119;  leaves  St.  Vincent,  157;  killed  in 
battle  of  Santiago,  282. 

Villa  Urrutia,  Senor  de,  Spanish  peace  commissioner,  391. 

Virginius,  seizure  of,  34. 

Vittoria,    Spanish   cruiser,   99. 

Vives,  captain-general  of  Cuba,  15,  20. 

Vixen,  American  converted  yacht,  175,  176,  190;  on  Santiago  block 
ade,  192,  194,  195;  in  battle  of  Santiago,  273,  279. 

Vizcaya,  Spanish  cruiser,  100;  at  Havana,  71;  at  St.  Vincent,  118, 
157;  crosses  Atlantic,  168;  at  Santiago,  183;  leaves  Santiago,  272; 
in  battle  of  Santiago,  277,  284;  driven  ashore,  285. 

Volunteers,  call  for,   105. 

Volunteers,  Spanish,  in  Cuba,  30. 

Vulcan,  American  naval  repair  ship,  114. 

Wade,  Major-General  J.    F.,   145,   146. 

Wainwright,  Lieutenant-Commander  R.,  in  battle  of  Santiago,  281,  282. 

Wake  Island,  365. 

Walker,  Commander  Asa,  of  the  Concord,  132. 

Walker,  E.  H.  R.,  British  consul  at  Manila,  131,  143. 

Ward,   Ensign  H.   H.,   Bureau  of  Navigation,  332,  359. 

Ward,   Lieutenant  Aaron,   of  the   Wasp,   384. 

Wasp,  American  converted  yacht,  148,  216,  338;  at  Nipe  Bay,  384,  385. 

Watson,  Captain  J.  W.,  Tenth  Cavalry,  223. 

Watson,  Commodore  J.  C.,  158;  in  command  of  Eastern  Squadron, 
334,  361 ;  in  command  of  north  coast  blockade,  379. 

Watts,  E.,  American  deputy  consul-general  at  Cairo,  362. 

Webb,   Major,  Thirty-third  Michigan,  262. 

Webster,  Daniel,  on  Cuba,  23. 

Wells,  Lieutenant  B.  W.,  of  the  Brooklyn,  290. 

Wessels,  Major  H.  W.,  Third  Cavalry,  214. 

Weston,  Colonel  J.  F.,  chief  commissary  of  Santiago  expedition,  215. 

Weyler,  Valeriano,  captain-general  of  Cuba,  46;  reconcentration  order, 
50,  51;  recalled,  62. 

Wheeler,  Major-General  Joseph,  214,  222;  at  Las  Guasimas,  223;  recon 
noitres  near  Santiago,  234;  absent  from  council  of  June  3oth,  235; 
in  battle  of  San  Juan,  241;  refuses  to  retreat,  262;  at  conference  of 
July  2d,  266;  advises  against  attack  on  forts,  303;  commissioner  on 
surrender,  310;  opinion  of  Shafter,  313;  signs  "  round  robin,"  325. 

Wheeling,   American   gunboat,   ICM. 

Wherry,   Lieutenant-Colonel  W.   M.,   Second   Infantry,  213. 

White,  Justice,  nominated  as  American  peace  commissioner,  391. 

Whitney,  Lieutenant  H.   H..  Fourth  Artillery,  336. 

Whittier,   Lieutenant-Colonel   C.  A.,   of  Merritt's   staff,  376,  377. 

Wikoff,  Colonel  C.  A.,  Twenty-second  Infantry,  213;  in  battle  of  San 
Juan,  241 ;  killed,  245. 

Wildes,  Captain  Frank,  of  the  Boston,  132. 

Wildman,  Rounsevelle,  American  consul  at  Hong-Kong,  356. 

Willard,  Ensign  A.  L.,  of  the  Machias,  154. 

Williams,  Oscar  F.,  United  States  consul  at  Manila,  131. 

Wilmington.  American  gunboat,  104,  116,  151;  at  Cardenas,  152;  at 
Manzanillo,  "' 


Wilson,  Brigadier-General  T.  M.,  chief  of  engineers,  146. 
Wilson,  Major-General  J.  H.,  146;  in  Porto  Rico,  338,  3 


339,  344,  346. 


INDEX  415 

Windom,  American  revenue  cutter,  154. 

Winslow,  American  torpedo  boat,  116,  151;  disabled  at  Cardenas,  152. 

Winslow,   Lieutenant  C.   McR.,  of  the  Nashville,  154. 

Wisconsin,  American  battle  ship,  101. 

Wompatuck,  American  tug,  155,  159,  181 ;  at  San  Juan,  161,  164;  con 
voying  Fifth  Corps,  218;  at  Manzanillo,  381,  386. 

Wood,  Colonel  Leonard,  First  Volunteer  Cavalry,  214;  at  Las  Gua- 
simas,  224;  in  battle  of  San  Juan,  241,  258;  signs  "  round  robin," 
325;  military  governor  of  Santiago,  326. 

Wood,  Commander  E.  P.,  of  the  Petrel,  132,  142. 

Wood,  Lieutenant  S.  S.,  of  the  Dupont,  116. 

Woodford,  General,  American  minister  to  Spain,  72;  submits  propo 
sition  for  armistice  in  Cuba,  79;  ordered  to  present  American  ulti 
matum,  92;  leaves  Madrid,  94. 

Woosung,  Monocacy  left  at,  130. 

Worth,  Lieutenant-Colonel  W.  S.,  Thirteenth  Infantry,  213;  wounded 
at  San  Juan,  245. 

Yale,  American  auxiliary  cruiser,  112,  158;  scouting  for  Cervera,  166, 
171;  off  Santiago,  176;  brings  Miles  to  Santiago,  307;  to  Porto 
Rico,  334. 

Yankee,  American  auxiliary  cruiser,  117;  on  Santiago  blockade,  194; 
in  Guantanamo  Bay,  199;  fired  on  by  Scorpion,  210;  in  Eastern 
Squadron,  361;  off  Cienfuegos,  380;  off  Casilda,  381. 

Yankton,  American  auxiliary  cruiser,  381. 

Yauco,  Porto  Rico,  337. 

Yorktown,  American  gunboat,  104. 

Yosemite,  American  auxiliary  cruiser,  117,  332;  blockades  San  Juan, 
333;  in  Eastern  Squadron,  361. 

Young,  Brigadier-General  S.  B.  M.,  214,  222;  at  Las  Guasimas,  223, 
227;  suffers  from  fever,  241;  at  Montauk  Point,  326. 

Young,   Lieutenant  L.,  of  the  Hist,  381. 

Yucatan,  American  transport,  216. 

Zafiro,  American  supply  ship,  130,  374. 
Zanjon,  compromise  of,  38. 
Zealandia,  American  transport,  365. 


THE    END 


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The  American  Revolution,  1763-1783. 

Being  the  Chapters  and  Passages  relating  to  America,  from  the 
Author's  "History  of  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century." 
By  WILLIAM  EDWARD  HARTPOLE  LECKY,  M.  P.  Arranged  and 
edited,  with  Historical  and  Biographical  Notes,  by  James  Albert 
Woodburn,  Professor  of  American  History  and  Politics  in  Indiana 
University.  I  zmo.  Cloth,  $1.25. 

A  French  Volunteer  of  the  War  of  Independence. 

By  the  Chevalier  DE  PONTGIBAUD.  Translated  and  edited  by 
Robert  B.  Douglas.  With  Introduction  and  Frontispiece, 
i  zmo.  Cloth,  $1.50. 

Germany  and  the  Germans. 

By  WILLIAM  HARBUTT  DAWSON,  author  of  "  German  Socialism 
and  Ferdinand  Lassalle,"  "  Prince  Bismarck  and  State  Social 
ism,"  etc.  2  vols.,  8vo.  Cloth,  $6.00. 

"This  excellent  work — a  literary  monument  of  intelligent  and  conscientious 
labor — deals  with  every  phase  and  aspect  of  state  and  political  activity,  public 
and  private,  in  the  Fatherland.  .  .  .  Teems  with  entertaining  anecdotes  and 
introspective  apergus  of  character." — London  Telegraph. 

"Mr.  Dawson  has  made  a  remarkably  close  and  discriminating  study  of 
German  life  and  institutions  at  the  present  day,  and  the  results  of  his  observa 
tions  are  set  forth  in  a  most  interesting  manner." — Brooklyn  Times. 

A  History  of  Germany,  from  the  Earliest  Times 
to  the  Present  Day. 

By  BAYARD  TAYLOR.  With  an  Additional  Chapter  by  MARIE 
HANSEN-TAYLOR.  With  Portrait  and  Maps.  I  zmo.  Cloth, 
$i-5°. 

"  When  one  considers  the  confused,  complicated,  and  sporadic  elements  of 
German  history,  it  seems  scarcely  possible  to  present  a  clear,  continuous  narra 
tive.  Yet  this  is  what  Bayard  Taylor  did.  He  omitted  no  episode  of  impor 
tance,  and  yet  managed  to  preserve  a  main  line  of  connection  from  century  to 
century  throughout  the  narrative." — Philadelphia  Ledger. 

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By  EDGAR  STANTON  MACLAY,  A.  ML 
A  History  of  American  Privateers. 

By  EDGAR  STANTON  MACLAY,  A.  M.,  author  of  '*  A  History  of 
the  United  States  Navy."  Uniform  with  "  A  History  of  the 
United  States  Navy."  One  volume.  Illustrated.  8vo.  Cloth, 

$3-5°- 

After  several  years  of  research  the  distinguished  historian  of  American  sea  power 
presents  the  first  comprehensive  account  of  one  of  the  most  picturesque  and  absorb 
ing  phases  of  our  maritime  warfare.  The  importance  of  the  theme  is  indicated 
by  the  fact  that  the  value  of  prizes  and  cargoes  taken  by  privateers  in  the  Revo 
lution  was  three  times  that  of  the  prizes  and  cargoes  taken  by  naval  vessels, 
while  in  the  War  of  1812  we  had  517  privateers  and  only  23  vessels  in  our 
navy.  The  intimate  connection  between  privateers  and  the  navy,  the  former 
serving  often  as  a  training  school  for  the  latter,  is  brought  out  in  the  author's 
narrative.  From  forgotten  monographs,  the  records  of  historical  societies,  from 
unpublished  log  books,  and  from  descendants  of  noted  privateersmen,  he  has 
obtained  intimate  and  vivid  accounts  of  the  fitting  out  of  the  vessels,  the 
incidents  of  their  voyages,  and  the  thrilling  adventures  of  the  brave  sailors  who 
manned  them.  Mr.  Maclay's  romantic  tale  is  accompanied  by  reproductions  of 
contemporary  pictures,  portraits,  and  documents,  and  also  by  illustrations  by 
Mr.  George  Gibbs. 

A   History  of  the   United  States  Navy,  from 
1775  to  1898. 

By  EDGAR  STANTON  MACLAY,  A.  M.  With  Technical  Revision 
by  Lieutenant  Roy  C.  Smith,  U.  S.  N.  New  edition,  revised 
and  enlarged,  with  new  chapters  and  several  new  Illustrations. 
In  two  volumes,  8vo.  Per  volume,  cloth,  $3.50. 

This  'work  has  been  adopted  as  the  Text- Book  upon  United  States  Naval 
History  in  the  U.  S.  Naval  Academy  at  Annapolis. 

The  Private  Journal  of  William  Maclay, 

United  States  Senator  from  Pennsylvania,  1789-1791.  With 
Portrait  from  Original  Miniature.  Edited  by  EDGAR  S.  MACLAY, 
A.M.  Large  8vo.  Cloth,  $2.25. 

During  his  two  years  in  the  Senate  William  Maclay  kept  a  journal  of  his 
own  in  which  he  minutely  recorded  the  transactions  of  each  day.  This  record 
throws  a  flood  of  light  on  the  doings  of  our  first  legislators. 

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MCMASTER'S  FIFTH  VOLUME. 

History  of  the  People  of  the  United 
States. 

By  Prof.  JOHN  BACH  MCMASTER.    Vol.  V.    8vo. 
Cloth,  with  Maps,  $2.50. 

The  fifth  volume  of  Prof.  J.  B.  Me  Master's 
"History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States" 
will  cover  the  time  of  the  administrations  of  John 
Quincy  Adams  and  Andrew  Jackson,  and  will  de 
scribe  the  development  of  the  democratic  spirit, 
the  manifestations  of  new  interest  in  social  prob 
lems,  and  the  various  conditions  and  plans  pre 
sented  between  1825  and  1837.  To  a  large  extent 
the  intimate  phases  of  the  subjects  which  are  treat 
ed  have  received  scant  attention  heretofore.  A  pe 
culiar  interest  attaches  to  the  various  banking  and 
financial  experiments  proposed  and  adopted  at 
that  time,  to  the  humanitarian  and  socialistic 
movements,  the  improvements  in  the  conditions 
of  city  life,  to  the  author's  full  presentation  of  the 
literary  activity  of  the  country,  and  his  treatment 
of  the  relations  of  the  East  and  West.  Many  of 
these  subjects  have  necessitated  years  of  first-hand 
investigations,  and  are  now  treated  adequately  for 
the  first  time. 

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LITERATURES  OF  THE  WORLD. 

Edited  by 

EDMUND   GOSSE,  Hon.  M.  A.  of  Trinity  College,  Cambridge, 
J2mo,    Cloth,  $1.50  each. 

SPANISH   LITERATURE. 

BY  JAMES   FITZMAU RICE-KELLY, 

Member  of  the  Spanish  Academy. 


ff  Mr.  Kelly  has  written  a  book  that  must  be  read  and 
pondered,  for  within  its  limits  it  has  no  rival  as  *  A  History 
of  Spanish  Literature.'  " — The  Mail  and  Express. 

"  The  work  before  us  is  one  which  no  student  can  hence 
forth  neglect,  ...  if  the  student  would  keep  his  knowl 
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newed  expression  of  admiration  for  this  excellent  manual  ; 
the  style  is  marked  and  full  of  piquancy,  the  phrases  dwell 
in  the  memory." — The  Spectator. 

ft A  handbook  that  has  long  been  needed  for  the  use  of 
the  general  reader,  and  it  admirably  supplies  the  want. 
Great  skill  is  shown  in  the  selection  of  the  important  facts ; 
the  criticisms,  though  necessarily  brief,  are  authoritative  and 
to  the  point,  and  the  history  is  gracefully  told  in  sound 
literary  style." — Saturday  Evening  Gazette. 

ft  For  the  first  time  a  survey  of  Spanish  literature  is  pre 
sented  to  English  readers  by  a  writer  of  ample  knowledge 
and  keen  discrimination.  Mr.  Kelly's  work  rises  far  be 
yond  the  level  of  the  text-books.  So  good  a  critic  does  not 
merely  comment  on  literature;  he  makes  it  himself." — 
New  York  Bookman. 

75.    APPLETON     AND     COMPANY,     NEW    YORK. 


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The  Harmonic  Method  for  Learning  Spanish. 

Designed  for  Elementary  Use.  By  Luis  A.  BARALT,  A.  B., 
M.  D.,  Instructor  in  the  Spanish  Language  and  Literature  in 
the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York,  and  in  the  New  York 
Evening  High  School.  $1.00  net. 

De  Tornos's  Combined  Spanish  Method. 

New  edition.  With  a  Pronouncing  Vocabulary.  Revised  edi 
tion,  with  the  new  orthography  conforming  to  the  rules  of  the 
Spanish  Academy.  By  ALBERTO  DE  TORNOS,  A.  M.  I  zmo. 
Cloth,  $1.50.  Key  to  Combined  Spanish  Method,  50  cents. 

Cervantes  El  Cautivo. 

An  Episode  from  "Don  Quixote."  Text  based  on  the  edition 
of  the  Royal  Spanish  Academy.  Edited,  with  an  Introduction, 
Grammatical  and  Explanatory  Notes,  and  a  Spanish- English 
Vocabulary,  by  EDUARDO  TOLRA  Y  FORNES,  Professor  Normal, 
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El  Si  de  las  Ninas. 

A  Comedy  in  Three  Acts.  By  LEANDRO  FERNANDEZ  MORATIN. 
Edited,  with  a  Biographical  Notice,  Explanatory  Notes,  and  a 
Spanish- English  Vocabulary,  by  EDUARDO  TOLRA  Y  FORNES, 
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The  Elementary  Spanish  Reader  and  Trans 
lator. 

By  MIGUEL  T.  TOLON,  Professor  of  Modern  Languages  and 
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"  The  True  Story  of  the  Boers/' 

Oom  Paul's  People. 

By    HOWARD    C.    HILLEGAS.       With   Illustrations.       I  zmo. 
Cloth,  $1.50. 

"  Gives  precisely  the  information  necessary  to  those  who  desire  to  follow 
intelligently  the  progress  of  events  at  the  present  time." — New  York  Com 
mercial  Advertiser. 

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portions  of  it  read  almost  like  a  cablegram  from  the  Transvaal." — New  York 
Sunday  World. 

"A  book  on  the  Boer  troubles  that  is  free  from  British  prejudices  and 
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entation  of  the  Boer  side  of  the  controversy." — Chicago  Tribune. 

Actual  Africa ;  or,  The  Coming  Continent. 

A  Tour  of  Exploration.     By  FRANK   VINCENT.     With  Map 
and  104  full-page  Illustrations.     8vo.     Cloth,  $5.00. 

Mr.  Vincent's  important  and  instructive  book  has  a  peculiar  interest  for 
readers  at  this  time.  The  author  presents  vivid  accounts  of  his  visits  to 
Delagoa  Bay,  and  to  Durban,  in  Natal,  whence  he  traveled  to  Newcastle, 
Charlestown,  Johannesburg,  and  Pretoria.  Mr.  Vincent  gives  most  graphic 
accounts  of  the  life  of  the  Boers,  and  the  mining  and  other  interests  of  the 
Transvaal.  His  visit  to  the  Transvaal  was  followed  by  a  journey  through 
the  Orange  Free  State,  where  he  visited  the  capital,  Bloemfontein,  and  after 
ward  he  made  a  careful  study  of  the  Kimberley  diamond  mines.  His  journey 
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comprehensive  view  of  the  present  theater  of  action  in  Africa.  The  results 
of  this  personal  study  of  the  territory  now  attracting  so  much  attention  in 
clude  many  characteristic  illustrations. 

"  The  completest  guide-book  to  the  Dark  Continent  ever  published." — 
New  York  Herald. 


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YOUNG  HEROES  OF  OUR  NAVY. 

Uniform  Edition.    Each,  J2mo,  cloth,  $J.OO. 

The  Hero  of  Manila. 

Dewey  on  the  Mississippi  and  the  Pacific.  By  ROSSITER  JOHNSON, 
author  of  "Phaeton  Rogers,"  "A  History  of  the  War  of 
Secession,"  etc.  Illustrated  by  B.  West  Clinedinst  and  Others. 
A  new  book  in  the  Young  Heroes  of  our  Navy  Series. 

"A  complete  biography  up  to  date.  The  aid  of  fiction  has  only  occasion 
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which  are  themselves  based  upon  fact." — New  York  Herald. 

"Will  have  much  fascination  for  boys." — New  York  Tribune. 

The  Hero  of  Erie   (Commodore  Perry]. 
By  JAMES  BARNES,  author  of  "  Midshipman  Farragut,"    "Com 
modore  Bainbridge,"  etc.      With  10  full-page  Illustrations. 

Commodore  Bainbridge. 

From  the  Gunroom  to  the  Quarter-deck.  By  JAMES  BARNES, 
author  of  "  Midshipman  Farragut."  Illustrated  by  George 
Gibbs  and  Others. 

Midshipman  Farragut. 

By  JAMES  BARNES,  author  of  "For  King  or  Country,"  etc. 
Illustrated  by  Carlton  T.  Chapman. 

Decatur  and  Somers. 

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Paul  Jones. 

By  MOLLY  ELLIOT  SEAWELL.      With  8  full-page  Illustrations. 

Midshipman  Paulding. 

A  True  Story  of  the  War  of  I  8 1  2.  By  MOLLY  ELLIOT  SEAWELL. 
With  6  full-page  Illustrations. 

Little  Jarvis. 

The  Story  of  the  Heroic  Midshipman  of  the  Frigate  Constellation. 
By  MOLLY  ELLIOT  SEAWELL.  With  6  full-page  Illustrations. 

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. .-.  .-•>  *.    ,-.-.  •-•-  --.-.  <E. 

l»HILACELPHtA,   1707. 


7E  HOUSEHOLD  HIS 
TORY  OF  TV/ 
STA  TES  AND  ITS  PEOPLE. 
FOR  YOUNG  AMERICANS,  By  ED 
WARD  EGGLESTON.  Richly  illus 
trated  with  350  Drawings,  75  Maps, 
etc.  Square  Svo.  Cloth,  $2.50. 

FKOM  THE  PREFACE. 

The  present  work  is  meant,  in  the  first  instance,  for  the  young- not  alone 
for  bovs  and  girls,  but  for  young  men  and  women  who  have  yet  to  make 
themselves  familiar  wilh  the  more  important  features  of  their  country's 
historr.  By  a  book  for  the  young  is  meant  one  in  which  the  author  studies  to 
make 'his  statements  clear  and  explicit,  in  which  curious  and  picturesque  de 
tails  are  inserted,  and  in  which  the  writer  does  not  neglect  such  anecdotes  us 
lend  the  charm  of  a  human  and  personal  interest  to  the  broader  facts  of  the 
nation's  storr  That  history  is  often  tiresome  to  the  young  is  not  so  much 
the  fault  of  history  as  of  a  false  method  of  writing  by  which  one  contrives 
to  relate  events  without  sympathy  or  imagination,  without  narrative  connec 
tion  or  animation.  The  attempt  to  master  vague  and  general  records  of 
kiln-dried  facts  is  certain  to  beget  in  the  ordinary  reader  a  repulsion  from 
the  study  of  history-one  of  the  very  most  important  of  all  studies  for  its 
widening  influence  on  general  culture,  _ 

"  Fills  a  decided  gap  which  has  existed  for  -^ 

die  past  twenty  years  in  American  historical 
literat  ire.  The  'work  is  admirably  planned 
and  executed,  and  will  at  once  uke  its  place  as 
a  standard  record  ot  the  life,  growth,  and  de- 
of  the  nation.  It  is  profusely  and 


INKAN'S  TRAP. 


and  boys.  The  lavish  use  the  publishers  have  made  of  colored 
plates,  woodcuts,  and  photographic  reproductions,  gives  an  un 
wonted  piquancy  to  the  printed  page,  catching  the  eye  as  surely 
as  die  text  engages  the  mind."—  -V«w  York  Critic. 

"The  author  writes  history  as  a  story.  It  can  "never  be 
less  than  that.  The  book  wiil  enlist  the  interest  of  young 
people,  enlighten  their  understanding,  and  by  the  glow  of  its 
statements  fix  the  great  events  of  the  country  firmly  in  the 
Frmndtcm  Bulletin, 


beautifully  illustrated."-^  AMAW 

"The  book  in  its  new  dress  makes  a  much 
finer  appearance  than 
before,  and  will  be  wel 
comed  by  older  readers 
as  gladly  as  its 


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